"Remember that you are mortal, and you have a limited time to live, and in devoting yourself to discussion of the nature of time and eternity you have seen things that have been, are now, and are to come."
I appreciate that there seems to be a universal preconception for "Hater" or "Haters".
In particular, I like thinking that Plato is not just "golden", but "gilded", as in, "cheap" and "superficial", like modern currency, or that his dialogues are just goldleafpaintedoverbadphilosophy.
Good find on Sannídōros! I missed that etymology completely.
I've been toying with the use of some personal interpretations of the Johari Window
That's interesting; I've never come across that idea named before.
Back in theatre school, they used to tell us (as regards auditions), "You're basically three people..."; I've heard this from so many, random acting coaches and casting agents: "Who people see you as, who you think you are, and who you really are". I wonder if they got it from Luft and Ingham?
2) Prolepsis is a form of reasoning and cannot be considered canonical faculty or knowledge is impossible. That means Epicurus blundered with his description of canon or applied pure reasoning in his description of gods. Whether his reasoning is correct or incorrect remains forever undetermined as knowledge is impossible in this case and everything goes.
I would consider prolḗpseis to just be raw, pre-interpretive mental data, like sensations are just physical data, and feelings are just emotional data, all of which are produced prior to evaluation or reflection. We digest all of this data when we exercise various applications of the mind, like imagining, supposing, entertaining, fantasizing, considering, exploring, believing, or formulating (which can all produce false results), and then there is acknowledging the raw data, just witnessing, or observing, or recalling, which is just recognizing the objects of experiences that are self-evident.
It's like lying to ourselves: we just can't. It catches up to us, because reality doesn't go away.
In that regard, I think of the mind like the moon, and prolḗpseis are like impact craters that deepen over time. The mind is physically bombarded with hard impulses, and they leave marks in the form of memories. As humans, the shape of our craters are comparable – the "yellow" crater looks yellow on everyone's personal moon, and the "dog" crater looks like a dog. The craters for "mortals" looks the same, and "animals" (they're all breathing and making babies), and it would follow then that the basic crater of "divinity" largely looks the same to everyone (they're perfectly happy).
I think we all have an idea (just as people) of what a category of beings that are perfectly happy would be like (we all seem to share that notion), and that notion is perfectly natural, so it's just being received from environmental stimuli and physical experiences, because its shared.
Epíkouros explains that we're not physically observing the visible particles of the gods, like lights and colors, but rather, we receive knowledge of the gods by the means of subtle particles that only interface with the mental organ, comparable to the way we receive knowledge of justice. Justice has no color, nor a shape, nor a sound, nor a language; it is only expressed by particular examples. The gods are the same way. We have a basic definition of "a god" we can apply to various candidates for divinity. For example, Jews propose that the divine is YHWH. Fair enough. That's a proposition we can evaluate for truthfulness, and we can do so because we have a firm grasp of what the definition of a real god (who doesn't cause trouble), and that is our ruler to test for truth (literally, those basic understandings are part of the canon, meaning "ruler"). YHWH causes trouble, therefore, YHWH is not a real god. At best, YHWH (if real) is a meddlesome extra-terrestrial, or, more likely, a misconception, caused by mixing the notion of god with the notion of a moody human. Christians maintain, like Aristotle, that God created the universe. Diogénēs the Epicurean wonders, Why? Was he bored? Was he lonely? From where does he inherit his artistic creativity? That "God" sounds more like a human sculptor or a chemist than it does a principle of Goodness. We'll find false gods in anything supposed to have created us, evaluates us, and anything that interferes with our history. People throw around their conceptions of "God" all the time, and we know, for a fact, they are nonsense, because all of those conceptions contradict the basic notion of a happy being. Jesus literally bleeds for us (so they say). I can do that, and I am most definitely not a god. And you can't be both mortal and immortal, or else the meanings of words just dissolve into confusion.
