Posts by Cassius

Also, on the "dreadful" -

That's a word that to me tends to emphasis the excruciatingly painful, which - going along with Nate's earlier comment - might not be so much the intimation as is "good" vs "bad" or even "evil".

"good" is a very generic word that both sounds philosophical and doesn't emphasize some kind of pointed state of ecstacy. Does the original greek bear a "bad" that corresponds to what is translated as "good" so that the entire passage sounds more philosophical than referring to "terrible" or "dreadful?"

Thank you Don! That is a great start toward what we ought to set up as a special page!

Considering it as you said a rough draft from which to work further, I hope we can combine our efforts and work on turning this into something that will be an important resource.

Is there any way beyond ellipsis that we can indicate how much of gap exists before and after the Tet?

You know Bryan (and Don et al), whether as part of the Epicurea or otherwise, I think it would be a major contribution if we could combine our efforts and come up with a complete version of whatever is left of the scroll on which the Tetrapharmakos is taken. We don't even seem to have an agreed upon title, and I gather all it is referred to is P. Herc. 1005

It would be a major contribution if we could put together a page on

"Translation Of The Surviving Text of P. Herc. 1005" and begin to put all that we know about this scroll in context.

Is any of it of substance translated in a Sedley or other text? Where would we begin?

This is definitely a subject I'd like to see expanded as part of our studies of Epicurean canonics. Might be worth a subforum at some point, but more likely I will create an entry in the Canonics section of the Wiki here and list the separate fallacies there.

Today I came across this reference to a logical fallacy that is addressed in Lucretius. I am sure there are many more, but this will get the thread started:

The Fallacy Of Division / Composition

Here's the thrust of the fallacious reasoning, in an entry for Fallacy of Division:

The fallacy of division^[1] is an informal fallacy that occurs when one reasons that something that is true for a whole must also be true of all or some of its parts.

An example:

1. The second grade in Jefferson Elementary eats a lot of ice cream
2. Carlos is a second-grader in Jefferson Elementary
3. Therefore, Carlos eats a lot of ice cream

The converse of this fallacy is called fallacy of composition, which arises when one fallaciously attributes a property of some part of a thing to the thing as a whole.

If a system as a whole has some property that none of its constituents has (or perhaps, it has it but not as a result of some constituent's having that property), this is sometimes called an emergent property of the system.

The term mereological fallacy refers to approximately the same incorrect inference that properties of a whole are also properties of its parts.^[2][3][4][5]

Dealt With in Epicurean Texts

The same wikipedia artlcie says:

Both the fallacy of division and the fallacy of composition were addressed by Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations.

In the philosophy of the ancient Greek Anaxagoras, as claimed by the Roman atomist Lucretius,^[6] it was assumed that the atoms constituting a substance must themselves have the salient observed properties of that substance: so atoms of water would be wet, atoms of iron would be hard, atoms of wool would be soft, etc. This doctrine is called homoeomeria, and it depends on the fallacy of division.

---

This would be found at Lucretius Book 1, at 830, which begins as follows:

[830] Now let us also search into the homoeomeria of Anaxagoras, as the Greeks term it, though the poverty of our country’s speech does not suffer us to name it in our own tongue; nevertheless the thing itself it is easy to set forth in words.

[834] First—what he calls the homoeomeria of things—you must know that he thinks that bones are made of very small and tiny bones, and flesh of small and tiny pieces of flesh, and blood is created of many drops of blood coming together in union, and that gold again can be built up of grains of gold, and the earth grow together out of little earths, that fire is made of fires, and water of water-drops, and all the rest he pictures and imagines in the same way. And yet he does not allow that there is void in things on any side, nor that there is a limit to the cutting up of bodies. Therefore in this point and that he seems to me to go astray just as they did, of whom I told above.

Bryan do you know if there is a translation of what exists most closely before and after this passage? I don't think I have been able to piece together anything coherent about that, much less any indication of how much is lost between anything that remains and this particular passage.

Don I noticed that in my prior thread here (from several years ago) I don't think you added any comment. I think several of my links came from or through you, but since you are one of the most-well-versed on the text issues, if you have anything new to add to bring that thread up to date, please do.

