Posts by Cassius

Godfrey you are asking the question that leads me to my own conclusion: How are all three legs of the canon supposed to work and what makes them canonical?

I've always come to the conclusion that in order for the legs of the canon to serve as criteria of truth, they had to function "automatically" without the input of reason/opinion. Therefore I have always rejected the view that anticipations could be "concepts," because in my view that creates a feedback loop. If the opinion we form after experience becomes part of our standard of truth, then that just doesn't work if the main feature of the canon is that it is pre-rational.

Now in my mind there is a possibility that the anticipation faculty is some kind of "organizational" capacity that can be made sharper over time, just as perhaps our ear for music or our ability to pick out detail in sight might improve with experience. But that would just be improvement in the working of a non-rational faculty, and if you consider concepts like "ox" to be subjects of anticipations, then in my mind that's a non-starter. "Ox" is a human-developed category of living things summarized in a particular word "ox," and it's going to be a matter of opinion where the dividing line between an ox and a cow and a horse and sheep really lies.

So I think DeWitt is correct in ruling out the possibility of there being an "anticipation" of a concrete particular like an ox or Plato.

The process of deciding whether the thing headed toward us is an ox, or Plato, clearly does involve some kind of process in which the mind works to narrow down the possibilities and fit the data to a pattern we have developed over time, but at the point we're saying "that's an ox because it matches our definition of an ox," and at that point we are pretty far from what Epicurus was considering to be a faculty analogous to seeing and hearing.

Now being a lawyer I think I can take the other side of that argument. I can argue that, "Yes, since human experience isn't absolute and so much is relative to our perspective, then we should consider our previously-formed concepts and opinions to be a part of our canon of "truth." In saying that we would have to emphasize that "truth" is not absolute, so it's ok to incorporate own on reasoning conclusions as part of what we think is true.

And it seems that the "later" or "the Epicureans generally" did take that course, thereby creating a fourth leg of the standard of truth.

However DeWitt concludes that that was a big mistake, and I agree with DeWitt. Once you admit that the product of conceptual reasoning itself is a part of your measure of "truth," to me you are on the slippery slope to Platonic rationalism, because your holding the opinions of your own mind as equal in authority to the promptings of nature.

[Edit: I made some pretty significant revisions to clean up my poor typing and phrasing hopefully without changing the meaning.]

Don I expected that you would not yet be satisfied. Have you yet gotten to the chapter in DeWitt where he talks about his view of anticipations?

We do probably have two very separate issues here:

(1) The practical meaning/definition/view of "truth"

(2) The nature and use of "anticipations."

My current thought is that I go very much along the lines of Godfrey's quote from "A Few Days In Athens" as to "truth," and as to anticipations, I am pretty much with DeWitt but with a focus on anticipations being a "faculty" (like sight) which makes it critical to distinguish the faculty from any single "perception" that arises from the faculty.

I think it is very very easy to equate an anticipation with a particular conclusion, and I think that is exactly what Bailey and probably Tsouna are doing, and I think they are wrong about that. I think that anticipations are distinct perceptions (just like from 5 senses and feelings) from which we draw opinions, but blurring the line between the perception and our opinion or conclusion is a major error.

Even DeWitt seems to me to be too close to equating an anticipation with a particular opinion, but if you read him closely enough I don't think he really goes over the line. For example when we talk about having an anticipation of justice, I don't think that means that our particular anticipation equates to a conclusion that a particular situation is just or unjust. My view is that it's a faculty that allows us to recognize that what is being observed is something that our minds are disposed to file under a category that "justice," but that all the conclusions about whether the particular situation is just or unjust are in the realm of opinion rather than in the realm of the anticipation faculty. Where I think DeWitt is most correct in ridiculing the idea that anticipations allow us to identify cows or horses. I think that process, which is featured in Diogenes Laertius, is something else (probably "conceptual reasoning"), not a description of the faculty of anticipations.

Hello and welcome to the forum @Billytea !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Martin

Just for clarification:

The truth about something is not a prolepsis (in most cases). During the referred to podcast discussion, my agreement with truth as prolepsis was about the meaning of the word truth, not truth about something, and I thought the other participants were referring to the meaning of the word truth, too.

