Posts by Cassius

Well he's certainly not in the best condition he could possibly be, as no one would voluntarily choose kidney disease. But the general point is the happiness and predominance of pleasure do require total absence of pain, so it is perilous to summarize the philosophy as the removal of all pain rather than focusing on the value of Pleasure as allowing happiness even when some pains are present.

And I do see our conversation as being about "the best ways of explaining Epicurus to normal people" rather than that we are trying to nitpick against particular people or expressions.

Edit - thanks to Wbernys for pointing out that my second sentence should be do NOT require...!

Quote from wbernys

because we can't experience the height of pleasure while in pain, and oftentimes pain doesn't allow pleasure as the two are opposites, so I don't mind commentators emphasizing that with caveats.

And yet on the last day of his life Epicurus considered himself happy / and/or considered it to be among his happiest days despite his excruciating pain.

How would you reconcile that with what you just wrote as quoted there?

I see this discussion as extremely helpful as well on the question of how best to convey Epicurean philosophy to others.

Here's another example of a similar issue, this from the blurb on "Martin the Epicurean" at Amazon:

I would draw attention to the last phrase of the last sentence. I don't mean to be criticizing anyone in particular here, and I haven't traced back to see if that is a quotation from the book itself or an addition by an Amazon or other book representative. I see the blurb is written as if it were not written by MFS himself.

But regardless of who wrote it, when I see that I can't help but think that 95% of people are going to take that as meaning either one of two things -- (1) Pleasure doesn't include sex drugs and rock-n-roll, it ONLY includes "absence of pain in the body and absence of trouble in the mind" or (2) Sex drugs and rock-n-roll may be pleasures, but the ULTIMATE pleasures are "absence of pain in the body and absence of trouble in the mind."

I am here of course using "sex drugs and rock-n-roll" as a stand-in for all of the normal and ordinary active pleasures of body and mind, specifically including "joy and delight."

And I don't think it's true, or helpful to imply even if it sounds good to some people, that either (1) or (2) are what Epicurus taught.

Edit: I'm also not entirely comfortable with the statement that Epicurus "regarded scientific knowledge as subservient to the moral end." Not as much of a problem there as in the explanation of pleasure, but I'd be concerned about confusion there as well. Epicurus didn't start out complaining that his teachers didn't tell him how to live happily, he started out questioning their scientific rigor as to chaos.

Quote from wbernys

Psychological hedonism helps to dispel this vanity, there is no rising above pleasure or pain, there are only correct and incorrect views on how to achieve it. So it helps to both "knock down our opponents who say they are mighty and rise above pleasure, generally removes stigma around hedonism, and offers a therapy that we all pursue the same goal, so let's find out how to achieve it.

Ok yes then this is just where we have a disagreement as to the best and most accurate way of describing what Epicurus is doing.

It's the same problem I have with this sentence from Brittanica:

psychological hedonism, in philosophical psychology, the view that all human action is ultimately motivated by desires for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. It has been espoused by a variety of distinguished thinkers, including Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, and important discussions of it can also be found in works by Plato, Aristotle, Joseph Butler, G.E. Moore, and Henry Sidgwick.

In my view, nothing was added of value to the world or to the human race by those two sentences, ESPECIALLY as to the result them being to imply that Epicurus held the same views as Bentham or Mill, or even similar views to Plato, Aristotle, Butler, Moore, or Sidgwick.

Our friend Elli here I think makes a similar point when she refuses to discuss Epicurean philosophy as "Epicureanism." Grouping things together overbroadly creates major problems in the understanding of ordinary people. No doubt specialists in psychology and psychiatry may find such groupings helpful, in the same way that the term "American" can apply to someone who lives in Portland Oregon or San Francisco CA or New York NY or Mobile Alabama. They all live in the same continent, but to suggest for very long that we can generalize much about their psychology from that fact would be to make a major mistake.

