Posts by Joshua

Prof. Dewitt cites the scriptures of the Christians many times in Epicurus and His Philosophy, but a longer and more focused treatment is in another work entitled St. Paul and Epicurus. Both were published in 1954, and, while a thorough critique of either text is well outside the scope of this investigation, it is clear that he must have had the latter text in mind while researching the former. His study of the 'Peace and Safety' question is in the section of that text entitled Thessalonians. The plain fact is that he does not substantiate his claim anywhere in these books; nevertheless, I include this here for those who wish to read further into his thoughts. Here is the passage in which he again asserts that Peace and Safety were catchwords;

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By good luck [Epicurus] arrived safely at the refuge of his choice, the city of Lampsacus on the Hellespont, now the Dardanelles; but on the way he was in danger of death by exposure or of capture by pirates, and he narrowly escaped shipwreck. This painful experience was taken to heart. Never again did he invite persecution.

Instead he took the determination to confine himself to peaceful methods and even prescribed rules of safety for his followers in his Authorized Doctrines. Thus the words Peace and Safety became catchwords of his sect and unless we are aware of this fact we shall fail to recognize the meaning of Paul in First Thessalonians 5:3: "For when they shall say Peace and Safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them." This version, however, leaves something to be desired; it would be more accurate to read: "For at the very time that the words Peace and Safety are on their lips, sudden destruction is hanging over them."

And here, a further claim is used to justify his work to 'correct the translation'. If you read St. Paul and Epicurus, you will find a lot of correcting, emending, and substituting. I leave it to others to judge his translations of the New Testament; I pause only to note that there is again no evidence furnished to support the claim that Peace and Safety were catchwords.

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No person of ordinary intelligence at the date when the letter was written would have been ignorant that peace and safety were objectives of the Epicurean way of life. Recognition of this fact will enable us to correct the translation. To this end it must be remembered that the second coming and the destruction of unbelievers are events in the future but the threat is present and perpetual. With this knowledge kept well in mind we shall be able to set the tenses to rights: "At the very moment that they are saying 'peace and safety' sudden destruction is hanging over them."

Five of the ten endnotes cited above reference the New Testament, and three of the five cite St. Paul's First Epistle to the Thessalonians, chapter 5, verse 3:

Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια, pax et securitas, peace and safety. This is the verse on which Dewitt hangs his argument, and it is worth seeing where it leads. The Epistle does not contain any mention of Epicureanism, though there are references which might be taken as allusions; Dewitt has his own list, but these are mine. Chapter 2, verse 4 has Paul writing "not as trying to please human beings, but rather God, who judges our hearts." Chapter 4, verses 3-5 constitutes an exhortation for the readers to be chaste and take a wife, "not in the passion of lust like heathen." Verse 11 in the same chapter instructs the readers to "aspire to live a tranquil life [ἡσυχάζειν], to mind your own affairs, and to work with your [own] hands, as we instructed you," and verse 12, "conduct yourselves properly toward outsiders and not depend on anyone."

The problem with trying to connect any one of these to Epicureanism is that they are commonplaces in the writings of St. Paul, and only one of them (4:11, live quietly) is remotely specific enough even to explore further. Here is that full passage:

As you will perceive, there are superficial similarities between Paul's injunction to 'live quietly (ἡσυχάζειν)' and the Epicurean dictum 'live unknown (λάθε βιώσας)', as salvaged for us by Plutarch in fragment U551. The really striking thing about Dewitt's commentary on this verse is the total absence of any commentary on this verse. In St. Paul and Epicurus he writes the following, not in connection with this citation, but in general;

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The courts of law, [Epicurus] well knew, though ostensibly existing for the sake of justice, were only too often employed as an agency of envy to rob the rich of their wealth, politicians of their power, and famous men of their prestige. The obscure citizen was the safest. It was consequently his general advice "to live and die unknown," and in particular "to shun the political career."

So Dewitt does not claim that St. Paul instructed his readers to 'live unknown', and the reason, I think, is clear. Had St. Paul done so, it would seem to have been advised in open contradiction of the Great Commission, enshrined in the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 28, verses 16-20;

Is the advice of Epicurus to 'live unknown' in open contradiction of his own desire to bring the fruits of the philosophy to others? That question, too, is outside the scope of this investigation.

It will be enough to say here that neither Vatican Saying 67, nor Lucian's Alexander the Oracle-Monger, nor the remaining scriptural citations are of any real relevance to our main question. Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and Plutarch's Adversus Colotem are quoted by Dewitt. Cicero he uses to demonstrate that even hostile critics of Epicureanism could not, with reason or justice, admonish the behavior of the Epicureans, though they admonished the philosophy. Cicero is a reliable authority on this question, and he speaks against self-interest; I have no quarrel with Dewitt on this point.

His citation to Plutarch on forgiveness is confirmed by the Loeb edition of Adversus Colotem, edited and translated by Benedict Einarson and Philip Howard De Lacy, where a footnote in that text on page 259 in volume XIV suggests that Plutarch is indeed echoing Epicurus himself. The citation there is to Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, book 10, 118. This passage in Lives is on forgiving or excusing the mistakes or trespasses of slaves.

There is, I think, only one of the remaining endnotes meriting detailed exposition, and that is endnote 68 in Chapter IV. Here is the passage again:

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It was from this time that the word Safety, asphaleia [ἀσφάλεια] in Greek, attained the status of a watchword. Eventually it conferred a new vogue upon securitas [sēcūritās] in Latin,⁶⁸ as also upon praesidium [praesidium]. When the poet Horace in his first ode hails Maecenas as his praesidium, he recognizes him as the assurance of his safety from attacks by enemies.

It may be observed in passing that St. Paul quoted the words Peace and Safety as catchwords of the Epicureans, to whom he refused the honor of mention by name.⁶⁹ In this collocation Peace signified harmonious relations with neighbors while Safety meant the security of the man as a citizen, the sort of safety that Paul himself enjoyed by virtue of Roman citizenship.

* * *

⁶⁸ It may denote akedia [ἀκηδία, acēdia], freedom from a feeling of responsibility; aponia [ἀπονῐ́ᾱ], exemption from responsibility; or ataraxy, freedom from turmoil of soul. See Latin lexicon.

I claim the following insight as original, but concede that without Stephen Greenblatt's work in his book The Swerve I would not have hit upon it. Acedia, a kind of cabin fever, sometimes described as a state of listlessness or torpor, is a sin in the Christian religion, and connected with the sin of sloth. Why is Dewitt mentioning it here, as if it were a synonym of securitas or ἀσφάλεια? My answer; he is calling to mind this word specifically because it serves his purpose of delineating the boundary between Epicureanism and Christianity on the subject of safety, and between Epicureanism and Stoicism on the use of the word ataraxia (ἀταραξία). In acedia, he finds a word, in both Greek and Latin, that no one else will ever claim. This is not the eternal peace of the Christians which they claim is only found in Christ. It is not the apatheia of the Stoics, who will never tolerate idleness, nor is it the otium of the Roman elite, a kind of healthful leisure focused on restorative cultural pursuits. Neither does Dewitt mean to remind us of the negative meaning of acedia; he doesn't even mention that there is any other meaning.

