Posts by Joshua

Thank you Godfrey, it is Inspire, not Aspire

I do see it--between 'Aspire Red' and 'Modern Flat UI'.

😬

I did discover poking around in DRN the other day that Yellow River could be translated as flauus fluuius in Latin, which gave me no end of pleasure!

I have started a thread summarizing my current understanding of this issue here, and I will try to keep the top post there as accurate and up to date as I can.

In a thread started by Cassius in December of 2021, it was noted that David Sedley makes reference to a bust of Zeno of Sidon. Sedley relates the story of the discovery of the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum, and on page 96 he writes;

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"As Piaggio's work proceeded with agonising slowness, excitement mounted in the learned circles of Europe. There were expectations of a second Renaissance. Surely the lost poetry of Sappho, or some exquisite play by Menander, was about to come to light. These expectations turned to bafflement and disappointment when rumours started to emerge from Piaggio's workshop at Portici that the first columns deciphered contained a Greek prose text in which harmful effects of music were criticised. A flattering mention of 'Zeno' led to reports that the author was a Stoic. But when after nearly two years the unrolling was completed, the title given at the end turned out to be 'Philodemus, On music', and this Philodemus was soon identified as the Epicurean philosopher of that name, already known as the author of some attractive epigrams. The Zeno whom he praised was not the Stoic Zeno of Citium, but the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon, whose bust was among those found in the villa's library. It has since come to be generally accepted that the library was that of Philodemus' school."

--page 96, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, by David Sedley

The bust in question is in bronze, and the name ΖΗΝΩΝ is inscribed on a round base.

File:Zeno - portrait for a library, Colosseum.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

This photograph of the bust, released by the photographer into the public domain, is accompanied by a citation directing the reader to The Sculpted Word, Bernard Frischer's seminal text on Epicurean iconography. In footnote 100 on page 123 Frischer writes;

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"The same method [of identifying Epicurean busts by their marked resemblance to Epicurus himself] applied, e.g., to the problem of whether the bust of Zeno found in the Villa dei Papiri at Herculaneum represents the famous Stoic philosopher or his later Epicurean namesake confirms the communis opinio that it is the former, not the later, since this Zeno does not look at all like an Epicurean."

Frischer offers several citations to follow up on this line of inquiry (Richter; Schefold; F. Poulsen; Pandermalis). I shall try to examine these sources in time, and keep this post up to date.

The bust found in Herculaneum does bear an unmistakable resemblance to another bust, this one discovered in Italy and thought to be a Roman copy of a Greek original.

File:Paolo Monti - Servizio fotografico (Napoli, 1969) - BEIC 6353768.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

File:Zeno of Citium - Museo archeologico nazionale di Napoli.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

Both of the above photographs are released under a Creative Commons license.

Category:Zeno of Citium bust, Farnese collection (Naples) - Wikimedia Commons

This bust, certainly the most famous bust alleged to be of Zeno of Citium, likewise bears the inscription ΖΗΝΩΝ. The second link includes a note that runs as follows;

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Marble bust of Zeno of Citium. Farnese Collection, National Archaeological Museum of Naples (cat. no. 6128). By comparison with the bronze bust from the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum, it was established that this portrait is that of the Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium, and not Zeno of Elea or Zeno of Sidon.

You can view the more detailed timeline compiled by Eikadistes  here.

Zeno of Elea (c.490-c.430 BC) was a pre-Socratic philosopher of the 5th century in the Eleatic school, and was a student of Parmenides. He is notable for his work on paradoxes.

Zeno of Citium (c.334-c.262 BC), the founder of Stoicism, was an approximate contemporary of Epicurus, younger than him by perhaps seven years and outliving him by perhaps 8 years.

Zeno of Sidon (c. 150-c.75 BC ) was the seventh Scholarch of the Epicurean Garden just outside Athens, excluding both Epicurus and Metrodorus (who predeceased the founder). When Philodemus was a young man, it was the scholarch Zeno who trained him in philosophy, and Cicero himself heard Zeno lecture when the future statesman was in his twenties.

Wikipedia has a disambiguation page listing other notable figures from the ancient world sharing the name Zeno.

Given my historically lax approach to completing research tasks, Cassius has wisely suggested that I start a thread to get the basic facts on record and invite assistance and commentary. I am not on the point of suggesting that the two busts in question are portraits of Zeno of Sidon, and not Zeno of Citium as has been alleged. But I am suggesting that the opinion of Bernard Frischer and those he cites should not necessarily be taken as the last word on the subject. Neither bust can be positively identified with either philosopher; it is a question of weighing the circumstantial evidence, and remaining open to any fresh evidence that should come to light. The praxis of identifying hitherto unknown Epicurean busts and icons by studying them in comparison with known Epicurean busts and icons offers one such line of circumstantial evidence.

