Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Don

Maybe he died the year he would have turned 72 but it was before his birthday that year?

I think that's likely.

I'm an Epicurean, not a mathematician, so I'm not confident with my numbers.

Even so, the dates and ages that Diogenes Laërtius presents do not add up (according to my calculations).

If Epicurus was born in the early months of 341 BCE, then his 72^nd birthday would have landed in the early months of 269 BCE (the 3^rd year of the 127^th Olympiad) and not 270 BCE (the 2^nd year of the of 127^th Olympiad). Therefore, it must either be the case that (a) Epicurus died when he was 71 (and not 72) during the archonship of Sosistratus, or else (b) he died in 269 BCE during the archonship of Pytharatus. Otherwise, Epicurus would have to have been born in the 2^nd year of the 109th Olympiad (early 342 BCE) during the archonship of Pythodotus (and not the 3^rd year [342-341 BCE] during the archonship of Sosigenes). Either way, Diogenes’ propositions that Epicurus (1) was born in the “third year of the 109th Olympiad [342-341 BCE] during the archonship of Sosigenes”, that (2) he died “in the second year of the 127th Olympiad, in the archonship of Pytharatus [271-270 BCE]” and that (3) he died “at the age of seventy-two” cannot all be true. Diogenes is either mistaking the dates, or Epicurus’ age.

Given the clarity of the archonships that Diogenes presents, which is supported by other authors, I suppose that Diogenes made an error: Epicurus died when he was 71 (not 72).

Quote from Don

Quote from Joshua

The planets are stars in this analysis--they are the "wandering stars" spoken of in the Letter to Pythocles;

Exactly. The ancient Greeks saw those as literally "wandering stars." They didn't think of them as "worlds" or "planets" like we conceive of a planet as another body circling a star. They're not a kosmos. They're simply ἄστρων πλανᾶσθαι, astron planasthai, stars who for some reason wander across the άστρα that are fixed in place in the night sky.

I love the way they described celestial objects.

Everything in the sky was one kind of "glower" or another. There are countless "glowers" that twinkle. There are a limited number of "wandering glowers" like Jupiter. Then we have "long-haired glowers" like Halley's Comet (which Epicurus should have seen with Nausiphanes). Everything else seems to have been categorized as "remaining glowers", which might have included things like meteors, or perhaps even the Andromeda Galaxy (which would have been visible to ancient peoples without ambient light). Our "kosmos", I think, should contain all the "glowers" we can see.

Space is great.

Quote from Don

These are off the top of my head. I also said above that "I don't intend to pray" but looking at what I've typed... who knows. Maybe I'll try one of those forms of "prayer" in the future after all.

I think you've identified a key question I need to answer, which is "how did Epicureans pray?"

When I think of "prayer", my mind goes to intercession, which, I think, Epicurus would have identified as a kind of wish-fulfillment. He definitely rejects this. He acknowledges that the gods are completely removed from the stage of the human drama. They aren't even in the audience. They don't even live around the theatre. (It seems likely that they don't go to shows.)

Then we have various forms of vocal prayer, hymns, songs, chanting, and mantras. I think we can find an example of this sort of prayer in Greek theatre. It was musical, religious, and DeWitt (as I recall) describes Epicurus as having been a regular participant. This sort of prayer seems to have provided Epicurus and his friends with a sort of practical utility that was inherently pleasurable.

Meditation is, I think, another form of prayer we can identify (or perhaps "prayer" is a form of "meditation"? The ways we employ these words in English are slippery). Of kind of meditation, I do not think that formless meditation works in this case (in other words, emptying oneself of all sensations, totally withdrawing inward, focusing on concepts like non-existence).

Contemplative prayer is defined in various ways, but in an Epicurean sense, I think this might be a useful framework in which to discuss piety. Ancient Epicureans memorized the Key Doctrines of Epicurean ethics, and the Elementary Principles of his physics. In this regard, I can accept prayer as a natural, cognitive practice, and can acknowledge that I engage in this behavior.

