Posts by Cassius

Elli referenced this is a post: Fragment 213 :"Sweet is the memory of this dead friend."

And of course there is this that would be relevant --

47. I have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to you or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

OH --- I have what I think is a GREAT suggestion ---

Oscar I have a couple of references to point you toward ---

Not exactly funeral rites, but a cemetery stone --

No I don't recall seeing that -- if you come across it please post - I will google too.

Simple to find - I will see if there is a better version - http://www.thinkatheist.com/group/atheists…-by-christopher

In that context, I forgot the paragraph that Vincent Cook has on his site Epicurus.net about "Epicurus and The Judeans" (for some reason I can't reach the site this morning, so this is the archive.org link) -

Epicureanism and the Judeans

In the Talmudic Mishnah, one of the authoritative documents of Rabbinical Judaism, there is a remarkable statement in the tractate Sanhedrin that defines the Jewish religion in relation to Epicureanism:

“All Israel has a share in the world to come, as Isaiah said: And all of your people who are righteous will merit eternity and inherit the land. And these are the people who do not merit the world to come: The ones who say that there is no resurrection of the dead, and those who deny the Torah is from the heavens, and Epicureans (‘Apikorsim’).”

Modern Jews use “apikoros” as a generic term for an unbeliever, but the authors of the Talmud were clearly singling out followers of Epicurus. In effect, this statement is saying that all of Israel will enjoy eternal life except those who get corrupted by Epicurus or certain characteristic Epicurean beliefs (namely, Epicurean denials of an after-life and of divine providence). This peculiar hostility towards Epicureanism is all the more remarkable for the fact that this particular statement was later taken to be the basis for speculation about the meaning of Jewishness among Rabbis of the Middle Ages, the most famous of whom, Moses Maimonides, explicitly continued the Jewish tradition of denouncing Epicureanism late in the 12^th century A.D.

Antiochus IV

The origins of this anti-Epicurean element of Jewish thought can be traced to the 2^nd century B.C., when the Seleucid monarch Antiochus IV Epiphanes embarked on a military campaign against Egypt in an attempt to conquer his Ptolemaic rival. Judea had the misfortune to be located between the Seleucid heartland of Syria and Ptolemaic Egypt, and the Judeans were divided into pro-Seleucid and pro-Ptolemaic factions. At this time, the hereditary Zadokite priesthood had been deeply influenced by Greek culture, adopting doctrines that tended to discount the conservative oral tradition and deny some of the more superstitious beliefs then current, notably the belief in bodily resurrection. At the time of Antiochus's campaign, the Zadokite high priest was a pro-Ptolemaic partisan.

Antiochus, anxious to secure Judea in connection with his Egyptian expedition and to create a more culturally-unified empire, had the Zadokite high priest removed and founded a Greek-style Gymnasium in Jerusalem. Antiochus was sympathetic to Epicureanism (albeit not acting in accord with Epicurus's injunctions to avoid politics), so his attempt at a forced hellenization of Judea was closely linked to Epicureanism in the minds of the Judean patriots. Another factor was that Epicureans were prominent in the hellenized cities of Galilee, creating a rivalry between Epicureanism and the traditional religion among the northern Judeans. Antiochus's provocations brought about a strong nationalistic reaction, which exploded into violence when a rumor of Antiochus's death reached Judea. While the rumor was false, nonetheless the Hasmonean leader Judas Maccabeus was ultimately successful in his revolt against the Seleucids.

After the Hasmoneans consolidated their power, a rather delicate situation developed with respect to the priesthood. The hereditary successors to the priesthood had had their legitimacy fatally undermined by their hellenizing tendencies and their close association with the foreign Ptolemaic monarchy. The party of the “separatists” (the Pharisees), prevented the Zadokite legitimists (the Sadducees) from reassuming control of the temple in Jerusalem, while some of the Sadducees set up a rival temple in the Egyptian city of Leontopolis.