Greenblatt touches on acedia in chapter 2 of The Swerve, which I think is worth quoting at length:

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Though in the most influential of all the monastic rules, written in the sixth century, St. Benedict did not similarly specify an explicit literacy requirement, he provided the equivalent of one by including a period each day for reading—“prayerful reading,” as he put it—as well as manual labor. “Idleness is the enemy of the soul,” the saint wrote, and he made certain that the hours would be filled up. Monks would be permitted to read at certain other times as well, though such voluntary reading would have to be conducted in strict silence. (In Benedict’s time, as throughout antiquity, reading was ordinarily performed audibly.) But about the prescribed reading times there was nothing voluntary.

The monks were to read, whether they felt like it or not, and the Rule called for careful supervision:

• Above all, one or two seniors must surely be deputed to make the rounds of the monastery while the brothers are reading. Their duty is to see that no brother is so acediosus as to waste time or engage in idle talk to the neglect of his reading, and so not only harm himself but also distract others. (49:17–18)

Acediosus, sometimes translated as “apathetic,” refers to an illness, specific to monastic communities, which had already been brilliantly diagnosed in the late fourth century by the Desert Father John Cassian. The monk in the grip of acedia would find it difficult or impossible to read. Looking away from his book, he might try to distract himself with gossip but would more likely glance in disgust at his surroundings and at his fellow monks. He would feel that things were better somewhere else, that he was wasting his life, that everything was stale and pointless, that he was suffocating.

• He looks about anxiously this way and that, and sighs that none of the brethren come to see him, and often goes in and out of his cell, and frequently gazes up at the sun, as if it was too slow in setting, and so a kind of unreasonable confusion of mind takes possession of him like some foul darkness.

Such a monk—and there were evidently many of them—had succumbed to what we would call a clinical state of depression.

Cassian called the disease “the noonday demon,” and the Benedictine Rule set a careful watch, especially at reading times, to detect anyone manifesting its symptoms.

• If such a monk is found—God forbid—he should be reproved a first and a second time. If he does not amend, he must be subjected to the punishment of the rule so that the others may have fear.

A refusal to read at the prescribed time—whether because of distraction, boredom, or despair—would thus be visited first by public criticism and then, if the refusal continued, by blows. The symptoms of psychic pain would be driven out by physical pain. And, suitably chastened, the distressed monk would return—in principle at least—to his “prayerful reading.”

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There is another passage which is of interest here, and it comes from the rediscovered library of Philodemus in Herculaneum. On a charred papyrus scroll, PHerc. 1005 Col. 4.2-18, he writes;

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He who claims to know us and to be instructed by us, who claims to be a genuine reader of various writings and of complete books, even if he says something correctly, he has only memorized various quotations and does not know the multitude of our thoughts. What he has to do, he looks up in summeries, like people who believe that they [can learn to be] steersman from books and [can cross every ocean].

In Dewitt's translation of acedia, it is a virtue, not a vice or sin. It becomes a state of mind and body uniquely Epicurean, where freedom from responsibility gives one time enough, room enough, and leisure enough to pursue pleasure and happiness according to the vera ratio or true philosophy, and where the best mode of life is most assuredly available to us.

So much for the endnotes. There is one mountain still unmined in the Bibliography to Dewitt's book, and after that I will present my own discoveries and, at last, reach a verdict and conclusion.

Item number 6 on the Getting Started page here at the forum reads as follows;

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Read The Two Books We Most Recommend - Epicurus and His Philosophy by Norman DeWitt, and Living For Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life by Emily Austin. Austin's book provides an attractive and practical introduction geared toward those who are just starting with the philosophy, and DeWitt's book provides a sweeping overview of the philosophy with many additional details.

We continue to recommend Norman Dewitt's book on Epicurus for many reasons, not least among them being, first, his comprehensive, well-ordered, and systematic treatment of the subject at both the macroscopic and microscopic levels, and, second, his rare, early, sustained defense of Epicurean philosophy against a parade of hostile critics stretching back into antiquity. That he achieves this while remaining both accessible and insightful is something to be remarked upon, and he has earned a small but devoted readership among us.

Nevertheless, the text does have weaknesses.

"You are too timid in drawing your inferences," says the scolding Sherlock Holmes to friend Watson. This is a charge that will never be laid at the feet of Prof. Dewitt. I said that his work was insightful; the truth is that his work is insightful in part because he is not timid in drawing his inferences. This is a problem in places, and the problem is compounded when his endnotes are less fulsomely thorough than we might hope, which, for some of us, is frequently. One area of particular contention is on the question of 'Peace and Safety'.

Epicurus and His Philosophy contains 18 mentions of the phrase 'Peace and Safety', with salient examples on pages 85, 189, 190, 194, 285, 304, and 338. Here is the passage (and associated endnotes) from page 85 in Chapter IV, Mytilene and Lampsacus:

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It was the mature judgment of Epicurus after his escape to Lampsacus that Peace and Safety were essential conditions not only for the tranquillity of the individual but also for the successful promulgation of a new philosophy. It was from this time that the word Safety, asphaleia [ᾰ̓σφᾰ́λειᾰ] in Greek, attained the status of a watchword. Eventually it conferred a new vogue upon securitas [sēcūritās] in Latin,⁶⁸ as also upon praesidium [praesidium]. When the poet Horace in his first ode hails Maecenas as his praesidium, he recognizes him as the assurance of his safety from attacks by enemies.

It may be observed in passing that St. Paul quoted the words Peace and Safety as catchwords of the Epicureans, to whom he refused the honor of mention by name.⁶⁹ In this collocation Peace signified harmonious relations with neighbors while Safety meant the security of the man as a citizen, the sort of safety that Paul himself enjoyed by virtue of Roman citizenship.

* * *

⁶⁸ It may denote akedia [ἀκηδία, acēdia], freedom from a feeling of responsibility; aponia [ἀπονῐ́ᾱ], exemption from responsibility; or ataraxy, freedom from turmoil of soul. See Latin lexicon.

⁶⁹ I Thess. 5:3. [I link to the USCCB only because it is the least user-hostile Bible reference website I can find.]

For the sake of completeness, I will include the following passages with their endnotes. First, page 190 in Chapter X, The New Freedom.