There are other forms we can identify as well. This is just to identify some categories.

So, maybe it's safe to say that Epicurean prayer was as reasonable as "listening to pleasurable music" and "studying nature", so long as those practices yield a happier life.

I might just be griping about a childhood conundrum no one has ever answered satisfactorily:

In 2nd-grade, I learned about ancient Egypt, and I learned that Egyptians had other gods than Jesus. So I wondered, "If the people who built pyramids had thousands of years of history without knowing Jesus, how do we know that Jesus is 'the real god', or even matters at all?"

The minute I accepted that ancient Egyptians had other gods (that Jesus was not the only object of worship) the notion of a "god" suddenly seemed very small, and very imaginary.

I continue to have suspicions about the "Idealist" interpretation:

What good is a god that is just a dream?

The whole thing strikes me as an example of the placebo effect. The placebo effect tends to stop working the moment the test subject realizes that they are just a test subject.

For a different example, typically, after a child learns that Santa Claus is a cultural myth, they stop putting out milk and cookies before going to bed. Furthermore, there are no children who believe in one of the mythical figures (like the Easter Bunny) while simultaneously rejecting another (like Santa Claus). The principle that allows you to reject one is applicable to the others.

If you go from being a person who prays (as wish fulfillment), and then you learn that god does not listen to prayers and does not grant wishes ... what's the point of praying?

I go back-and-forth with my family on the latter point. They all recommend prayer, and either believes that God answers their prayers, or that the act of praying to God makes them feel peaceful. For me, I cannot find peace in a God that only exists as a symbol in my mind. In fact, that very acknowledgment is the thing that makes me feel like prayer is ridiculous in the first place.

Really, it's not just the "idealist" interpretation.

Honestly, what's the point of prayer if no one is listening?

I've really never been able to accept Epicurean theology ... unless we're talking about drugs. If we can all entertain the idea that "the image of god" is something that happens "when you drink kykeon during Dionysian mystery rites", then I am 100% on board. That is a real experience, it is repeatable, it is measurable, we have thousands of years of documented "encounters with gods" while ingesting intoxicants from every human group, during every time period in history. The experience is overwhelmingly positive. (If you have any personal doubts, just look at research being done with Pscilocybin, LSD, and MDMA on post-traumatic stress and depression.)

Still ... I have equal doubts about my proposition that Epicureans were tripping.

Why couldn't Epicurus have just said "Gods are no more real than monsters and other dream-entities. You are taking a huge cognitive risk in entertaining the possibilities of either one"?

Another way of saying this is that no matter how many time evolution starts over, it will eventually yield a "crab"-creature. Likewise, no matter how many times humans re-engineer language, we will require a word for "divinity", because, as seems to be apparent, it is natural and necessary.

Quote from shahabgh66

But sometimes names and their connotations catch my eyes

I think you're on to something here, shahabgh66 in terms of what I want to call a sort of convergent evolution of linguistics. There is a universal need to define spiritual concepts, and the ways we wield language lead to symbols that converges upon common metaphors.

For example, prior to their adoption of Χριστιανός (Khristianós or "Christian"), worshippers of the Christ simply referred to themselves as followers of της οδου (tês hodoû) or “The Way“. Thousands of miles away, separated by centuries, a group of ancient Chinese philosophers, alchemists, and mystics followed the universal 道 or (Dào”) meaning “road”, “path” or “Way”.

There are other examples (such as identifying "God", literally, with "Wisdom")

There is an interesting study done on the development of words referring to color (as an example). The study was published in a book by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay called Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution (1969). Essentially, they demonstrate that isolated groups of humans will develop words for color in a predictable pattern: cultures with only two color words only had words for "bright" and "dark". With third word, it is always "red" (etc.).

In that same way, I think (in the development of language), different groups of humans are compelled by psychological needs to express certain, universal experiences, like the experience of dreaming, of being intoxicated, or experiencing necrosis, or witnessing others' deaths.