Another line of inquiry may place more emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the bronze bust; 1.) in a villa owned by an Epicurean, 2.) in a specialized library in that villa, devoted to housing the scrolls of Philodemus, and to the philosophy of Epicurus, and 3.) bearing an inscription of a name held in high esteem by the author of those scrolls and the students of that philosophy.

There remain several gaps in my knowledge, which I list here in no particular order.

• How do we account for the 122 years between the death of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, owner of the villa and patron of Philodemus, and the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in 79 AD that led to the preservation of the library and busts? Who owned the villa after he died, and why did they preserve the library?
• Are there any busts known to depict Zeno of Elea?
• Do the sources cited by Frischer go deeper in their analysis than he does in the footnote quoted above?

So I naturally assumed that there was a bust known with certainty to be that of Zeno of Citium, but the fact is that apart from the inscription Ζήνων there is no positive identification on any of them to suggest which of the philosophers who held that name were sculpted. It could be Zeno of Citium, Zeno of Sidon, or Zeno of Elea (student of Parmenides and author of Zeno's Paradox).

Piso died in Italy ~30 years after Zeno of Sidon died in Athens. There are 122 years between Piso and Vesuvius--who lived there in the meantime? Why did they preserve Philodemus' library? Were they Epicurean? If so, why is there a bust of the founder of Stoicism in the Villa? Perhaps Piso or his successors thought it was Zeno of Sidon.

I'll need to review Frischer's book. This kind of blows my mind--Philodemus studied under Zeno of Sidon, a bust of someone named Zeno is in the Villa that houses his library, and yet the whole world over knows it as a bust of Zeno of Citium...because it doesnt look Epicurean enough! If Bernard Frischer's is the last word on this subject, I don't think this investigation is over yet.

https://www.getty.edu/art/exhibitions/villa_papiri/downloads/villa_papyri_objects.pdf

This PDF from the Getty Museum (page 14) suggests that a bust of Zeno of Citium might have been mistaken for a bust of Zeno of Sidon.

Edit; This text mentions a bust of Zeno of Sidon (control+f search 'sidon').

And this page from Wikimedia Commons quotes Bernard Frischer of The Sculpted Word as writing that "this Zeno does not look at all like an Epicurean."

Thank you, Cassius!

I was just wondering to myself how I should prepare for tomorrow, this is very helpful.

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And as for these symmetries and proportions of the pores, or little passages in the organs of the senses, about which they talk so much, and those different mixtures of seeds, which, they say, being dispersed through all savors, odors, and colors, move the senses of different persons to perceive different qualities, do they not manifestly drive them to this, that things are no more of one quality than another? For to pacify those who think the sense is deceived and lies because they see contrary events and passions in such as use the same objects, and to solve this objection, they teach,—that all things being mixed and confounded together, and yet one nevertheless being more suitable and fitting to one, and another to another, it is not possible that there should in all cases be a contact and comprehension of one and the same quality, nor does the object equally affect all with all its parts, every one meeting only those to which it has its sense commensurate and [p. 343] proportioned; so that they are to blame so obstinately to insist that a thing is either good or bad, white or not white, thinking to establish their own senses by destroying those of others; whereas they ought neither to combat the senses,—because they all touch some quality, each one drawing from this confused mixture, as from a living and large fountain, what is suitable and convenient,—nor to pronounce of the whole, by touching only the parts, nor to think that all ought to be affected after one and the same manner by the same thing, seeing that one is affected by one quality and faculty of it, and another by another. Let us then seek who those men are which bring in this opinion that things are not more of one quality than another, if they are not those who hold that every sensible thing is a mixture, composed of all sorts of qualities, like a mixture of new wine fermenting, and who confess that all their rules are lost and their faculty of judging quite gone, if they admit any sensible object that is pure and simple, and do not make each one thing to be many?