To further complicate matters, Judea later became a client state of Rome, and the Romans installed their own Jewish rulers and Sadducee priests. Not only were they opposed by the Pharisees, other anti-foreign religious factions arose during the late Hasmonean period (early 1^rst century B.C.) to challenge the Pharisees and the Sadducees and the Samaritans (a regional offshoot of Judaism whose followers had established their own center of worship on Mount Gezzerim), their adherents questioning the necessity for temple ritual and priestly authority altogether. One of these dissident groups called themselves the “keepers” (Nazarim) of divine wisdom. These Nazarim, or Nazarenes, taught that righteousness towards others along with frequent rituals of baptism and anointment and a ritual eucharist for the dead was sufficient to place oneself in accord with God without the traditional temple ceremonies. After the Roman conquest of Judea, the Nazarene cults became one of the focal points of resistance to Roman and Herodian rule, as both the Pharisees and Sadducees were co-opted by the Herodian monarchy that had been installed by the Romans.

Spoils from the Jerusalem Temple

The historical significance of these intricacies of ancient Judean politics is that the Pharisees are the direct ancestors of modern Rabbinical Judaism, while the Nazarene movement spawned two religions that have survived to modern times, the Mandaean and the Christian. The founding of these two Nazarene religions was attributed to John the Baptist and Jesus, respectively.

The Talmud is derived from the Pharisaic oral tradition, so the Talmud passage quoted above can be explained as a Pharisaic attack on the Sadducees by comparing some of the distinctive Sadducee beliefs to those of the hated Seleucid defiler of the Temple. It seems that the Sadducees could never quite live down the charge of having sold out to the Seleucids and the Romans, as they disappeared shortly after the Romans destroyed the Jerusalem Temple in 70 A.D. and the genealogical records for proving their Zadokite ancestry (the last remaining basis for Sadducee legitimacy) along with it. Today, the memory of the Maccabean revolt against Antiochus survives in the Jewish celebration of Hanukkah, and the legacy of the factional conflicts of the Hasmonean period lives on in the separate religions of the Jews, Mandaeans, and Christians and in the Talmudic denunciation of Epicureanism.

All of those a week reasonable and correct to me. The only small quibble would be that I think we always have to be careful with the word "random" not to imply that anything is possible. I don't think "anything is possible" is Epicurean, and would cite the AA Long article "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism"

Poster (whose post should not be lost to time):

I do not have "justice" as a separate goal from pleasure. It is just one of many behaviors that bring me pleasure.

What I know from developmental pediatrics is that the sense of justice is not learned-- it is innate. The sense of empathy-- innate. The specific ways your culture will develop practices to express justice and empathy can vary a lot, but the basic sensation of pleasure in justice and empathetic actions, and pain at injustice and nonempathetic actions-- these are not taught.

Further, either you have empathy or you don't-- on a spectrum, yes, but we know of no way to make a biologically low empathy person care about others. We can modify their behavior to a degree, but we can't cause them to have feelings their brains don't produce.

So that brings me to the conclusion that it is always an error to wonder if a typically empathetic person will be cruel if advised to seek pleasure. The answer is no, because that would cause the typical person pain.

I think people ask this question for two reasons-- first, a worry that they themselves will become a type of person they don't like. No, of course not, because that would be pain. Nothing needs to be added to the philosophy to rescue you from that pain-- you'll naturally avoid it. No god or absolute moral is needed. This is good not because it keeps you from being unjust but because you won't have to worry about that particular pain. I hope that relieves you of any anxiety over that question.

Second, people worry that non-empathetic others will become criminals, since they would be advised to seek pleasure and they are NOT typical-- they don't biologically care about justice for others. So we would be in danger.

The answer to that concern is what Elli quoted above, that laws are to protect typical just humans from the unjust. Since the unjust, low empathy types are already not motivated by caring, being told there's no absolute morality does not take away empathy that wasn't there. It could take away their fear of afterlife punishment, but punishment is generally a minimally effective deterrent anyway. Look at all the religious criminals in jail, whose desire to commit a crime overrode their fear of hell. Part of that is because most current religions allow last minute forgiveness-- very convenient! Lol.