Along those lines, as Epicurus recognizes in KD5 and KD6, the structures of society, leadership roles and economic exchanges, develop naturally out of a common benefit. Therein, different groups of peoples exalt admirable, magnificent figures characterized as being "helpers".

We all have some word for "soul", and that word always seems to correlate concepts like "personality", "awareness", "will", and "the part of us that's 'awake' when we dream at night". We (apparently) have a common need to express "spirituality", and that word always seems to correlate concepts like "psychology", "self-help", "art", "meditation", and "the need to organize mental phenomenon during times of over-stimulation". There are many other examples.

While the particular characteristics of the words differ depending on the filter of culture, there seem to be universal, pre-conceptual notions that we are compelled to identify by need. The common notion of "the religious experience", of "the divine nature", or "the gods" falls in this category as a universal experience that isolated peoples share.

In this regard, I suppose that the archetype of a "savior", a "guru", or a "helper" might be one such common notion, instigated by a universal need to express the experience of a "spiritual guide". We all have personal role models, and groups of us have universal saviors.

Philodemos provides a number of examples of deductive reasoning in On Methods of Inference [https://twentiers.com/on-signs/] and seems to negate inductive reasoning:

He suggests that the following deduction is valid:

‘Since the men in our experience, in so far as and according
as they are men, are mortal,
‘Men everywhere are mortal,’

Whereas the following inductive assumption is invalid:

‘Since men in our experience are mortal,
‘Men everywhere are mortal,’

As Philodemos writes, "the analogical method of inference is not cogent; and on the whole if it is cogent, it must assume that unperceived objects are like those in our experience.”

However, he later asserts that "it will be sufficient for us to base our belief on probability in these matters, just as we do in regard to what is learned from trial; for example, that we shall be safe sailing in summer, since we have had experience of favorable winds in that season." If I'm reading that right, he seems to be saying that inductive reasoning tends to be inaccurate; however, it is at least functional, and, anticipating Pragmatists like William James, we can consider it true (enough).

I'll need to go back to the original Greek to identify the named methods of inference, because he seems to either accept or reject "argument from analogy", depending on the context: As he writes, "if anyone uses the argument from analogy properly, he will not fail, and we consider that our statement is true", whereas, he earlier states"the analogical method of inference is not cogent".

I find the text to be challenging, but, ultimately, it seems to me that Philodemos is providing us with examples of functional methods of inference that are not necessarily definite, only probable. Ultimately, it is up to our sensations to provide evidence to justify any given proposition.

Quote from Godfrey

So if I'm reading correctly Eikadistes , you're saying that "amount" isn't a part of the original Greek? Am I understanding that correctly?

Within the context of Userner/Arrighetti's renderings, I believe that is correct. I do not find an ancient Greek noun that corresponds with our noun "amount". The word being employed ἴσην (ísēn) is an adjective meaning "equal" or "the same as". The noun that the adjective is modifying is "pleasure", so adding a second noun to that clause (in my opinion) is semantically unnecessary.

Though, again, I don't mean to make too big of a deal out of it. It's mostly stylistic.

Quote from Cassius

the thread topic question, as to substituting "pain" in the place of "pleasure,"

Cassiusthis isn't clear. Your post quotes the Doxa in its entirety: "Would Epicurus say: 'Infinite Time contains no more pain than limited time when the limit of pain is measured by reason?'"

Quote from Cassius

but if you could also comment on whether it works to substitute pain, that would be good too.

My answer therefore changes from "No-ish" to a confident "No". "No more pain" is not the same as "continuous pleasure" because "no more pain" also includes "death", and that's no good. This is where we dodge the Cyrenaics accusation that our goal in life is that of a corpse.

No-ish, but only over a few stylistic caveats in translation:

Usener and/or Arrighetti transcribe (what I read as) the reflexive pronoun αὐτῆς (autês), which is a feminine declension of αὐτός (autós). In my translation, I came up with the following:

“Unlimited time contains the same pleasure as that which is limited, if a person herself measures the limits by reason.”

