Posts by Cassius

Great post Don.

I think you can add to the list that if I recall correctly, when Lucretius introduces the subject in book one, he adds the proviso that nothing comes from nothing "...at the will of the gods" or something to that effect.

As to the twelve fundamental propositions, yes I have seen commentators with other versions of the list, but they are all assembling them from Lucretius and the letter to Herodotus. The main one that comes to mind was done by Diskin Clay, and one aspect of that one that always stuck with me is that he included the equivalent of PD1, that the gods are complete in themselves, as one of the twelve fundamental propositions.

I believe he includes it in his article, "Epicurus' Last Will and Testamant." I don't remember the date but shortly after I first started studying Epicurus, probably in 2013. I contacted Mr. Clay when he was living in North Carolina (he's now deceased) and he sent me a printed copy. I will upload it and come back here and link it. I haven't read it in years but I am sure you will find it interesting.

Here's the article: "Epicurus' Last Will and Testament" - by Diskin Clay

In case anyone is interested in a Diskin Clay reading marathon, here is:

- his 1967 thesis from the University of Washington: Lucretius' Translation of Greek Philosophy - By Diskin Clay

- his article A Lost Epicurean Community - By Diskin Clay

One more: Diskin Clay - A Brief Memoir for Angelo Casanova (regarding Oinoanda)

Below is a photo of Mr. Clay in his younger years.

Welcome to Episode Fifty-Five of Lucretius Today. Last week we started this passage from Book 4, and today we will finish it, focusing on the last two passages underlined below.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In today's podcast we will discuss how reason is dependent upon the senses.

Latin Lines 469 -521

Munro Notes

469-521 if a man teaches that nothing can be known, how does be know that? how distinguish between knowing and not knowing? on the truth of the senses all reasoning depends, which must be false if they are false: nor is one sense more certain than another; all being equally true; nor is the same sense at one time more certain than at another: all reasoning, nay life itself would at once come to an end, if the senses are not to be trusted; as in any building, if the rule and square are wry, every part will be crooked and unstable, so all reasoning must be false, if the senses on which it is grounded are false.

Brown 1743

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards. And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason - that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

Munro 1886

Again if a man believe that nothing is known, he knows not whether this even can be known, since he admits he knows nothing. I will therefore decline to argue the case against him who places himself with head where his feet should be. And yet granting that he knows this, I would still put this question, since he has never yet seen any truth in things, whence he knows what knowing and not knowing severally are, and what it is that has produced the knowledge of the true and the false and what has proved the doubtful to differ from the certain.

You will find that from the senses first has proceeded the knowledge of the true and the false and that the senses cannot be refuted. For that which is of itself to be able to refute things false by true things must from the nature of the case be proved to have the higher certainty. Well then, what must fairly be accounted of higher certainty than sense? Shall reason founded on false sense be able to contradict them, wholly founded as it is on the senses? And if they are not true, then all reason as well is rendered false. Or shall the ears be able to take the eyes to task, or the touch the ears? Again shall the taste call in question this touch, or the nostrils refute or the eyes controvert it? Not so, I guess; for each apart has its own distinct office, each its own power; and therefore we must perceive what is soft and cold or hot by one distinct faculty, by another perceive the different colors of things and thus see all objects which are conjoined with color. Taste too has its faculty apart; smells spring from one source, sounds from another. It must follow therefore that any one sense cannot confute any other. No nor can any sense take itself to task, since equal credit must be assigned to it at all times. What therefore has at any time appeared true to each sense, is true.

And if reason shall be unable to explain away the cause why things which close at hand were square, at a distance looked round, it yet is better, if you are at a loss for the reason, to state erroneously the causes of each shape than to let slip from your grasp on any side things manifest and ruin the groundwork of belief and wrench up all the foundations on which rest life and existence. For not only would all reason give way, life itself would at once fall to the ground, unless you choose to trust the senses and shun precipices and all things else of this sort that are to be avoided, and to pursue the opposite things. All that host of words then be sure is quite unmeaning which has been drawn out in array against the senses.

Once more, as in a building, if the rule first applied is wry, and the square is untrue and swerves from its straight lines, and if there is the slightest hitch in any part of the level, all the construction must be faulty, all must be wry, crooked, sloping, leaning forwards, leaning backwards, without symmetry, so that some parts seem ready to fall, others do fall, ruined all by the first erroneous measurements; so too all reason of things must needs prove to you distorted and false, which is founded on false senses.

