Rolf I am pretty sure this is the one where Don appeared with us:
there's also the full series of episodes on Cicero's "On The Nature of The Gods" that begins with episode 226:
Posts by Cassius
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Bryan's word list:
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Welcome to Episode 287 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
Today we close in on the ending of Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's argument that all we should face pain "like a man," focusing most of his attention on soldiers and military analogies. This week, Cicero turns his attention to examples of wise men facing pain, and he begins to summarize his argument. We'll pick up with Section XXV.
Prolepsis Discussion Outline
FWIW at the moment my plan is to organize tomorrow's session to maximize getting all participants up to speed on what the sources say about the background of the dispute. We can then after that, and in this thread, take up any relevant modern theories that people want to discuss.
- Review of the pre-Epicurean background to which Epicurus was reactling, including Plato's Meno Paradox, based on our prior discussions on that here.
- Review of the Epicurean sources, which we'll take up using DeWitt's organization in Chapter 8 (Section 3) of Epicurus and His Philosophy. These sources will include:
- Diogenes Laertius Section 33
- 33. The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’
- 34. Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view. The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth. Now we must proceed to the letter.
- Cicero's "On The Nature of The Gods" Book I Beginning Section XVI
- ... Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men is there but possesses untaught some preconception of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement.
- XVII You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that "that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favor, since all such things belong only to the weak."
- If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshiping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favor alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence.
- Epicurus' References in the Letter to Menoeceus and Principal Doctrines
- Diogenes Laertius Section 33
I think that Cassius doesn't necessarily like endorsing one scientific view too much or trying to shoehorn Epicurean philosophy into a modern theory, and I agree somewhat. For me, modern science - investigations into nature - is a way to update Epicurus' spirit if not the letter of his physics.
I am all for discussing modern validations of Epicurean theory too, but the reason for my different emphasis is to get people on board with the philosophical issues that Epicurus was dealing with so we can see why he thought this issue was important.
Much like atomism is an explanation of the way the world works that is graspable and gives confidence that the universe is natural rather than divine, I we need to understand that Epicurus was assembling a theory to provide confidence that a reasonable explanation of knowledge can be grasped without requiring us to believe in ideal forms, recollection of past lives, etc.
When you grasp at a conceptual level what Epicurus was doing, you're not as likely to fall to the problem of toying with the theory as a purely historical predecessor to modern science. Just like there's a lot more to Lucretius than atomism, you see that a big-picture analysis of the problem of knowledge is still very relevant today.
As DofO said in identifying the ultimate question:
QuoteFr. 5
[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?
Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.
It has been suggested that this week we do a general review of Prolepsis / Anticipations. This is a deep topic with lots of uncertainty but several of us have discussed this numbers of times and i think we can have an articulate discussion about the general outlines of the topic that would be of help to newer people. And so this will be our June 22nd topic for our Sunday Zoom discussion.
Maybe there's a "preprint" available somewhere that we can search for....
Episode 286 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Confronting Pain With Reason Rather Than With 'Virtue.'"
Due to a quirk in the forum software I am not sure that everyone gets notified when a new "blog" article is published. I suspect many people navigate by looking to see what new threads are posted, so this thread is for purposes of being sure people are aware of her latest article:
Excellent contribution Bryan! So given that Epicurus was likely aware of this statement by Aristotle, which tracks the reasoning of Cosma Raimondi, by the way, what do we make of Diogenes Laertius' and Cicero's statements which seem to stake Epicurus out on the opposite position?
At the moment i am still of the opinion that Epicurus DID say something about the wise man still being happy while under extreme pain, given the statements of Diogenes Laertius and Cicero to that same effect.
I personally then am inclined to conclude that this is going to be more evidence that Epicurus was using words in non-standard ways, and that he did the same to happiness as he did to pleasure and virtue and gods. Clearly if Epicurus held himself to be happy in the midst of last-phase kidney disease, then he is working with a definition of happiness that does not exclude extreme pain. Aristotle and Cosma Raimondi may think that makes no sense, if they are focusing solely on the "stimulative pleasure" side of happiness, but given that Epicurus was expanding the scope of the word "pleasure" I think it's entirely possible that he in fact considered himself to be "happy" and expected his students to understand why.
And that's where I am on "crying out" too. Yes it makes total sense that Epicurus or anyone else would "cry out" when under extreme pain. But on the other hand I do not think it would make sense for Epicurus to compose a book of "Lamentations" to devote his mind to wailing or waxing at length on how much pain he was in.
Leading me to conclude that the best interpretations are probably:
(1) Epicurean happiness does not totally exclude the experience of great pain (mental and bodily). We'll certainly do what is possible to avoid that, but we will bear it by deeming our pleasure to outweigh that pain up until the moment we deem it time to "exit the stage" (because we have rationally concluded that the future will be unavoidably worse);
(2) An Epicurean like any other person going to "cry out" when under torture, but as long as his actions are within his control, an Epicurean won't wail and gnash teeth and compose length lamentations about the pain of life. And in fact an Epicurean will plan ahead to the extent possible to make sure that he does not degenerate into an out-of-control condition before taking events into his own hands.