I think we are better off using evidence based deterrents for the non-empathetic, such as Japan's system of restorative justice, which has low recidivism. Which is in line with taking action in favor of our own pleasure in safety. It does not trigger any sense of injustice pain in us to do that, because our innate justice sense is based on a tit for tat strategy.

Posted originally here

Yes I have Oscar, and the full text is available online at Epicurism.info at this link:

http://www.epicurism.info/etexts/stpaulandepicurus.html

This book is more limited in interest than DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" but it contains a lot of good analysis and citations to places in the "New Testament" which may possibly be referring to Epicurus.

I'm not entirely convinced that there is as much to this bridge / transition thesis as Norman DeWitt makes it out to be. in fact you could probably take his same cites and add them into the argument that Wiker makes in the "Moral Darwinism" book as evidence that Epicurus and Christianity are from the beginning and forever at war with each other.

But to repeat all my prior comments, I think DeWitt is hugely perceptive on Epicurus so no doubt there are matters of parallel development here that support DeWitt's view.

To me, this book is probably of most interest to people who are well-versed in New Testament details and will enjoy seeing how Epicurus may indeed have a / the "Antichrist" to the early Christians, with such references as the "Prince of Power of Air."

Perhaps this book is also a personal attempt to reconcile Epicurus with Christianity, if DeWitt personally was a Christian, but unfortunately I know nothing about DeWitt personally, so I just take the book on its own merits.

Yes it's available through Google books, and if you google some of the greyer sites you can find it online.

Elli and I have discussed getting it translated to Greek too, but so far have not made much progress. We contacted the University of Minnesota press about it and It remains in copyright for another decade or two.

I agree that Wiker came up with an interesting title in "Moral Darwinism" -- a title that probably lends the book more gravity than it deserves.

Quote from michelepinto

"Principle that is accepted as true or just, without critical examination or discussion: proclaim a dogma

This form of "dogma" would be absolutely unacceptable to all of us, I am sure!

Michele you will see that Frances Wright does a very good job of campaigning against just this type of dogma. I recall she has Epicurus criticize the Pythagoreans on exactly this point.

I also think that one day when I am able to prevail on you to read the Norman DeWitt book that you will find that you agree with his take on it too.

The germ of an issue with which we do wrestle, of course, is the position taken by Pyrrho and the Skeptics that *nothing* is in fact "true," or the position by Cicero that all things are "merely probable."

Have you read the remaining fragments of Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" as translated by DeLacy? There is an EXCELLENT explanatory essay by DeLacy at the end of that book about how Epicurus differed from Plato and Aristotle on the issue of what truth is and what things we should be confident of and which we should not.

For the moment we will just proceed "dogmatically" taking the position that you are not taking sides with those "....trifler[s], who pervert all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards."

Glad to have you Rivelle, and glad that things are (mostly) going well for you! Sounds like you have a lot of interesting background (English literary history) so we'll look forward to discussions with you here. Thank you for joining us!

michelepinto - I was going to go with Cicero as the fourth, but given our recent exchanges about skepticism, I went with Pyrrho instead!

Daniel how did you come across this book? Is it well known?

Poster 2 asked: "Can we conclude, then, that the pleasant life will look very similar for most people?"

Cassius:

Perhaps so if you limit the universe being considered drastically enough. The best life for all Eskimos in Alaska in the year 1930 would probably look roughly the same, perhaps, as an example. But the true ultimate point is that just as "justice" is not the same for all people at all places and all times (and that's explicit in PD30-40) so "virtue" is not going to be the same, and so the best application of "simplicity" or "sustainabilty" is not going to be the same. And the greater the differences in circumstances between the sets of people involved, the greater the difference in what is simple and sustainable and the best net result in terms of pleasure over pain is going to be.

And if you are diagnosed with cancer and have a year to live and have no wife and children to support, are you going to live the same way as if you are 25 and married with three kids and have no health problems?