Bailey 1921

Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?

You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false. Or will the ears be able to pass judgement on the eyes, or touch on the ears? or again will the taste in the mouth refute this touch; will the nostrils disprove it, or the eyes show it false? It is not so, I trow. For each sense has its faculty set apart, each its own power, and so it must needs be that we perceive in one way what is soft or cold or hot, and in another the diverse colours of things, and see all that goes along with colour. Likewise, the taste of the mouth has its power apart; in one way smells arise, in another sounds. And so it must needs be that one sense cannot prove another false. Nor again will they be able to pass judgement on themselves, since equal trust must at all times be placed in them. Therefore, whatever they have perceived on each occasion, is true.

And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses.

Again, just as in a building, if the first ruler is awry, and if the square is wrong and out of the straight lines, if the level sags a whit in any place, it must needs be that the whole structure will be made faulty and crooked, all awry, bulging, leaning forwards or backwards, and out of harmony, so that some parts seem already to long to fall, or do fall, all betrayed by the first wrong measurements; even so then your reasoning of things must be awry and false, which all springs from false senses.

Images are significant in Epicurean philosophy for the light they shed on Epicurus' theory of how we receive information about the outside world. There is a long discussion in Book 4 of Lucretius on this topic. Although our understanding of light and hearing and other sensations is much different today, the discussion of images shows that Epicurus understood the nature of illusions and other distortions in the information we perceive about the outside world, and therefore the necessity of adjusting for those distortions.

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Lucretius Book Two:

[216] Herein I would fain that you should learn this too, that when first-bodies are being carried downwards straight through the void by their own weight, at times quite undetermined and at undetermined spots they push a little from their path: yet only just so much as you could call a change of trend. But if they were not used to swerve, all things would fall downwards through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be, nor a blow brought to pass for the first-beginnings: so nature would never have brought aught to being.

[225] But if perchance any one believes that heavier bodies, because they are carried more quickly straight through the void, can fall from above on the lighter, and so bring about the blows which can give creative motions, he wanders far away from true reason.

For all things that fall through the water and thin air, these things must needs quicken their fall in proportion to their weights, just because the body of water and the thin nature of air cannot check each thing equally, but give place more quickly when overcome by heavier bodies. But, on the other hand, the empty void cannot on any side, at any time, support anything, but rather, as its own nature desires, it continues to give place; wherefore all things must needs be borne on through the calm void, moving at equal rate with unequal weights. The heavier will not then ever be able to fall on the lighter from above, nor of themselves bring about the blows, which make diverse the movements, by which nature carries things on. Wherefore, again and again, it must needs be that the first-bodies swerve a little; yet not more than the very least, lest we seem to be imagining a sideways movement, and the truth refute it. For this we see plain and evident, that bodies, as far as in them lies, cannot travel sideways, since they fall headlong from above, as far as you can descry. But that nothing at all swerves from the straight direction of its path, what sense is there which can descry?

[251] Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.

[B-2::263] Do you not see too how, when the barriers are flung open, yet for an instant of time the eager might of the horses cannot burst out so suddenly as their mind itself desires? For the whole store of matter throughout the whole body must be roused to movement, that then aroused through every limb it may strain and follow the eager longing of the mind; so that you see a start of movement is brought to pass from the heart, and comes forth first of all from the will of the mind, and then afterwards is spread through all the body and limbs.

[272] Nor is it the same as when we move forward impelled by a blow from the strong might and strong constraint of another. For then it is clear to see that all the matter of the body moves and is hurried on against our will, until the will has reined it back throughout the limbs. Do you not then now see that, albeit a force outside pushes many men and constrains them often to go forward against their will and to be hurried away headlong, yet there is something in our breast, which can fight against it and withstand it? And at its bidding too the store of matter is constrained now and then to turn throughout the limbs and members, and, when pushed forward, is reined back and comes to rest again.

[284] Wherefore in the seeds too you must needs allow likewise that there is another cause of motion besides blows and weights, whence comes this power born in us, since we see that nothing can come to pass from nothing. For weight prevents all things coming to pass by blows, as by some force without. But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time.

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Lucretius Book One:

[511] Moreover, since there is void in things created, solid matter must needs stand all round, nor can anything by true reasoning be shown to hide void in its body and hold it within, except you grant that what keeps it in is solid. Now it can be nothing but a union of matter, which could keep in the void in things. Matter then, which exists with solid body, can be everlasting, when all else is dissolved.

