Would a pill that brings you "tranquility" at the cost of never experiencing "joy" be worth it?
That's pretty much the definition of what happens to one's feelings when one tries to dull the pain in one's life, isn't it? When you minimize your pain, over time, your pleasure goes with it.
(and I tend to react negatively that way – with a kind of emotional clutch – every time I hear the phrase “hedonic (or Epicurean) calculus” or the like; that’s just me personally,
Amen to that! It's not just you, Pacatus .
I doubt that Epicurus considered any aspect of "grasping" something to be part of the canonic faculty. Recognizing a pattern as significant and deserving of attention seems to me to be one thing, while interpreting it - in any way at all, as a snake or a danger or anything - seems to be another thing, and the part where error can enter in.
And it looks to me that it was important to Epicurus to keep separate the part where error can enter from the part that we accept without question - else we have a feedback loop and lose the ability to distinguish between our opinion vs what Nature is relaying to us directly and precognitively.
Well said!
These three paragraphs from the Forte Labs article seem to me to be the most pertinent to this discussion:
"What the mind is doing when it “recognizes” an image is not matching it against a database of static images. There is no such database in the brain. Instead, it is reconstructing that image on the fly, drawing on many conceptual levels, mixing and matching thousands of patterns at many levels of abstraction to see which ones fit the electric signals coming in through the retina."
"Patterns triggered in the neocortex trigger other patterns. Partially complete patterns send signals down the conceptual hierarchy, fitting new lenses to the data. Completed patterns send signals up, fitting new data to the lenses. Some patterns refer to themselves recursively, giving us the ability to think about our thinking or to “go meta.” An element of a pattern can be a decision point for another pattern, creating conditional relationships. Many patterns are highly redundant, with PRs dedicated to linguistic, visual, auditory, and tactile versions of the same object, which is what allows us to recognize apples in many different contexts."
"Paradoxically, a conceptual hierarchy made up of massively parallel pattern recognizers would explain a lot about our subjective experience. The feeling that something is “on the tip of the tongue” could be pattern recognizers firing below the level they become conscious. The certainty of “I know it when I see it” could be combinations of PRs firing without a corresponding, higher-order word label. Our intuition acquires new depths when it isn’t limited to conscious patterns."
Dr. Glidden used, as I recall, two useful phrases to describe prolepsis: pattern recognition and prediction engine. Don brought up the example of the mind interpreting a stick in the forest as a snake, which illustrates the function well as I understand it. If the interpretation of a stick as a snake is a prolepsis, then it illustrates that 1) the mind's prediction is "non-cognitive," "pre-cognitive," "non-conscious," and 2) this prediction is then evaluated consciously. The conscious evaluation in the case of the stick involves gathering more data: after jumping back reflexively, looking again at the stick/snake to discover that it's a stick. This further illustrates Dr. Glidden's point that prolepseis, unlike sensations, aren't always "true" as well as his thesis that Epicurus anticipated modern neuroscience in thinking about prolepseis.
Logic becomes involved when the prolepsis involves language and to evaluate conscious thinking, but is of no use in understanding reality without input from the sensations. Prolepseis act directly on input from the sensations and stimulate the feelings. Logic may act indirectly on input from the sensations or can ignore any input. It also attempts to ignore the feelings. The idealists consider this a strength, but in reality it's a fatal flaw. Without utilizing material input, and without listening to the "gut" reactions of the feelings, logic is divorced from reality. Isn't "divorced from reality" generally considered "useless"?
The 2015 Disney movie Inside Out, about the emotions, also comes to mind.
The quotation that comes to mind is:
"Additionally, once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into ignorance but can be exceedingly affected by the emotions (and will feel grief (119)) although this will not be a hindrance in their progress toward wisdom." (117) from Diogenes Laertius
Happy Twentieth!
Speaking of desires, I found this blog post to have some good insights on the subject:
There seems to be something in the air these days: people are discovering the benefits of the Epicurean life, some perhaps through studying Epicurus, and some perhaps by reasoning it out on their own. Not all are presenting a complete worldview as did Epicurus, but it does seem to be a trend that's heading in a good direction.
I think they may misunderstand his position with the "extravagant desire as a surefire happiness-squisher."
They probably haven't read Living for Pleasure yet.... Although I quite like the use of the term "extravagant desires" in that book, this does point out the problem with that description. For now I would give these authors the benefit of the doubt and assume that they're using "extravagant" to describe unnecessary desires.
And yes, it's nice to see that they understand the difference between desires and pleasures 
I can't comment on the home page.... As for how I use the site, I've got the "unread posts" page bookmarked; that's my entry point to everything here.
This article is in this morning's paper and it struck me as really cool for anyone here who's a sci-fi nerd. It also is a great example, for a non-scientist such as me, of the enormous amount of tedious work that can be involved in scientific progress.
UCLA is asking for the public’s help in finding signs of extraterrestrial intelligence
There is a link within the article that leads to the UCLA website where you can participate. Or just look at the task involved, which is interesting conceptually but extremely tedious to do for any length of time.
VS29. Speaking freely in my study of what is natural, I prefer to prophesize about what is good for all people, even if no one will understand me, rather than to accept common opinions and thereby reap the showers of praise that fall so freely from the great mass of men. Saint-Andre translation
All in all, I'd say she made quite a good presentation in defense of Epicurus.
I like where this is going, and it brings to mind the "idealist" interpretation of the gods. I'm curious if any of the articles on that subject mention PD01 or any other PDs that might be relevant.
Quote from Don[82] But mental tranquillity* means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.
*ἀταραξία ataraxia (literally spelled ataraksia)
This reads to me like a definition.... 
May I posit that the musk ox is actually pursuing pleasure and not tolerating pain out on the tundra? I get this from time spent with Milo the Alaskan Malamute. He prefers spending his time in the snow, in below zero temperatures, in a snowstorm. He'll hang inside with his people and other dogs, but given the choice, he'll go for the snow.
Of course this is no knock on the musk ox. It may even make it more Epicurean! I'm just questioning this particular analogy 
So happiness is something else beyond pleasure.
This seems problematic to me. And it's also the crux of the issue: is happiness something beyond pleasure?
--Both physical and mental pleasures
--Assurance of security in the future (basic necessities and safety)
--Freedom from fear of death and God(s)
--Physical health
Looking at this, I'd say physical health and pleasure aren't necessarily necessary for happiness, but mental pleasures are. Now, that would imply that there's a ranking of pleasures involved in happiness. However, I don't subscribe to a ranking of pleasures but to classifications of desires. This leads me to the thought that happiness is, perhaps, a static mental pleasure.
A happy life can still feel happy even when immediate pleasure isn't occuring, and I think that it really points to "happiness" being mostly an internal story about whether or not we are feeling pleased about the way our life is currently unfolding.
This sounds right, although I would tend to use "state" instead of "story." And this of course leads to the discussion of ataraxia and eudaimonia, and whether they are fancy pleasures which are more important than pleasure, or whether they are subsets of pleasure.
If I understand correctly, Kalosyni 's quote above is related to Don 's description of a background state of happy homeostasis. I think that that's necessary, but not sufficient, for the fullness of pleasure. Dabbling in prudent extravagance can fill the tank in that regard (referring to one of Cassius 's former illustrations.
A: Pleasure
Why: Happiness is a type of pleasure, whereas pleasure isn't necessarily a type of happiness. It seems to me that pleasure has a pretty specific definition in EP, but happiness is less well defined.
