Posts by Cassius

But maybe it would help me understand where you are coming from wbernys if I understood:

What do you think it gains someone to make the point "Epicurus was a psychological hedonist" ?

That's the point I really don't understand. I feel like someone is thinking that this is a profound insight that leads to some really important conclusions or living a better life, but I just don't see the direction or the benefit in arguing for the label.

It seems to me that PD25 can be read perfectly logically as a call to make sure your goals and actions truly align, because it's very possible to be mistaken about whether you are pursuing your goals and actions consistently.

What benefit comes from saying "PD25 tells us that Epicurus was a psychological hedonist?"

Quote from wbernys

We can have free will to believe absurd things, like the mythic gods or death being an evil, we have freedom to make extreme miscalculations, but not maybe not in deciding that we like pleasure and dislike pain, and that this always play a role in our decisions.

This is exactly what I think is *not* the case in terms of end result. Now I do agree that the feelings of pleasure and pain are largely "hard-wired" as we are born finding some things painful and other things pleasurable. Perhaps some modifications can be made in that over time and with training but they are relatively minor. And in that sense I do think there is a large element of necessity.

And that's the point. "Psyschologically" in our mind we can tell ourselves to pursue some other goal than pleasure. We have the free will to do that as Godfrey makes the point and Don has observed the same thing. This is absolutely obvious when we consider all the different views in real life as in philosophy as to what goals we should pursue in order to maximizes "happiness."

And talking about "happiness" is another way of making the same point. Most everyone seems to "want to be happy" (a point that would support "psychological hedonism" but we can change our minds or have different opinions about what happiness means to us an infinie number of times.

So when Don says this I agree:

Quote from Don

I would argue that everyone pursues what they believe will bring them pleasure, will provide happiness. It's just that sometimes - often - we fool ourselves into pursuing those things that will not in reality bring pleasure in the long run.

But I don't see how that makes any kind of profound point. It's like saying "People do what they want to do" or "People do what they think they have to do" and those points may or may not be true in a given situation.

But the whole project of pursuing Epicurean philosophy is that your mind can choose what to pursue and to avoid, and that you should affirmatively and consciously seek to align your goals at every moment with the goal nature has given you to pursue, which is pleasure. And this statement presupposes that you have the power to choose another goal other than pleasure.

And in this context part of the point could be that everyone (even Stoics and Religionists) say that they are pursuing "happiness" but if you pursue happiness by pursuing anything other than pleasure (nature's goal) then your actions (pursuit of virtue or piety or duty, for examples) will not be consistent with your avowed goal (happiness)

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As another comment from another direction, if in fact the best translation is one of "your" then I would not rule out the possibility that this statement was pulled out of a specific letter or some other specific context which would provide additional background to those who were aware of it. And that's another reason I would be reluctant to adopt any construction of its means that would seem to undercut the entire project of emphasizing our power through reason to align our actions with reaonable conduct so as to achieve a life of happiness which is a life of pleasure.

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Yeah the very fact that you are fleeing/escaping or pursuing/chasing indicates to me that what you're doing is exercising free will, and I don't see how that is compatible with implying that everything everyone does is "necessarily' because they see it as leading to greater pleasure for them.

We don't need to take every question and submit it to AI engines for their response so I'll hold off from that and I suggest others do too at least for a while. Exploring the issue is genuinely useful for our own development, and I think we're going to find that the issue is definitely worth talking about and thinking through to taking a position.

Ha - I see this earlier thread from you on the same subject --- one thing I do agree with is that this is an interesting issue to flesh out

Thread

Was Epicurus a Psychological Hedonist, an Ethical Hedonist, Both, or Neither?

Admin Note: Cassius reset the title of this thread to its current form on 5/16/26 to make it our main thread on Psychological Hedonism as of 2026. When Wbernys originally set it up it was entitled - "Do you believe in psychological hedonism/egoism? Any philosophers on this?"



I'm become more interested in psychological hedonism (the thesis that all human actions are due to avoiding pain and increasing pleasure) and curious your guys thoughts on it.

I think i generally believe in it. There are…

wbernys

October 17, 2025 at 6:18 PM

Quote from wbernys

Cooper (1999) thinks it is evidence that Epicurus is not a psychologist hedonist,

Do you have a link to what you are referring to here? I would like to see the argument he is advocating.