In general, the prolḗpseis are grasped by the applications of the mind (like contemplation and reflection) in the same way that contemplation and reflection also grasp ideas like "Middle Earth" and "lightsabers" (which are only real as fantasy), but the difference is that all of these other mental objects are generated by the faculties of reason, whereas prolḗpseis are like fish captured by a mental net: the mind captures what nature gives it; our myths are made, not captured.
We talk a lot about what the gods are in this forum, and, I believe, most of the candidates we have proposed tend to contradict the raw definition of divinity that Epíkouros provides. We like the idea that they might just be mental conceptions that only exist in the human mind, made of mental particles, and that, perhaps, they were first recognized by early hominids in dream-states (either nocturnal dreams or perhaps self-induced visions). We also like to consider that the gods are some kind of laughing, talking, respirating space ghosts (I'm sort of joking). Honestly, we're not sure, but, we can be sure that it is irrational for any hypothetical "god" to act "ungodly", because, without a doubt, we know, for a fact, what the definition of a "god" is, regardless of whichone.
Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!
I can provide a few instances that might help orient the idea. (And not that I have a full grasp – it's a slippery concept for us all – but these are the examples I found in the available works).
Diogénēs provides us with the following definition (per my swing at translating).
Quote
33 But they call the [next criterion] “Preconception“50as if a comprehension, or a right opinion, or notion, or universal thought stored in her, that is, memoryof the appearances repeatedly [received] from abroad, like [the form of a] Human, such is one example; for once it [appears], the clear [form of a] Human attaches to [the] preconception, and the imprint of the sensations is preceding [it]. Then, each name primarily follows [what] is visible, since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it, just as [we] have further established a horseis [this] or [a] cow [isthat]. For one must perceive before the preconception the [physical] form of [a] horse and of [a] cow. One should not at all have named something, not before one experienced the [physical] impression related to the preconception. But the preconceptions are manifest [to the mind], and because of prior [experience] the conjectural things are contingent upon sensible [stimuli] to [which] we say they are referring, as when we have confirmed if [a] Human is there. 34But they also call the preconception [an] opinion [that] they affirm [to be] either true or false; for indeed, to be true, [it] must corroborate or not contradict; but if not corroborating or contradicting, [it] happens to be false. Hence, this has introduced [the need to practice] waiting [for confirmation]; for example, a [soldier] had waited [to make a judgment] and had advanced near a watchtower, and [having advanced] near, it had become known what sort [of watchtower] it appears [to be].
One takeaway here is that, of considerations, a prolḗpsis is a true consideration, and, further, a consideration the directly corresponds with a real, demonstrable thing, or typeofthing. Truth is a true belief about reality, so the prolḗpsis of gods is having the right opinion about theology.
Epíkouros gives us an example of a truebelief versus a falsebelief:
In the Epistle to Menoikeus, in a discussion on theology, the ΠΡΟΛEΨΣEΙΣ or προλήψεις (prolḗpseis) are contrasted against ΥΠΟΛEΨΣEΙΣ or ὑπολήψεις (hypolḗpseis). Whereas the prolḗpseis are formed in the mind "before", so hypolḗpseis are formed "after" (123). The prolḗpsis of a god is a being who is blessed and incorruptible. The hypolḗpseis of a god is a being who is corrective, punitive, meddling, and generally troublesome. The prolḗpsis in this case is just the basic definition of "a god", whereas the hypolḗpsis incorporates another, unrelated prolḗpsis (like the prolḗpsis of the atmospheric phenomena of static discharge) to create a fantastical narrative that deviates from this fundamental definition (like Zeus smites the wicked with thunderbolts or rewards the faithful by not obliterating them). Hypolḗpseis are false assumptions, directly contrasted against reliable prolḗpseis.
From this, I take away that the prolḗpsis of the gods corresponds with the notion that a god is a perfectly happy being, whereas a mortal is an animal that dies, and a horse is a hooved quadraped. In this sense, it can be helpfully contextualized as part of the process of a naming schema. All disconnected cultures of peoples have a words for "warmth" and "baby" and "milk" and "hair", "light", "dark", and, as the cross-cultural exchange triggered by Alexander demonstrated to Hellenic Greece, apparently, as is evident to anthropologists, archaeologists, and linguists, "gods".