Don, I wonder if you have the same concern about this as your earlier concern?

if I recall the Voula Tsouna article correctly (and I think it is posted here) she discusses David Sedleys views as different from hers, and I recall agreeing more with Sedley than with her.

File

Tsouna - Epicurean Preconceptions (2016 Article)

Epicurean Preconceptions

Cassius

May 2, 2020 at 6:14 PM

Also in getting the terminology correct I think it is important to keep in mind that "prolepsis" appears to refer to a FACULTY, while "truth" in the way we are talking about it here probably always refers to a PARTICULAR truth, in the same we that SIGHT is the faculty but we SEE a particular object.

So whether we have "prolepsis of truth" very possibly should always be stated to convey that we are talking about having a prolepsis of the truth of a particular situation.

Maybe there is a prolepsis of what truth is in the abstract, like there are prolepsises of the nature of the gods, but we have to remember I think that a prolepsis is like any other faculty (like sight) in that what the prolepsis reports will be reported truly, but may be "untrue to the facts" just like people can have incorrect preconceptions of the nature of the gods.

Yes Godfrey that is the direction I think probably Elayne will come down on when she has a chance to elaborate. In the sense you are talking evaluation of a "prolepsis of truth" would probably include recognition that human truth is contextual and that godlike omniscient certainty is an invalid standard.

Quote from Don

I'm also reading Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and the commentary that you recommended. This does seem to bear directly on the issue at hand, so thanks for that suggestion.

Don it's going to take you a while to get through that material so we are going to have to give your some time, but I do think you will continue to agree that it is extremely relevant material. It's possibly some of the most helpful material I've come across, especially in how it provides background in comparing Epicurus to Plato and especially Aristotle. Aristotle is often considered much appreciative of the senses than was Plato, and that's probably true, but DeLacey helps show I think that Epicurus went much further in rejecting rationalism and that is point that deserves tremendous emphasis (to the everlasting pain and embarrassment of the Randians/Objectivists!).

As we discuss that remember that i have the full book online so we can post links to this location: https://archive.org/stream/philode…age/n5/mode/2up

Wow my compliments and thanks to both Godfrey and Don for these last posts. Godfrey that quote from Frances Wright is directly on point, and Don thanks for that link to the article on Prolepsis which I have not seen. I have not yet started to read it but the abstract sounds very promising to me. Sounds like most all of us are going to agree with his direction as the prolepsis being pre-rational and not at all the same thing as "concept formation" (which would involve reasoning/opinion.

If I understand the direction Don is going (and I think i do) he will not be surprised that I agree with him and the direction. At this point in the conversation I am prepared to commit that I believe that Epicurus held that prolepsis/anticipation/preconception is a faculty that provides a COMPONENT of "truth," just as do the five senses and the feelings of pain and pleasure, but I would not say that in general we can say that 'truth' IS a preconception.

I am pretty convinced along with Frances Wright and Don that truth is a purely contextual proposition. I think the word "objective" when evaluating the "truth" of a situation means something like "repeated observations from the same perspective under the same conditions will produce the same result" which I gather to be something like the "correspondence theory" of truth in that the opinion corresponds reliability with the situation about which the opinion is given. I think that in order to evaluate the "truth" of any proposition you have to have an opinion about the nature of the observer, and an opinion about the nature of what is being observed, and an opinion about the conditions under which the observation is being made. I think that that is why we're going to find Lucretius devoting so much attention to "images" in De Rerum Natura, in that he is stressing that our opinion as to truth (which he is convinced we can obtain in at least some instances) has to be tested by whether repeated observations produce the same result. That would constitute "our truth" but even then, as Frances Wright says, that truth ceases to exist when the facts change and the repeated observations stop yielding the same result. (And yes I am kind of mirroring the statements about "justice" in the PDs to the effect that justice changes when the facts change.