Quote from wbernys

Basically it says that "no matter how much the Stoics like to talk about virtue in of itself", there actions are still ultimately motivated by a fear of pain and desire to remove mental disturbance, even if they don't admit it.

I generally come down on the other side of this question because I think there is a major issue of determinism to consider here. I would expect Epicurus' focus would be on "free will" and he would not advocate a doctrine that would not allow for people to "be wrong" and to in fact pursue something that they recognized was not in their best interest.

I know that we have seen opinions on this forum before on both sides of the issue, so this is a good opportunity to discuss it again, especially because I see both positives and negatives in the use of the argument that "everyone is really a hedonist." if I recall correctly this is in Emily Austin's "Living For Pleasure," but I don't like using that approach myself. Maybe someone can persuade me to see it differently if we identify and articulate both sides of the question.

This week we continue on into properties and qualities of bodies and other aspects of emergence.

Lucretius Side-by-Side

Draft Outline of this episode, We ourselves should be so lucky as to get half of this in, but the outline may be helpful to others and for the next several weeks:

Podcast Outline: Cicero Academic Questions Book 2, Sections 8-9

Opening Frame (5-10 minutes)

Recap the battle map from Section 7:

• Three players: Stoics (some impressions reliably true), Academic Skeptics (no impressions reliably true), Epicurus (senses neither right nor wrong — judgment always in the mind)
• Lucullus in Sections 8-9 shifts tactics: he stops defending the kataleptic impression directly and instead argues that practical life, virtue, and wisdom require certainty. This is a different kind of argument — from consequences rather than from epistemology. Flag this shift for listeners.

Major Point 1: The "Virtue Requires Knowledge" Argument (Section 8 )

Lucullus argues that the virtuous person who endures torture to preserve duty and faith must have comprehended something true — otherwise what grounds the commitment? If nothing can be known, why would anyone hold to anything at all?

Epicurean Response to develop:

• Epicurus agrees entirely that virtue requires knowledge — but the knowledge required is the Canon's knowledge, not the Stoic's rational grasp of a kataleptic impression.
• The wise person who endures pain does so because they have correctly understood through sensation, anticipation, and feeling that certain goods (friendship, integrity, the conditions of genuine pleasure) are genuinely worth preserving.
• The Epicurean grounding for moral commitment is empirical, not rationalist. The commitment doesn't require certainty in the Stoic sense — it requires honest attention to what sensation and feeling actually report.
• Key distinction to make: Lucullus is assuming that the only alternative to Stoic knowledge is Academic paralysis. The Epicurean is a third option he hasn't considered.

Major Point 2: Wisdom Knowing Itself (Section 8 )

Lucullus asks: if wisdom doesn't know whether it is wisdom, how does it act with confidence? How does it know what the highest good is?

Epicurean Response:

• This argument proves too much. The Epicurean has a perfectly clear answer to "what is wisdom?" — wisdom is prudence (phronesis), the practical ability to calculate what produces genuine pleasure and genuine pain correctly over time. This is grounded in the Canon, not in rationalist self-certification.
• The Stoic account of wisdom as self-certifying rational grasp is precisely what the Academic Skeptics demolished. Epicurus never needed that account. Wisdom for Epicurus is the correct use of the natural criteria — not a mystical rational state that validates itself.
• Lucullus is caricaturing the Skeptic position and then implying that any opponent of the kataleptic impression must share it. The Epicurean does not.

Major Point 3: The Impulse (Hormē) Argument (Section 8 )

Lucullus argues that the impulse (hormē) to act — the desire that moves us — must be set in motion by something "seen and trusted." If what is seen cannot be distinguished from what is false, the impulse has no reliable foundation and action becomes impossible.

This is actually Epicurean-friendly territory — develop carefully:

• Epicurus completely agrees that desire (hormē in Stoic terms, appetite/desire in Epicurean terms) is set in motion by what is seen and felt. This is precisely the role of sensation and the feelings in the Canon.
• The difference: for the Stoics, the triggering impression must be a kataleptic impression — a rational state that certifies its own truth. For Epicurus, the sensation simply registers what is there, and the feelings of pleasure and pain provide the evaluative signal. No rational self-certification required.
• This is where the alogon point is crucial: sensation is non-rational, which is why it is reliable. The Stoic impression is rational — which is exactly why it can be deceived, as the Academics showed.
• Lucullus's argument therefore inadvertently supports the Epicurean Canon as the better foundation for action.

