Posts by Cassius

I went looking for a youtube video that reflected what I think is the proper attitude to take toward Zeno's "paradoxes" (I think the proper attitude is contempt without finding something suitable. However here's one where Meg Ryan illustrates the stupidity of it:

And here is one that, but giving some very good quotes from the people who came up with this, does a good job of setting the table:

Unfortunately, after setting the table by showing the quotes which make clear what kind of nonsense the Eleatics were after, it drops the ball and leaves things hanging.

Here's Joe Rogan giving a look of astonishment at the suggestions. I don't know who he's talking to but I see this as the attitude that anyone of common sense would have toward hearing this kind of thing stated: He says something like "maybe we should stop listening to these people."

After listening to the descriptions of these paradoxes I see these as very close to the ontological arguments for god. "Because in my mind I can imagine a god of infinite power, such a god must exist," IS VERY SIMILAR TO: "Because I can in my mind imagine that there are an infinite number of points between two other points, it must be impossible to count them all or walk across a room." To me this is very similar nonsense. Both should be rejected out of hand and considered nonsense on the ground that the reality perceived through the senses always trumps the allegations of "logic constructed by the mind" when that logic cannot ultimately be traced back to something that can be verified through the senses. Neither the purely mental contention that all-powerful beings exist nor the purely mental contention that all distances can be infinitely divided have any connection to the reality that we perceive through our senses, and both should be rejected as absurd without any more consideration than would be given to the person who asserts that all knowledge is impossible, or who asserts a totally deterministic view of human nature.

That's where Isaac Asimov's criticism of Socrates comes into play as well, and I think it applies to Zeno of Elea as well, of whom I feel also "sick and tired":

Quote from Isaac Asimov "The Relativity of Wrong"

First, let me dispose of Socrates because I am sick and tired of this pretense that knowing you know nothing is a mark of wisdom. No one knows nothing. In a matter of days, babies learn to recognize their mothers. Socrates would agree, of course, and explain that knowledge of trivia is not what he means. He means that in the great abstractions over which human beings debate, one should start without preconceived, unexamined notions, and that he alone knew this. (What an enormously arrogant claim!) In his discussions of such matters as "What is justice?" or "What is virtue?" he took the attitude that he knew nothing and had to be instructed by others. (This is called "Socratic irony," for Socrates knew very well that he knew a great deal more than the poor souls he was picking on.) By pretending ignorance, Socrates lured others into propounding their views on such abstractions. Socrates then, by a series of ignorant-sounding questions, forced the others into such a mélange of self-contradictions that they would finally break down and admit they didn't know what they were talking about. It is the mark of the marvelous toleration of the Athenians that they let this continue for decades and that it wasn't till Socrates turned seventy that they broke down and forced him to drink poison.

But my attitude is best expressed in the quote from Seneca, where I think he's channeling Epicurus rather than his Stoic friends.

Quote from (Seneca’s Letters – Book II Letter XLVIII)

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.

Over the years I have heard repeated references to Victor Stenger as a physicist whose views are among those which some find most closely supportive of atomism and other aspects of Epicurean philosophy. I see we have an article here already by Godfrey which I will move into this section.

Unfortunately I have never found time to read him myself, but I hope to correct that oversight. For that reason, I don't know if he ever specifically commented on his general approval or disapproval of Epicurus except in regard to basic atomism.

Until I'm able to comment further, i've set up this subforum to expand on Godfrey's earlier observations and allow people a place to make more specific comments.

Here is a good biography of Stenger written on Skeptic.com after his death. Here's his Wikipedia entry.

I see that some Stenger resources are no longer available on the web, but a version on Archive.org exists at this link. These articles include:

Quote

Quantum Time Travel. Reality Check column in Skeptical Briefs Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2000, showing why the Time Travel Causal Paradox ("Grandfater's Paradox") does not apply for pure quantum states, thus allowing time to be reversible at the quantum level.

If you want to read a Short Primer on Quantum Mechanics  go here.

---

Papers, Talks and Preprints:

• The Mystical World of Quantum Mechanics Essay that appeared in The Times Higher Educaton Supplement January 5, 2001, p. 20. OK to distribute, with credit.
• "Quantum Quackery." This article appeared in Skeptical Inquirer Vol. 21. No. 1, January/February 1997, p. 37. It was based on an invited talk at the World Skeptics Congress in Buffalo in June, 1996. Link to article on CSICOP web site
• A video of talk on "Quantum Quackery" given at Cal Tech in June, 1996 is available from The Skeptics Society.
• "Quantum Metaphysics." Talk given at the Westminster College, Oxford Conference on the Modern Spiritualities, March 1995. Appearing in "Modern Spiritualities," Prometheus Books1996. Also published in The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1(1), 26-30, 1997.
• "Mystical Physics." Paper published in Free Inquiry 16(3)1996. PDF.
• "Myth of Quantum Consciousness." Paper published in The Humanist, Vol. 53(3), May/June 1993. pp. 13-15. PDF file of paper.