This is all hugely deep and I reserve the right to amend and change my comments, but the general direction that I am going is that I am agreeing with Don's observations. I think that Elayne is raising a valid point too, but I think that point is eventually going to resolve itself in the direction of clarifying that "we know truth instinctively by prolepsis" more to something like "'truth' is an important and valid human experience in which input from the faculty of preconception is an important point, but one of the most important things to recognize about truth is that what we consider to be true changes with contextual facts." I suspect that's the direction that Frances Wright was going in and her version is probably much more clear than mine.

Don -- Elayne got called away today and wasn't able to participate in this episode, so we'll bring up these comments next week and now you have a full week to consider whether there's any other aspect for us to cover

Thank you Don. As you think about it more, also please comment on what got you on this train of thought in the first place. I know in this instance I started the thread myself, but this comes up regularly so it would be interesting to know what passage or text or whatever led you to have a concern about the issue.

Welcome to Episode Thirty of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 661 - 729

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

Daniel Browne:

But to return, we see the wooly sheep, the warlike breed of horses, and horned bulls, living under the same covert of the sky, grazing together in the same field, and quenching their thirst in the same stream of water; yet they are each of a different species, and retain the nature of their sires, and every kind imitates the dispositions of the race from which they came, so different is the nature of the seeds in every herb, so various are the principles of the water in every stream. Now though blood, bones, veins, heat, moisture, bowels, nerves, go to the formation of every animal, yet of what variety of figures, widely different in themselves, do their seeds consist?

And then all bodies that are combustible, and burnt by fire, if they agree on nothing else, yet discharge from themselves such parts, by which they spread about their flame and light; from whence they raise sparkles, and scatter their embers all abroad. So if you examine other things by the same rule, you will find seeds of different kind lie concealed in all bodies within, and show themselves of a different figure.

Lastly, you observe many things that emit both smell and taste, especially those victims you offer when your mind is religiously moved for something you have unjustly acquired. These sensations, therefore, must be raised by seeds of different figure; for smell pierces through pores where taste can find no passage. The juice likewise, and the taste of things, affect the sense by proper organs, to convince that their seeds vary in their figure. Principles therefore of various shape make up every particular mass, and things in general are composed of mingled seeds; for, in these verses of mine, you may all along observe that many letters are common to many words, and yet you must confess, that some verses and some words consist of very different letters, not because the number of letters are few, or no two words are formed of the same letters, but because every verse and every word is composed of letters altogether different. So, though the same principles are common to many things, yet the things may remain very different among themselves; and it may properly enough be said that men, and fruits, and pleasant trees are made up of different seeds.

Yet we are not to suppose that all seeds of whatever figure do mutually unite to the production of beings, for then you would observe monsters springing up every day, creatures half man, half horse, the lofty boughs of trees growing out of a living body, and the limbs of land animals joined to the bodies of fish, and nature forming every where out of the earth (the mother of all things) Chimaeras from their dreadful mouths breathing out flames; but ‘tis plain, nothing of this happens, since we see all things are formed from certain seeds, and regular principles, and preserve their kind as they grow up and increase.

Nor indeed can it, by the fixed rules of reason, be otherwise; for, out of the several sorts of food, the particles of that which is proper to every animal descend into the limbs, and there united, produce the motions suitable to that animal; but, on the contrary, those particles of food that are destructive, some of them, we find, nature throws off through open passages, others are, insensibly to us, forced out of the body through the pores, such as would admit of no Union with others, nor agree to promote the vital motions and purposes of life.

But lest you should think that living creatures only are bound by these laws, the same reason holds with regard to all other beings; for as all bodies are in their nature different in themselves, so it is necessary that each should consist of principles of a different figure, not but that many seeds are the same in shape, but they do not all agree in form perfectly alike. Since then the seeds differ, it is necessary that their intervals, their courses, connections, weights, strokes, concussions, and motions, should differ likewise; Properties, that not only make a distinction between animals, but divide the Earth and the Sea, and preserve the heavens separate from the earth, and secure all things from being confusedly mingled together.

Munro:

And so the woolly flocks and the martial breed of horses and homed herds, though often cropping the grass from one field beneath the same canopy of heaven and slaking their thirst from one stream of water, yet have all their life a dissimilar appearance and retain the nature of their parents and severally imitate their ways each after its kind: so great is the diversity of matter in any kind of herbage, so great in every river. And hence, too, any one you please out of the whole number of living creatures is made up of bones, blood, vein, heat, moisture, flesh, sinews; and these things again differ widely from one another and are composed of first-beginnings of unlike shape.