[520] Next, if there were nothing which was empty and void, the whole would be solid; unless on the other hand there were bodies determined, to fill all the places that they held, the whole universe would be but empty void space. Body, then, we may be sure, is marked off from void turn and turn about, since there is neither a world utterly full nor yet quite empty. There are therefore bodies determined, such as can mark off void space from what is full. These cannot be broken up when hit by blows from without, nor again can they be pierced to the heart and undone, nor by any other way can they be assailed and made to totter; all of which I have above shown to you but a little while before. For it is clear that nothing could be crushed in without void, or broken or cleft in twain by cutting, nor admit moisture nor likewise spreading cold or piercing flame, whereby all things are brought to their end. And the more each thing keeps void within it, the more is it assailed to the heart by these things and begins to totter. Therefore, if the first bodies are solid and free from void, as I have shown, they must be everlasting.

[540] Moreover, if matter had not been everlasting, ere this all things had wholly passed away to nothing, and all that we see had been born again from nothing. But since I have shown above that nothing can be created from nothing, nor can what has been begotten be summoned back to nothing, the first-beginnings must needs be of immortal body, into which at their last day all things can be dissolved, that there may be matter enough for renewing things. Therefore the first-beginnings are of solid singleness, nor in any other way can they be preserved through the ages from infinite time now gone and renew things.

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Thread starter.

For discussion here.

Thread for discussion.

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Readiung from post 58 to 58 and looking for the connection, I think Elli has just given us an example of a swerve happening at macro level, or perhaps the discontinuity of matter? .

I should say more about Lawrence Krauss. I'm not accusing him of being a bad person either. My main observation there is that there seem to be people who actually revel in uncertainty and doubt, and in particular, in creating uncertainty and doubt in other people where it did not previously exist. Now that can certainly be a good thing, but some people seem to carry it to an extreme of seeking uncertainty and doubt as an end in itself, and I don't think that's something that Epicurus would approve of. And I get that sense about Lawrence Krauss in his desire to define "nothing" in away that is counter-intuitive to a traditional and logical interpretation of the word "nothing." Of course there's that pesky word "logical" again

OK I have to apologize to everyone for being so distracted today that I have been delayed in responding more completely. As for myself, I continue to see this exchange as totally productive and a good-faith difference in perspective among friends. I do not doubt for a moment the good faith of everyone involved. I don't insist that my friends see everything the same way I do, nor do I let my friends insist that I see things their way.

I do, however, doubt the good faith of people like Lawrence Krauss, especially after watching his debate on something from nothing with Richard Dawkins. I believe that history has shown that scientists are every bit as open to errors of prejudice and bias and self-interest as anyone else, and I believe that nothing revolutionary has happened in human nature in the last 100 years to think that those errors of bias and prejudice and self-interest have been or ever can be eliminated.

Elli in referring to Epicurus I was mainly referring to those mathematicians whose mathematics was indeed in retrospect pretty good in calculating the size of the sun. It seems to me that Epicurus doubted them in large part because of what he perceived was their lack of good faith in arguing for conclusions beyond the scope of their facts. That remains a hazard today.

Here's my list of views that I personally hold but expect no one else to consider as evidence any more than they would consider the nonsense of any other dottering old fool. I've never suggested that anyone should take my point of view on anything, as a matter of fact. All I do is take the material I can find on Epicurus and interpret it in a way that seems the most persuasive to me. That's all I can do and of course everyone is entitled to their own opinion. These are mine. In each of these I should probably add "And I do not believe that any evidence to the contrary is conclusive" -- but that get's tiresome. These are my conclusions at this point in my life:

• I do not believe that the universe as a whole was ever created at a single point in time.
• I do not believe that the universe as a whole will ever come to an end.
• I do not believe that the universe has a size limit.
• I do not believe that the things we see around us are infinitely divisible.
• I do not believe that the viewpoint that the universe is composed of solid bodies and void has entirely lost its usefulness.
• I do not believe that any enumeration of elemental particles would ever come to an end.
• I do not believe that from any realistic viewpoint that the elementary particles, no matter how we define them, are motionless.
• I do not believe that the universe as a whole has a center (or floor, walls, or ceiling, for that matter)
• I firmly believe that elemental parties have a capacity that is reasonably describable as being capable of swerving at no fixed time and no fixed place

To me, that leaves me in broad agreement with the fundamental assertions of Epicurean physics quite well.