In the Epistle to Herodotos, the Hegemon contrasts the prolḗpseis of objects perceived by us against the "concept of Time", which is not described as a thing like a "horse", or "man", or "god", nor a category of things like an "animal", or "mortal", or "immortal", nor even expressed as a quality of a real thing, like "having hooves", or "respirating", or "being perfectly happy", but is rather just a kind of relative, measuring stick, an "accident of accidents" (172). We casually throw around the word time to actually mean something like any relative, human measurement against periodically-rotating, nearby objects, albeit the annual revolution around the Sun, or the frequency of a Cesium-133 atom. Here, Time is a bit of a contrast against a classical, Epicurean preconception.
Mentioned elsewhere, in the final few Doctrines, Epíkouros identifies "justice" as a prolḗpsis, which, itself, is neither a real thing (like a "man" and "horse"), but more of a category (like "vertebrates") but as applies to situations and events, as a pact to neither harm nor be harmed. The preconception is realized during any periods where pacts are being honored between different parties. Here, there's not a Golden Triforce you can pocket called "justice", but there are examples of the "justice" that is evident within "just actions", so, this is another, kind of categorical preconception.
That's how I read it. These are the main instances I found where "preconception" is used.
That's a really beautiful sentiment. I think I'd like to encourage these options with all of my family members. I worked IT for a funeral home acquisition company, and I spent some time installing network equipment in funeral homes after-hours, observing the traditional options. Without getting too specific, I'll just say I came out not liking any of the traditional options.
Also, Bryan or Don, if you have guys have any interest, would you take a swing at translating P.Herc. 1520 ("On Philosophy") by Polystratos? My translation right now sucks.
There's a lot of P.Herc. that needs English translations.
I've connected with some folks in a Herculaneum Forum on Discord. So far, I haven't found any Epicureans, but I really would like to organize a project to provide these resources.
I mention in another post I'm trying to reconstruct key dates forPhilódēmos here.
You may also find my annotations at the bottom of the latter page useful for P.Herc. investigation. Beside Philódēmos (who has, like, 190+ fragments in the library, which I haven't collected in this format because goddamn will that take me a while...), here are the rest:
Thank you for the illuminating footnote: "While “Mýs” is typically translated as “Mouse” (assumed to be a diminutive) it could equally refer to his region of origin, perhaps Mysia. Most slaves in ancient Greece were foreigners who had been captured, sold, or imprisoned."
It seems Mysia was in the area of Lampsacus and Cyzicus (we know Epikouros sent letters to friends in Cyzicus, at least, P.Herc. 1418, col. 7).
According to Strabo (Geography, 13.1.19), Epikouros associated with "the most distinguished of those in this city [Lampsacus]" so maybe he did pick up Mýs around that time and location.
You're welcome!
I hope it's accurate.
I made that connection while making my map of Anatolian regions, combined with some simultaneous research on the conditions of ancient Greek slavery. Once I realized Lampsakos was in Mysia, it jumped out at me (like you recognized), and it just fits really well!
In my opinion ... I have a soft-spot for Humphries' style, though I don't think it's the most educational. It speaks to me personally, and provides me with a poetry that I find entrancing.
M. F. Smith is definitely going to be your best, contemporary resource. He writes in prose, or adapted free verse, and does not impose a rhyme schema on the literature. He is usually my go-to if I want to understand, conceptually, what Lucretius meant by a stanza. He's great with annotations, too.
The one weak spot I note with Smith is that he has a tendency to employ contemporary, technical jargon to refer to Epicurean physics, and, more and more, I think it's a bit anachronistic.