Furthermore whatever things are set on fire and burned, store up in their body, if nothing else, at least those particles, out of which they may radiate fire and send out light and make sparks fly and scatter embers all about.

If you will go over all other things by a like process of reasoning, you will thus find that they conceal in their body the seeds of many things and contain elements of various shapes. Again you see many things to which are given at once both color and taste together with smell; especially those many offerings [which are burned on the altars].

These must therefore be made up of elements of different shapes; for smell enters in where color passes not into the frame, color too in one way, taste in another makes its entrance into the senses; so that you know they differ in the shapes of their first elements. Therefore unlike forms unite into one mass and things are made up of a mixture of seed. Throughout moreover these very verses of ours you see many elements common to many words, though yet you must admit that the verses and words one with another are different and composed of different elements; not that but few letters which are in common run through them or that no two words or verses one with another are made up entirely of the same, but because as a rule they do not all resemble one the other. Thus also though in other things there are many first-beginnings common to many things, yet they can make up one with the other a quite dissimilar whole; so that men and corn and joyous trees may fairly be said to consist of different elements.

And yet we are not to suppose that all things can be joined together in all ways; for then you would see prodigies produced on all hands, forms springing up half man half beast and sometimes tall boughs sprouting from the living body, and many limbs of land-creatures joined with those of sea-animals, nature too throughout the all-bearing lands feeding chimeras which breathed flames from noisome mouth. It is plain however that nothing of the sort is done, since we see that all things produced from fixed seeds and a fixed mother can in growing preserve the marks of their kind. This you are to know must take place after a fixed law.

For the particles suitable for each thing from all kinds of food when inside the body pass into the frame and joining on produce the appropriate motions; but on the other hand we see nature throw out on the earth those that are alien, and many things with their unseen bodies fly out of the body impelled by blows: those I mean which have not been able to join on to any part nor when inside to feel in unison with and adopt the vital motions.

But lest you haply suppose that living things alone are bound by these conditions, such a law keeps all things within their limits. For even as things begotten are in their whole nature all unlike one the other, thus each must consist of first-beginnings of unlike shape; not that a scanty number are possessed of a like form, but because as a rule they do not all resemble one the other. Again since the seeds differ, there must be a difference in the spaces between, the passages, the connections, the weights, the blows, the clashings, the motions; all which not only disjoin living bodies, but hold apart the lands and the whole sea, and keep all heaven away from the earth.

BAILEY:

And so often fleecy flocks and he warrior brood of horses and horned herds, cropping the grass from one field beneath the same canopy of heaven, and slaking their thirst from one stream of water, yet live their life with different aspect, and keep the nature of their parents and imitate their ways each after his own kind. So great is the difference of matter in any kind of grass you will, so great in every stream. Moreover, any one living creature of them all is made of bones, blood, veins, heat, moisture, flesh and sinews: and they as well are far different, formed as they are with first-beginnings of unlike shape.

Then once again, all things that are set ablaze and burnt up by fire, store in their body, if nothing else, yet at least those particles, from which they may be able to toss fire abroad and shoot out light, and make sparks fly, and scatter cinders far and wide. Traversing all other things with the like reasoning of your mind, you will find then that they hide in their body the seeds of many things and contain diverse shapes. Again, you see many things to which both colour and taste are given together with smell.

First of all, most of the offerings [burnt on the altars of the gods]: these then must needs be made of diverse shapes; for the burning smell pierces, where the hue passes not into the limbs, even so the hue in one way, the taste in another, finds its way into our senses; so that you may know that they differ in the shapes of their first-bodies. So different forms come together into one mass and things are made with mingled seeds. Nay, more, everywhere in these very verses of mine you see many letters common to many words, and yet you must needs grant that verses and words are formed of different letters, one from another; not that but a few letters run through them in common, or that no two of them are made of letters all the same, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. So in other things likewise since there are first-beginnings common to many things, yet they can exist with sums different from one another: so that the human race and corn and glad trees are rightly said to be created of different particles.

