In my #67 post, where I stated "the katastemic pleasures one feels when deeply studying and grasping some deep Epicurean concept", I was describing this sensory psychological static pleasure (not the kinetic act of reading words) which we simultaneously receive when acquiring knowledge as I understood from VS-27.
According to your Emily Austin reference in your Substack post (Against Katastematic Supremacy) on this topic (See Chapter 4, note 8.), "katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one's ability to satisfy one's necessary desires and an awareness of one's healthy psychological functioning".
Both of these quotes are right on point. When Emily Austin takes the position that katastematic pleasures are sensory, she is stating the MINORITY position. The more widespread position that is being argued by many is that katastematic pleasure is not sensory at all. The real meaning of "static" to them is very unclear but the essence is that they are separating it from any feeling of pleasure. Enduring? sure. Long-lasting - sure. Established? sure -- but those words do not capture the "non-sensory" aspect that I think you will find in what Max Duboff wrote, and in many others before him, and that is the real issue.
They are saying that Epicurus held that we would not know the good but for sensory pleasure, but that the good itself is not sensory at all.
I know this is counterintuitive but the fault is in the position that Austin and Aronson and Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky are pushing back against, and that is why they are pushing back.
I am working on a list of citations where people are arguing the tranquility / non-sensory posiiton that you (and Dave) have asked about and I will have more details for you soon.