‘αἱ δὲ πολυθρύλητοι συμμετρίαι καὶ ἁρμονίαι τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων αἵ τε πολυμιξίαι τῶν σπερμάτων, ἃ δὴ πᾶσι χυμοῖς καὶ ὀσμαῖς καὶ χρόαις ἐνδιεσπαρμένα λέγουσιν ἑτέραν ἑτέρῳ ποιότητος κινεῖν αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον τὰ πράγματα συνελαύνουσιν αὐτοῖς; τοὺς γὰρ οἰομένους ψεύδεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅτι τἀναντία πάθη γιγνόμενα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρῶσι, παραμυθούμενοι διδάσκουσιν, ὡς ἀναπεφυρμένων καὶ συμμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ τι πάντων, ἄλλου δ᾽ ἄλλῳ πεφυκότος ἐναρμόττειν, οὐκ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς ποιότητος ἐπαφὴ καὶ ἀντίληψις οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι κινεῖ πάντας ὡσαύτως τὸ ὑποκείμενον: ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἕκαστοι μόνοις ἐντυγχάνοντες, πρὸς ἃ σύμμετρον ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διαμάχονται περὶ τοῦ χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὰς αὑτῶν οἰόμενοι βεβαιοῦν αἰσθήσεις τῷ τὰς ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖν: δεῖν δ᾽ αἰσθήσει [p. 428] μὲν μηδεμιᾷ μάχεσθαι πᾶσαι γὰρ ἅπτονταί τινος, οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς τῆς πολυμιξίας ἑκάστη λαμβάνουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον: ὅλου δὲ μὴ κατηγορεῖν, ἁπτομένους μερῶν, μηδὲ ταὐτὸ δεῖν οἴεσθαι πάσχειν ἅπαντας, ἄλλους κατ᾽ ἄλλην ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ πάσχοντας.’ ὥρα δὴ σκοπεῖν, τίνες μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἢ οἳ πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰσθητὸν κρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιοτήτων ἀποφαίνουσι
σύμμικτον ὥστε γλεῦκος αὐλητήριον,
ἔρρειν δ᾽ ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς κανόνας αὐτοῖς καὶ παντάπασιν οἴχεσθαι τὸ κριτήριον, ἄνπερ εἰλικρινὲς αἰσθητὸν ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ πολλὰ ἕκαστον ἀπέλιπον.

--Plutarch, Adversus Colotem

I consulted Sedley's reconstruction of the 37 books On Nature, but he writes that there is too little surviving evidence to reconstruct books 16-37. My initial reaction to the phrase παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν] is that this sounds a lot like the simulacra or eidola of Lucretius' fourth book;

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Lastly those images
Which to our eyes in mirrors do appear,
In water, or in any shining surface,
Must be, since furnished with like look of things,
Fashioned from images of things sent out.
There are, then, tenuous effigies of forms,
Like unto them, which no one can divine
When taken singly, which do yet give back,
When by continued and recurrent discharge
Expelled, a picture from the mirrors' plane.
Nor otherwise, it seems, can they be kept
So well conserved that thus be given back
Figures so like each object.

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So in this reading of the fragment, the atomic films keep their proportion even though the usual case with atoms is a series of repeated collisions that, one would think, would quickly render these films unintelligible. However, Plutarch's mention of the "symmetry (of atom to sense organ; ie scent to the nose, taste to the tongue, etc) about which they talk so much" leads me to believe that he is responding directly to Epicurus as quoted in this fragment. I'm not entirely sure I have Plutarch's meaning though.

I am part way through Heroes, the second volume of Stephen Fry's Mythos series, and can heartily recommend them as a good reintroduction to Greek mythology. The audiobooks, read by Fry himself, are especially pleasant. The work is narrative and not scholarly, but the stories are good and the author is passionate about then.

https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/B07SLLYGF6?ref_=dbs_m_mng_wam_calw_tkin_0&storeType=ebooks

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-Morally bad Pleasure ? => When it would destroy friendship or the justice to others it would destroy our values, securities, good feelings/pleasures with others, chances of reciprocy advantages, bring great disturbances and destroys our kastastematic Pleasure, so an Epicurean would avoid it. Nature gave us for that feelings like compassion, empathy and good feelings(Pleasure) by helping others.

I've been trying to take a more careful approach to the language that we use when we talk about pleasure and pain, and a crucial distinction needs to be made here between 'pleasure', which is a feeling, and 'actions or choices that produce pleasure'. The feeling of pleasure is always intrinsically good; behaviors and decisions that produce pleasure may or may not be instrumentally good.

When we say that some pleasures should be chosen and some avoided, what we are really saying is that the actions we take to pursue the intrinsic good of pleasure are sometimes more likely to produce the intrinsic bad of pain. And the reverse is true is well; choosing to endure for a time the intrinsic bad of pain can often lead to greater pleasure.