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It is also manifest that he looked chiefly to friendly diplomacy to keep the environment in control. Good will is a catchword of his creed no less than Peace and Safety. It is a precondition of Peace and Safety. He wrote, for instance: "A life of freedom cannot amass great wealth because of success in this being difficult apart from servitude to mobs or monarchs but it does enjoy all things in uninterrupted abundance; if, however, now and then great wealth does fall to its lot, it would gladly disburse this to win the good will of the neighbor." ⁵³

^{* * *}

⁵³ Ibid. 67. [Ibid here refers back to "SV", Sententiae Vaticanae - That is, the Vatican Sayings, number 67]

Next, page 194 in the same chapter.

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It is easy also to find place in this context for the calculus of advantage. Anger is a turmoil in the soul and as such is destructive of serenity or ataraxy. There is more to be said, however: angry reprisals invite reprisals and would be destructive of that peace and safety which Epicureans raised to the rank of a practical objective. As a sect, Cicero informs us, "they were to the least degree malicious." ⁶⁸ They were not revengeful; even while attacking them Plutarch ascribes to them the saying "Let this too meet with forgiveness." ⁶⁹

* * *

⁶⁸ Tusc. Disp. 3.21.50.

⁶⁹ Adv. Colot. 1118e.

Page 285 in Chapter XIII, The True Piety:

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The followers of Epicurus after his death, though diligent cultivators of peace and safety, continued to display the same belligerency as their founder. According to Lucian it was chiefly the Epicureans who summoned up courage to defy Alexander the False Prophet, and the only man to accuse him to his face on a specific charge was an Epicurean, who almost paid for his daring by his life.¹¹⁷ Upward of a century before the date of this alleged occurrence it was the Epicureans in Thessalonica who by their derision aroused the indignation of St. Paul, then prophesying the second coming of Christ. In his retort he denied them the honor of mention by name but identified them adequately by those catchwords of their creed, "Peace and Safety."¹¹⁸ It may be added that the Epicureans, as usual, were in the right; the prophecy was not fulfilled.

* * *

¹¹⁷ Alexander 25,44-46.

¹¹⁸ 1 Thess. 5:3.

Page 304 in Chapter XIV, The New Virtues:

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While this conjunction of faith in doctrine with faith in the leader introduces a dynamic emotional element, it still falls short of making a complete picture. The disciple cannot live to himself. Epicurus thought of his oracular teachings as "beneficial for all men," and he planned coherence for all the local brotherhoods in which his disciples were enrolled. All members depended upon one another for what St. Paul referred to as Peace and Safety. This means that the Epicurean must not only feel faith in doctrine and leader but also in friends and friendship. The authority for this is Vatican Saying 34, which exhibits a play upon words that is characteristic of the master's style: "We do not so much have need of help from friends in time of need as faith in help in time of need." This is an excellent commentary upon the words of St. Paul, "faith which worketh by love."⁴⁷

* * *

⁴⁷ Gal. 5:6.

Page 338 in Chapter XV, Extension, Submergence, and Revival:

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Both Thessalonica and Corinth must have been strongholds of Epicureanism. We must learn to read between the lines. Paul had been preaching at Thessalonica about the second coming of Christ, and prophecy always aroused the scorn of the Epicureans, who denied all participation of the gods in the affairs of man. The answer of Paul to these scoffers is to condemn them to instant annihilation: "For when they shall say Peace and Safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child, and they shall not escape."³⁶ The Epicureans were not accorded the honor of mention by name, but Peace and Safety were catchwords of their sect. It was part of their ethics to live a retired life apart from the turmoil of the courts and the market place and so to seek security from the malice and injury of other men. Paul follows up the quarrel and predicts the coming of Antichrist, the model for which was Antiochus Epiphanes, the archenemy of his race and the patron of the hated Epicureans.³⁷

* * *

³⁶ I Thess. 5:3.

³⁷ II Thess. 2:3-4.

It will be shown that none of the texts cited in the endnotes are sufficient to satisfy the claim that 'Peace and Safety' were watchwords or catchwords among Epicureans, and that Dewitt does not offer substantial evidence in support of this claim.

However, as we move forward in this analysis we will explore sources hitherto unexamined in connection with this question, and these sources might give us a hint as to why Dewitt makes this claim - and why we should dismiss it.

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[...] The ultimate, most glorious restoration
would be to the golden age of King Arthur.

We get most of our sense of King Arthur from Geoffrey of Monmouth,
who completed his Historia Regum Britanniae (History of the Kings of
Britain) in 1138, and from Sir Thomas Malory, whose fifteenth-century Le
Morte d’Arthur (The Death of Arthur) was, in 1485, one of the first books
to be printed in England. That gave the Arthur myth wider circulation.
There’s now been so much talk about King Arthur over the centuries that
many people feel, like they do with ghosts, that ‘there must be something in
it’. There is: it just happens to be deep-seated psychological need rather
than historical reality.

The story of Arthur reflects our longing, as a species, for the ancient,
concealed and magical. Towards the end of Le Morte d’Arthur, Malory
suggests the title is not the spoiler it seems: ‘Yet some men say in many
parts of England that King Arthur is not dead, but had gone by the will of
our Lord Jesu into another place; and … many men say that there is written
upon his tomb this verse: Hic jacet Arthurus, Rex quondam, Rexque
futurus’ (Here lies Arthur, the once and future king).

-David Mitchell, Unruly

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Oh, and by the way Patrikios , I think the actual footnote is this;

image.png

So I don't think those passages that TauPhi pulled for us are relevant to the question.

Edit; I see what happened. In chapter 14 the footnote is 99, not 88;

So the text in question is Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum. In other words, Epicurus Actually Makes the Pleasant Life Impossible.

Patrikios , the reference there is to Usener fragment U68, quoted here from Attalus.

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[ U68 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D:

It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2:

Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible is part of Against Colotes (Adversus Colotem), which in turn is bundled up in a massive collection of Plutarch's works called Moralia. The Internet archive has the Loeb set of Moralia that runs to 16 volumes in modern print. This is from Volume 14;

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“It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the 'painlessness' and the 'stable condition of the flesh,' supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the 'stable and settled condition of the flesh' and the 'trustworthy expectation' of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. (5.) Now first observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this 'pleasure' or 'painlessness' or 'stable condition' of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body, compelled, since pleasure is not retained in the mind but leaks and slips away, to attach it to its source, shoring up 'the pleasure of the body with the delight of the soul,' as Epicurus puts it, but in the end passing once more by anticipation from the delight to the pleasure.

***

And here is Peter Saint-Andre's text and translation at Monadnock;

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68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

δυναμένοις refers to capability, and ἐπιλογίζεσθαι (a word that also appears in the Principle Doctrine 22 and Vatican saying 35) seems to carry a meaning like 'reasoning it out'. This latter term might be an Epicurean neologism, and would possibly be a hapax if his works weren't frequently cited by friends and his critics alike.

