I see I have uncovered a major new problem: Mike and I are time zone incompatible, and he gets going right when I am about to fall asleep! I will see what I can do to fix that, but in the meantime I am afraid I am out for the night. Keep up the posting and I will catch up tomorrow! (And stay away from the Volcano!)
Thanks Cassius. Anyways, I can be at any time zone depending on my daily chores. Ok, I think you are getting sleepy. Good night. See you here again tomorrow. 
Epicurus was focusing on definition by examples.
You nailed it! In my language which is Filipino (Tagalog), We have the word "Maligaya" which is more like Eudaimonia and "Masaya" which is more like pleasure. We are not confused about the two especially if we use examples or say them with appropriate connotations. We translate "Are you happy with your work?" with "Maligaya ka ba sa trabaho mo?" or "Masaya ka ba sa trabaho mo?' interchangeably. Ordinary Filipinos would understand them to be the same thing. So when I tell them in Tagalog what Epicureanism is, they don't encounter any confusion about happiness and pleasure much the same as when I talk to a Filipino language teacher.
I guess it's not wrong to believe that the word happiness that is repeatedly used across Epicurus works is Eudaimonia. I don't think of any problem with it so long as we understand that the highest good is pleasure and not happiness. The important thing is that we are aware that the relationship between the two makes each other like identical. Torquatus said that "to live happily is nothing except to live with pleasure."
Even Aristotle said that happiness "...is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure."
Our debate today is not new. It was already being debated in ancient Greece. Here is the full context from Nicomachean Ethics, "Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is [eudaimonia], and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what [eudaimonia] is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure, wealth or honour…"
Aristotle and Torquatus consider happiness and pleasure to mean the same thing. Therefore, it must not be a big issue if we sometimes use them interchangeably as this is also used interchangeably in some of the texts we use such as the Letter to Menoeceus, PD, VS, and On Ends. Besides, Epicurus is not big on definitions or essences of things. Since the debate about this was already existing in ancient Greece, Epicurus would probably think of happiness and pleasure the way Aristotle and Torquatus would understand them. If not, where can we find a proof that Epicurus made any distinction much clearer than that of Torquatus?
Whether one or more of them is a "state" however may be a different question
Again, like what I mentioned to you yesterday, I do not believe in anything static or a certain kind of state. We just can't help using the term for the sake of analysis. The fact that the absence of pain produces pleasure simply explains they are different from each other. When I produce a meal, the meal is not me. 
Mike, I think you are spot on with differentiating the two. I would add that it is possible that we'll understand how the mind (our brain) undergoes pleasure and I think the absence of pain isn't the full story. We are hungry, so we eat, and then we are satiated. IMO, pleasure can start by thinking about what you want to eat and with whom you want to dine with.
Yes. That's exactly the point. Like what I argued yesterday here, death will guarantee the removal of all pains, but it will never give us pleasure since the dead are already devoid of sensation, hence they could never want or be satisfied.
I am beginning to see that pleasure and happiness are two different things, and it seems that happiness is a somewhat remote state as compared to mental pleasure. It appears to me that happiness is a circumstance while pleasure is a kind of feeling. Torquatus said that the greatest pleasure of the mind is a contributor to happiness. This implies a connection of two different things.
In the last paragraph of part XVII of Book 1 of On Ends, Torquatus said "This is now entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable..."
And with regard to my previous comment that the absence of pain does not necessarily mean pleasure, Torquatus has the same explanation when he said in the same paragraph that "...we affirm that men do rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure, which can affect the senses, succeeds."
In other words, pleasure and happiness are not the same thing while pleasure and the absence of pain are two different states as well.
Cicero's comment presupposes that pleasure is irrational which is contrary to what Torquatus explains about the use of virtue for pleasure. I think it is just an argumentative device he made in order to insert the popular notion of pleasure as against that of Epicureans. Cicero loves teasing for an argument to come out as opposed to Socrates who loves interrogation.
Cicero stating that the philosophy of Epicurus is better suited to an animal than a human.
Lol. Nietzsche would surely tell him the opposite. I guess he would say that a Platonic reasoning is indeed for animals or for humans with herd mentality. 
But abstract general reasoning is no prudence at all. It's a different animal. 
-- because we are the "rational animal" and we are "better" than that! (I am being sarcastic, of course)
Yes. Epicurus has made it clear when he expressed repeatedly across his works that we should live a prudent life. Prudence is impossible without reason.
And Epicurus wouldn't tell us to live with pleasure if only the removal of pain is the end.
Yes I am convinced that is the main point Mike. I know we are hitting you with a lot of material in terms of the DeWitt book and now these other articles such as Nikolsky, and I presume you have a life outside this philosophy work, plus you have to worry about a volcano!
But over time I hope you will keep an eye on this particular issue. It's something we are going to face with every new person who comes down the road, because the mainline summaries of Epicurus are so focused on this point -- it is the strategy they use to back up their argument that Epicurus was not REALLY a hedonist after all, because what he really advocated was this "fancy pleaure" which really isn't pleasure as ordinary people understand it at all.
Lol. Volcano is nothing to fear. Yes. I know that Epicurus is hedonistic. I don't think he promotes Taoism or Zen Budhism. This is why my strong argument is that death will guarantee the removal of all pains, but it will never provide us any pleasure.
