Maybe the symbol of Epicureanism should be a tricycle!
LOL. That's taken, sort of...
Maybe the symbol of Epicureanism should be a tricycle!
LOL. That's taken, sort of...
For what it's worth, here's my page on that...
Don, do you have a vector file of your Four Atoms version of it
I just threw that together on Paint.net. The image I posted is all I have.
the larger atom at the top
I couldn't not see that as a hair curl in the middle of his forehead, like Superman.
I guess my pareidolia is overactive.
Somehow I can't see it (on your wall)? Can you please also post it to this thread?
I couldn't post images to my wall, so I edited the post above.
I very much like the variant of the moon Don
My major misgiving about the moon I'm using is that it can be interpreted as a moon with a surprised look on its face. (Once you see it, you can't unsee it.)
LOL I got tired of looking at the Moon going "Oh!" That experiment didn't last long. For those who are curious what that moon looked like, I'll post here for future reference:
I've gone back to Eikadistes ' 20er moon logo. It pairs nicely with my Epicurist tagline. I still like the waning gibbous moon as a symbol.
I very much like the variant of the moon Don
My major misgiving about the moon I'm using is that it can be interpreted as a moon with a surprised look on its face. (Once you see it, you can't unsee it.)
alluding to the shibboleth of the size of the sun.
You are clever. That didn't even cross my mind ![]()
I like the simplicity of the moon symbol, however it's similarity to the crescent and star might be confusing for some and offensive to others.
Yes, now I begin to think that could be an issue.
Also maybe looks "wiccan".
Thinking to set this idea aside for now.
Honestly, I'd be more inclined to adopt the 20er moon given those others who use moons. Nobody has a monopoly on the phases of the moon.
PS. In light of that, I've taken Kalosyni 's version of Eikadistes' 20er moon phase and added 4 atoms of 4 different sizes in a diamond pattern inspired by Godfrey 's post above. I'm saying they represent atoms (varying in size) as well as the 4 lines of the Tetrapharmakos. I could have gone with three for the Canon. To be clear: I'm NOT endorsing this. Merely playing and "trying it on for size" for a little while.
I keep leaning toward a field of random dots representing particles. Maybe this could be incorporated into the moon symbol, either on the dark or the light side.
Four dots in a square or diamond? Particles/atoms/craters on the moon?
Thanks for the reply.
My first reaction to your post is that whether it's concepts or preconcepts in translation, the word there in 33 is prolepsis, so we're back to the discussion of what the canonic faculty of what prolepsis is.
it is also valid and important to abstract into the single word "pleasure" all possible examples of pleasurable feelings so that we can discuss pleasure conceptually and understand that it is "Pleasure" and not divine will or ideal forms that constitutes the highest good.
See, that's where I'm not understanding where our disagreement lies. I agree that the single word pleasure encompasses all possible pleasurable feelings.
The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."
Right there, as an example, is Epicurus including ataraxia, aponia, joy, and delight under the heading of pleasure.
that it is "Pleasure" ... that constitutes the highest good.
We can capitalize the word to make it appear more "conceptual" but they couldn't do that in the ancient world. It was all capital letters when Epicurus was writing. But he also explicitly says:
U67. I do not think I could conceive of the good (τἀγαθὸν tagathon) without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.
The word there is tagathon "the highest good." Here's including all those physical pleasurable feelings/activities within the definition of the supreme good.
The last point for now from me is that preconceptions (prolepsis) is a distinct leg of the canon apart from the feelings of pleasure and pain. I agree we have to have words to describe the myriad pleasurable and painful feelings, and words have to have a referent in the physical or mental world. For me, when it comes to naming feelings, we feel the feeling then try to name it. That's one reason the are so many shades and intensities of pleasure and pain. Similarly but distinctly, we sense a pattern in the world through the proleptic faculty and call it justice or a cow or a tower.
This is a conversation that would work better as an actual conversation, but I remain engaged in the discussion.
Canonical pleasure is a feeling but "feeling pleasure" is something completely different and these two are not interchangeable.
I touched on this in my reply to Cassius but I felt a desire to respond directly to your post as well.
I disagree. As I mentioned above, from my reading, the Epicureans were firmly rooted in the physical world. Epicurus hit on using pleasure as a criteria of truth specifically because it was a visceral feeling which does "arise in every animate being."
Diogenes Laertius10.31..34: Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings (pathe) are the standards of truth ... They affirm that there are two states of feeling (pathe), pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined.
Grief, sadness, joy, and all the emotions or feelings fall either under pleasure or pain.
I'm not a huge fan of Brene Brown, but her recent Atlas of the Heart set out to classify our emotions:
In looking over her chart, I think every one of those emotions or experiences can be classified as either pain or pleasure (or painful or pleasurable if you like). That's what Diogenes is referring to when he says of the Epicureans "there are two states of feeling (pathe), pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being."
I'm still not sure desire is a feeling: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hide-a…on-and-a-desire
The subtitle of that article gets at something that's been tickling my brain: "Emotion and desire are intimately related, but which one comes first? " I would substitute "feeling" for "emotion" for out purposes, but it'll do. I also like "some desires are purely physiological or biological, although even these, whether or not they be satisfied, give rise to emotions." (my emphasis added) . I still think we can have feelings about a desire but I don't think that I think that desire itself is a feeling.
In looking at Brene Brown's list, I keep thinking: We can have a desire for longing. We can wish for contentment. We can want to have our grief taken away. We can want ice cream. We can lust for sex. We can't just desire/wish/want/lust. We have to desire desire/wish/want/lust for something. There has to be an object, internal or external, of our desire/wish/aspiration/want. I think this is why I'm reluctant to assign the word "feeling" to desire. Now, we can pile feelings on top of desire if we don't get what we want (or if we do get what we want).
