Posts by Cassius

Quote from Pacatus

And I disagree that there is (or can be) some non-contextual definition of “happiness” that can be applied except in the most abstract of cases.

Which leads to the question: Do we stop trying, or do we simply define our terms as we think best, such as "believe that a god is a living being blessed and imperishable" or "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain."

I think Epicurus is with you, and that he therefore - rather than give up or give in to false presumptions - determined that he was going to state his own terms to explain the answer to contentious questions.

I therefore think Dons "subjective wellbeing" helps explain the issue, but in Epicurean terms Epicurus decided the best term for this either is or falls under "pleasure."

Cute comment by Cicero:

Quote from Cicero On Fate I

The method which I pursued in other volumes, those on the Nature of the Gods, and also in those which I have published on Divination, was that of setting out a continuous discourse both for and against, to enable each student to accept for himself the view that seems to him most probable; but I was prevented by accident from adopting it in the present discussion on the subject of Fate.

I am setting up this thread in preparation for devoting one or more episodes of the Lucretius Today podcast to the sections of this work devoted to attacking Epicurus. I'd like to add here quotes that are relevant either to Epicurus directly or to issues where Cicero is directly contradicting Epicurus. This collection will then be used to develop the outline for the podcasts devoted to this topic.

A transcribed copy of the Yonge edition is here. I would also like to add a link to the most recent public domain version of the Loeb edition.

Welcome to Episode 259 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our review of the key doctrines of Epicurus that are featured here at Epicureansfriends on the front page of our website.

This week we will address what Epicurus and Lucretius use as the starting point for the discussion of Epicurean physics: nothing can come from nothing.

Full show notes here: Lucretius Today Episode 259 - Nothing Comes From Nothing

Welcome to Episode 258 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week, now that we have completed Book 1 of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," we are going to move to a discussion of some of the most important doctrines of Epicurus as listed on the front page of our website.

This week will be the continuation and conclusion of our discussion on the Epicurean rejection of determinism.

Lucretius Today Episode 257 - Fate, Necessity, Determinism

Lucretius Today Episode 258 is now available:

"There Is No Necessity To Live Under the Control of Necessity - Part 2 - Conclusion"

Welcome to Episode 257 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week, now that we have completed Book 1 of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," we are going to move to a discussion of some of the most important doctrines of Epicurus as listed on the front page of our website.

This week we will be discussing Epicurus' refutation of determinism.

A discussion guide for this episode is here:

Lucretius Today Episode 257 - Fate, Necessity, Determinism

Welcome to Episode 256 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week, now that we have completed Book 1 of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," we are going to complete our series on the Epicurean gods by addressing a common question: Did Epicurus think that his gods had real physical existence?

Today's Text

We are bridging over from the following contained at the very end of Book One of On The Nature of The Gods:

XLIV. ...

But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs? Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed, in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members of a man, without the least power to use them—a certain unsubstantial pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none, since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of imbecility.

Lucretius Today Episode 255 is now available: "CIcero's Cotta Argues That Epicurean Gods Are As Despicable As Are Epicureans Themselves"

Quote from Kalosyni

The quest and desire for "meaning" is brought about by feeling vexation and dissatisfaction with one's life.

I would say that the decision to seek "meaning" rather than happiness is directly related to buying in, or being browbeaten, into thinking that pleasure and happiness are disreputable goals. The ancients didn't talk about "meaning" because they still had the intellectual integrity to see that the issue is between virtue, a type of Idealism, and happiness caused by pleasure, which is what Nature gives us.

Quote from SillyApe

That's why I like the teachings of Epicureanism on how to cultivate a good life: they are tangible and "real", not based on some abstraction or transcendence. Sensations are here and now, being way more reliable than abstract concepts.

I definitely agree with that as to transcendence, and as to "abstractions" I have used that formulation myself.

i write to talk about the meaning of "abstractions" probably not being clear enough would explanation. Mental pleasure is certainly recognized by Epicurus as being as much, or more, significant to us than "bodily" pleasures (the quotes are because all pleasures are ultimately of the body, and yet it is useful to distinguish the five senses from what we are talking about as "mental").

I think what we are concerned mostly about in attacking the writer's concept of meaningfulness is that he and many others are postulating that there is some 'higher' (transcendent) set of values that override the values of real living people. That's simply untrue - false - wishful thinking, and needs to be refuted as such.

On the other hand, there are mental pleasures - friendship would be one - that are extremely important to us, and are not to be dismissed because they are "abstract." I've probably been "guilty" in earlier years here on the forum of calling the problem "abstractions" when I probably should have called the problem "idealism" or "transcendentalism" or similar wording. Maybe there are even better words to describe what we are talking about, but the issue i think is, as you say, the "here and now" which is important to us, and not fictionalized idealism. The term "abstractions" probably includes feelings that are indeed real to us in the here and now, so we have to sort out whether they arise from things that are true and real (the reality of nature, including human nature) vs those things that are purely invented in our minds (the idealism of the supernatural and the idea that some things transcend nature).