While I usually prefer to employ gender-neutral language (for example, preferring "Sage" to "Wise Man"), I note that Epicurus sometimes employs feminine declensions of words, and where he does, I think it is important to give it its due. (For example, throughout the Epistle to Pythokles, unlike the other letters, Epicurus refers to "the gods" (theon) in the feminine theia or "divine [nature]".)

(I'm also seeing autês as specifying the other, general pronoun τις meaning "someone", "who", "one", or "a person" ... though it may actually be describing or reinforcing something else.)

We also find the adjective ἴσην (ísēn), the feminine, accusative singular of of ῐ̓́σος (ísos) which indicates that which is "equal" or "the same". Translating "no greater than" (even in a mathematical sense) does not express the same thing, but carries a slightly different connotation

With this in mind, I think that the sentence is comparing two instances of maximum sustained states of pleasure. Contextually, we are discussing two πέρατα (pérata) or "limits" of pleasure), one lasting less than 125 years, and one lasting forever [i.e. the pleasure of the gods]. Here is another instance, like KD1, of Epicurus mentioning a "god" without ever using the word for "god".)

It's a small caveat, but it does slightly change the meaning. For me, it indicates that our lives are not diminished due to the fact that we are not immortal. Achieving the goal of life is not reserved for godlike person; we can all enjoy the universal goal toward which all life is directed.

Stylistically, I also note that ἡδονήν (hēdonḗn) is only used once by Epicurus in the original Greek. That is just an aesthetic choice, and does not affect the semantics of the sentence.

Quote from Don

I also think it's important to disregard the PD numbers.

Always this.

Quote from Bryan

You really have made a beautiful website. It is very well organized, and it is filled only with treasures.

Thank you for that!

All treasures to share.

Quote from Bryan

Does using Epíkouros add another layer of complexity, or does it get us closer to source?

You're reading my mind, because I go back-and-forth on how I'd like to identify each historical figure. One on hand, the Latinized names of figures (like Athenaeus) are more recognizable, and that recognition can be helpful to students (versus seeing "Athenaios"). At the same time, as with Loukianos, I want to steer students away from pronunciations like Lucian /'luːsiːən/ that have been historically Latinized; but with our source material and access to ancient sources, that seems like an unnecessary step, so I push away from /miːno.'iːsiːəs/ toward /mɛː'nɔɪ.ke.uːs/ for example. In the case of Epíkouros, I go back-and-forth. In each case, I try to provide both options somewhere on the site.

The proverbial spirit has moved me, so I have included critical selections from Athenaeus, Eusebius, and Lactantius that reference Epicurus and his philosophy.

I added a number of critical authors to the website, including Cicero, Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, and several works of Plutarch (here is Against Colotes, among others: https://twentiers.com/colotes/)

Quote from Cassius

In the case of gods we are talking about a wide class that could have very many forms, so long as those forms are consistent with blessedness and imperishability. In the case of "centaurs" that's an assertion of a very specific physical formation that conflicts with our long experience with both humans and horses.

Good point; let me be more general.

Let's use the example of "demons" (as a class). How do I know that the notion of "the gods" is an authentic preconception whereas that the notion of a "demon" is a false belief? For example, what if I were to posit that I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure" and I assign to that prolepsis the word "demon", as a class of perfectly-pleasureless beings?

Here's another way I might approach the question for my own understanding:

How do I know that "the gods" in "dreams" are more real than centaurs and cyclops?

I thought about this and wanted to see what the herd thinks:

Epicurus explicitly warns against pursuing a political career, but does add a caveat that one might pursue a political career if they are so compelled by their natural disposition. Similarly, Epicurus advises against romantic exploits, but stops short of explicitly prohibiting them, so long as they do not cause turmoil. Similarly, in the Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus clearly recommends that we should believe in a god and pray faithfully... I wonder, like sex and politics if Epicurus would allow for anti-religious students to abstain from prayer if they are so inclined by their natural disposition?

Quote from Julia

There are no outside persons inside my mind like that, so I would not expect to at some point have an experience of this kind. For me, death was different every time:

It was terror and fright.

