Posts by Cassius

Yes, beautifully stated and I think very accurate to what Epicurus was saying!

Welcome indeed Nicola, and thank you for posting! Over the last month, strangely enough, we've been getting new registrations using names similar to "antivirus software" products, and when I saw "Nico Lab" that sounded kind of similar We look at and welcome every new member individually, so that's how your welcome got customized with that "post or out!" remark

You sound like a great addition to the forum so thanks for adding yourself. Please look around and post in or on whatever topics interest you. No question is too basic because that's how we do things here - talking to others about details and issues is the best way to learn things for ourselves.

Again - welcome!

Episode Nine is now released!

Quote from Godfrey

The primary fears are considered to be those of the gods and of death.

I want to comment on this because this formulation reminds me of some comments I have seen (maybe in Nussbaum) implying that death and gods were the "primary" concern of Epicurus. You're not saying this Godfrey, I know, but I have seen glib comments lots of places implying that Epicurus was primarily a therapist and he thought all he had to do was to deal with gods and death and everything would magically be OK.

I don't think that was his perspective at all. I think Epicurus highlighted those because they are of profound significance to any thinking person, no matter how healthy and normal and strong he might be otherwise. Someone can be intensely interested in those subjects without having a fearful bone in their body, and that's the way I picture Epicurus.

My point here is only that I don't think Epicurean philosophy and the PD's were organized so that they could be used like a protocol in a mental hospital -- I think they were organized in order of importance to any healthy and intelligent person.

I am sorry if my comments seem tangential but hopefully they aren't too obscure, and I don't mean to derail the point you are making, which is that we need to extend the principles and do a lot more discussion on the emotions at a very basic level.

Quote from Hiram

That's a very categorical rejection of several of the Principal Doctrines on your part.

No, I don't see it that way at all. You are quoting the principal doctrines on justice, and justice is one of the "virtues," all of which are subservient to the most fundamental principle that pleasure is the guide of life.

The subservience of justice to pleasure is explained thoroughly in Torquatus / On Ends:

Quote

XVI. It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, License, and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awakening trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected.

The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumor, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity, and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved.

On the other hand, for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially as there really is no motive for transgressing since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings.

Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

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The point of our disagreement is in your statement "Mutual advantage is the key concept in Epicurean social ethics." I don't think that statement is saved by the "social" modifier to ethics. Epicurean ethics of any kind is always based on pleasure, and pleasure is something that is felt individually. There is no "group" pleasure, or else we would all be Benthamites looking for the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. By elevating "mutual advantage" to the role of "the key concept" you're doing the same thing the Stoics and Platonists do every day - you're saying that mutual advantage is an end in itself regardless of what it produces from the individual perspective.

As to Elli's example you are making the same presumption in talking about "dangerous for a society" and "benefits the members of that society." You are lumping all sorts of things into that analysis as if it is possible to do so, which it is not -- from a philosophical perspective there are no bright lines that establish such things as "dangerous for a society" or "benefits the members of the society." You or any other individual can certainly make that calculation for yourself, but to say that Epicurean philosophy and/or "Nature" supports it as a general rule is to turn the contextual nature of pleasure and Epicurean philosophy upside down.

Which is exactly what that essay by Thrasher does. He admits in the preamble, for good reason, that "The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice,however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern." However I would go further and say that he is understating the point when he says "many" -- the truth is that it is very clear that "the requirements of justice" are of no relevance to an Epicurean stated in the way that implies that there are absolute principles of justice. The PDs that you are quoting makes plain that justice changes with circumstance, and there is no Epicurean principle of "the best society" that can be read into the doctrines to infer that any particular society should always be defended, or always be deposed. Plenty of societies can deserve to be defended, and plenty of societies can deserve to be destroyed, but there is no standard above the individual level that answers the question as to which is which.

I don't have the time to read the full essay in detail again right now; I know I have argued against it in the past, perhaps even here in this forum. But one of the basic issues is his search for a "rule hedonism" -- in other words he is looking for a "rule" that appears to be divorced from pleasure itself, which, like the gods, has no ruler over it. He's attempting to systematize a theory of contract in which individuals secure their greatest happiness by agreeing to a mutual contract -- that is all well and good, and in practice that's pretty much what it seems like we ought to struggle toward- -- but each in our own individual circumstances, and not by looking for universal rules which we then see, in the classic error of "virtue" - as an end in itself, rather than always looking to pleasure itself.

