I'm reminded of Thomas Jefferson's language in the American Declaration of Independence that we are entitled to the "Pursuit of Happiness". It's not a static state
I think that's exactly right! Certainly happiness can be used to refer to a feeling that exists in the moment, but also happiness can be more of an evaluative judgment as well, and it's important to distinguish which one we are talking about.
Yes that's the interesting part. Regardless of Laertius, CR pretty clearly had Cicero, and Cicero clearly says that Epicurus held that the wise man can be happy when in the bull. Did CR simply not believe him?
And there's a note in the Martin Davies' introduction to the letter to the effect that CR was reputed to be something of an expert in Cicero.
It would be interesting to look at the Latin / Italian of CR's original letter.
Even if the wise one is under torture - stretched on the rack, he is experiencing eudaimonia."
I recall in my college philosophy class that the professor generally translated that as having a "good spirit."
It seems like the usage in English of "happy" over time has changed, but regardless of that there's no doubt that a normal person today hearing the word "happy" is going to understand at first glance something much different than what was being talked about by Epicurus and the others as well.
Having a good spirit would also appear to be something of an idiom even then - certainly Epicurus did not consider there to be anything supernatural involved in it, regardless of what Socrates might have implied about having a "daemon" talking to him.
What does that lead to? Probably to the continuous need for up-front and early discussion of what "happiness" really means when describing Epicurean philosophy, just like explanations are needed for "pleasure" and "gods" and "virtue."
Epicurus has probably given us the best example possible by writing that letter on his last day. That makes it unmistakeable that happiness does not require total absence of and separation from pain.
That's another very good observation about reading things together. Which takes us back to some degree to the related question of "How did Cosma Raimondi get this wrong?". Is this point Don just made what he failed to appreciate?
I might recombine these two threads given that they may be more closely related than I anticipated, but for the time being I'll keep them separate and just crossreference. Cosma Raimondi is probably an example of the interpretation problem, but the problem is much bigger than him.
And I think the same mistaken estimation of Epicurus ' views of "happiness" is why Cosma Raimondi apparently failed to recognize that Epicurus was taking the same position as the Stoics took, albeit with drastically different definitions of the term "happiness."
It's going to take a lot of adjustment in the minds of many people who think that Epicurus' highest priority was to exclude every pain from life, and that their way to happiness is to live minimally and ascetically so as to never let any pain intrude.
Instead, it appears to me that the fragments we have remaining on this issue point the way to seeing that Epicurus fully recognized that all pain cannot be removed from life in practice, and that in fact he was prepared to find happiness even during periods of great mental and physical pain.
We all know that it was important to Epicurus to emphasize that the goal is happiness rather than "virtue," but this understanding blows a hole in the superficial analysis that happiness is to be found in finding some kind of ambiguous "absence of pain." It points to a much deeper analysis of how pleasure and pain form the basis of happiness. As Diogenes of Oinoanda said, the question is not "what is the means to happiness" but "What is happiness?" And many writers on Epicurus have never really articulated what happiness really means and how it doesn't equate to "absence of pain."
Fragment 32:
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
I've followed this discussion, but I don't understand why discussions of human behavior in extremis (at the point of death) are relevant to the average person. It sounds like argument for argument's sake. I don't intend to be argumentative, but why should we care how a person's prior state of happiness affects them moments before death? Is that supposed to prove anything about the value of living well?
I think your question helps point to the answer. I agree, the Epicureans would NOT have engaged in an in extremis debate unless for the sake of making a larger point. Nor do i think Cicero would. There are deeper issues at stake about the meaning of happiness and under what terms, if any, it can be lost.
Here's the section of Part 2 of Tusculan Disputations to which I am referring. Cicero says that making certain sounds can be helpful at times, but his criticism seems to be against extended "lamentation." Of course the part of the claim he that we avoid lamentation because it is "noble" to do so is largely inadmissible in Epicurean terms, but there are practical implications as well that are more acceptable. At any rate, this context might help explain what the issue is all about.
The key part: For as the engines you throw stones or darts with, throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing, the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them.
More context:
For the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if we give way; so the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed, that it cannot support itself. And if we consider things truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and above all things we must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the throwing out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger.
II-XXIV.¶
What! they who would speak louder than ordinary, are they satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue, or stretching the common organs of speech and utterance? the whole body and every muscle is at full stretch, if I may be allowed the expression, every nerve is exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for himself, with relation to the Varian law. For as the engines you throw stones or darts with, throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing, the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give any ease, it still should be considered, whether it were consistent with a brave and resolute man. But, if it does not ease our pain, why should we debase ourselves to no purpose? for what is more unbecoming in a man than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with respect to pain is not confined to it; we should apply this exertion of the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms; but since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is honourable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honourable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or if they are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step from their honour. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rushing into the battle. But the honourable character and the glory of the death which they were seeking, made all fear of death of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left his country triumphing over the Lacedæmonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain.