This conversation really solidifies why I find it unhelpful to talk not only about "pscyhological hedonism" but to "hedonism" in general. There are so many ways of looking at these issues that to imply that there are other commonalities beyond the term "pleasure" being centrally involved is to create more confusion than clarity.

So probably as this conversation dies down we'll all go back to our separate observations as to when and where it is appropriate to talk about "hedonism" or "psychological hedonism," and this will be a "to each his own" issue of applying whatever terminology works best for a particular situation. And I can see the merits in that approach, even if I have to grit my teeth when the term comes up and think to myself "that person*** is trying to apologize for pleasure."

*** Not a reference to Webernys or anyone here!

I see this and I can see where it supports where you are coming from wbernys. What I am not convinced of is that talking in terms of "psychology" is helpful to a philosophical discussion, as I see much potential damage in it for the reasons we are discussing. Is focusing on "psychological hedonism" not just a method of "apologizing for" hedonism?

I would say that Epicurus is not advocating the pursuit of pleasure because we "have to" pursue pleasure, he is advocating for it because Nature prescribes it, we have the ability to ignore Nature's prescription, and we will live better if we follow Nature rather than substituting our own goals. Do you see that part differently?

Quote

psychological hedonism, in philosophical psychology, the view that all human action is ultimately motivated by desires for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. It has been espoused by a variety of distinguished thinkers, including Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, and important discussions of it can also be found in works by Plato, Aristotle, Joseph Butler, G.E. Moore, and Henry Sidgwick.

Because its defenders generally assume that agents are motivated only by the prospect of their own pleasures and pains, psychological hedonism is a form of psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is a broader notion, however, since one can hold that human actions are exclusively self-interested without insisting that self-interest always reduces to matters of pleasure and pain. As an empirical thesis about human motivation, psychological hedonism is logically distinct from claims about the value of desires. It is thus distinct from axiological or normative hedonism, the view that only pleasure has intrinsic value, and from ethical hedonism, the view that pleasure-producing actions are morally right.

Psychological hedonism | Pleasure, Pain & Motivation | Britannica

Psychological hedonism, in philosophical psychology, the view that all human action is ultimately motivated by desires for pleasure and the avoidance of pain.…

www.britannica.com

Quote from wbernys

Secondly, If this is Epicurus' position (which i believe it is) than it is important to know how to defend it from others like the Stoics and Religious who will say that this an evil doctrine, taught by a nihilistic and crude man, and both he and we are just projecting our own vile natures onto good people (something I've seen a few times).

OK here in this sentence, it is the "this" I am questioning (I added the underline).

I would say that Epicurus would hold that "pleasure" is nature's guide and that happiness is a life of pleasure and that is what we should pursue, and that we see that this is nature's goal by observing the young of all species.

Are you suggesting that instead of saying it that way, it is more persuasive to say "Epicurus was a psychological hedonist, meaning that we all pursue what we believe we will find pleasureable whether we do so consciously or not."

If you are suggesting that saying "Epicurus was a pyschological hedonist ...." is more persuasive, I don't understand why that would be the case, because then going on to defend the position that "everyone is doing it whether they do so concsiously or not" in my view just then shifts the playing field over onto the question of whether people are conscious of their actions and reasoning or not. I don't personally find arguing that position particularly productive of anything because it sounds like the topic of debate has become some form of determinism.

Apparently there's some disconnect in what you're seeing and what I am seeing. I am by no means saying you are wrong (as I think Don agrees with you) but I sam still missing the point of shifting the discussion of the pursuit of pleasure over to the field of "whether you are conscious of it or not."

Help me understand why it seems attractive to talk about "psychological hedonism" rather than just "hedonism."

Is it because "psychological hedonism" implies you can't help it so you are defending hedonism on the grounds that "you can't help it"?

Keith tells us:

I am 77 years old and have had a lifelong interest in Philosophy. This has influenced both my beliefs and how I conduct my life.

Initially this resulted in the dismissal of many social and religious conventions but then turned me to embracing the results of my learning.