Major Point 4: If Perceptions Could All Be False, Reason Collapses (Section 9)

Lucullus argues that if all perceptions are potentially false and indistinguishable from false ones, then:

• No syllogistic conclusion (apodeixis) is reliable
• Inquiry becomes impossible (you can't discover what is false)
• Philosophy itself, which proceeds by reason, is destroyed

Epicurean Response:

• Agree with the conclusion, reject the premise. Epicurus does not hold that perceptions could all be false. The Academics say nothing can be known; the Stoics say some impressions are certified; Epicurus says sensation is universally reliable as a registering mechanism.
• The key Epicurean point: "discovery" and inquiry are possible precisely because sensation reports accurately. The apodeixis — reasoning from the perceived to the unperceived — is exactly the Epicurean sign-inference doctrine (semeia). Sensation provides the reliable input; reason draws inferences; those inferences are tested against further sensation.
• Lucullus is scoring points against the Academics here that Epicurus would largely endorse — but he assumes Epicurus is in the Academic camp, which is wrong.

Major Point 5: The Self-Refutation of the Skeptics — Carneades vs. Antipater (Section 9)

The famous exchange: Antipater demands that the Skeptic admit that at least one thing can be known — namely, that nothing can be known. Carneades resists: the Skeptic who says nothing can be known excepts nothing, not even this claim.

Develop for the podcast:

• This is an internal Academic debate that Epicurus is not part of — but it matters because it shows that the Skeptical position is genuinely incoherent on its own terms.
• The Epicurean observation: both sides are trapped because they accepted the Stoic premise that impressions are rational states with truth-values. Epicurus stepped outside that debate entirely. The senses don't claim anything, so the senses can't be self-refuting.
• The Carneades move (the Skeptic excepts nothing) is logically consistent but practically disastrous — it produces exactly the paralysis Lucullus is worried about. This is why the Epicurean account is superior: it avoids both the Stoic overreach and the Academic paralysis.

Major Point 6: Antiochus's Sharpened Version — The Dogma Problem (Section 9)

Antiochus argues that the Academics have adopted a dogma — the rule that nothing can be perceived — and that this dogma must itself be perceived to be held and acted on. The Academics are therefore self-undermining.

Develop:

• This is the strongest argument in the section and deserves extended treatment.
• The Epicurean parallel: the Canon is not a dogma in this problematic sense. It does not require its own prior certification. Sensation is already operating before any philosophical reflection on whether sensation is reliable — which is DeWitt's point about the natural criterion. You don't first certify your senses and then use them; you use them and the use itself is the evidence of their reliability.
• Contrast with the Stoic position: the kataleptic impression does require a prior definition (Zeno's four-clause definition - SEE BELOW) and the Academics correctly identified that the third clause can never be satisfied. The Epicurean criterion requires no such definition — it is built into the nature of sensation as alogon registration.

Closing Frame: What Lucullus Gets Right and Where He Goes Wrong

Where Lucullus is correct:

• Academic Skepticism is self-defeating
• Wisdom and virtue do require some form of reliable knowledge
• Action requires that the triggering perception be trustworthy

Where Lucullus goes wrong:

• He assumes the only alternative to the Stoic kataleptic impression is Academic paralysis — the Epicurean Canon is the third option he ignores
• His insistence that there is "truth in the senses" remains a category error — the senses are the criterion by which truth is tested, not themselves containers of truth (DL X.31: sensation cannot add to or take from what it receives)
• His account of wisdom as self-certifying rational knowledge is exactly what the Academics demolished — Epicurean wisdom grounded in the Canon avoids that demolition entirely

The textual citation to anchor the close: DL X.31 on sensation as alogon — non-rational, non-judging, therefore perfectly reliable as a registering mechanism. This is what Lucullus cannot say about his own criterion, and why the Epicurean position survives the Academic attack that destroys the Stoic one.