Thanks Don, that's the kind of analysis we need. At this point I'm still not 100% convinced either way, though. Certainly the wise man is more affected by his emotions than others are, but i'm not sure it follows automatically that the wise man will cry out in pain, or for how long.
Not that i am a wise man, but I know I say "ouch" when I get hit with a paper cut or something unexpected.
Maybe the issue is the subtlety of "lament" or "groan" in the sense of long extended "woe is me" wailing, which is what Cicero seems to be focusing his criticism on in Tusculan Disputations in a discussion that seems to involve funeral rites. While it's natural to "cry out" when we get a sharp pain without prior warning, it's probably not a good idea to "wail" or "lament" continuously when your gout flairs up for hours or days or weeks at a time, or when you are mourning the loss of a loved one.
At the moment that direction is probably the way I would slice the issue. Exclamations for brief and unexpected pain, but after a time you get control of yourself and focus the mind on overcoming the pain.
I see that I started a thread on this six years ago but it did not get developed. This is a question that we discussed in the podcast recorded on 6/15, so if anyone has any comment on whether Yonge could be correct, let me know and I will record some new commentary before the podcast is released.
It appears that the translators other than Yonge seem to take the position that Epicurus said that the wise man WILL cry out under torture, but it's not 100% clear to me that it's beyond doubt that that's what Epicurus would have said.
It seems to me that there is a strong analogy between being under torture and being under the extreme pain of kidney disease, and we know that Epicurus took the time to say that he was still happy while in that condition. But there's nothing recorded as to Epicurus himself groaning or crying out from pain.
Now Cicero himself says that there are times when you are exerting yourself that you will groan/cry out, much in the way that athletes do, so I can see that one angle on this is that it makes sense to groan or cry out when that accomplishes something. But on the other hand if it accomplishes nothing but giving vent to pain/fear/frustration, then I could see it having negative effects on yourself and your friends around you.
I can see as a general rule that it makes sense to say that a truly happy man does not lose his happiness just because he is experiencing severe pain for a time. But it seems to me much harder to state a general rule of "no" or "yes" as to whether or not to groan cry out.
Should we consider the possibility that Yonge has it right and the others have it wrong?
I'd especially appreciate the help of our usual Greek researchers such as Bryan and Don and Eikadistes on this question.
in a related question, there's a conflict in the translators about the Bull of Phalaris and crying out in pain. Let's deal with that here:
I think we've probably mentioned this in the past but not devoted a thread to it, and this apparent conflict in the sources deserves scrutiny to see how it might be reconciled.
In his letter, Cosma Raimondi takes the Stoic to task for saying that one can be happy even while being roasted in the bull of Phalaris. Here is the section. I have included both the direct statement and his justification, where he explains his reasoning, which seems to me to be sound as far as it goes.
Though this was Epicurus’s judgment, the Stoics took a different view, arguing that happiness was to be found in virtue alone. For them the wise man would still be happy even if he were being tortured by the cruelest butchers. This is a position I most emphatically reject. What could be more absurd than to call a man ‘happy’ when he is in fact utterly miserable? What could be sillier than to say that the man being roasted in the bull of Phalaris,1 and subject to the most extreme torment, was not wretched? How again could you be further from any sort of happiness than to lack all or most of the things that themselves make up happiness? The Stoics think that someone who is starving and lame and afflicted with all the other disadvantages of health or external circumstances is nonetheless in a state of perfect felicity as long as he can display his virtue. All their books praise and celebrate the famous Marcus Regulus for his courage under torture.2 For my part I think that Regulus or anyone else, even someone utterly virtuous and constant, of the utmost innocence and integrity, who is being roasted in the bull of Phalaris or who is exiled from his country or afflicted quite undeservedly with misfortunes even more bitter, can be accounted not simply not happy but truly unhappy, and all the more so because the great and prominent virtue that should have led to a happier outcome has instead proved so disastrous for them.
If we were indeed composed solely of a mind, I should be inclined to call Regulus `happy’ and entertain the Stoic view that we should find happiness in virtue alone. But since we are composed of a mind and a body, why do they leave out of this account of human happiness something that is part of mankind and properly pertains to it? Why do they consider only the mind and neglect the body, when the body houses the mind and is the other half of what man is? If you are seeking the totality of something made up of various parts, and yet some part is missing, I cannot think it perfect and complete.
Nevertheless, the position CR is attacking (a man can be happy even under torture) seems to be endorsed by Epicurus as well, if both Diogenes Laertius and Cicero are correct:
Diogenes Laertius 118
And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament.
Cicero Tusculan Disputations II-VII.¶
But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere, that if a wise man were to be burned, or put to the torture,—you expect, perhaps, that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself under it with resolution! he would not yield to it, and that, by Hercules! would he very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules whom I have just invoked: but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, that robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in Phalaris's bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it! What sweet? is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those very men who deny pain to be an evil, are not in the habit of saying that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say, that it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which Epicurus uses—a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull, and his own bed: but I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he bears it with courage, it is sufficient; that he should rejoice in it, I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, against nature, hard to submit to, and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly through extremity of pain on mount Œta: the arrows with which Hercules presented him, were then no consolation to him, when......