And yet we must not think that all particles can be linked together in all ways, for you would see monsters created everywhere, forms coming to being half man, half beast, and sometimes tall branches growing out from a living body, and many limbs of land-beasts linked with beasts of the sea, and nature too throughout the lands, that are the parents of all things, feeding Chimaeras breathing flame from their noisome mouths. But it is clear to see that none of these things comes to be, since we see that all things are born of fixed seeds and a fixed parent, and can, as they grow, preserve their kind. You may be sure that that must needs come to pass by a fixed law.

For its own proper particles separate from every kind of food and pass within into the limbs of everything, and are there linked on and bring about the suitable movements. But, on the other hand, we see nature cast out alien matter on to the ground, and many things with bodies unseen flee from the body, driven by blows, which could not be linked to any part nor within feel the lively motions in harmony with the body and imitate them. But lest by chance you should think that living things alone are bound by these laws, the same condition sets a limit to all things. For even as all things begotten are in their whole nature unlike one to the other, so it must needs be that each is made of first-beginnings of a different shape; not that but a few are endowed with a like form, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. Moreover, since the seeds are different, there must needs be a difference in their spaces, passages, fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, which not only sunder living things, but part earth and the whole sea, and hold all the sky away from the earth.

Don if you get a chance could you let us know if we've addressed your thoughts in the podcast? I am sure there is a lot more on this to discuss, and I am not even sure that we hit your exact question.

Quote from Don

There's a LOT to digest here and I greatly appreciate everyone's thoughts on this topic. I plan to respond in more detail, but I had to say that this line from Elayne 's post made me smile and nod my head in agreement!

Well said!

Hello and welcome to the forum @toink !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Yes, Godfrey I agree. I can understand the technical issues being discussed by those who challenge "free will" - at least I think I can - but I also observe that those who really get into arguing against "free will" seem to have an agenda with implications that go far more deep than just a desire to be technically correct. Some version of "free will" is something that seems to be just as real to us as pleasure and pain, and from a practical point of view that pretty much ends the discussion of whether it is "real" or not.

I was going to ask if this was an original video to you Eoghan, but all I had to do was hear that accent in the first words -- listening now! Looks great so far!

Outstanding video! I hope we will get lots of comments at the various places this gets posted, and I encourage everyone to watch and consider "sharing."

Don your comment on feet is interesting too, since it has always struck me how odd Lucretius' formulation is in the discussion of those who deny the existence of any kind of knowledge, which also contains a "foot" analogy -

I see Munro uses "where his feet should be" to pursue the analogy, but I was expecting to see some variation of "pedes" here and see "vestgia" instead so I am not sure how firmly the foot analogy holds. (However since I think Munro tried very much to be literal, I bet it does.)

Yes Don - I hate to be so dependent on the commentators, but this is one of those areas that has sunk into my mind I think from a variety of sources - and not just DeWitt - that the "cosmos/world" reference in Herodotus is intended not just to refer to the Earth, but (I presume) pretty much everything we see in the sky as well. And yes that would certainly lend itself to interpretation that Epicurus was distinguishing "our visible universes" from "all other infinitely numbered other universes that are out there beyond those that we can see ourselves. "

However all along the way I drag my feet about using the word "universe" in this phrasing, since I grew up on the definition that "universe" means "everything" and "everything" in fact means "every thing" !

But times change and if people want to use "universe" to mean some segment of the whole then that is OK with me, just like I acknowledge that there are all sorts of languages other than English, and in the end the terms are matters of convention.

From that article I just cited, here is the part that seems to me to be the centerof the criticism against "A Universe From Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing," both the book and the terminology. I think the questions I underlined here are things we have to wrestle with in thinking about "Infinity and the Expanding Universe":

Quote

That brings me to South African physicist George Ellis. When I interviewed Ellis last year, I asked him if Krauss’s book answers the question posed by its subtitle. Ellis responded:

Certainly not. He is presenting untested speculative theories of how things came into existence out of a pre-existing complex of entities, including variational principles, quantum field theory, specific symmetry groups, a bubbling vacuum, all the components of the standard model of particle physics, and so on. He does not explain in what way these entities could have pre-existed the coming into being of the universe, why they should have existed at all, or why they should have had the form they did. And he gives no experimental or observational process whereby we could test these vivid speculations of the supposed universe-generation mechanism. How indeed can you test what existed before the universe existed? You can’t.