So, 'those who are capable of reasoning/realizing/recognizing/figuring'...etc.

Cassius is correct that Dewitt thinks this is a jab at Plato, Timaeus 40d;

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The words "those who are capable of figuring the problem out" are a parody of Plato's Timaeus 40d, where the text reads "those who are incapable of making the calculations" and the reference is to mathematical calculations of the movements of the celestial bodies, which "bring fears and portents of future events" to the ignorant. Baiting the adversary was a favorite sport of Epicurus.

And here is Timaeus 40d;

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[40d] send upon men unable to calculate alarming portents of the things which shall come to pass hereafter,—to describe all this without an inspection of models1 of these movements would be labor in vain. Wherefore, let this account suffice us, and let our discourse concerning the nature of the visible and generated gods have an end.

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μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένων τοῖς οὐ δυναμένοις λογίζεσθαι πέμπουσιν, τὸ λέγειν ἄνευ δι᾽ ὄψεως τούτων αὖ τῶν μιμημάτων μάταιος ἂν εἴη πόνος: ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε ἱκανῶς ἡμῖν ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν εἰρημένα φύσεως ἐχέτω τέλος.

Cicero makes that objection in book two of On Ends: this is from the Reid translation;

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But Epicurus, I imagine, neither lacks the desire to express himself lucidly and plainly, if he can, nor deals with dark subjects, as do the physical writers, nor with technical matters, like the mathematicians, but speaks on a doctrine which is perspicuous and easy and which has already spread itself abroad. Still you do not declare that we fail to understand what pleasure is, but what he says of it, whence it results not that we fail to under- stand the force of the word in question, but that he speaks after a fashion of his own and gives no heed to ours. If indeed his statement is identical with that of Hieronymus, who pronounces that supreme good consists in a life apart from all annoyance, why does he prefer to talk of pleasure rather than of freedom from pain, as Hieronymus does, who well understands what he is describing? And if he thinks he must add to this the pleasure which depends on agitation (for he thus speaks of this sweet kind of pleasure, as consisting in agitation, and of the other, felt by a man free from pain, as consisting in steadiness) why does he fight? He cannot bring it about that any man who knows him- self, I mean who has thoroughly examined his own constitution and his own senses, should think that freedom from pain is one and the same thing with pleasure. It is as good as doing violence to the senses, Torquatus, to uproot from our minds those notions of words which are ingrained in us. Why, who can fail to see that there are, in the nature of things, these three states, one when we are in pleasure, another when we are in pain, the third, the state in which I am now, and I suppose you too, when we are neither in pain nor in pleasure; thus he who is feasting is in pleasure, while he who is on the rack is in pain. But do you not see that between these extremes lies a great crowd of men who feel neither delight nor sorrow?’ ‘Not at all” said he; ‘and I affirm that all who are without pain are in pleasure and that the fullest possible.’ ‘Therefore he who, not thirsty himself, mixes mead for another, and he who, being thirsty, drinks the mead, are in just the same state of pleasure?’

And in the first book, the Epicurean Torquatus touches on the problem of "Chrysippus' Hand", which deals with the same question;

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Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension. But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack af anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. - My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better? Imagine on the other hand a man worn by the greatest mental and bodily pains which can befall a human being, with no hope before him that his lot will ever be lighter, and moreover destitute of pleasure either actual or probable; what more pitiable object can be mentioned or imagined? But if a life replete with pains is above all things to be shunned, then assuredly the supreme evil is life accompanied by pain; and from this view it is a consistent inference that the climax of things good is life accompanied by pleasure.

We discussed the passage from book two in episode 201 of Lucretius Today, which I remember being one of our better efforts...

I've lived in 7 different places in the last 15 years, not counting the cab of a freightliner that I lived out of for two of them.

Looking back, there are things I wish I hadn't given away, things I wish I hadn't acquired, and things I would like to have but couldn't make practical use of in my current place.

It's unlikely that I'll ever own a house, but my experience has given me a good idea of what I'll want in it if I ever do.

Everything in it will be useful, practical, and optimized for utility.

For example; I once had a paper shredder with an irritatingly small bin that was a hassle to empty. So I took a wire rack shelving unit and cut out several wires from the surface of one shelf. I set the head of the paper shredder into the hole that this created, used a bent paper clip attached to the shelf to trigger the safety sensor, and put a large trash can with a can liner under the shelf. The paper shredder dropped the shredding directly into the can, and when I wanted to empty it I could just slide the can out and change the bag.

On the shelf there were two trays for sorting the mail. Once a week or so I could shred everything. The old system was troublesome, irritating, and messy. The new system was neat, tidy, efficient, and effortless.

Then I put a box of wine on the next shelf up with the spout hanging over the end, and a drip pan filled with corks hanging off the lower shelf to catch spills.

I put kitchen knives on a magnetic strip above the sink, with all my frying pans and small sauce pans hanging from hooks on the opposite wall. I don't want to pull everything out from the cabinet to get to the one sauce pan at the back.

So this is my advice; use a systems-based approach and optimize for an experience free of headache and hassle. I'm sure if I lived in that apartment any longer I would have had a mini-fridge next to my living room hammock. I still miss that hammock!

Julia, Don has a write-up that might be relevant to your question here.

And here is a thread where the question of Epicurus' birthday was raised in 2022.

Edit: another thread in the chain that led to the current paper by Don.

Dewitt's paper on this is only just over a page long, and he does point out that in Diogenes Laertius Timocrates is quoted claiming that Epicurus could not rise out of his chair.

Quote

[7] further, [Timocrates asserts] that Epicurus's acquaintance with philosophy was small and his acquaintance with life even smaller ; that his bodily health was pitiful,12 so much so that for many years he was unable to rise from his chair ;

[7] τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἠγνοηκέναι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα ἐλεεινῶς διακεῖσθαι, ὡς πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φορείου διαναστῆναι

He also points out that the word ὠθεῖσθαι is "omitted by Bailey, and can only mean 'get myself pushed'".

So he suggests something like this;

“If you [plural], and Themista in particular invite me, I can have myself pushed in a three-wheeled cart to wherever you are”

He further suggests that this is not an offer to go there quickly. Dewitt thinks that a slow and laborious journey is signified, and that Epicurus is saying he would make that journey with all its hardships for his friends.

Quote

Epicurus, however, was not a paralytic, and his conveyance was certainly "pushed."

(I have a feeling Don will enjoy that word 'certainly'...)

More on garlands;

Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Pife Impossible;

Quote

No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland (στέφανος [garland, wreath, chaplet, crown]) of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: “We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.” And yet again, these other words are theirs: “There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh.”

