Was Epicurus using people's positive views of the best possible unperturbed state of mind (as envisioned with peaceful gods) as a goal of our practice to prudently live pleasantly?
That seems to be the case. It also seems to be the interpretation of the "idealist" theory of the gods, which is contrasted with the "realist" theory. There are several threads in the forum discussing these two interpretations.
Notes from a ruminaceous journey through my “innermundia” after reading the Raghunanan article:
- I didn’t find the premise very convincing.
- Might it be most constructive to be satisfied with multiple possible explanations of the gods? And perhaps useful to look at the subject for practical insights, through modern eyes?
- If the goal is to live like gods among men, and since we have no direct evidence of their existence (others may feel differently) is there any point in trying to discern anything about them other than their blessedness and incorruptibility? Other than for the pleasure of scholarship, of course. One can live like a god by not troubling oneself or causing trouble for others by worrying about the form(s) of the gods. Instead, what if one were to think of a god as "the being whose blessedness is incorruptible" rather than "the blessed and incorruptible being"? I realize that this is a leap from the texts, but it may be a more useful way for us moderns to contemplate the gods by being more in line with our current understanding. Instead of troubling ourselves over the forms of the gods, we can focus on achieving a godlike state of blessedness.
- Also, could it be that one will only come to a proper conception of the gods when one has achieved a state of blessedness that one has a reasonable expectation of continuing? By focusing on the action, not on the form. There’s no textual evidence of this that I’m aware of; I’m just ruminating. But it's kind of indirectly analogous to Eastern "enlightenment" or the rarity of the Stoic sage, although I'm not suggesting any direct connection, just ruminating.
- And "neither causes trouble for oneself or another" (which the author repeated several times) can also be read to say that an Epicurean isn't a selfish hedonist, but one whose "hedonic calculations" include the well-being of others as consequences of one's own pleasure. EP is a philosophy of personal responsibility: nobody is dictating what is right. Consider, though, that one of the greatest gifts is multiplying pleasure by sharing it.
- In sum, know that a god is a being whose blessedness is incorruptible…. Meditate on this and other things, and you will live like a god among men!
I suppose someone could counter that the gods are "confident of continuing" to be incorruptible.
This actually makes sense if you follow the reasoning that (I think; correct me if I'm wrong!) Cassius is doing in the podcast. There's a prolepsis of gods, but one must use correct reasoning to determine their nature. This leads from the fullness of pleasure, and the confidence of it continuing, to blessedness and incorruptibility.
There are no stupid questions!
Not sure if this paper is on here somewhere; it critiques Placita 2.29:
Understanding that it's a paraphrase, I like "boldly met." The big criticism of PD04 is that it takes severe circumstances too lightly. Chronic long-term illness, terminal illness: these must be boldly met.
Epicurus doesn’t shy away from bold language. Two phrases that immediately come to mind are "live like a god" and "I spit on...." And I don't see boldness as Stoic: one has to be rather bold to be an Epicurean and to go against the prevailing Platonic/Aristotlean/monotheistic worldview.
Even everyday pains can benefit from a bit of boldness, from being bold in living the philosophy. They tend to quietly build up, and don't just disappear on their own.
Having said this, "boldly met" and the complete haiku is a paraphrase. Of a paraphrase.
I highly recommend the article that Don posted in #26; the link is copied here:
I can't say that I agree with everything in the article, but it brings up some interesting points for discussion. For starters, it posits that each of the fourfold remedies corresponds to one of the criteria of truth. So, the author is presenting a case for four, not three, canonic criteria.
I've got to reread this and let it percolate for a while, but I definitely recommend reading it. Only 5 short pages, for those of us who are time and/or attention crunched 
Relevant to the above discussion (with translation of the tetrapharmakos I personally like much better than the common 'wikipedia' one).
Laudator Temporis Acti: The Epicurean Tetrapharmakos
The translation in the link in TauPhi 's post #36 has a nice treatment of the last two lines, which seems to be in line with Epicurus' manner of phrasing: "on the one hand, the good - easily acquired/ on the other hand, the terrible - easily endured."
I'm referring to "on the one hand... one the other hand" which may be taken to correspond to pleasure and pain. But I'm totally out of my depth in discussing translation of the Greek, so I'm just putting this out there 
Another year older, another year wiser. Happy birthday, Cassius!
Love that book! My daughter and I listened to it on a cross continent trip a couple of years ago.
Quote from Pacatusmy hypertexting brain
Nicely phrased Pacatus ! I've never heard it put that way before.
If supernatural gods/creators exist, I doubt they have the same faculties as we do. Therefore, the idea that they would use the same criteria for reward/punishment as we do based on moral properties we evolved as social species seems unlikely to me. Therefore, I don’t fear the gods or aim to control any reward or punishment given after death or anticipate it.
Cicero and the Stoics and there ilk apparently believed that they understood the morality of the gods (or God), while at the same time ridiculing Epicurus for postulating about the physical facts of the gods, and about their blessedness and incorruptibility. And Cicero and company promoted the idea of rocks that orbit in space are gods. All of these trains of thought are beginning to converge in my mind to provide a logical context for the Epicurean gods. So thank you Eric for posting this.
Sensations, anticipations and feelings should be taken as priority over reasoning...
It may be more accurate to state this along the lines of "Sensations, anticipations and feelings should be taken as preceding, and a verification of, reasoning...." Reasoning can be a check on information from the senses, anticipations and feelings, but it also needs verification by the senses, anticipations and feelings. Reasoning that doesn't begin with the sensations, anticipations and feelings isn't grounded in reality. This is probably what you meant by "taken as priority;" I'm just thinking that it would be helpful to be more specific in this particular description.
These two passages seem to touch on this subject as well:
PD26: The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.
VS21: Nature must be persuaded, not forced. And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires.
I find it interesting that, at least in St-Andre's translation, harm is referred to generally and not as specific to the individual. This, to me, correlates to what Don has described above. Basically, to achieve maximal pleasure you must consider the consequences of your actions.
For a more positive answer to the problem of the invisibility cloak, I'll point out PD05:
It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.
For the practicing Epicurean, this supercedes the negative reinforcement.
perhaps even though there are many "images" coming into the psyche, it is only the "blessed and incorruptable" which are those of the gods. So those other images which are dark, painful, and ugly are not considered (or not labeled) to be the gods.
This immediately brings up, for me, the vengeful and angry Old Testament god. While I can find value in the Epicurean notion of a god, it's difficult for me to accept this idea as universal. I do, however, think that it can be a universally beneficial way of idealizing the notion of god, or of perfection.
Polystratus is saying, I think, that it makes no sense to say that either relative or non-relative is exclusively "real," for if that is the case then even something as obviously real as minerals has to be unreal. At least that's how I read what's presented here.
I'm a little surprised by that, because I would think that his position would be that "larger" and "smaller" would just be "events," and therefore not real. At least they would not be material; he seems to be saying that an event is real, even if not material. Didn't Lucretius have something to say about that? The details don't come to mind at the moment. Perhaps an event is real in the same sense that the dreams of madmen are real?