... because i am not at all sure that such as think as this exists. If there is a change in state, as in removal of pain, then there is some action going on that explains the source of the pleasure. I do not believe that "absence of pain" alone is an activity, any more than "calmly" expresses an activity. As per the argument in these articles, especailly Wenham perhaps on this particular point, all pleasure comes through sensation, and absence of sensation is death. If you are sensing pleasure, you are sensing "something' -- even if your mind is merely contemplating, which you find enjoyable. i think it ends up being a non-sequitur, and essentially on the feeling of pleasure itself, to talk in terms of "absence of" as describing the positive experience of pleasure.
That's why this entire issue of katastematic pleasure is so important, and why Nikolsky and gosling and taylor and Wenham write to refute it. As Nikolsky state most explicitly, the entire issue of "stastic pleasure" was likely invented by a later stoic as part of their categorization obsession, and it seems to me very likely that Epicurus would have rejected the classification if he himself had been asked about it.
I agree. I don't believe in anything static as well. But for the sake of analysis, we can't help using the term since it is how we state pleasure that is not kinetic or moving. But anyways, my point is that pain and painlessness can not exist at the same place at the same moment the way the absence of pain and pleasure can not exist at the same place and at the same moment, too.
Mike I can see why you would say "no pain" because of the point that the two feelings are separate and distinct. But in terms of 'demanding no pain at all' you would also keep in mind that we sometimes choose pain in order to produce pleasure, so while they are not the same feeling, a pleasure that is purchased at the cost of a particular pain might be a pleasure that we would choose, despite the cost in pain, would it not?
Yes. We choose pain (and skip some immediate pleasures) to achieve greater pleasure. I am referring to static pleasure that is produced by the absence of pain. If the absence of pain is the only definition of pleasure, then the stoic ataraxia must be pleasure, too. And I don't think they will agree in that case. Just like my example before, my stomach pain will not be painless at the same time, yet, when it is no longer painful, it does not mean pleasure because that state of painlessness must be different from pleasure as well. If my stomach is not any more painful, the pleasure there is when I enjoy walking which I couldn't do when I was in pain.
Why is it that we often cite Cicero? He was a Stoic and he absolutely loathed the Epicureans to no end. Is it because he wrote against them so prolifically? Or is it instead that in his refutations he presented the original ideas and opinions of the Epicureans that have otherwise been lost to history?
Cicero is a Skeptic (skeptic). I don't know how others view him, but I used to be a skeptic, and I modeled my skepticism partly from him and partly from Socrates. When I was a skeptic, I was honest to myself when presenting an opposing view. I presented it as correctly as possible so I could find the most appropriate rebuttal. I wouldn't fake myself with untrue negation of an untrue position since my aim was also tranquility by suspending my judgment. When I would present an opposing position, I would make sure I understood it correctly so that my criticism would be valid.
I am sure Cicero had the same attitude. I am confident that he presented Epicurean philosophy correctly in the character of Torquatus. I can't find any reason for Cicero to fake the Roman public since he is not a Sophist. Therefore, the Book 1 in which Torquatus presents Epicurean philosophy on behalf of Epicureans can be considered authoritative.
"Pleasure is the absence of pain" and that "pleasure is a feeling when desires are satisfied" (ie a more hedonistic pleasure)
I think my comment just above is the appropriate reply for this.
An illustration I would give would be applicable to any pleasure, but let's just choose "dancing." The best way to experience dancing would be not to be distracted from dancing (don't fall, don't bump into others, don't get called away to do something else) and without any pain mixed in (don't be distracted thinking about painful thoughts) while you are dancing.
This makes more sense to me now. I know that pleasure is produced by the absence of pain as what I already discussed lately in the other thread. Now, at that very state of tranquility right before the production of pleasure, there is surely no pleasure yet but a plain painlessness, and it's strange to say that painlessness means pleasure. I think that pleasure begins when you start enjoying a particular desire that has no more corresponding pain like your example of dancing. I want to dance because it's fun, but it is only fun if I do not encounter distractions. Otherwise, it's not pure dancing. And if I die, I will never be happy even if there is no more pain at all. The painlessness of death will not provide me with happiness since I am already devoid of sensation. Therefore, pleasure (and happiness) is not simply produced by the absence of pain but out of a particular desire that demands no pain at all.
Cassius I also came across online lectures that say that the kind of pleasure Epicureans hold is ataraxia. Is there any truth in this? As far as I know ataraxia is what the Stoics are aiming. Does it mean the Epicurean meaning of tranquility is the same as that of Stoicism? It sounds odd. This makes me think that the absence of pain alone is not enough to define either pleasure or happiness.
I'm focusing on it only to the extent in which it was quoted in Torquatus. I'm not looking into the merits of the argument, but the literary sources that espouse it.
Would you mean the definitions of both pleasure and pain or the differences between pleasure and happiness?
Thanks Mike! Just as you were posting that comment I was pasting the same thing into an updated version. That is one of the most clear statements of the proposition that I am aware of.
You're welcome Cassius. What makes me wonder is whether we pursue happiness for pleasure or pleasure for happiness...only if they are two different things. If they are just the same, I am curious why Torquatus had to emphasize that to live happily is nothing except to live with pleasure.