---

Book Reviews by V. Stenger:

• "The Dreams that Stuff is Made Of." Review of Dreams of a Final Theory by Steven Weinberg. Published in Free Inquiry 13(3) Summer 1994, p. 59. Text file of review.
• Review of Cranks, Quarks and the Cosmos by Jeremy Bernstein. Published in Physics Today, August 1993. Text file of review.

We can use this thread to make general comments, but those who are more familiar with specific aspects of his work than I am are encourage to start independent threads with titles that reflect the subject.

Also, if anyone runs across any earlier threads on Stenger that need to be moved here, please let me know.

Although not dealing directly with Zeno, as we discuss this issue we'll want to refer back to this prior thread from Bryan on "The Covered Father":

Post

The Covered Father

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not…

Bryan

March 2, 2024 at 9:43 PM

Interesting thoughts Twentier. I don't have anything to add to your thinking at the moment, but this phrase in particular sparked my interest:

Quote from Twentier

but, the total sum of immortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases

Are we sure that that is part of the theory? If so, why?

Is there something more going on to explain that, or is that exclusively a deduction from the view that if a class exists, then it exists and infinite number of times, and if so then "infinity never decreases" and so "the total sum of mortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases"?

Today a friend referred me to an essay by Isaac Asimov entitled "The Relativity of Wrong" with which I was not previously familiar. It contains of Socrates which seems right in line with the Epicurean perspective. Even more than that, it contains an analysis of what it means to be "right" or "wrong" that I think is probably also very consistent with Epicurus' perspective. Here's a good summary of the point from Wikipedia ("In the title essay, Asimov argues that there exist degrees of wrongness, and being wrong in one way is not necessarily as bad as being wrong in another way")

I don't know anything about this website that has a copy other than that it comes up first when one searches for the author and title) but here it is in easy to read form. (Let me expand my caveat - I haven't vetted any of these websites I am linking to - I just see on their face that they address this topic.)

The Relativity of Wrong by Isaac Asimov

Looks like it can also be read here: https://skepticalinquirer.org/1989/10/the-relativity-of-wrong/

There's also a copy on Archive.org

Some criticism of the article here.

Seems to me to be an enjoyable article and well worth reading.

We can probably take this article as key material:

Zeno’s Paradoxes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Zeno’s Paradoxes

First published Tue Apr 30, 2002; substantive revision Wed Mar 6, 2024

Almost everything that we know about Zeno of Elea is to be found in the opening pages of Plato’s Parmenides. There we learn that Zeno was nearly 40 years old when Socrates was a young man, say 20. Since Socrates was born in 469 BC we can estimate a birth date for Zeno around 490 BC. Beyond this, really all we know is that he was close to Parmenides (Plato reports the gossip that they had a sexual relationship when Zeno was young), and that he wrote a book of paradoxes defending Parmenides’ philosophy. Sadly this book has not survived, and what we know of his arguments is second-hand, principally through Aristotle and his commentators (here we draw particularly on Simplicius, who, though writing a thousand years after Zeno, apparently possessed at least some of his book). There were apparently 40 ‘paradoxes of plurality’, attempting to show that ontological pluralism—a belief in the existence of many things rather than only one—leads to absurd conclusions; of these paradoxes only two definitely survive, though a third argument can probably be attributed to Zeno. Aristotle speaks of a further four arguments against motion (and by extension change generally), all of which he gives and attempts to refute. In addition, Aristotle attributes two other paradoxes to Zeno. Sadly again, almost none of these paradoxes are quoted in Zeno’s original words by their various commentators, but in paraphrase.

1.1 Ancient Background

Before we look at the paradoxes themselves it will be useful to sketch some of their historical and logical significance. First, Zeno sought to defend Parmenides by attacking his critics. Parmenides rejected pluralism and the reality of any kind of change: for him all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason and revelation. Not surprisingly, this philosophy found many critics, who ridiculed the suggestion; after all it flies in the face of some of our most basic beliefs about the world. In response to this criticism Zeno did something that may sound obvious, but which had a profound impact on Greek philosophy that is felt to this day: he attempted to show that equal absurdities followed logically from the denial of Parmenides’ views. You think that there are many things? Then you must conclude that everything is both infinitely small and infinitely big! You think that motion is infinitely divisible? Then it follows that nothing moves! (This is what a ‘paradox’ is: a demonstration that a contradiction or absurd consequence follows from apparently reasonable assumptions.)