He knew that when reasoning is involved people are prone to make mistakes in their judgements. Types of desires is a neat tool to increase our chances to reason well and to make choices that minimise pain and maximise pleasure.
I like the way you worded this. I'm not sure how I can fit it into what I wrote above, BUT I wanted to acknowledge that I like the way you worded this AND to say I agree with your idea.
Yep, I think we are going to have to disagree; however, let me try to win you over to the dark side... or at least try to fully explain my position.
I of course agree with your view of please and pain and feelings. I just also believe that the same words can also be used as concepts to denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain), and I think that Epicurus is using it both ways in different contexts as needed.
From my perspective, pleasure (hedone) and pain (various words: lype, algos) refer to the *feelings* we experience. However, I also agree with you that the words "denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain)." As I read the texts, I understand Epicurus et al. to be saying that ALL our feelings - ALL of the ways that we experience what happens to us (the literal meaning of pathe) - fall into either being pleasure or pain. All we feel can be categorized into one or the other those overarching categories. So, I agree that he's "using it both ways in different contexts," but our feeling is the constant referent.
Diogenes Laertius: They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined.
I believe Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans were firmly rooted in physical reality. When you say "concepts" I hear "Platonic ideals that exist outside the physical world." And the word that he uses is consistent for pleasure - hedone - although different words for pain are sometimes used to juxtapose against pleasure.
For example i think references to "limit of pleasure" are conceptual. Of course we can prove our concept is accurate by looking to the feelings, and that's why it all makes sense. But the "limit of quantity of pleasure" does not in my mind describe a "particular feeling."
I agree that the "limit of pleasure" doesn't describe a "particular feeling." Instead, it refers to an animate being feeling only pleasurable sensations. Which, as finite, animate, mortal beings we can never achieve. It's a goal to move toward. That's why we choose and reject desires. To move closer to the limit of pleasure even if it is an unattainable goals for us mortal beings. Just because it's unattainable, it still is a worthy goal even if pleasures can be added and subtracted to our experience.
As it says:
Diogenes Laertius: Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible*, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures (hedone).
Eudaimonia falls under pleasure. *"The highest possible" to me reads like "the limit of pleasure." We live as mortal beings and experience pleasure that can be augmented by adding and subtracting pleasures (pleasurable feelings).
I think it is interesting there never was a symbol other than the bust, which I'm sure not just anyone could afford to own or put on display.
I don't know if any of the ancient philosophical schools had symbols as we think of them: Stoics, Academics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans, Cyrenaics, and so on and so on. Maybe they had no need. If you wanted to be a student of a school, you knew where to go in your city. I believe all the schools though had statues and busts of their founders in prominent places. Cassius Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't their reference to Epicureans in particular going around with Epicurus face on rings, cups, etc, as if it's an idiosyncrasy of the school?
I am not sure there is much variation in the appearance of pigs(?)
That leaping posture in both of them seems too similar to be coincidence to me, but granted, that's only two data points.
I find the pose of the Boscoreale pig surprisingly similar to the Herculaneum pig.
"The Boscoreale Treasure is a large collection of exquisite silver and gold Roman objects discovered in the ruins of the ancient Villa della Pisanella at Boscoreale, near Pompeii, southern Italy." So, they're both from the same general area and same time but still, I find that similarity fascinating.
Thinking out loud (fully realizing I just said no letters
)
Φ or Φ - Greek phi
Some mashup of Greek H eta hedone "pleasure" and Α alpha algos "pain"?
Pig? Stylized pig? Think Christian fish?
Like I said, just thinking out loud.
Symbols like these are adopted and used without asking for universal agreement, let alone permission, and they either make it or they don't. As such, the process is an evolutionary trial & error cycle through the court of public opinion, until something just happens to be found that clicks with enough of a majority to catch on. So the trick, in my opinion, is not to make the entire world agree. It should be enough if we can come to reasonable level of agreement amongst each other, and then just try and see what happens.
Well said, Kalosyni , kudos!
I'm reminded of the Christian fish:
which appears to have been used even earlier than the cross, fell out of popular use, then roared back onto the backs of cars in the 1970s.
I think the four letters "20er" spelled out are already too much writing to make for a good logo / symbol / …
Agreed. I really like it as a graphic or as say a team logo when we have a softball team. As an overall symbol, agree with you.
lunate Epsilon: ϵ (Unicode U+03F5)
Combining Dot Above: ̇ (Unicode U+0307)
Result:ϵ̇
I can't endorse that dotted lunate epsilon. It has the same issue you raised with the symbolized E with the detached top line as to necklace, etc.
Generally, I don't like letters or numbers to be used as symbols. There's too much room for misinterpretion, jokes, etc. I'm not even sure I fully endorse the pig as a symbol. Is Horace the only textual evidence for that? I know the statue is from Herculaneum. That said, I do have a small plastic piglet on my desk at work:
I don't have a firm proposal, but I'm intrigued by the conversation.
the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.
I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.
And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.
You're on to something, but don't overly rely on that translation to make your point. Here's my translation:
So, the one who exhorts, on the one hand, for the one who is young to live nobly; and, on the other hand, the one who is old to come to an end nobly is a good-hearted simpleton not only because life is to be welcomed** but also because the practice of living well, nobly, and beautifully and the practice of dying well, nobly, and beautifully are the same. But far worse is the one who says, on the one hand, it is well not to be born; or, on the other hand, "failing this, to pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible."
**οὐ μόνον ὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν,... "not uniquely or only because of the 'welcoming-ness' of living,..." Or maybe better "because life is to be welcomed,..."
ἀσπαστός = welcome (whose arrival is a cause of joy)