In addition to the translation issue I think it is almost or more an issue that we do not have the immediate before or after context of these lines. This lack of context accentuates what I personally think is the ultimate issue, that the work in largest context appears to concern a dispute among Epicureans in which over-simplification and not paying sufficient attention to reading the original texts is a criticism being leveled by Philodemus against others.

Without the before or after context we have no way of knowing whether this formulation was being cited approvingly or disparagingly. It's for that reason that I don't "blame" Philodemus for the confusion that we now have to deal with. If more context is discovered at some point we may find out the truth someday, but in the meantime this excerpt is the *only* statement of this formulation in the ancient texts, and it is a shame that it is being presented to the world as being as worthy of respect as if it were a well-attested statement of Epicurus himself.

Not saying that you have any new input on these issues but for others reading along intermittently maybe at some point someone will make new connections that help us with it, once they are aware of the issues.

Quote from Don

I need to find a better translation and change that WP article

If you can that would be great!

Quote from Eikadistes

One thing I'll note is that EYEKKAPTEPHTON is used in opposition to TAΓAΘON (which, as Don has demonstrated in the past, can appropriately be expressed as "The Good", which is Pleasure), so in this case, "the terrible" or "bad", I think, is referring to the general feeling of Pain.

Thanks to you guys for pointing this out. The common discussion across the internet as "the terrible is easy to endure" is probably in my view the most damaging aspect of talking loosely about it.

The point of PD3 and PD4 from which these are derivations seems to me to be almost certainly, as you are stating, to be directed at "the good" or "what is good in life" and "the bad" or "what is bad in life," in a generic and philosophical way. Give the wide net that is included with Epicurus' view of "pleasure" then there's a corresponding wide net regarding "pain." The thrust of Epicurus' views on pleasure and pain are completely defensible and persuasive when put placed in its full philosophic context. In the form it's trumpeted widely, as for example in today's Wikipedia, I continue to see its use as an abomination.

No need to go through all this again but we continuously have new people, so might as well link to my prior thread here for those who have not seen it.

I am not finding a prior thread directly on the Sorites Issue - and this is something we will want to remedy. In the meantime here are some links where it has come up before:

Post

The Covered Father

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not…

Bryan

March 2, 2024 at 9:43 PM

Sorites paradox - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

168

Discussion in Lucretius Today Episode 150 - Episode 150 - "Epicurus And His Philosophy" Part 06 - Development of the School in Mytilene and Lampsacus

Note about the Sorities discussion:

Post

RE: October 7, 2024 - First Monday Epicurean Philosophy Zoom Discussion - Agenda

A key text which was mentioned in our Zoom last night involves the first sentence of the following quote which Usener catalogs as part of U67, from Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 12.67, 546E:

• And indeed Epíkouros, while not hiding himself, says loudly "I myself am not able to conceive the good – if I removed the pleasure from flavor, and removed the pleasure from Aphrodisian activities." For this wise man believes that even the life of profligates can be irreproachable – if It should be safe

…

Cassius

October 3, 2024 at 9:32 AM

Thanks very much!

A key text which was mentioned in our Zoom last night involves the first sentence of the following quote which Usener catalogs as part of U67, from Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 12.67, 546E:

• And indeed Epíkouros, while not hiding himself, says loudly "I myself am not able to conceive the good – if I removed the pleasure from flavor, and removed the pleasure from Aphrodisian activities." For this wise man believes that even the life of profligates can be irreproachable – if It should be safe and favorable for one of them! Therefore, the Poets of comedy, who are perhaps disdainful of pleasure and intemperance, call out the Epicureans and Followers.

As stated, the first sentence will be our special focus, but the remainder of the quote illustrates how enemies of Epicurus combine it with PD10 and their general denunciation of pleasure for purposes of disparagement.

Find the full U67 on page 188 of Bryan's PDF version of Epicurea here:

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4995-epicurea-9-11-pdf/

Happy Birthday to Cassius! Learn more about Cassius and say happy birthday on Cassius's timeline: Cassius

I am glad we reached this section before we do our special episode on the "real vs ideal" debate. This section contains some very interesting material on images, a subject that most seem to agree play into the question of prolepsis.