These points are no less true for the masochist; if he tells me that enduring pain can be psychologically pleasureable, and that the psychological pleasure is greater than the physical pain, then he, too, is practicing choice and avoidance.

But I agree with most of what you say! I wouldn't want to lose the capacity to feel pain entirely while I still lived.

Pain is biologically advantageous but only up to a point. The skin->spinal cord->muscle reflex arc protects us from hot stoves and sharp objects, internal pain is symptomatic of injury or disease, and mental suffering may indicate that a change in lifestyle is needed.

But of what use is that pain that comes from vain ambition, fear of mortality, desire for limitless wealth, and terror in conceptualizing the gods? The irony of his position is that his argument is consequentialist. 'Pain is useful, therefore pain cannot be bad'.

Thought experiment; as it is, computers throw error messages when something goes wrong. If we could design a computer that feels pain and screams when something goes wrong, would that be an ethically neutral decision? No; pain is bad.

I have to apologize for my seasonal allergies in this episode, my voice was clearly strained!

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The world view of Philolaus . In the world view of Philolaus, the center is occupied by the Central Fire, Anticthon (Counter-Earth, CE),The Earth, the Moon (M), the Sun, and beyond those lie the spheres of the five planets and that of the fixed stars. The crystalline spheres around the Central Fire are 10 (= 1+2+3+4), equal to the sum of the first four numbers.

-The Heliocentric System from the Orphic Hymns and the Pythagoreans to the Emperor Julian link

Welcome, Josh!

Words that start with Χαπ- seem to be exceedingly rare. I did not find any in the two volume ~1500 page Cambridge Greek Lexicon on my book shelf. Χαρ- and καπ- are way more common.

If the word is actually Χαριέστερος (or -ον) this is a word that Epicurus does use in the Letter to Pythocles;

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οὐδὲ γὰρ ‹ἂν› εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ζῷον κἂν μικρῷ χαριέστερον ᾖ, ἡ τοιαύτη μωρία ἐκπέσοι, μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον.

Bailey: For not even the lowest animal, although ‘a small thing gives the greater pleasure,’ would be seized by such foolishness, much less one who was possessed of perfect happiness.

Yonge: Nor can such folly as this occur to any being who is even moderately comfortable, much less to one which is possessed of perfect happiness.

Cassius has asked for a clear refutation of the Ontological Argument and I have promised to attempt it. First, here is a syllogism of the argument as presented on the Wikipedia page.

Quote from Wikipedia

In Chapter 3, Anselm presents a further argument in the same vein:[23]

1. By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
2. A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily exist.
3. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
4. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
5. Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.
6. God exists in the mind as an idea.
7. Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.

End Quote.

Let's look at these individually.

This premise establishes our major terms;

1. God: a being than which none greater can be imagined.
2. Being: an existence either imagined or real.
3. Greatness: an attribute of a being. Only one being can embody the superlative of this attribute, Greatest.
4. Imagined: Existing in the mind as an idea, but not exclusively; an imagined existence may also be a real existence.
5. Real: Existing outside the mind, but not exclusively; a real existence may also be an imagined existence.

"Necessarily" has a precise meaning in logic. Necessary conditions are often contrasted with sufficient conditions. e.g. A square is a parallelogram with four equal sides and four right angles. Having four sides is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a square--all quadrilaterals have four sides but not all of them are squares. Having four sides is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a quadrilateral.

This premise is a bare assertion, and to that extent is fairly weak. Why is a being that necessarily exists in reality greater than a being that does not necessarily exist? Let me offer the following syllogism as a counter;

1. By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
2. A being that has the power to choose whether to exist in reality or not is greater than a being, either real or imagined, that does not have this power.
3. Thus, by definition, God either exists in reality or does not according to his will.
4. It is not possible for us to know whether God has decided to cease existing in reality in any given moment.
5. Therefore, it is not possible to know whether God exists in reality.

Can it be demonstrated that St. Anselm's second premise is truer than my second premise? Remember, they cannot both be true; a being that necessarily exists in reality cannot choose not to exist in reality. However, they can certainly both be false.

To be continued...

VS46. Let us completely rid ourselves of our bad habits as if they were evil men who have done us long and grievous harm.

τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντες τελείως ἐκδιώκομεν.

With the usual caveat that we don't know who wrote these maxims.

I'm not familiar with any such citation. Certainly Plato thought that matter was a crude and illusory imitation of form--a sort of counterfeit. Literally insubstantial, because the substance of every thing is not the thing itself or its physical components, but the changeless, timeless Form of that kind of thing.

That's gorgeous!