Suggested Episode Structure

1. Recap battle map (5 min)
2. The virtue/wisdom arguments — Epicurean response (15 min)
3. The hormē argument — where Lucullus inadvertently supports Epicurus (10 min)
4. Reason and discovery — sign-inference as the Epicurean answer (10 min)
5. Carneades vs. Antipater — why the Epicurean avoids both traps (10 min)
6. Antiochus's dogma point — why the Canon needs no prior certification (10 min)
7. Closing assessment — what Lucullus gets right and where he goes wrong (5-10 min)
   
   
   NOTE:

Zeno's four-clause definition of the kataleptic impression (phantasia kataleptike) runs as follows:

1. The impression arises from an existing object
2. It is formed in accordance with that existing object
3. It is of such a kind as could not arise from a non-existing object
4. It is stamped and impressed upon the soul with all the characters of the object

The first two clauses are relatively uncontroversial — most impressions, even false ones, arise from something and bear some correspondence to their object. The philosophically load-bearing clause is the third: that a kataleptic impression is one that could not have arisen from a non-existing object — meaning it carries built-in certification of its own accuracy.

This third clause is where the Academic Skeptics drove their wedge. Arcesilaus and then Carneades argued with great effectiveness that no impression satisfies it, because hallucinations, dreams, and perceptual deceptions produce impressions that are phenomenologically identical to veridical ones. The madman who sees a phantom horse and the sane man who sees a real horse have impressions qualitatively indistinguishable to the perceiver. If the impressions cannot be distinguished from the inside, the third clause can never be satisfied — there is no class of impressions that could not have arisen from a non-existing object.

The fourth clause — the impression is "stamped and impressed upon the soul" — is Zeno's attempt to give the kataleptic impression a kind of quasi-physical character, suggesting it bears the precise contours of the real object the way a seal bears the shape of the signet ring. The Academics attacked this too, arguing that a false impression could be equally "stamped and impressed" without any difference the perceiver could detect.

The entire debate plays out within the shared assumption that impressions are rational states with truth-values — which is exactly why Epicurus, by making sensation alogon (non-rational, non-judging), steps outside the battlefield entirely. The Epicurean senses cannot have a kataleptic impression because they have no impressions with propositional content at all. They simply register. You cannot attack a registering mechanism with the indistinguishability argument, because the argument requires that the mechanism be making some kind of judgment about whether what it receives is real — and Epicurean sensation makes no such judgment.

Welcome to Episode 333 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will continue in Book Two, where we will take up Section 8

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Wow a lot of effort went into that - thanks Eikadistes!

Thank you Don!

If anyone sees any significant changes, additions, or whatever that deviate from the version at the Catalonia page, please let us know here in this thread. Up to now the version at the link below has been the best available to us:

The inscripion

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Thanks to Godfrey for this info about the translator of a popular edition of Lucretius:

This showed up in my inbox:

"Poets, Painters, and the Plunder of the Parthenon" with A. E. Stallings | Getty Events

It's a live lecture but is being streamed as well.

Quote from wbernys

I was already a little unsure about posting this.

No - I'm glad you posted. if you were thinking it it's likely others are too, so always feel free to speak up.

This goes along with Dave's question. Aside from those of us who are really into the topic there's always a general level of background discussion among people who are mildly interested, and it's there that the subtle connotations of the words end up being influential.

If people just accepted the superficial labels then no one would take any serious interest in Epicurus because the superficial labels are coded by society to keep people in line and within society's guad rails.

This forum is here for those who take ideas seriously and want to make up their own minds about things.

This is where I was just thinking and citing earlier this week some of the opening words of DeWitt's book - the second sentence of chapter one in fact

Quote

At the very outset the reader should be prepared to think of him at one and the same time as the most revered and the most reviled of all founders of thought in the Graeco-Roman world.

There's no middle ground on Epicurus. If you don't reallze that when you read opinions about Epicurus that you're reading opinions about explosive stuff, then either you or the person you're reading doesn't realize what being talked about at all.

I personally think this needs to be hammered home:

To me this conversation is sort of like discussing Epicurus as a "hedonist." Yes I understand that that term has a technical meaning in which pleasure is the key. However in common discussion the term is LOADED with implications, most of which imply that people should choose "pleasures of the moment" over consideration of "all the consequences so as to gain the greatest net pleasure, even if it means temporarily accepting pain." With a proper explanation, the term "hedonism" is fine, but that doesn't cut away the general context that it is loaded with negative vibrations.

So too with "virtue ethics," with "deonotology" (clearly the worst) and also "consequentialism" (which strips away the question of "Which consequences?" which is really the important question).