Epicurean philosophy has until recently played an important but adjuvant role and Epicurious was never the subject of my focused study. Then approximately six months ago a book reading group I belonged to had “Living for Pleasure” by Emily Austin as the subject. I warmed to the content and started to dig deeper into the life and legacy of Epicurious which I have found highly logical and remarkable in its relevance in the age of science.
I then stumbled across the Epicurean Friends website and it appears that you offer a remarkable resource for me to further develop my interest in Epicurean philosophy. I would therefore very much appreciate if you would accept me as a member.
Kind regards,
Keith

Welcome Keith

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 24 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion.

Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards and associated Terms of Use. Please be sure to read that document to understand our ground rules.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be assured of your time here will be productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you already have.

You can also check out our Getting Started page for ideas on how to use this website.

We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

But maybe it would help me understand where you are coming from wbernys if I understood:

What do you think it gains someone to make the point "Epicurus was a psychological hedonist" ?

That's the point I really don't understand. I feel like someone is thinking that this is a profound insight that leads to some really important conclusions or living a better life, but I just don't see the direction or the benefit in arguing for the label.

It seems to me that PD25 can be read perfectly logically as a call to make sure your goals and actions truly align, because it's very possible to be mistaken about whether you are pursuing your goals and actions consistently.

What benefit comes from saying "PD25 tells us that Epicurus was a psychological hedonist?"

Quote from wbernys

We can have free will to believe absurd things, like the mythic gods or death being an evil, we have freedom to make extreme miscalculations, but not maybe not in deciding that we like pleasure and dislike pain, and that this always play a role in our decisions.

This is exactly what I think is *not* the case in terms of end result. Now I do agree that the feelings of pleasure and pain are largely "hard-wired" as we are born finding some things painful and other things pleasurable. Perhaps some modifications can be made in that over time and with training but they are relatively minor. And in that sense I do think there is a large element of necessity.

And that's the point. "Psyschologically" in our mind we can tell ourselves to pursue some other goal than pleasure. We have the free will to do that as Godfrey makes the point and Don has observed the same thing. This is absolutely obvious when we consider all the different views in real life as in philosophy as to what goals we should pursue in order to maximizes "happiness."

And talking about "happiness" is another way of making the same point. Most everyone seems to "want to be happy" (a point that would support "psychological hedonism" but we can change our minds or have different opinions about what happiness means to us an infinie number of times.

So when Don says this I agree:

Quote from Don

I would argue that everyone pursues what they believe will bring them pleasure, will provide happiness. It's just that sometimes - often - we fool ourselves into pursuing those things that will not in reality bring pleasure in the long run.

But I don't see how that makes any kind of profound point. It's like saying "People do what they want to do" or "People do what they think they have to do" and those points may or may not be true in a given situation.

But the whole project of pursuing Epicurean philosophy is that your mind can choose what to pursue and to avoid, and that you should affirmatively and consciously seek to align your goals at every moment with the goal nature has given you to pursue, which is pleasure. And this statement presupposes that you have the power to choose another goal other than pleasure.

And in this context part of the point could be that everyone (even Stoics and Religionists) say that they are pursuing "happiness" but if you pursue happiness by pursuing anything other than pleasure (nature's goal) then your actions (pursuit of virtue or piety or duty, for examples) will not be consistent with your avowed goal (happiness)

-----

As another comment from another direction, if in fact the best translation is one of "your" then I would not rule out the possibility that this statement was pulled out of a specific letter or some other specific context which would provide additional background to those who were aware of it. And that's another reason I would be reluctant to adopt any construction of its means that would seem to undercut the entire project of emphasizing our power through reason to align our actions with reaonable conduct so as to achieve a life of happiness which is a life of pleasure.

Happy Birthday to Noddy! Learn more about Noddy and say happy birthday on Noddy's timeline: Noddy

Yeah the very fact that you are fleeing/escaping or pursuing/chasing indicates to me that what you're doing is exercising free will, and I don't see how that is compatible with implying that everything everyone does is "necessarily' because they see it as leading to greater pleasure for them.