Ok. You're proposing about 15 acres.
Don this subject came up in the zoom last night. Do we have any indication whatever to your knowledge as to the size of the garden in terms of acres? Kochie was thinking pretty large, and it would probably be enlightening - if there is any basis for it - to start making clear the "size," just as the "location" is significant.
Any suggestions for audio readings?
Joshua's response to this is my view too.
Were it not for the Charlton Griffin rendering on Audible, this forum might well not exist. It was *the* turning point for me in my decision to devote more time to studying Lucretius. I'd rank the Dewitt book up there in the same category of major influences, but it turns out that I needed the motivation of hearing Lucretius read in Griffin's booming voice to really motivate me.
I can't recommend the Griffin audio (which is a reading of the Rolfe Humphries translation) highly enough.
And as a comment on the Humphries verse rendering, I've found that one the best for me too. Even his rending of the title: "The Way Things Are" strikes me as the best "tone" to reflect how forceful Epicurean philosophy can be.
Don is correct. I think most people would agree that the current leading translation by one of the foremost leading scholars is Martin Ferguson Smith's Hackett Publishing version. You can find that lots of places inexpensively.
I know you're looking for a printed edition so I won't focus on the three we have here.
Also check here, and let's add further longer comments there to add to that discussion:
I'm reminded of Thomas Jefferson's language in the American Declaration of Independence that we are entitled to the "Pursuit of Happiness". It's not a static state
I think that's exactly right! Certainly happiness can be used to refer to a feeling that exists in the moment, but also happiness can be more of an evaluative judgment as well, and it's important to distinguish which one we are talking about.
Yes that's the interesting part. Regardless of Laertius, CR pretty clearly had Cicero, and Cicero clearly says that Epicurus held that the wise man can be happy when in the bull. Did CR simply not believe him?
And there's a note in the Martin Davies' introduction to the letter to the effect that CR was reputed to be something of an expert in Cicero.
It would be interesting to look at the Latin / Italian of CR's original letter.
Even if the wise one is under torture - stretched on the rack, he is experiencing eudaimonia."
I recall in my college philosophy class that the professor generally translated that as having a "good spirit."
It seems like the usage in English of "happy" over time has changed, but regardless of that there's no doubt that a normal person today hearing the word "happy" is going to understand at first glance something much different than what was being talked about by Epicurus and the others as well.
Having a good spirit would also appear to be something of an idiom even then - certainly Epicurus did not consider there to be anything supernatural involved in it, regardless of what Socrates might have implied about having a "daemon" talking to him.
What does that lead to? Probably to the continuous need for up-front and early discussion of what "happiness" really means when describing Epicurean philosophy, just like explanations are needed for "pleasure" and "gods" and "virtue."
Epicurus has probably given us the best example possible by writing that letter on his last day. That makes it unmistakeable that happiness does not require total absence of and separation from pain.
That's another very good observation about reading things together. Which takes us back to some degree to the related question of "How did Cosma Raimondi get this wrong?". Is this point Don just made what he failed to appreciate?
I might recombine these two threads given that they may be more closely related than I anticipated, but for the time being I'll keep them separate and just crossreference. Cosma Raimondi is probably an example of the interpretation problem, but the problem is much bigger than him.
And I think the same mistaken estimation of Epicurus ' views of "happiness" is why Cosma Raimondi apparently failed to recognize that Epicurus was taking the same position as the Stoics took, albeit with drastically different definitions of the term "happiness."
It's going to take a lot of adjustment in the minds of many people who think that Epicurus' highest priority was to exclude every pain from life, and that their way to happiness is to live minimally and ascetically so as to never let any pain intrude.
Instead, it appears to me that the fragments we have remaining on this issue point the way to seeing that Epicurus fully recognized that all pain cannot be removed from life in practice, and that in fact he was prepared to find happiness even during periods of great mental and physical pain.
We all know that it was important to Epicurus to emphasize that the goal is happiness rather than "virtue," but this understanding blows a hole in the superficial analysis that happiness is to be found in finding some kind of ambiguous "absence of pain." It points to a much deeper analysis of how pleasure and pain form the basis of happiness. As Diogenes of Oinoanda said, the question is not "what is the means to happiness" but "What is happiness?" And many writers on Epicurus have never really articulated what happiness really means and how it doesn't equate to "absence of pain."
QuoteFragment 32:
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
I've followed this discussion, but I don't understand why discussions of human behavior in extremis (at the point of death) are relevant to the average person. It sounds like argument for argument's sake. I don't intend to be argumentative, but why should we care how a person's prior state of happiness affects them moments before death? Is that supposed to prove anything about the value of living well?
I think your question helps point to the answer. I agree, the Epicureans would NOT have engaged in an in extremis debate unless for the sake of making a larger point. Nor do i think Cicero would. There are deeper issues at stake about the meaning of happiness and under what terms, if any, it can be lost.
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