I think the point of all this is that an Epicurean understanding of a universe which is not ordered by gods or fate or determinism demands a sliding scale. The ultimate unifying factor is the feeling of pain and pleasure which generally works the same for most humans, but beyond those facts of nature there are no hard and fast rules. Of course "the feeling of pain and pleasure which generally works the same for most humans" is itself a set of limits and boundaries, so it is also not true to think that "anything goes."

Poster 2 - And any order disappears into the chaotic entropy of relativism...

Cassius:

Order" is the trap the religionists expect you to fall into. The nature of things derives from the properties of the elements and the qualities of the bodies that come together from the elements. That gives us all the limits and bounds we need to have confidence in reality and to learn to live happily. There is no foundation for Randian "objectivism," and suggesting that just because there is no god everything is "subjective" is equally ridiculous. Go put your hand in a fire and tell yourself the resulting pain is all relative.

Also:

"But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by its creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone.

When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise."

Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 15, 1820

Welcome Rivelle - when you get a chance please let us a little about yourself and your background with Epicurus!

Here's my view on that:

Quote from michelepinto

This is why I don't believe I have any truth in my hand.

Taken to an extreme, that would make you a skeptic like Pyrrho, and I am sure you are not one of those! The key word there would be "ANY" truth -- because I know that you do have at least SOME truth And that is why the part of Lucretius book IV beginning as follows is one of my favorites:

Bailey: Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?

Browne: Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

Quote from michelepinto

As it is not possible to prove the existence of God it is not even possible to prove its non-existence. At most we can argue about the possibilities of one thesis or another.

That is very close to the formulation taken by Frances Wright in "A Few Days In Athens" -- but in the context of the general existence of gods such as the Greeks were familiar with, not supernatural gods which could have created the universe, on which I believe Epicurus was rightfully very firm.

Quote from michelepinto

I have a friend who feels such a comfort in believing that there is a God to take care of him who, if denied, could hardly be happy.

I too have such friends - and family members - and I do not attempt to engage them in these discussions for that same reason - it would destroy the happiness that they have created for themselves, and they would not be able to reconstruct a substitute. But that does not mean that i do not engage people who are capable of handling the truth, hopefully which includes everyone who comes to this forum and reads the ground rules of what we are doing here - pursuing Epicurean philosophy.

Quote from michelepinto

I don't think this can make them happy, but why should I decide for them?

I absolutely agree that we have absolutely no right to decide for other people what they should choose to believe.

Quote from michelepinto

But I respect the ideas of others. I'll never find myself saying, I'm right, you're wrong. This is what religions say.
Epicurus is not a prophet, but a philosopher, his wisdom is human and perfectible.

Saying "I am right and you are wrong" depends entirely on the subject matter at hand. Many many issues are matters of interpretation and discretion. But if someone tells me that they are never going to die, presuming that the person is someone with whom we have entered discussion in good faith, I tell them "you are wrong."

I say "presuming it is someone who enters discussion in good faith" to distinguish the situation of a conversation with a religious fanatic, with whom I would not choose to engage anyway, but with whom I would not want to talk unless I were sure that the fanatic were not capable of resolving the dispute by force.

So in general I think the issue of how to discuss things is one in which great discretion is required, with the full truth reserved to those with whom the full truth can really be shared.

But on core issues of fact, discussed among friends, I think Epicurus was certainly correct to have said, as recorded by Diogenes Laertius, that

"[The wise man] will be a dogmatist but not a mere skeptic;."

Poster1 - How does this reconcile the natural/necessary categories that are traditionally ascribed to Epicurus?

IV - The categories don't restrict the pleasures. They tell us whether we should choose to indulge in the pleasure or not, and how often.

Poster 2 - Yes but can't we also be happy with simple pleasures? For example I'd love to be driving a ferarri but i drive a hybrid so i am happy enough that i'm saving a little gas. I guess I don't understand if he's teaching that pleasures include pain that is greater than the pleasure?