We don't need to take every question and submit it to AI engines for their response so I'll hold off from that and I suggest others do too at least for a while. Exploring the issue is genuinely useful for our own development, and I think we're going to find that the issue is definitely worth talking about and thinking through to taking a position.

Ha - I see this earlier thread from you on the same subject --- one thing I do agree with is that this is an interesting issue to flesh out

Quote from wbernys

Cooper (1999) thinks it is evidence that Epicurus is not a psychologist hedonist,

Do you have a link to what you are referring to here? I would like to see the argument he is advocating.

Quote from wbernys

Basically it says that "no matter how much the Stoics like to talk about virtue in of itself", there actions are still ultimately motivated by a fear of pain and desire to remove mental disturbance, even if they don't admit it.

I generally come down on the other side of this question because I think there is a major issue of determinism to consider here. I would expect Epicurus' focus would be on "free will" and he would not advocate a doctrine that would not allow for people to "be wrong" and to in fact pursue something that they recognized was not in their best interest.

I know that we have seen opinions on this forum before on both sides of the issue, so this is a good opportunity to discuss it again, especially because I see both positives and negatives in the use of the argument that "everyone is really a hedonist." if I recall correctly this is in Emily Austin's "Living For Pleasure," but I don't like using that approach myself. Maybe someone can persuade me to see it differently if we identify and articulate both sides of the question.

This week we continue on into properties and qualities of bodies and other aspects of emergence.

Lucretius Side-by-Side

Draft Outline of this episode, We ourselves should be so lucky as to get half of this in, but the outline may be helpful to others and for the next several weeks:

Podcast Outline: Cicero Academic Questions Book 2, Sections 8-9

Opening Frame (5-10 minutes)

Recap the battle map from Section 7:

• Three players: Stoics (some impressions reliably true), Academic Skeptics (no impressions reliably true), Epicurus (senses neither right nor wrong — judgment always in the mind)
• Lucullus in Sections 8-9 shifts tactics: he stops defending the kataleptic impression directly and instead argues that practical life, virtue, and wisdom require certainty. This is a different kind of argument — from consequences rather than from epistemology. Flag this shift for listeners.

Major Point 1: The "Virtue Requires Knowledge" Argument (Section 8 )

Lucullus argues that the virtuous person who endures torture to preserve duty and faith must have comprehended something true — otherwise what grounds the commitment? If nothing can be known, why would anyone hold to anything at all?

Epicurean Response to develop:

• Epicurus agrees entirely that virtue requires knowledge — but the knowledge required is the Canon's knowledge, not the Stoic's rational grasp of a kataleptic impression.
• The wise person who endures pain does so because they have correctly understood through sensation, anticipation, and feeling that certain goods (friendship, integrity, the conditions of genuine pleasure) are genuinely worth preserving.
• The Epicurean grounding for moral commitment is empirical, not rationalist. The commitment doesn't require certainty in the Stoic sense — it requires honest attention to what sensation and feeling actually report.
• Key distinction to make: Lucullus is assuming that the only alternative to Stoic knowledge is Academic paralysis. The Epicurean is a third option he hasn't considered.

Major Point 2: Wisdom Knowing Itself (Section 8 )

Lucullus asks: if wisdom doesn't know whether it is wisdom, how does it act with confidence? How does it know what the highest good is?

Epicurean Response:

• This argument proves too much. The Epicurean has a perfectly clear answer to "what is wisdom?" — wisdom is prudence (phronesis), the practical ability to calculate what produces genuine pleasure and genuine pain correctly over time. This is grounded in the Canon, not in rationalist self-certification.
• The Stoic account of wisdom as self-certifying rational grasp is precisely what the Academic Skeptics demolished. Epicurus never needed that account. Wisdom for Epicurus is the correct use of the natural criteria — not a mystical rational state that validates itself.
• Lucullus is caricaturing the Skeptic position and then implying that any opponent of the kataleptic impression must share it. The Epicurean does not.