Quote from Kalosyni

....more science details:

While I certainly am interested in the latest science, I wouldn't want us to go in that direction primarily. We need to understand where Epicurus was going because his view of death is going to relate to his view of life and how to spend it, as well as his views on reductionism/skepticism. The issue is not how long it takes our bodies to irreversibly decompose, the issue is whether after that period of time (no matter how long it is) we have "souls" which continue to live on in perpetuity.

Again, congratulations on some very good work.

As to the comments I made on PD02 in general, I moved them over here:

Post

RE: PD02 - Best Translation To Feature At EpicureanFriends?

I haven't had time to go through these yet but I will. Thanks for the work Eikadistes!

In the meantime I glanced at the page and here's a general comment:

2 Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]



Some people are going to argue that what Epicurus is saying here is more either:

A Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved is imperceptible; and that which is…

Cassius

November 13, 2024 at 9:17 AM

Quote from Eikadistes

It would be more prudent to express the idea that "Those who have died are definitely not experiencing an afterlife."

Yes I definitely think that's the primary take-home point of the whole thing, as per what is said in the letter to Menoeceus:

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.

The tricky part to me is that PD02 seems to be focusing on deprivation of sensation in a somewhat different way than the letter - making a deeper point about the relationship between sensation and being alive.

I don't think we've addressed the question, sort of like the sorites question, of "How many faculties can you subtract from a human and still have something that is alive? I tend to think that "sensation" is sometimes being used not only to refer to the five senses but also to pain and pleasure and prolepsis.

Can you still have pain or pleasure or prolepsis without having any of the five bodily senses? I think it makes a considerable difference whether the answer is (A) once the five senses are gone you are dead or (B once the five senses AND pain and pleasure AND prolepsis is gone you are dead.

The implication of the standard translation of that last clause as "and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us" may tend to make some people think that any absence of all of the five senses equals death, but I am not sure at all that that is correct unless we also specify that feeling (pain and pleasure) and prolepsis are also gone. Being "unconscious" might suspend the five senses, but would not equal a state that is "nothingness" in the same way that death would. Or would it?

Opinions on any of that?

Following up on my comment in post 16 above, I see that there are a couple of translations in the list that Kalosyni cited that seem to me to make more sentence (especially in the last portion) than the dominant version that we usually see. These two (especially Anderson) strike me as better conveying what would appear to be the intended meaning:

“Death is nothing to us, because dissolution means unconsciousness and unconsciousness is nothing to us.” De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

““Death is nothing to us, because a body that has been dispersed into elements experiences no sensations, and the absence of sensation is nothing to us.” Anderson (2004)

I haven't had time to go through these yet but I will. Thanks for the work Eikadistes!

In the meantime I glanced at the page and here's a general comment:

2 Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]

Some people are going to argue that what Epicurus is saying here is more either:

A Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved is imperceptible; and that which is imperceptible in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]

or at least:

B Death in no way exists for us; for that which has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us. [see: Key Doctrine 2]

Apparently the original Greek must indicate it the way everyone wants to translate it, but what would you say to someone who says that version A or B of phrase would be more consistent with Epicurus' views on the canon of truth (which is based on perception)? The "that which lacks perception in now way exists for us" seems to be the most difficult to follow as worded.

I originally posted this reference for last week's episode, but we deferred it til this week as it is more appropriate here in the closing:

Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 20:

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .................

For god [is, I say], a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having complete [self-sufficiency]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have beings as fellow-citizens.

And there is this further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man — I do not say «god» —, having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

Welcome to Episode 255 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 41 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more worthy of the country of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?

But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.

XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention the power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor beneficent. Is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good men? The very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear to men; and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only, without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands, and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no return. How much more reason have we to think that the Gods, who want nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! If it were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? Why do the priests preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? What have we to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them?

But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs? Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed, in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members of a man, without the least power to use them—a certain unsubstantial pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none, since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of imbecility.

- End of Book One -

Happy Birthday to C. Florius Lupus! Learn more about C. Florius Lupus and say happy birthday on C. Florius Lupus's timeline: C. Florius Lupus

Lucretius Today Episode 254 is now available: "The Skeptic Asks: Does Not Epicurus Undermine Religion As Much as Any Outright Atheist?"

Episode 254 upcoming within the hour. I want to commend Joshua again for coming up with a brilliant subtopic to close the episode -citing Emily Austin's suggestion of what Lucretius had in mind for the closing of his poem. Really pulls together a lot of what we have been talking about. Posting soon.