It was despair and frantic effort.

It was abandonment and sadness.

It was erratic chaos and powerlessness.

It was relief and release in death by a thousand cuts.

[...]

And with that little opening speech, I circle back to the gods: I don't think near-death experiences are very consistent, and I think they very much depend on who you ask and what they've experienced: pharmaceuticals, social context, age (especially child vs teenager/adult), type of survival situation, cultural backdrop. With the experiences so different, can we really conceive of them as to "pertaining to gods"? [...]

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These are all good points, and to reinforce @Root304 's observation, psychedelics are inconsistent and potential causes of more pain than pleasure. Additionally, all of this is dependent on our internal ecosystems, so reliably re-producing the experience of the divine is not universal with any one substance ... still, I can't identify with "the experience of the divine" without drugs.

That's just where I'm at with my personal experience. I've never seen blissful people in dreams that do not correspond with mortals that I have met in my life. (But I'd really like to!)

Right now, at best, as far as I can determine, (1) Epicurus said that the gods were evident because he became aware that Indians prayed to gods but separate from the Greeks (via Pyrrho through Nausiphanes), (2) His suggestion that piety comes from dreams is just a general way of saying "religion is social construct that evolved from basic human behaviors", (3) Hermarkhos, Demetrios, Philodemos, and Lucretius making indications that the gods breathe and converse is not a preconception, but inductive reasoning that happens to be coherent with the preconception, and (4) the actual gods don't really exist except as concepts in our minds.

Eh, I don't know. I really want to dream about Zeus once and put an end to it.

Quote from Root304

Eh... My foray into psychedelics was pretty disasterous and almost entirely led to my adoption of Naturalism and Epicureanism.

I definitely don't mean to frame psychedelics as a panacea or a purely positive experience. Set, setting, and mental disposition (especially mental illness) can turn a trip into a miserable hell.

That said, I'm just speaking for myself ... I personally was unable to conceive of "the divine" until I ate mushrooms at age 19. Up until that moment in time, my personal opinion was that "God" was a delusion, "believers" were deluded, and "spirituality" was an empty word for the deluded. I rejected the "religious experience" as a dangerous hallucination, if it existed at all.

The possibility of having dreams in a wakeful state changed that for me.

Still, if I'm being honest, when it comes down to it, I'm still an atheist at heart.

I really just continue to wonder (thus, the source of this thread)...

"... how in the Hell can anyone *actually* believe in gods?"

Epicurean theology was something that never jived with me from the very being. Let's just get rid of the gods altogether. Fuck 'em, right? Who cares? Obviously Epicurus taught the opposite, but I really want to get in his head and understand why it matters at all if psychedelics aren't involved.

I had a lot of dreams, but never the form of a perfect humanoid that inspired me.

I'm just trying to get in the mind of someone who actually believes with confidence.

If you guys aren't careful, this is going to turn into an essay.

I had a few other thoughts I wanted to share about my own bias(es):

1. I live in an "photo-centric" era. Images and icons are everywhere. I know the faces of people who died before I was born. I know the faces of people who died before my society developed. I know the face of Epicurus, himself, down to his cheekbones. But ancient Greeks, in terms of realistic representative art, were limited to statues, and they were usually either civic or mythological. Most grandkids did not have busts of their beloved grandma and grandpa on their mantle. To spontaneously witness the form of a 20-something friend during "dream-states" at various points in one's life would have been much more significant to a non-"photo-centric" world.

2. I live in a prohibitionary era with regards to psychedelics. Most of us do, and most of the modern world is characterized by prohibition in some form at some time, albeit trying to demonize Gin in medieval England, to American zealots trying to ban Peyote ceremonies from native rituals. The suspicion of psychedelic chemicals is ubiquitous, and is utterly prohibited from children to the extent that we attempt to censor information. The point is, the average ancient Greek was not exposed to "Reefer Madness" and "Just Say 'No'" and would have seen been more likely to associate religion with the state of divine intoxication and the rituals used to induce it.