More on garlands;

Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Pife Impossible;

Quote

No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland (στέφανος [garland, wreath, chaplet, crown]) of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: “We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.” And yet again, these other words are theirs: “There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh.”

Cassius; We may want to move these posts to a new thread.

I'm curious to know what you've found from Clay, Don. Here is a passage from Athenaeus, Deipnosphistae, on one possible meaning of κυλιστὸς (round, large, easily rolled);

Quote

I find also, in the comic poets[see Pamela Gordon above re: New Comedy], mention made of a kind of garland called κυλιστὸς, and I find that Archippus mentions it in his Rhinon, in these lines—

• He went away unhurt to his own house, Having laid aside his cloak, but having on His ἐκκύλιστος garland.

And Alexis, in his Agonis, or The Colt, says—

• This third man has a κυλιστὸς garland Of fig-leaves; but while living he delighted In similar ornaments:

and in his Sciron he says—

• Like a κυλιστὸς garland in suspense.

[p. 1084] Antiphanes also mentions it in his Man in Love with Himself. And Eubulus, in his Œnomaus, or Pelops, saying—

• Brought into circular shape, Like a κυλιστὸς garland.

What, then, is this κυλιστός? For I am aware that Nicander of Thyatira, in his Attic Nouns, speaks as follows,— “'᾿εκκυλίσιοι στέφανοι, and especially those made of roses.” And now I ask what species of garland this was, O Cynulcus; and do not tell me that I am to understand the word as meaning merely large. For you are a man who are fond of not only picking things little known out of books, but of even digging out such matters; like the philosophers in the Joint Deceiver of Baton the comic poet; men whom Sophocles also mentions in his Fellow Feasters, and who resemble you,—

• You should not wear a beard thus well perfumed, And 'tis a shame for you, of such high birth, To be reproached as the son of your belly, When you might rather be call'd your father's son.

Since, then, you are sated not only with the heads of glaucus, but also with that ever-green herb, which that Anthedonian Deity12 ate, and became immortal, give us an answer now about the subject of discussion, that we may not think that when you are dead, you will be metamorphosed, as the divine Plato has described in his treatise on the Soul. For he says that those who are addicted to gluttony, and insolence, and drunkenness, and who are restrained by no modesty, may naturally become transformed into the race of asses, and similar animals.

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And here is the Greek text which I won't re-format;

Quote

εὑρίσκω δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς ΚΥΛΙΣΤΟΝ τινα καλούμενον στέφανον καὶ μνημονεύοντα αὐτοῦ Ἄρχιππον ἐν Ῥίνωνι διὰ τούτων ῾I 687 K':'

ἀθῷος ἀποδοὺς θοἰμάτιον ἀπέρχεται,
στέφανον ἔχων τῶν ἐκκυλίστων οἴκαδε.
Ἄλεξις δ᾽ ἐν μὲν Ἀγωνίδι ἢ Ἱππίσκῳ ῾II 298 K':'
ὁ τρίτος οὗτος δ᾽ ἔχει
σύκων κυλιστὸν στέφανον. ἀλλ᾽ ἔχαιρε καὶ
ζῶν τοῖς τοιούτοις.
ἐν δὲ τῷ Σκίρωνί φησι ῾ib. 373':'
ὥσπερ κυλιστὸς στέφανος αἰωρούμενος.
μνημονεύει δ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀντιφάνης ἐν Ἑαυτοῦ Ἐρῶντι ῾ib. 31',' Εὔβουλος δ᾽ ἐν Οἰνομάῳ ἢ Πέλοπι ῾ib. 190':'
περιφοραῖς κυκλούμενος
ὥσπερ κυλιστὸς στέφανος.
τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ κυλιστός; οἶδα γὰρ τὸν Θυατειρηνὸν Νίκανδρον ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς Ὀνόμασι λέγοντα τάδε: ‘ἐκκύλιστοι στέφανοι καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ ῥόδων.' καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁποῖον ζητῶ, ὦ Κύνουλκε. καὶ μή μοι εἴπῃς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἁδροὺς ἀκούειν. σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ τὰ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἀπόρρητα οὐ μόνον ἐκλέγων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξορύττων, καθάπερ οἱ παρὰ Βάτωνι τῷ κωμῳδιοποιῷ ἐν Συνεξαπατῶντι φιλόσοφοι ῾III 329 K',' περὶ ὧν καὶ Σοφοκλῆς Συνδείπνῳ φησίν, οὖσί σοι παραπλησίοις ῾fr. 139 N':'
οὔτοι γένειον ὧδε χρὴ διηλιφὲς
φοροῦντα κἀντίπαιδα καὶ γένει μέγαν
γαστρὸς καλεῖσθαι παῖδα, τοῦ πατρὸς παρόν.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἤδη καὶ σὺ πεπλήρωσαι οὐ μόνον τῶν τοῦ γλαύκου κρανίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀειζώου βοτάνης, ἧς ὁ Ἀνθηδόνιος ἐκεῖνος δαίμων ἐμφορηθεὶς ἀθάνατος πάλιν ητις γέγονε, λέγε ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Πλάτωνα ῾Phaed. p. 81e' 'ὑπολάβωμέν σε ἀποθανόντα μεταμορφωθῆναι [ἐν τῷ περὶ Ψυχῆς]: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὰς γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβουμένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι.'

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I find this interesting for several reasons; one is the connection in this passage between garlands and the "Epicurean" vices of gluttony, drunkenness, insolence, and immodesty. Another connection is with the proem to the fourth book of Lucretius;

Quote

I traverse the distant haunts of the Pierides, never trodden before by the foot of man. ’Tis my joy to approach those untasted springs and drink my fill, ’tis my joy to pluck new flowers and gather a glorious coronal for my head from spots whence before the muses have never wreathed the forehead of any man. First because I teach about great things, and hasten to free the mind from the close bondage of religion, then because on a dark theme I trace verses so full of light, touching all with the muses’ charm. For that too is seen to be not without good reason; for even as healers, when they essay to give loathsome wormwood to children, first touch the rim all round the cup with the sweet golden moisture of honey, so that the unwitting age of children may be beguiled as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink the bitter draught of wormwood, and though charmed may not be harmed, but rather by such means may be restored and come to health; so now, since this philosophy full often seems too bitter to those who have not tasted it, and the multitude shrinks back away from it, I have desired to set forth to you my reasoning in the sweet-tongued song of the muses, and as though to touch it with the pleasant honey of poetry, if perchance I might avail by such means to keep your mind set upon my verses, while you take in the whole nature of things, and are conscious of your profit.

-Cyril Bailey translation

So I offer 'thrice-garlanded' as one more possibility. And I also cannot help but think of this passage from Coleridge;

Quote

Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread
For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise.