I would say that I think your post illustrates how two of the most important things to do at the very start is:

1 - Get rid of every implication and every attribute we think we know about gods except that they are (1) living beings, (2) live totally happy lives, and (3) are deathless.

2 - Then consider everything after that to be a matter of lesser importance, on which you can come up with some reasonable theories, but can't be sure about the details. That's just like the stars and other things in the sky where you don't have much evidence. You can come up with possibilities that are consistent with basic physics, and harmonize with point 1, but there you have to be satisfied with multiple possibilities rather than single certainties.

As Velleius put it in the nature of the gods, it's Point 1 that is essential and the place where you can really stop. Point 2 may be helpful to some people, but not to others, and we don't have enough information to be totally sure how things really are. So if we go into Point 2 we really have to be careful about the limits of what we know and what we don't.

Point 1 is the part we can be sure about based on the reasoning given:

Quote

XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

Going that far gets you to the point where you are certain that there is no need to live in dread of gods.

Going further into Point 2 gets you more into matters of "curiosity" rather than what you really need to know, and takes you into areas where you are "directed partly by nature and party by reason" where the conclusions are less certain. And there you get into areas where "waiting" and multiple possibilities are going to be the best you can do, and you start talking then about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" because you just don't have any more detail.

Quote

For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason.

Thanks for that exhaustive treatment Twentier!

Robert we have a lot of former Buddhists here, so you might find this subforum interesting, especially if you find yourself wanting to discuss points of comparison.

But to you (and all new people) who just get starting reading the forum, please feel free to post questions or comments in any section as you are getting started, and don't worry about waiting to try to read everything before you post.

This isn't like a computer tech forum where the standard answer to basic questions is RTFM. We have some basic materials or locations to which we can point you, but more than that our participants enjoy going through basic points with "newer" people. Doing that regularly helps us sharpen our own understanding and reminds us of the basic points, rather than staying deep in weeds, as we can tend to do when we're discussing some history or translation or textual issue. The basic points always need to be our primary points of discussion.

I have posted above the text of section 27, which is where we will go next when we resume the text, but I wanted to memorialize too that -- as we discussed on Wednesday night -- there is more to say about the take-home aspects of Zeno's paradoxes, so we will probably start the episode by covering that.

.... Which means we will need to do some more preparation on exactly what those "take-home" points are!

Welcome to Episode 244 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, smooth, and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos, which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a certain resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus’s Deity there is no real substance, but the resemblance of substance.

Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason cannot reside in any other shape.

First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form, either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a sort of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with its own form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored of a mare, or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the Gods are of the human form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own species?

Thanks for introducing yourself Robert! We look forward to hearing more from you!

Lucretius Today Episode 243 - "From "All Sensations Are True" to Reasoning By Similarity And Analogy" - is now available:

The episode should be released later today. One thing that Joshua brings up tangentially is a reference to Zeno's paradoxes - specifically as to whether Achilles could outrun the tortoise if the tortoise had any head start at all.

In our current context, the important of that is the question of what Zeno was advocating and why. Was he really asserting that Achilles cannot outrun a tortoise? Or was he making the opposite point, and expecting us to make the obvious deduction, that what we see must be taken as more real and more important than what a logical formula divorced from the senses might say?

I don't know that we have discussed that enough, and even if we have in prior conversations, this is a classic challenge to the senses that it would benefit us to highlight somewhere on the forum more so than we do now.

Perhaps all of his 'paradoxes' need the same treatment, the the tortoise one is maybe the best well known.

I would say there is no doubt but that what you are talking about in terms of a "internal existing working model of how the universe operates" is an important aspect of our lives. And I would say there is no doubt but that prolepsis is involved in the formation and operation of that. It might be going too far to say that they are exactly the same thing, but I'd agree that they are closely related.

I feel much the same way on each of your points Matteng. If you are so inclined to make comments here while you are reading the book, I feel sure those would be helpful to the group. The charge of "lack of engagement with society" is in my view not at all warranted, but it has been very damaging to the wider acceptance of Epicurean philosophy and needs to be dealt with aggressively. No self-respecting healthy young person is going to be willing to embrace Epicurean philosophy if they think that doing so requires them to withdraw from the world and "live in a cave." I think most of us here share our disagreement with that charge, to the extent that it seems ridiculous even to talk about the charge as if it were serious, but it certainly is a serious one and much work needs to be invested in driving it away as in VS46:

VS46. Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

Thanks Godfrey! I think pulling these sentences out goes in the same direction. If these stand alone:

Quote

Relative predicates do not have the same status as things said not relatively but in accordance with something’s own nature. Nor does the one kind truly exist but the other not. So to expect them to have the same attributes, or the one kind to exist but the other not, is naive.