Major Point 3: The Impulse (Hormē) Argument (Section 8 )

Lucullus argues that the impulse (hormē) to act — the desire that moves us — must be set in motion by something "seen and trusted." If what is seen cannot be distinguished from what is false, the impulse has no reliable foundation and action becomes impossible.

This is actually Epicurean-friendly territory — develop carefully:

• Epicurus completely agrees that desire (hormē in Stoic terms, appetite/desire in Epicurean terms) is set in motion by what is seen and felt. This is precisely the role of sensation and the feelings in the Canon.
• The difference: for the Stoics, the triggering impression must be a kataleptic impression — a rational state that certifies its own truth. For Epicurus, the sensation simply registers what is there, and the feelings of pleasure and pain provide the evaluative signal. No rational self-certification required.
• This is where the alogon point is crucial: sensation is non-rational, which is why it is reliable. The Stoic impression is rational — which is exactly why it can be deceived, as the Academics showed.
• Lucullus's argument therefore inadvertently supports the Epicurean Canon as the better foundation for action.

Major Point 4: If Perceptions Could All Be False, Reason Collapses (Section 9)

Lucullus argues that if all perceptions are potentially false and indistinguishable from false ones, then:

• No syllogistic conclusion (apodeixis) is reliable
• Inquiry becomes impossible (you can't discover what is false)
• Philosophy itself, which proceeds by reason, is destroyed

Epicurean Response:

• Agree with the conclusion, reject the premise. Epicurus does not hold that perceptions could all be false. The Academics say nothing can be known; the Stoics say some impressions are certified; Epicurus says sensation is universally reliable as a registering mechanism.
• The key Epicurean point: "discovery" and inquiry are possible precisely because sensation reports accurately. The apodeixis — reasoning from the perceived to the unperceived — is exactly the Epicurean sign-inference doctrine (semeia). Sensation provides the reliable input; reason draws inferences; those inferences are tested against further sensation.
• Lucullus is scoring points against the Academics here that Epicurus would largely endorse — but he assumes Epicurus is in the Academic camp, which is wrong.

Major Point 5: The Self-Refutation of the Skeptics — Carneades vs. Antipater (Section 9)

The famous exchange: Antipater demands that the Skeptic admit that at least one thing can be known — namely, that nothing can be known. Carneades resists: the Skeptic who says nothing can be known excepts nothing, not even this claim.

Develop for the podcast:

• This is an internal Academic debate that Epicurus is not part of — but it matters because it shows that the Skeptical position is genuinely incoherent on its own terms.
• The Epicurean observation: both sides are trapped because they accepted the Stoic premise that impressions are rational states with truth-values. Epicurus stepped outside that debate entirely. The senses don't claim anything, so the senses can't be self-refuting.
• The Carneades move (the Skeptic excepts nothing) is logically consistent but practically disastrous — it produces exactly the paralysis Lucullus is worried about. This is why the Epicurean account is superior: it avoids both the Stoic overreach and the Academic paralysis.

Major Point 6: Antiochus's Sharpened Version — The Dogma Problem (Section 9)

Antiochus argues that the Academics have adopted a dogma — the rule that nothing can be perceived — and that this dogma must itself be perceived to be held and acted on. The Academics are therefore self-undermining.

Develop:

• This is the strongest argument in the section and deserves extended treatment.
• The Epicurean parallel: the Canon is not a dogma in this problematic sense. It does not require its own prior certification. Sensation is already operating before any philosophical reflection on whether sensation is reliable — which is DeWitt's point about the natural criterion. You don't first certify your senses and then use them; you use them and the use itself is the evidence of their reliability.
• Contrast with the Stoic position: the kataleptic impression does require a prior definition (Zeno's four-clause definition - SEE BELOW) and the Academics correctly identified that the third clause can never be satisfied. The Epicurean criterion requires no such definition — it is built into the nature of sensation as alogon registration.