So to compare this to the original list of twelve, the only one that my understanding that truly indisputable modern science would say needs revision would be eleven and perhaps nine.

PN 01 Matter is uncreatable.

PN 02 Matter is indestructible.

PN 03 The universe consists of solid bodies and void.

PN 04 Solid bodies are either compounds or simple.

PN 05 The multitude of atoms is infinite.

PN 06 The void is infinite in extent.

PN 07 The atoms are always in motion.

PN 08 The speed of atomic motion is uniform.

PN 09 Motion is linear in space, vibratory in compounds.

PN 10 Atoms are capable of swerving slightly at any point in space or time.

PN 11 Atoms are characterized by three qualities: weight, shape and size.

PN 12 The number of the different shapes is not infinite, merely innumerable.

Now of course I am not saying that modern science does not have lots of detail that can be applied to stating these more accurately or in ways that would significantly revise them. But I think each of these can be interpreted in a way that remains consistent with what I understand to be modern science.

Now is Lawrence Krauss and / or other people going to tell me that my views are obsolete and that I need to spend more time in physics classes.? Sure. And he'll go to his grave doing his best to make sense of the evidence in front of him, as I will to mine.

I know it's somewhat uncomfortable to talk about these issues so frankly, but my analysis is that it helps everyone to think about these issues and see where people stand. I never represent that I am a physicist, and I freely admit that many physicists don't seem to agree with these conclusions.

I do what I do because it is enjoyable and satisfying on many different levels, and as Epicurus said "In a philosophical discussion he who is defeated gains more, since he learns more."

And I say all this with a smile and is as good a humor as ever!

Quote from Elayne

fact remains that you are telling people modern physics models somehow threaten our philosophy, and it's not true.

I am not seeing myself as disputing the part I quoted or any of the rest of what I quite there.

My view is that modern physics has a position on whether the universe is eternal and similar issues, and Epicurus had a position on those issues. Everyone can think about and decide for themselves what they want to believe and how much personal research they want to do, but they'll never even be able to consider Epicurus' position unless they know what it was and his reasons for holding them.

I certainly am not an expert in modern physics, and it's not appropriate for me to suggest to people that they should take a particular modern physics position either. I'm not qualified to say that a particular expert today is right, so I should not be in the business of endorsing one view over another, or saying that a particular expert has conclusively proved Epicurus wrong on the ultimate conclusions, even where there are many intermediate issues that clearly would appear to need revision.

Regardless of which side we take, there's no escaping the fact than in representing something to be Epicurean philosophy there 's a clearly documented position that Epicurus took on many of these issues. I don't think it was appropriate for Frances Wright to ascribe positions to Epicurus that conflicted with those he actually took, and I would not think it appropriate for someone to endorse a particular model unless they are themselves experts in the science. You're certainly a lot closer to that than I am, but even then, it's not a part of Epicurean philosophy to endorse the work of any particular scientists or to say that even a "consensus of scientists" deserves deference. For the very reasons you're saying, "science" changes over time and thus its conclusions change. We aren't in the business of being experts in science, we're in the business of finding a workable philosophy of life that allows us to live happily. Epicurus himself said that it would be better to follow the religionists than to give in to particular "scientists" of his day -- those that denied the possibility of "free will."

I note that while I was composing this Elli wrote another very good post about remembering important issues like friendships and feelings. I totally agree with that. I note that she closed with "Please do not leave it in laboratory conditions or in the hands of academics." I totally agree with that too, and that is why I do not think we should ever be in the business of placing our opinion on ultimate issues in the hands of "experts" who claim that they in their laboratories have access to ultimate truths that other people don't. I am very willing to believe that they have access to all sorts of detailed observations that others don't have, but I think every person has to reserve for himself or herself the ultimate responsibility for their ultimate conclusions about their place in the universe. And whether I think they "have to" or not -- that's the nature of things. Nature hasn't set up a system where we are all compelled to believe the same thing, or to find pleasure in the same things.