Cassius; We may want to move these posts to a new thread.

I'm curious to know what you've found from Clay, Don. Here is a passage from Athenaeus, Deipnosphistae, on one possible meaning of κυλιστὸς (round, large, easily rolled);

Quote

I find also, in the comic poets[see Pamela Gordon above re: New Comedy], mention made of a kind of garland called κυλιστὸς, and I find that Archippus mentions it in his Rhinon, in these lines—

• He went away unhurt to his own house, Having laid aside his cloak, but having on His ἐκκύλιστος garland.

And Alexis, in his Agonis, or The Colt, says—

• This third man has a κυλιστὸς garland Of fig-leaves; but while living he delighted In similar ornaments:

and in his Sciron he says—

• Like a κυλιστὸς garland in suspense.

[p. 1084] Antiphanes also mentions it in his Man in Love with Himself. And Eubulus, in his Œnomaus, or Pelops, saying—

• Brought into circular shape, Like a κυλιστὸς garland.

What, then, is this κυλιστός? For I am aware that Nicander of Thyatira, in his Attic Nouns, speaks as follows,— “'᾿εκκυλίσιοι στέφανοι, and especially those made of roses.” And now I ask what species of garland this was, O Cynulcus; and do not tell me that I am to understand the word as meaning merely large. For you are a man who are fond of not only picking things little known out of books, but of even digging out such matters; like the philosophers in the Joint Deceiver of Baton the comic poet; men whom Sophocles also mentions in his Fellow Feasters, and who resemble you,—

• You should not wear a beard thus well perfumed, And 'tis a shame for you, of such high birth, To be reproached as the son of your belly, When you might rather be call'd your father's son.

Since, then, you are sated not only with the heads of glaucus, but also with that ever-green herb, which that Anthedonian Deity12 ate, and became immortal, give us an answer now about the subject of discussion, that we may not think that when you are dead, you will be metamorphosed, as the divine Plato has described in his treatise on the Soul. For he says that those who are addicted to gluttony, and insolence, and drunkenness, and who are restrained by no modesty, may naturally become transformed into the race of asses, and similar animals.

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And here is the Greek text which I won't re-format;

Quote

εὑρίσκω δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς ΚΥΛΙΣΤΟΝ τινα καλούμενον στέφανον καὶ μνημονεύοντα αὐτοῦ Ἄρχιππον ἐν Ῥίνωνι διὰ τούτων ῾I 687 K':'

ἀθῷος ἀποδοὺς θοἰμάτιον ἀπέρχεται,
στέφανον ἔχων τῶν ἐκκυλίστων οἴκαδε.
Ἄλεξις δ᾽ ἐν μὲν Ἀγωνίδι ἢ Ἱππίσκῳ ῾II 298 K':'
ὁ τρίτος οὗτος δ᾽ ἔχει
σύκων κυλιστὸν στέφανον. ἀλλ᾽ ἔχαιρε καὶ
ζῶν τοῖς τοιούτοις.
ἐν δὲ τῷ Σκίρωνί φησι ῾ib. 373':'
ὥσπερ κυλιστὸς στέφανος αἰωρούμενος.
μνημονεύει δ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀντιφάνης ἐν Ἑαυτοῦ Ἐρῶντι ῾ib. 31',' Εὔβουλος δ᾽ ἐν Οἰνομάῳ ἢ Πέλοπι ῾ib. 190':'
περιφοραῖς κυκλούμενος
ὥσπερ κυλιστὸς στέφανος.
τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ κυλιστός; οἶδα γὰρ τὸν Θυατειρηνὸν Νίκανδρον ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς Ὀνόμασι λέγοντα τάδε: ‘ἐκκύλιστοι στέφανοι καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ ῥόδων.' καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁποῖον ζητῶ, ὦ Κύνουλκε. καὶ μή μοι εἴπῃς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἁδροὺς ἀκούειν. σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ τὰ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἀπόρρητα οὐ μόνον ἐκλέγων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξορύττων, καθάπερ οἱ παρὰ Βάτωνι τῷ κωμῳδιοποιῷ ἐν Συνεξαπατῶντι φιλόσοφοι ῾III 329 K',' περὶ ὧν καὶ Σοφοκλῆς Συνδείπνῳ φησίν, οὖσί σοι παραπλησίοις ῾fr. 139 N':'
οὔτοι γένειον ὧδε χρὴ διηλιφὲς
φοροῦντα κἀντίπαιδα καὶ γένει μέγαν
γαστρὸς καλεῖσθαι παῖδα, τοῦ πατρὸς παρόν.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἤδη καὶ σὺ πεπλήρωσαι οὐ μόνον τῶν τοῦ γλαύκου κρανίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀειζώου βοτάνης, ἧς ὁ Ἀνθηδόνιος ἐκεῖνος δαίμων ἐμφορηθεὶς ἀθάνατος πάλιν ητις γέγονε, λέγε ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Πλάτωνα ῾Phaed. p. 81e' 'ὑπολάβωμέν σε ἀποθανόντα μεταμορφωθῆναι [ἐν τῷ περὶ Ψυχῆς]: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὰς γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβουμένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι.'

Display More

I find this interesting for several reasons; one is the connection in this passage between garlands and the "Epicurean" vices of gluttony, drunkenness, insolence, and immodesty. Another connection is with the proem to the fourth book of Lucretius;

Quote

I traverse the distant haunts of the Pierides, never trodden before by the foot of man. ’Tis my joy to approach those untasted springs and drink my fill, ’tis my joy to pluck new flowers and gather a glorious coronal for my head from spots whence before the muses have never wreathed the forehead of any man. First because I teach about great things, and hasten to free the mind from the close bondage of religion, then because on a dark theme I trace verses so full of light, touching all with the muses’ charm. For that too is seen to be not without good reason; for even as healers, when they essay to give loathsome wormwood to children, first touch the rim all round the cup with the sweet golden moisture of honey, so that the unwitting age of children may be beguiled as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink the bitter draught of wormwood, and though charmed may not be harmed, but rather by such means may be restored and come to health; so now, since this philosophy full often seems too bitter to those who have not tasted it, and the multitude shrinks back away from it, I have desired to set forth to you my reasoning in the sweet-tongued song of the muses, and as though to touch it with the pleasant honey of poetry, if perchance I might avail by such means to keep your mind set upon my verses, while you take in the whole nature of things, and are conscious of your profit.

-Cyril Bailey translation

So I offer 'thrice-garlanded' as one more possibility. And I also cannot help but think of this passage from Coleridge;

Quote

Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread
For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise.