... even that is prettty confusing to me but "things said not relatively but in accord with something's own nature" must refer to "gold" and "stone" or such otherwise "real objects" (presumably?)

And I think you are right on point here too, and the "surprise" you mention is why this is so important -- "events" DO seem to be being given the same status of significance to us as "material objects":

Quote from Godfrey

I'm a little surprised by that, because I would think that his position would be that "larger" and "smaller" would just be "events," and therefore not real. At least they would not be material; he seems to be saying that an event is real, even if not material.

If I am reading all this correctly then this reinforces the point that I think a lot of people kick back against, or even refuse to entertain the possibility of --- that the emphasis on dreams during sleep and the visions of madmen as being 'real' are part and parcel of a total overhaul of ways of thinking, in which Epicurus is doubling down that we must consider everything that affects us as being "real" rather than being caught up in the game being played by lots of people (Stoics then and now, lots of others today too) that we shouldn't consider the things that affect us as being "real" unless they have a flesh and blood or fully material existence.

There's a lot at stake in the issue of whether we should require "reality" to have a physical existence in order for us to consider it to be real and to exclude everything that does not possess material existence as "fantasy"

Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy?
Caught in a landslide, no escape from reality...

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Here is the part of Dr. Sedley's commentary that appears right after the quote that is included under "Part 1" in the post above. Explaining or giving examples of the the last underlined sentence below (especially as to "relative predicates") would be particularly helpful.

Quote

The opponents can be seen to draw heavily on Platonic dialectical materials in order to launch their attack on the reality of values, in particular in their contrast between the universally agreed determinate nature exhibited by minerals and the cultural relativity of values. As one might expect of the New Academy, this sceptical argument borrows its materials freely from the text of Plato (Phaedrus, 263a, cf. also Euthyphro, 7b-d, Theaetetus, 172b). More remarkable is how Polystratus, in his reply, appears himself to draw inspiration from Plato – a strategy with all the more ad hominem force when directed against Plato’s own self-declared successors. Plato had indeed never intended by this contrast between minerals and values to impugn the reality of the latter, any more than he had meant to infer from the relativity of large(r) and small(er) to their unreality. On the contrary, at Sophist 255c he had presented an exhaustive division of beings (ὄντα) into absolute and relative, a bicategorial scheme which became formal Academic doctrine under his second successor Xenocrates (F15 Isnardi Parente 2 ). Much the same stance as Plato’s own is developed by Polystratus as a rebuttal of the contemporary Academy. He resourcefully points out that the mere existence of an ontological difference between the two categories does not entail that one or other of them will fall short of reality. Anyone who thinks otherwise, he ingeniously adds, could as easily argue that, since such relative predicates as beneficial and harmful manifestly are part of the structure of reality, it must be the non-relative items such as minerals that are unreal!

As we prepare this week's recording for broadcast it looks like I may need to do some particular slicing in regard to the time we spent on David Sedley's "Point 1" as to Ontological argument in the post immediately above. The argument apparently revolves around the alleged differences between two classes, which appear to be(1) a class that includes "relative terms" vs (2) a class that includes gold and stones.

Apparently the difference between these two classes was being used by the Skeptics to argue that the senses are not real, but Sedley says that the Epicurean was able to turn the argument on its head and use it to show that the argument could just as well prove the reverse.

What is not so clear to me is which class the skeptics were saying was "real," and why. Seems I have read that Plato held that the "idea" of a horse is real, but individual horses 10 feet in front of us we can't be sure of. It therefore may be that the Skeptics were arguing that the relative terms are real, but the gold and stone or not. And in particular, there is something going on about how people perceive the same thing differently under different circumstances. But what's not clear on quick reading is whether what is being perceived differently are the relative terms or the solid objects. And it's even less clear how the argument could be turned on its head to show allegedly the opposite position. But then maybe the reason it's not clear has something to do with how the argument can be used for either side of the question.

If anyone has time to look at this part of the article and attempt to place the argument in simpler terms that would be great. i intend to take a look at this over the next several days to be sure that the podcast discussion that we release doesn't conflict with our best reading of this fairly tricky subject.