By no means do I live in fear of modern science, nor do I think that modern science threatens the significant conclusions of Epicurean philosophy. But I reserve to myself the ultimate right to decide whose opinions I am going to follow when issues are disputed, and I think Epicurus taught that as well. Epicurus resisted the idea that the scientific experts of his day should be the ultimate authority on issues where no direct evidence was possible, and I think the same approach is valid today. Many people are troubled by issues where we can never observe directly (life after death; was there an origin of everything; will there ever be an end to everything). Where we can only infer the unknown from the known there are always going to be competing theories, and everyone has to decide how to apply those theories to their own lives.

Quote from Elayne

No amount of evidence can relieve someone's anxiety, according to evidence, but therapy can be extremely helpful

This is the sentence I would use to discuss what I see as the only practical difference between our positions. I don't think that Epicurus would have devoted so much of his life to exploring and writing about nature if he did not think that evidence can and does relieve anxiety in some people, when processed into a reasonable system of thought such as he presented in his philosophy. I think the point where we are missing each other is that you are correctly pointing out that for some people, no amount of evidence presented to them is going to change their mind. Such people are for any of many possible reasons not oriented toward making up their minds based on evidence, and for them some type of therapy is the appropriate option. But I would contend that many others DO make up their minds based on evidence, and its to those that Epicurus and Lucretius primarily directed their work. They wouldn't have ignored those who aren't interested in evidence, but the great bulk of their work seems to me clearly directed to those who were interested in a reasoned and logical analysis of the great questions of life. And yes, I'll repeat that I don't think a "reasoned and logical analysis of the great questions of life" means what Plato and the Stoics meant in their version of what I would call "formal logic."

As a result it is entirely appropriate for some people to devote their lives to the study of nature and to take that information and develop a system of reasonable and logical thought like Epicurus did, and like Lucretius followed. The fact that others exist for whom no amount of gathering of evidence and system-building and reasoned presentation is going to make a difference is no reason at all not to engage in gathering of evidence and system-building and reasoned presentation for those who find such activities persuasive.

Quote from elli

The laconic answer by Epicurus that excludes all the dilemmas of "either or" by Aristotle is : "I say, BOTH of the above"!

I agree with Elli's laconic answer here -- BOTH approaches are legitimate and the Epicurean tent is big enough to contain them both. But I would strongly resist the idea that the ethics should or could reasonably be presented without the physics and the epistemology (the discussion of reason and logic and evidence that we are discussing now).

Quote from elli

Because if you want to give a credence to my experience of the symposia in Athens, that friends of Thessaloniki and Athens met in person once a year... The results of all the conferences and the symposia in public became a whole mess.

I continue to be fascinated by the situation among the Epicureans in Greece, and I am not satisfied that we should let that question go unexamined. In fact I think the answer there is very likely close to the subject that we are discussing. I think Elli is correct that closer personal contact would help alleviate any "mess" that might exist between disputing participants in Greece (or anywhere else), but I also don't think that the disputes are "only" a result of lack of personal contact. I think if people don't identify differences in approaches and bring out those differences for examination, then issues can never be resolved and progress made.

Even though this current debate may seem disconcerting I think it's among the most important we've ever had. We've been through debates before about whether "pleasure as the goal" should be kept front and center in presenting Epicurean philosophy, and we've seen people go separate ways because of disagreement about that. Rather than just have these debates go unresolved, it seems to me it's a lot better to explore in the open the reasons *why* the issues are important. That way even if people have to agree to disagree, then those of each position can continue to explore the implications of their positions, rather than leaving the different perspectives frozen perpetually. I think this discussion has been very useful for us all and I'm very glad we have had it.

Quote from Elayne

I do not think he would want to exclude intelligent scientists from his Garden.

I completely agree. Your next sentence that they might exclude themselves though seems more likely to be a problem, if Cicero was correct, and on this point I bet he was:

Quote from Elayne

If no one had ever made any further observations, then it would be understandable to take your position

The main point I would leave this with for now is that I think you and I are mainly having a terminology debate, but beneath the surface of that debate lies the deeper issues that are more clear when reviewing what Frances Wright wrote. It's not you who I have the big difference with as much as it is Frances Wright.and her "observation is everything" approach that is very explicitly stated here. She's representing that as as Epicurean philosophy and we need to decide whether she's right about that or not.

My tentative conclusion about Frances Wright is that her position on this issue was wrong, and that this is the reason, more than anything else, why she seems to have essentially dropped the subject of Epicurus for the rest of her life and devoted herself to pure local politics. I won't argue that her decision was wrong for her, because if she got the most enjoyment out of politics then it isn't appropriate for me to second-guess that, but I can easily see how her views led her to conclude that she had gotten all she was ever going to get out of Epicurus and to move on to something else.