That's the great error of humanism and all virtue ethics, as stated in PD25:

25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

Thrasher's "Epicurean Social Contract" theory is doomed for the reason all other efforts to derive an absolute best political theory is doomed. Once we go further than did Epicurus, who simply noted that any legitimate concept of "justice" turns on the pleasure of the people involved, then we slide down the slope directly to Platonism and Stoicism.

Epicurus didn't do that for reasons that ought to be clear when you start with his fundamental principles and build from the ground up.

Just for the record, Hiram, I continue to disagree strongly with that essay, (I would have to reread before i can remember HOW strongly, but i know we have discussed this several times before), and in particular disagree I strongly disagree with the statement that "mutual advantage is the key concept in Epicurean social ethics."

There is nothing whatsoever that would lead to that "mutual benefit" conclusion. Yes we have to observe that generally we have to expect that people to whom we do harm will inflict harm back on us. But causing others harm, up to and including killing them) is an entirely appropriate thing to do in some circumstances (such as killing an enemy in war, or killing a criminal before he kills us, just for two examples.)

You are reading a very broad "mutual" into the equation presumably for reasons that we have discussed in great detail before -- humanism -- but there is no way to substantiate that through a thorough reading of the texts.

The texts are clear that it is our own pleasure, combined with the pleasure of our friends (in whom we take pleasure), and not some generic pleasure of all, or "mutual benefit" of a wider group beyond ourselves and our friends. The welfare or benefit of others who are not our friends is going to be a contextual secondary consideration that will vary entirely with circumstance -- not "the key concept in Epicurean social ethics." So it is never "mutual benefit" as an abstraction without discussing who is involved in the equation. Friendship going dancing around the world proclaiming to all the benefits of pleasure does not mean that all are going to respond to our proclamation, or that we are going to reach agreements for the mutual benefit of those who don't.

Good catch as to that reference - here it is in Bailey, so we can find the Latin:

If ever they thought they had been tamed enough at home before the fight, they saw them burst into fury, when it came to conflict, maddened by the wounds, shouting, flying, panic, and confusion, nor could they rally any part of them; for all the diverse kinds of wild beasts would scatter hither and thither; even as now often the Lucanian kine cruelly mangled by the steel, scatter abroad, when they have dealt many deadly deeds to their own friends. [If indeed they ever acted thus. But scarce can I be brought to believe that, before this dire disaster befell both sides alike, they could not foresee and perceive in mind what would come to pass. And you could more readily maintain that this was done somewhere in the universe, in the diverse worlds fashioned in diverse fashion, than on any one determined earth.] But indeed they wished to do it not so much in the hope of victory, as to give the foemen cause to moan, resolved to perish themselves, since they mistrusted their numbers and lacked arms.

HMMM - I cannot find that in Munro, and i see that Bailey has it in brackets, so it may be something added in later. I will have to come back later to look at this.

I haven't read this through but at the very least this article collects references on the topic of Atticus' level of devotion to Epicurean philosophy.

https://www.academia.edu/31665742/Was_A…card=view-paper

WHEN THERE IS NO RECORD OF EPICURUS HIMSELF USING THESE TERMS AT ALL!

I haven't had time to read the article - maybe there is something redeeming about it beyond this blurb....

It's early in the morning and i don't have time to continue but i think in Eugenios' post THIS part will bear further elaboration:

Quote from Eugenios

We REALLY have to define what we mean by "living pleasurably" I think. Almost by definition, someone who derives "pleasure" - and I deliberately put that in quotes - from their heinous crimes isn't living pleasurably by almost any rational societal understanding - prolepsis, if you will - of what "living pleasurably" means.

I hope Elayne will have a chance to see this as I suspect she will have something to say on this point too.

Hello and welcome to the forum profkesarsarwara ! First and foremost, thank you for posting that you are the offspring of our fondly-remembered early member of this forum, Amrinder Singh! I did not get to know him as well as I would have liked, but all my interactions with him were excellent and his unfortunate departure was a great loss. I have to keep in mind the Epicurean viewpoint on death and temper my feelings of loss with the pleasure of having had the opportunity to call him a friend even for a brief time, even if only over the internet. I commented further over on the thread about your father so I will probably comment more extensively there --- but again, thank you for joining and posting!

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(The rest is the standard boilerplate)

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Lots of interesting stuff there Charles.