Thus what he is presenting is not tested science. It’s a philosophical speculation, which he apparently believes is so compelling he does not have to give any specification of evidence that would confirm it is true. Well, you can’t get any evidence about what existed before space and time came into being. Above all he believes that these mathematically based speculations solve thousand year old philosophical conundrums, without seriously engaging those philosophical issues. The belief that all of reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics and the equations of physics is a fantasy. As pointed out so well by Eddington in his Gifford lectures, they are partial and incomplete representations of physical, biological, psychological, and social reality.

And above all Krauss does not address why the laws of physics exist, why they have the form they have, or in what kind of manifestation they existed before the universe existed (which he must believe if he believes they brought the universe into existence). Who or what dreamt up symmetry principles, Lagrangians, specific symmetry groups, gauge theories, and so on? He does not begin to answer these questions. It’s very ironic when he says philosophy is bunk and then himself engages in this kind of attempt at philosophy.

So as to: "The belief that all of reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics and the equations of physics is a fantasy. " I think Epicurus would say that statement is exactly correct. Our human reality cannot be fully understood as "physics." Our human reality is real to us through the canonical faculties, including not just the bodily senses, which are "more" understandable in terms of physics, but also the feeling of pleasure and pain and anticipations, which arise from physical processes but in effect constitute a separate playing field of understanding. On that playing feel we are competing with supernatural religion and philosophical questions to which our nature impels us toward finding answers, and I think Epicurus would say that the best (most pleasurable) life requires that we address these issues as best we can.

Quote from Martin

Heat "death" is somewhat misleading. While we are no more after death, the universe exists without being alive and will still exist when it reaches heat death. ..... conditions will become too adverse for any lifeform to survive.

Martin, I think you mentioned this aspect briefly in the podcast, that the "death" part in "heat death" does not refer to the universe ceasing to exist, but to conditions for life (at least as we know it) not being possible.

I meant to backtrack and bring that out but I think I failed to get back to it. My concern with the subject was that we were planting the notion in less-read peoples' minds that we were entertaining a view in which the universe ceased to exist entirely. But I definitely remember your saying that so it's in the podcast episode and can always be referred to if anyone got really confused and thought we were totally off base from Epicurus.

In general that's really my main concern with most of the terminology like Krauss' "A Universe From Nothing." (Is Lawrence Krauss a Physicist, Or Just a Bad Philosopher?) I just came across that article and have only read it once, but I think the writer pretty much has the attitude I have. I am not sure if this attitude I am describing is that of a philosopher, or a "theologian" as the article mentions, but I think that whatever the issue really boils down to, Epicurus himself would be accused by Krauss of being a philosopher rather than a physicist in taking a position on the eternality of the elemental particles, and that there is no reason from a philosophical perspective to ascribe their existence to a supernatural god.

So I get the impression Krauss and people like him would not be on the side of Epicurus, and would actually be significantly opposed to many of his conclusions, or at least his procedures for reaching his conclusions, and that makes me concerned about seeming to cite their arguments without clarification.

The modern use of words like "nothing" (and maybe I should add "heat death") appear to the untrained to be making claims about ultimate traditional logical issues that are counterintuitive from/against the traditional Epicurean perspective, and should not be accepted on that level.

Plus, I have always been concerned, and continue to be concerned, that people like Krauss did not pick up their terminology because it was really compelled by the science, but exactly because it "tweaked" those who held to the older views, and that's an attitude I personally associate with radical skepticism and nihilism. That's just my personal viewpoint, of course, and it isn't necessarily implied or true in the case of any particular individual or theory, just something that seems to me to be worth considering in writing/talking about these issues to wider audiences.

(Sorry that this post is disjointed - i came across the article in mid-post and added it in. I need to pick up some of those points from that article in a separate post.)