I think the issues underlying this question are very important to the future growth of a real "Epicurean community" in the future. The reason I titled this thread as "tactical" is that I don't think we have been clear enough about a definite set of principles about "what it means to be an Epicurean." Most of the time the public discussion on Facebook and similar places has been focused on discussion of happiness and "pleasure as the goal" that everyone can interpret the way they want to. As a result the people we attract on Facebook or in local meetup efforts are often thinking we're just going to be attending some kind of self-help psychology group for the purpose of helping them de-stress in addition to their Yoga and/or their Prozac.

That is where I think we have to get over this current issue, because it is essentially the issue of dogmatism that has caused several divisions in our efforts in the past. The issue is somewhat like - "Can we say for sure that anything important is definitely "known" about the universe, about life after death, or the existence of gods?"

If we follow the Frances Wright line and say "everything is observation," that leaves those big-picture questions open, and many people will feel tricked. If we were to invite people to a meeting and then spent our time talking about eternity, infinity, atoms, nothing from nothing, and the like, then those people will feel like they are in the wrong place, as that is not at all what they came to hear. I would say maybe as much as 80% of the Facebook group, or more, fits that category.

So I think we have to start being more clear, and more "dogmatic" that Epicurus held to a certain set of principles that remain fundamentally valid. Sure I agree that many of the physics details need to be updated, but I am personally convinced that the large conclusions (eternality, infinity, absence of infinite divisibility, role of the senses and reason, life throughout the universe, responses to Platonic arguments against pleasure, responses to Parmenides on motion, etc.) are still very valid and at the very least worth talking about as reasonable solutions to these questions.

If you follow Frances Wright's reasoning, all of the physics and "answers to essential questions about the universe" are essentially out the window, and you do in fact become basically a self-help psychology group with just a different slant on pleasure and pain.

That's why I think the Frances Wright perspective has to be cleared up before we can move to a next level of engagement. We'll constantly run into the disappointment I mentioned if we don't. We've actually been pretty consistent over the last six months in holding regular Skype discussions, but until we reach some conclusions about the Frances Wright perspective, we wouldn't even be able to agree on topics for a conference.

Would the topics for a live conference be:

(1) the pleasure of music (2) the pleasure of smooth motion, (3) the pleasure of food, and (4) why pleasure is more important than logic and reason?

Or would the topics be:

(1) the universe was not created by a supernatural god but is eternal, (2) the universe is infinite in space so there is no room for a supernatural god, (3) matter cannot be divided forever, and the elemental particles are the source of stability and repeatability, (4) he who says he knows nothing is a trifler and perverse, and (5) Epicurean logic and reasoning are based on evidence from the components of the canon, which is why it is the best kind.
Frances Wright seems to have been one of the most brilliant writers on Epicurus in the last 500 years, yet in the end she dropped away from it, so I think there important lessons to be learned from this.

Quote from Elayne

You seem to want explanations which appeal to those with less education or intelligence, whether those explanations are correct or not. But a sturdy philosophy should not repel scientists who note inaccuracies or cling to conclusions that could result in less educated people feeling threatened by published reports about new observations.

This, combined with the nearby and ongoing discussion of the mind-blowing Parmenides assertions, reminds me that I have always identified with this attitude from Thomas Jefferson's letter to Peter Carr. And I have to agree with Jefferson - I would much rather live my life in community of ploughmen than a community of Parmenides fans, and I do think the issue is the "artificial" nature of the professors' rules. Which is not to say that the ploughman doesn't have rules of his own, but that he finds them located in things that are sensible to him. All of this hark's back to Joshua's video early in the thread about Lincoln basing his reasoning on eternal forms. It still seems to me that it is usually not flaws in the reasoning once started, but flaws in the starting point, that seem to be the issue:

Quote

Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules. In this branch, therefore, read good books, because they will encourage, as well as direct your feelings. The writings of Sterne, particularly, form the best course of morality that ever was written. Besides these, read the books mentioned in the enclosed paper; and, above all things, lose no occasion of exercising your dispositions to be grateful, to be generous, to be charitable, to be humane, to be true, just, firm, orderly, courageous, &c. Consider every act of this kind, as an exercise which will strengthen your moral faculties & increase your worth.