Cassius: That is exactly the point Bryan. You don't need a Ferrari, but do you really even "need" the hybrid, which is something wonderful of modern technology but would appear hopelessly complex to anyone more than a few decades ago? The Amish say that they get along quite well even today with horses and buggy's. The point is that choices are not absolute, but are relative to the individual person's circumstances. There is no absolute definition of "simple" vs "complex" and if you begin to think that there is, then you begin to fall into the error of other schools which hold that things are good and bad in themselves, made that way by gods of by ideal forms.

There are no such ideal forms or supernatural gods. There is only you, and the options open to you, and the question of what will happen to you when you choose from among available options.

It's not the point of these exercises to create a list of what constitutes Natural or necessary, and you don't see in the surviving epicurean literature any such lists, except in the extremely broad form we are discussing here. If you have the capacity to spend 24/7 on a riverside under a tree in the spring talking with your friends, then indeed that is the choice you should make, and that in fact might be akin to how "the gods" spend their time. But such a choice is not open to many of us (I would say "any" of us) so you have to keep your mind geared to the *practical* -- which is choosing among the options with an eye toward what the eventual total outcome will be for your life.

Yes simple is frequently the best choice, but it is NEVER the best choice "because it is simple" -- it is the best choice (when it is) because it leads to the practical result of the most pleasure over the least pain with your entire life in view.

Poster 2 - What if an action entails no disturbance to the performer of that action but to some other being? Said action could still entail no disturbance to the performer even in the case of the performer having reasons to believe that the action could possibly harm others. Is the pleasure produced by the action still not bad in itself in that case?

Cassius: No pleasure is ever "bad in itself" -- Epicurus states that flatly - because "pleasure feels good" which is what makes it pleasure. There is no outside or inside standard (gods, ideal forms, or Aristotelian "essences") which operate to make a thing bad in itself.

The common question of how to relate to others is not an exception to that rule -- there are no exceptions to reality.

The issue of the effects of our dealings with others is answered the same way. What will happen if I choose one course vs. another.

We might want to think that "people are special" and "there's a spark of the divine in everyone" and "Jesus loves ALL the little children of the world" but those things are fictional and simply not true.

The question of "Don't you need religion or XYZ in order to have a happy society is addressed by Diogenes of Oinonanda (Martin Ferguson Smith translation):

"Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before."

Poster 1: Can we conclude, then, that the pleasant life will look very similar for most people?

In other words, barring extreme outliers, cannot we conclude that in most circumstances avoiding junk food, promiscuous sex, and reckless spending habits (for examples) will lead to the most pleasant life?

I too would resist the urge to make a finite and definitive list of do's and don'ts but aren't some things just by the way nature is 'bad' insofar as they are almost guaranteed to bring us pain?

Cassius Amicus: Bottom line in my view the issue is that the circumstances of the group of people you are looking at will determine how similarly they make decisions. Eskimos in Alaska in 1930 will have different answers to what is simple and what is extravagant than New Yorkers in 2019 and their lives will look very dissimilar.

But yes, there are definitely characteristics that cut across time and place -- things that intoxicate us (romantic love) are going to be dangerous for everyone; walking on the edge of cliffs is going to be dangerous for everyone. But the 'by way of nature' you're talking about are things that arise from the nature of the human beings involved, and the way their bodies and minds operate, not "by way of gods telling us, or by way of ideal forms telling us how to live" and that's really the big issue.

As Epicurus says in PD10, we might consider the choices of a person to be monstrous, but if in fact those choices produced for the person a happy life, we would have no grounds for condemning those choices as "objectively" wrong.

10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligate men really freed them from fears of the mind concerning celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, and the fear of pain; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures from every source and would never have pain of body or mind, which is what is bad.

Wow I liked that sculpture - good job! Michele you have a copy of Bernard Frischer's Scuplted Word and his discussions and photos of the seated Epicurus? That's they way I primarily see him too, but surely in his younger years he was not always so, and I would like to picture him in his prime rather than in his declining years.