Welcome to Episode 249 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to insist that gods are supernatural and not at all similar to humans. We will, in turn, respond to Cotta's particular and general arguments.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly, like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.

But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in burning furnaces.

In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting.

XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but you term it “the approach and entrance of images into the mind.” Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the Gods are happy and eternal.

Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected, yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of, or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you derive any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect. For what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my mind, and yet not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore, can they be those persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells us that there never was such a person as Orpheus the poet; and it is said that the verse called Orphic verse was the invention of Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him, as you will have it, often runs in my head. What is the reason that I entertain one idea of the figure of the same person, and you another? Why do we image to ourselves such things as never had any existence, and which never can have, such as Scyllas and Chimæras? Why do we frame ideas of men, countries, and cities which we never saw? How is it that the very first moment that I choose I can form representations of them in my mind? How is it that they come to me, even in my sleep, without being called or sought after?

XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.

Lucretius Today Episode 248 is now available: "Cotta Pushes The 'Argument By Design' Against The Epicurean View That All - Including Gods - Is Natural."

Thanks Don. Joshua's insight there at the end was worth the entire episode, and we tried to follow up on it in our recording this morning.

There's a lot more going on here beneath the surface beyond just "what gods would look like."

Welcome to Episode 248 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to insist that gods are supernatural and not at all similar to humans. We will, in turn, respond to Cotta's particular and general arguments.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXIV. ... Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal. Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude—call it which you will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)—can it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did you ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand worlds, but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind; and as in mind, so in body? Why, therefore, as we are inferior in all other respects, should we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches nearer to the divinity than human form.

XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What can be more childish than to assert that there are no such creatures as are generated in the Red Sea or in India? The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the knowledge of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens, and rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because we never saw them? That similitude which you are so very fond of is nothing to the purpose. Is not a dog like a wolf? And, as Ennius says,

The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man!

Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity than an elephant; yet where can you find any of a larger size? I am speaking here of beasts. But among men, do we not see a disparity of manners in persons very much alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If this sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe what it would lead to. You have laid it down as certain that reason cannot possibly reside in any but the human form. Another may affirm that it can exist in none but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, that grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists of a soul, and an infirm and perishable body; in short, in none but a mortal man. But if you decline those opinions, why should a single form disturb you? You perceive that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with all the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven with his being; abstracted from which, you nevertheless know God, you say, if the lineaments do but remain. This is not talking considerately, but at a venture; for surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. How troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And why so? Because neither use nor ornament requires more than five; but your Deity has not only a finger more than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders, sides, a paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are these parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive to the existence of the Deity? Is the face itself of use? One would rather say so of the brain, the heart, the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of life. The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation of it.

XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent and stupendous works, the world, and its respective parts—the heaven, the earth, the seas—and the splendor with which they are adorned; who, contemplating the sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity and changes of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred from thence that there must be some excellent and eminent essence that originally made, and still moves, directs, and governs them. Suppose they should mistake in their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is that great and noble work which appears to you to be the effect of a divine mind, and from which you conclude that there are Gods? “I have,” say you, “a certain information of a Deity imprinted in my mind.” Of a bearded Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva.

But do you really imagine them to be such? How much better are the notions of the ignorant vulgar, who not only believe the Deities have members like ours, but that they make use of them; and therefore they assign them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of the Gods, yet they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity doing nothing. The Egyptians (so much ridiculed) held no beasts to be sacred, except on account of some advantage which they had received from them. The ibis, a very large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys a great number of serpents. These birds keep Egypt from pestilential diseases by killing and devouring the flying serpents brought from the deserts of Lybia by the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that may attend their biting while alive, or any infection when dead. I could speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, the crocodile, and the cat; but I am unwilling to be tedious; yet I will conclude with observing that the barbarians paid divine honors to beasts because of the benefits they received from them; whereas your Gods not only confer no benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of any description whatever.

Lucretius Today Episode 247 is now available: "Cotta Continues To Insist The Gods Are Supernatural And Not At All Similar To Humans."

I would expect any of our readers in GA or NC or DC or the Florida panhandle might be without power - at least that's our situation! But we have battery power and podcast editing continues. Gotta keep the responses to Cotta coming!