Lucian of Samosata is a notable case of someone who managed to cross several boundaries, of class, language, and nationality; he was born in Roman Syria on the banks of the Euphrates, and his native tongue was probably a dialect of Aramaic. If his own biographical writings are to be believed (a dubious proposition, some think), he was apprenticed to his uncle, a sculptor. Failing in that, he traveled for an education, finding his way first to Ionia and then to Athens.

He learned Greek and wrote with good style, gaining fame for himself and popularity (and notoriety) for his works. They were sporadically read in the east in the middle ages and since the Renaissance have never gone out of fashion in the west.

It was an exceptional career, and one that would be very difficult for most non-Greeks to imitate.

Things are quite different now. Literacy and education are widespread, books are mass-produced and easily accessible, and the internet has rendered most historical obstacles to learning obsolete.

In compensation, we have our own challenges; adherence to a philosophical sect is no longer the default. The language barrier between nations is less daunting than it was once, but the barrier between us and the language of the ancient texts is in some ways higher now than it has been in centuries; studying classics is also no longer the default.

Epicurus himself may have been in poor health; it depends which sources you rely upon. Here is the Suda, a tenth century Byzantine encyclopedia:

Quote

This man assigned no importance to religion;[1] but there were three brothers [sc. of his],[2] who died in the most pitiful way, struck down by countless diseases.[3] As for Epicurus, although still young, he was not able to easily descend from his bed by himself, but he was short-sighted and fearful of facing the sunlight, for he disliked the most brilliant and shining of the gods. And indeed he turned his eyes away even from the light of fire, and from his lower orifices blood used to drip down, and such was the consumption of his body that he was not even able to carry the weight of his own clothes.[4] And Metrodorus[5] and Polyaenus[6], both of them his companions, died in the worst way men can die, and indeed they took for their impiety a requital that nobody might ever blame. So easily overcome by pleasure was Epicurus that in his last moments he wrote in his will a disposition that a sacrifice be offered once a year to his father, his mother and his brothers, and to the previously mentioned Metrodorus and Polyaenus, but twice a year to himself;[7] so that even in this the sage honored the higher degree of profligacy. And he had some tables of stone built, and gave orders that these be put in his tomb, this greedy and gluttonous man. He devised these things not because he was rich, but because his appetites had driven him mad, as if those things should die along with him.

So the compilers of the Suda are clearly hostile, but what about the fragments of Epicurus' own letters? Some scholars (DeWitt and Diskin Clay among them) have suggested that Epicurus makes reference to his travelling in a three-wheeled cart, as Pamela Gordon explains:

Quote

Next we hear about the claim that Epicurus wrote letters that flattered Lysimachus’ minister Mithras, addressing him as one ought to address Apollo. At this point, we meet the fragments of the letters to Leontion and Themista mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. The language of these letters is extravagant: “By Lord Apollo, my dear little Leontion, how we burst into applause when we read your letter” (Παιὰν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἵου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον); “If you [plural], and Themista in particular invite me, I am capable of twirling thrice and rushing to wherever you are” (Οἷός τε . . . εἰμί, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρός με ἀφίκησθε, αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμίστα παρακαλῆτε, ὠθεῖσθαι, 10.5)[footnote 35]. Idiosyncratic Epicurean language of the sort parodied in New Comedy may be at play here. The signification of “twirling thrice” is lost to modern readers, and the word for “applause” (κροτοθορύβου) was unusual enough to inspire an entry in the Suda, with this fragmentary letter as the only source (kappa 2480 Adler). Diogenes also records that these sources assert that Epicurus wrote to Pythocles (whom they identify as “good looking”), “I shall sit here awaiting your desired, godlike entrance” (10.5).

‐-------------------

[footnote 35.] Clay (1998: 247), who offers the translation “on a three-wheeled cart,” stresses the writer’s “enthusiasm and warmth.”

Presumably inferring that τρικύλιστος somehow derives from τρι - κύκλος, three - cycle.

Maybe the symbol of Epicureanism should be a tricycle!

I'd like to throw in one more contender; the myrtle blossom, sacred to Aphrodite/Venus.

https://toptropicals.com/pics/garden/m1/Aroma/Myrtus_communis4234_flower_.jpg

Note that this is the True or Common Myrtle, myrtus communis. Frescoes featuring this plant have been discovered at Santorini and Pompeii.

Somewhere buried deep in the records of this forum is a link to an article making the argument for the preferability of polytheism over monotheism, but I cannot find it at present.

This book by Jonathan Kirsch looks promising. And I know we've talked about The Darkening Age by Catherine Nixey before as well.

More Olympians:

Poseidon, Ares, Hestia or Dionysus (depending on who and when you ask), and Artemis.

Hades was not an Olympian, but his power rivaled that of Poseidon, who was second in strength after Zeus.

I really recommend Stephen Fry's Mythos audiobooks! You should at least do yourself the favor of listening to the first chapter here:

Quote

Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

Does the meaning of this question change if you remove the word external?

This is a tangent, but consider the following Principle Doctrine:

Quote

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

Why does Epicurus think this is a problem for "the one who acts"? Cicero in On Ends suggests that this is not an effective deterrent; would Epicurus agree with him?

On Ends, Book II:

Quote

For those things which you were saying were very weak and powerless arguments,—when you urged that the wicked were tormented by their own consciences, and also by fear of punishment, which is either inflicted on them, or keeps them in constant fear that it will be inflicted. One ought not to imagine a man timid, or weak in his mind, nor a good man, who, whatever he has done, keeps tormenting himself, and dreads everything; but rather let us fancy one, who with great shrewdness refers everything to usefulness—an acute, crafty, wary man, able with ease to devise plans for deceiving any one secretly, without any witness, or any one being privy to it. Do you think that I am speaking of Lucius Tubulus?—who, when as prætor he had been sitting as judge upon the [pg 149]trial of some assassins, took money to influence his decision so undisguisedly, that the next year Publius Scævola, being tribune of the people, made a motion before the people, that an inquiry should be made into the case. In accordance with which decree of the people, Cnæus Cæpio, the consul, was ordered by the senate to investigate the affair. Tubulus immediately went into banishment, and did not dare to make any reply to the charge, for the matter was notorious.