To rememdy that, I recommend Munro. He has a great way of translating the "fundamental seeds of reality" using words besides "atoms" and "particles" that is refreshing, and, in my opinion, more authentic to how a Roman would have experienced the poem 2,075 years ago. Granted, Munro's vocabulary is a tad older, and reads as a bit more dated than Smith's more recent work.
If you like a good, familiar rhyme schema, try A. E. Stallings. I like his flavor.
Thanks and hello to everybody. I'm glad to be here with you all in this garden and I hope that this forum will give some good advice to improve myself.
Sam
Break the cycle of rebirths!
No, just kidding. You'll do well here to share jokes, make friends, and have fun learning.
Evidence is very fragmentary. I came across the figure as well in a few places:
“APOLLODORUS [of Lampsacus] [1] (fourth century BC) Apollodorus was an Epicurean and a brother of Leontius of Lampsacus.” (Curnow, The Philosophers of the Ancient Worlds: An A-Z Guide 31)
“APOLLODORUS [the Epicurean] [2] (third century BC) Apollodorus was an Epicurean, perhaps a pupil of Polystratus.” (Ibid.)
“APOLLODORUS [of Athens] [4] (second century BC) Apollodorus was an Epicurean, heading the school for most of the second half of the second century BC. His long tenure earned him the nickname of ‘Tyrant of the Garden’. He wrote many books, including a life of Epicurus, and was the teacher of Zeno of Sidon.” (Ibid.)
I am not sure why. I have only been able to locate scholarly attestations to the other Apollodoros, but not the original fragment, itself. Please let me know if you come across it!
Good deal! I've shared the Principle Doctrines by Makridis [1] here and the Key Doctrines by A. A. Long and Sedley [2] here. The Fundamental Articles by Wallace are [3]here, and then the Authorized Doctrines by De Witt are [4] here. Of course, I've got my [5] own here, and the compilation here.
I see that I started a thread on this six years ago but it did not get developed. This is a question that we discussed in the podcast recorded on 6/15, so if anyone has any comment on whether Yonge could be correct, let me know and I will record some new commentary before the podcast is released.
It appears that the translators other than Yonge seem to take the position that Epicurus said that the wise man WILL cry out under torture, but it's not 100% clear to me that it's beyond doubt that that's what Epicurus would have said.
It seems to me that there is a strong analogy between being under torture and being under the extreme pain of kidney disease, and we know that Epicurus took the time to say that he was still happy while in that condition. But there's nothing recorded as to Epicurus himself groaning or crying out from pain.
Now Cicero himself says that there are times when you are exerting yourself that you will groan/cry out, much in the way that athletes do, so I can see that one angle on this is that it makes sense to groan or cry out when that accomplishes something. But on the other hand if it accomplishes nothing but giving vent to pain/fear/frustration, then I could see it having negative effects on yourself and your friends around you.
I can see as a general rule that it makes sense to say that a truly happy man does not lose his happiness just because he is experiencing severe pain for a time. But it seems to me much harder to state a general rule of "no" or "yes" as to whether or not to groan cry out.
Should we consider the possibility that Yonge has it right and the others have it wrong?
I'd especially appreciate the help of our usual Greek researchers such as Bryan and Don and Eikadistes on this question.
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Here's how I read it:
"But even if the wise were tortured on a rack, they would be happy,4 and only the wise will have gratitude for friends both present and absent alike through both word and through deed.5However, when tortured on the rack, at some point they both moan and wail."
I take the μέντοι ("however") at the beginning of the second sentence to create a thematic opposition against the first proposition that a wise person maintains happiness while undergoing physical pain. In this case, I think, it conveys something like, though an emotionally healthy person will maintain a good attitude, they're still only human, and they will exhibit normative physical responses to stimuli, such as your knee popping when you knock it, or yelping when getting burned or stabbed.
This might be a sort of marker about the limits of un-disturbedness. Perhaps both mortals and immortals can achieve a state of robust, mental tranquility, but while immortals are removed from experiencing any painful sensations, mortals are still defined by pain that will eventually kill us.