Closing Frame: What Lucullus Gets Right and Where He Goes Wrong

Where Lucullus is correct:

• Academic Skepticism is self-defeating
• Wisdom and virtue do require some form of reliable knowledge
• Action requires that the triggering perception be trustworthy

Where Lucullus goes wrong:

• He assumes the only alternative to the Stoic kataleptic impression is Academic paralysis — the Epicurean Canon is the third option he ignores
• His insistence that there is "truth in the senses" remains a category error — the senses are the criterion by which truth is tested, not themselves containers of truth (DL X.31: sensation cannot add to or take from what it receives)
• His account of wisdom as self-certifying rational knowledge is exactly what the Academics demolished — Epicurean wisdom grounded in the Canon avoids that demolition entirely

The textual citation to anchor the close: DL X.31 on sensation as alogon — non-rational, non-judging, therefore perfectly reliable as a registering mechanism. This is what Lucullus cannot say about his own criterion, and why the Epicurean position survives the Academic attack that destroys the Stoic one.

Suggested Episode Structure

1. Recap battle map (5 min)
2. The virtue/wisdom arguments — Epicurean response (15 min)
3. The hormē argument — where Lucullus inadvertently supports Epicurus (10 min)
4. Reason and discovery — sign-inference as the Epicurean answer (10 min)
5. Carneades vs. Antipater — why the Epicurean avoids both traps (10 min)
6. Antiochus's dogma point — why the Canon needs no prior certification (10 min)
7. Closing assessment — what Lucullus gets right and where he goes wrong (5-10 min)
   
   
   NOTE:

Zeno's four-clause definition of the kataleptic impression (phantasia kataleptike) runs as follows:

1. The impression arises from an existing object
2. It is formed in accordance with that existing object
3. It is of such a kind as could not arise from a non-existing object
4. It is stamped and impressed upon the soul with all the characters of the object

The first two clauses are relatively uncontroversial — most impressions, even false ones, arise from something and bear some correspondence to their object. The philosophically load-bearing clause is the third: that a kataleptic impression is one that could not have arisen from a non-existing object — meaning it carries built-in certification of its own accuracy.

This third clause is where the Academic Skeptics drove their wedge. Arcesilaus and then Carneades argued with great effectiveness that no impression satisfies it, because hallucinations, dreams, and perceptual deceptions produce impressions that are phenomenologically identical to veridical ones. The madman who sees a phantom horse and the sane man who sees a real horse have impressions qualitatively indistinguishable to the perceiver. If the impressions cannot be distinguished from the inside, the third clause can never be satisfied — there is no class of impressions that could not have arisen from a non-existing object.

The fourth clause — the impression is "stamped and impressed upon the soul" — is Zeno's attempt to give the kataleptic impression a kind of quasi-physical character, suggesting it bears the precise contours of the real object the way a seal bears the shape of the signet ring. The Academics attacked this too, arguing that a false impression could be equally "stamped and impressed" without any difference the perceiver could detect.

The entire debate plays out within the shared assumption that impressions are rational states with truth-values — which is exactly why Epicurus, by making sensation alogon (non-rational, non-judging), steps outside the battlefield entirely. The Epicurean senses cannot have a kataleptic impression because they have no impressions with propositional content at all. They simply register. You cannot attack a registering mechanism with the indistinguishability argument, because the argument requires that the mechanism be making some kind of judgment about whether what it receives is real — and Epicurean sensation makes no such judgment.

Welcome to Episode 333 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will continue in Book Two, where we will take up Section 8

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Wow a lot of effort went into that - thanks Eikadistes!

Thank you Don!

If anyone sees any significant changes, additions, or whatever that deviate from the version at the Catalonia page, please let us know here in this thread. Up to now the version at the link below has been the best available to us:

The inscripion

Happy Birthday to mctimkat! Learn more about mctimkat and say happy birthday on mctimkat's timeline: mctimkat