XVII. We are not, therefore, inquiring about a man who is merely wicked, but about one who mingles cunning with his wickedness, (as Quintus Pompeius32 did when he repudiated the treaty of Numantia,) and yet who is not afraid of everything, but who has rather no regard for the stings of conscience, which it costs him no trouble at all to stifle; for a man who is called close and secret is so far from informing against himself, that he will even pretend to grieve at what is done wrong by another; for what else is the meaning of the word crafty (versutus)? I recollect on one occasion being present at a consultation held by Publius Sextilius Rufus, when he reported the case on which he asked advice to his friends in this manner: That he had been left heir to Quintus Fadius Gallus; in whose will it had been written that he had entreated Sextilius to take care that what he left behind him should come to his daughter. Sextilius denied that he had done so. He could deny it with impunity, for who was there to convict him? None of us believed him; and it was more likely that he should tell a lie whose interest it was to do so, than he who had set down in his will that he had made the request which he ought to have made. He added, moreover, that having sworn to comply with the Voconian33 law, he did [pg 150]not dare to violate it, unless his friends were of a contrary opinion. I myself was very young when I was present on this occasion, but there were present also many men of the highest character, not one of whom thought that more ought to be given to Fadia than could come to her under the provisions of the Voconian law. Sextilius retained a very large inheritance; of which, if he had followed the opinion of those men who preferred what was right and honourable to all profit and advantage, he would never have touched a single penny. Do you think that he was afterwards anxious and uneasy in his mind on that account? Not a bit of it: on the contrary, he was a rich man, owing to that inheritance, and he rejoiced in his riches, for he set a great value on money which was acquired not only without violating the laws, but even by the law.

As I said, this is a tangent. But it might be instructive.

Does the same hold for grief, sorrow, guilt, shame, fear, despair, etc?

Is happiness always pleasureable?

On the topic of desires, I do want to mention Ben Jonson's play The Alchemist. When the master of a London townhouse travels for his health, the servant he leaves behind falls into company with rogues, and they devise a number of schemes to cheat, swindle, and con their way to fortune. In one of these cons, the mark is a man named Sir Epicure Mammon, whose deep longing for the easy riches he hopes will be procured with the acquisition of the alchemical magnum opus - the legendary Philosopher's Stone - leaves him prey to a farcical series of embarrassments.

Here is Sir Epicure waxing poetic as he describes the panoply of his desires;

For I do mean
To have a list of wives and concubines,
Equal with Solomon, who had the stone
Alike with me; and I will make me a back
With the elixir, that shall be as tough
As Hercules, to encounter fifty a night.

***

I will have all my beds blown up, not stuft;
Down is too hard: and then, mine oval room
Fill'd with such pictures as Tiberius took
From Elephantis, and dull Aretine
But coldly imitated. Then, my glasses
Cut in more subtle angles, to disperse
And multiply the figures, as I walk
Naked between my succubae. My mists
I'll have of perfume, vapour'd 'bout the room,
To lose ourselves in; and my baths, like pits
To fall into; from whence we will come forth,
And roll us dry in gossamer and roses.

***

And my flatterers
Shall be the pure and gravest of divines,
That I can get for money. My mere fools,
Eloquent burgesses, and then my poets
The same that writ so subtly of the fart,
Whom I will entertain still for that subject.
The few that would give out themselves to be
Court and town-stallions, and, each-where, bely
Ladies who are known most innocent for them;
Those will I beg, to make me eunuchs of:
And they shall fan me with ten estrich tails
A-piece, made in a plume to gather wind.
We will be brave, Puffe, now we have the med'cine.
My meat shall all come in, in Indian shells,
Dishes of agat set in gold, and studded
With emeralds, sapphires, hyacinths, and rubies.
The tongues of carps, dormice, and camels' heels,
Boil'd in the spirit of sol, and dissolv'd pearl,
Apicius' diet, 'gainst the epilepsy:
And I will eat these broths with spoons of amber,
Headed with diamond and carbuncle.
My foot-boy shall eat pheasants, calver'd salmons,
Knots, godwits, lampreys: I myself will have
The beards of barbels served, instead of sallads;
Oil'd mushrooms; and the swelling unctuous paps
Of a fat pregnant sow, newly cut off,
Drest with an exquisite, and poignant sauce;
For which, I'll say unto my cook, "There's gold,
Go forth, and be a knight."

Note: I started to write up a separate thread, but then noticed Cassius created this one. So I'm just copying over what I wrote there.

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In light of a recent thread on the categories of desire, and another recent conversation on the topic of this thread, I wanted to add some clarity to why I answer the title question affirmatively; yes, I am provisionally of the opinion that desire is a kind of pain. As I said in a recent conversation, this is a consistent opinion, though not a strong one. I really am quite uncertain about this.

Desire is a conscious or unconscious feeling in the mind of wanting something; a preference to have where I have not, or to have not where I have.¹ Because a.) desire is a feeling, and because b.) "the feelings are two, pleasure and pain", desire is either;

1. Always pleasureable
2. Sometimes pleasureable and sometimes painful, or
3. Always painful.

The first proposition strikes me as facially absurd, but if some one wishes to defend it I'll hear them out. The main theater of dispute is between the second and third propositions. Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.

Take, for example, the phrasing of the thread title; Is Desire a Kind of Pain? I argue that it is. But it could be said that in defending that precise construction I am using language in a way that is self-serving. This can be seen in my response to the following deductive argument:

• P1. There is nothing other than pain that is always painful, and there is nothing other than pleasure that is always pleasureable.
• P2. Desire is by definition something other than pain, and also something other than pleasure.
• C. Desire, then, is neither always painful, nor always pleasureable.

And now my response, in which I categorize desire differently:

• P1. The feeling of pain is always painful.
• P2. The feeling of pain is differentiable. Just as we speak of mental pain vs bodily pain, it is possible to speak with even greater precision of the kinds of mental pain, and the kinds of bodily pain.
• P3. Each kind of pain is always painful when it is present.
• P4. Desire is a kind of mental pain.
• C. Desire is always painful when it is present.

You see the importance of language. Now, here are my immediate responses to some other objections:

• Isn't my desire for the continuation of something good that I already have pleasureable?

No. The current enjoyment is pleasureable, and the feeling of security that comes with certainty of (if that were possible), or confidence in, future enjoyment is also pleasureable. Future pleasures are not pleasant until you feel them. Future pains are not painful until you feel them. Let's explore this further with the next objection:

• If it's Christmas Eve and presents are expected Christmas morning, isn't it pleasureable to anticipate those presents?

Perhaps, but anticipating is not the same as desiring. I can anticipate a slap to the face without ever desiring one. It is possible to experience both feelings at once, or, if not, then in quick succession. But the desire, when and if it is felt, is felt as a kind of pain.

Note that I have said nothing about the intensity of that pain. It may be the slightest prick, or it might be much greater.

If one does experience the desire for their Christmas presents on Christmas Eve, the desire is felt in that moment.

I'll stop there for now. Again, I don't feel nearly as strongly about this as I might seem to let on, and I think I could be easily persuaded to a different opinion. Epicurus himself refers to "desires that are not accompanied by pain when they go unfulfilled" in the Principle Doctrines. If he's right, I'm probably wrong.

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¹ I suppose I'm drawing a distinction between desires, which are mental, and fundamental biological urges, which are physical, and which even insects respond to. Do tapeworms have desires? I would think not...