These terms get used to place people in boxes, and the motivation behind the boxing is rarely just a pure intellectual pursuit of truth. Usually the game has much more malicious purposes - to accept a negative label. So we have to be very very careful in how we play those games. Give the wrong people an inch and they will take a mile, and they will use any admission you make against you as if you are being convicted of murder in court.

(I gather this is pretty much what Eikadistes is saying too.....)

Thanks Don! U512 seems to be the key - with the problem of finding it being that Usener uses "honorable" and "excellence" and "noble." That makes it harder to find when I key on "beautiful," but for purposes of this particular conversation these wordings are even more directly on point.

U512

Aetius, Doxography, XII p. 547A: And in his work On the End-Goal, he says again: “{=U70}” And in other passages, he says “I spit upon the honorable and those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure.”

Plutarch, Against Colotes, 30, p. 1124E: … and when men take for sages those who “spit on excellence, unless pleasure attends it.” [c.f. 1124E @ U368]

Plutarch, Is “Live Unknown” a Wise Precept?, 4, p. 1129B: … to live together with Leontium and “spit on noble action,” and place the good in the “flesh” and in “titillations.”

It always irritates me when I can't find a quick reference

I have the "spit upon the beautiful" as Bailey's fragment 79, but I am not quickly finding the Usener number

Fragment Collection - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Further, even if you prefer the "beautiful" wording there (which I don't because of it's very Platonic ring) you can refer back to the adage that Epicurus spits upon the beautiful unless it brings pleasure.

As I understand it the Hicks version is "[135] He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance."

I think you can find quotes such as the Diogenes of Oinonanda statement that talk about the importance of attitude, but why is attitude important? Why is virtue important? Because they bring pleasure, not as goals in themselves. So i'd push back strongly on this direction, and question why someone might think it "feels wrong" to think of him as a consequentialist if not for the psychological pressure of a culture built on virtue ethics.

The conclusion of the philosophy is that the consequence that Nature (not society) calls for is pleasure, not virtue or anything else. Diogenes of Oinoanda himself has one of the most eloquent statements of this in his passage about shouting that a life of happiness is a life of pleasure, and that virtue is but a tool to pleasure, not the other way around.

This topic came up in our Zoom of 5/6/26 - whether the feelings and anticipations should be considered to be "sensations" or is that word only strictly applicable to the "five senses." Another way of asking the same question is to consider how parallel or close to each other the three categories really are. Obviously there are differences between them because they have different names, so they are not exactly the same thing. However it seems that they operate in similar ways, and most of us agree that Epicurus held that all of them operate "without opinion" and are "pre-rational." And perhaps most importantly for the question, at times when Epicurus talks about sensation he seems to be including the input we get from pleasure/pain and from prolepsis/anticipation as of they all fit under the same broad category of "sensation" / aesthesis.

Bryan offered the following citations in subsequent conversation and we can use this thread to discuss the issue further:

As to pleasure and pain being sensations:

(Aëtius, Placita Philosophorum, 4.8.2) "Epicurus says: 'a portion [of the functional component of the soul] is sensation, which is a certain faculty – and [a portion is] awareness, which indeed is an activity.' Therefore, with Epicurus, 'sensation' is said in two ways – while it means the faculty, ‘sensation’ also means the activity."

(PD 24) "If you will absolutely throw out any sensation, and you will not differentiate what is judged among what is still pending versus what is actually present according to sensation, experiences (i.e., pathe = the feelings), and the whole appearance-based attention of mental perception: then you will confuse the remaining sensations with pointless judgment, and thus you will throw out the criteria altogether.

(Lives 10.124c) "Every good and bad is in sensation."

(Plutarch, Against Colotes, 25, 1121A) "[the Epicureans] are shouting and being indignant on behalf of sensation: that they do not say what is external is hot -- but [say] the experience in that [sensation] produced is of that kind [i.e., feeling hot], so then – is not that the same as what is said [by the Cyrenaics] about taste: that it does not say that what is external is sweet ¬ but that some experience (i.e., pathos = a feeling) and movement has been produced for a taste of that kind [i.e., tasting sweet]?"

(Lives, 10.32) "[according to Epicurus] seeing and hearing have been established for us, just like feeling pain... all thoughts have arisen from the sensations."