What are the possibilities?
Are there other possibilities?
Good to hear you are well Eikadistes and thanks for those links.
Welcome to Episode 286 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
Today we close in on the ending of Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's criticisms of Epicurus' PD04, and Cicero's argument that all we need to do to overcome pain is to approach it "like a man."
This week, Cicero says that the call to virtuous conduct and overcoming of pain come from reason itself, which is the master of the soul. We'll be picking up with Section XX.
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The citation from Lucretius mentioned in this episode:
But still I fear your caution will dispute the maxims I lay down, who all your life have trembled at the poets' frightful tales. Alas! I could even now invent such dreams as would pervert the steadiest rules of reason, and make your fortunes tremble to the bottom. No wonder! But if Men were once convinced that death was the sure end of all their pains, they might with reason, then, resist the force of all Religion, and contemn the threats of poets. Now, we have no sense, no power, to strive against prejudice, because we fear a scene of endless torments after death.
Episode 285 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue Part Two of Cicero's treatment of the nature of evil in Tusculan Disputations, and our episode is entitled: "The Significance Of The Limits Of Pain"
Looks great - thanks Tau Phi!
As to the value of practice and the perils of insufficient practice, I just posted a thread here:
In Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 284 we discussed the issue of "practice" in dealing with pain and other challenges, and I found the adage which is the subject of this thread and wanted to pass it on, with its source, as part of that discussion.
The backstory is that as a result of a series of recent accidents I became aware of a genre of Youtube videos by people in the airline industry who make videos on the causes of airplane crashes. It's interesting on a variety of levels, especially as to the care they take in investigating all the evidence and waiting on sufficient evidence before jumping to conclusions about what happened.
In the link below, this commentator dissects a recent air crash in California in which we don't know what happened, but the recording of communications between plane and tower points to some disturbing possibilities about pilot error. In listening to that exchange and the analysis given afterward, I think we can hear several important issues that apply by analogy to Epicurus's suggestions as to how we should practice to live the happiest life possible to us.
I recommend watching the whole video if you have time, because it's very interesting and only about 15 minutes. If you do that you get the backstory and the pilot's own voice, but the analysis which I've cued at around the 10 minute mark includes the phrase I used for the title of the thread.
Another aspect that sounds like it was involved was the pilot perhaps getting a sense of helplessness and even resignation, and again there's a direct parallel to Epicurean philosophy that we should always remember that we can affect our outcomes and we're not subject to the supernatural or to fate.
No doubt there's various ways to interpret this video but I think it's true that if we haven't practiced in applying the lessons that Epicurus is teaching, it's much less likely that when we are confronted by a crisis that we will fall back to our level of practice, rather than rise to the occasion when we have not properly prepared our minds and bodies.
Hazardous attitudes can compromise safety and decision making for Pilots. I think a lot about a couple, I think I'm susceptible to like impulsivity and invulnerability. And then there's macho and anti-authority. That's four of the five, but the last one I don't think about that often is resignation, which is where a sense of helplessness can lead a pilot to just give up. And I need to remember to stay in the fight that my actions can make a difference. And to me, the best solution for resignation is training. It's often stated, but in a crisis, we don't rise to the occasion we fall to our level of training.
Welcome to Episode 285 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
Today we continue in Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's observations that we can prepare ourselves for bodily pain through exercise and training, a point in which Cicero did not pick out Epicurus as an opponent, and on which the ancient Epicureans would likely have agreed, at least to an extent. This week, Cicero tells us that he is going to leave to the Stoics to argue that pain is not evil, and he himself is going to proceed to talk about his opinion on how to deal with bodily pain, whether you are a soldier or a philosopher. We'll be picking up today with Section XVIII, and we'll see that Cicero focuses his attack on Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 4, and that will give us a great opportunity to explore that doctrine more closely.
Just as he was mentioned last week as an example of someone suffering great pain, Philoctetes is again mentioned by name as a point of reference, so we'll want to acquaint ourselves with his story:
I don't see anything there that indicates that Philoctetes cried out over his pain in an embarrassing way, but thus Cicero seems to say at XXIII:
But this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and above all things we must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry.
As might be expected, Cicero spends a lot of time talking about facing down pain in wartime, but at XXV he turns to the topic of dealing with pain in peacetime.
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Excellent topic for extended treatment, Joshua. Posting as a thread will allow for comment and suggestions while you are composing and therafter. When it is finished (am I foreshadowing Christianity there?} we will post a full copy to the Articles or Blogs section so that it can be featured for ongoing reference.
DeWitt never closes the circle and comes right out and states "and this echo of Epicurus in Christianity illustrates the goodness of Christianity in general and 'peace and safety' in particular," but it is easy to read that implication into the text.
Just as we warn people about questionable aspects of Frances Wright's A Few Days In Athens, it will be good to have a balanced treatment of this part of DeWitt's book.