Do I take it correctly that your main point / question is:

Quote from Charles

How exactly do we hold each other accountable, including pleasure seekers who wouldn’t label themselves Epicurean and aren’t familiar with our concepts of frankness and justice, but otherwise share many of our values?

It might help to direct the discussion if you further elaborated on what you mean by "holding each other accountable"?

It is possible that you are going in a direction that calls to my mind this excerpt from Torquatus in "On Ends":

Quote

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation.

if you are talking about "how do you prevent others with different views of pleasure from hurting us and our friends, then it seems to me that Torquatus is clearly saying that we "act to restrain" them ---

which is one reason why it is transparently wrong to suggest that Epicurus held that no Epicurean would participate in any form of public life, because there needs to be a mechanism for restraining those who would harm us, and I cannot imagine that Epicurus would have said "let someone else take care of that."

But you may not be going in that direction.....you may be thinking of something else entirely.

Perhaps one of the major take-aways from the background of prudence might be that it does not appeared to be linked to "logic"--- and if in fact "in a given situation at the appropriate time" is in fact a part of the meaning, then that certainly sounds situational rather than "idealistic" / "absolute"

Hello and welcome to the forum Nico Lab. First of all, are you human or robot? Please post something soon so we will know you are not a robot which should be deleted. Presuming we get past that formality...... Welcome!

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

I wonder what the root derivation of prudent / prudentia / etc really is. Could well be worthwhile to start using that word and stressing how it is different from "logic" or "divine commandment" or "virtue" and things like that. Unfortunately it's main connotation today might be "prude" which is very negative, but that's no reason to fight over it if it's worth fighting over. Stripping the vocabulary of useful terms has been one of the great successes of the anti-Epicureans.

So a desire ls probably never "vain" or "empty" in itself (i.e., there is no idealist classification of desires, even something like "fame," that is ALWAYS empty in itself, but if we want to generalize, which we have to in order to actually live our lives, we look at the context and circumstances and past experience and make our best estimate, using reason, of what is likely to occur if we choose to pursue a particular desire at a particular time in place. Would that be a reasonable way of expressing the point?

Now "empty" when applied to VIRTUE does make sense, because virtue is not its own reward; virtue must be performed for some other purpose, so "empty" makes good sense there.

As to "vain" that presumably is a synonym for "fruitlessly" rather than a reference to "vanity"(?)

Ok last of my related by somewhat random thoughts: I find discussion of "empty" to be fruitless without a LOT more explanation than is generally given to this issue. No doubt Epicurus had something in mind, but throwing around the word "empty" in our discussions means little, in my view, and appears to be superficial and unhelpful. Pleasure is pleasure, and pain is pain, and an experience of pleasure or pain is in itself never "empty." If what is being meant is that the pain outweighs the pleasure in the end, then that needs to be stated clearly, which "empty" does not convey. But I am not even sure that that is what is meant, as it appears more likely that Epicurus intended it as a synonym for "unnatural," which would require a lot more discussion as to what is meant.

Therefore so as far as i am concerned any modern reference to "empty desire" is more confusing than it is helpful (again, unless much deep explanation is provided). Otherwise, the result is some kind of Platonic idealism of a particular type of desire or action.

I just don't think the modern writers (and possibly Philodemus, depending on what he actually wrote, which is almost impossible to say) are going in the same direction as Epicurus intended. Since we aren't sure what Philodemus or these other writers were arguing about, I would not presume that any of them were wrong; I would say this is an example where we should "wait" to form a judgment about them unless and until we get more texts.

Edit: Referencing the quote below, I would say not only is there no "simple" answer, there is no "complex" answer either, if what is meant by "answer" is a bright line. My reading of the Epicurean viewpoint is that there ARE no bright lines (simple or complex) that apply across groups of people, only individuals in context.

Related to my last point is this from one of Annas footnotes:

I find all efforts to come up with discrete lists of "natural" and "necessary" to be artificial and unlikely to be something that Epicurus himself encouraged. That observation is behind my resistance to thinking that there is any kind of discrete / absolute / bright line "Epicurean measure of wealth" or Epicurean measure of anything else, other than in the most generic form of saying that it is the most pleasure and the least pain, but even that is clearly totally contextual to the individual involved.

So I think Julia Annas is right here that there is no reason to give this scholion authority, and every reason to question his judgment in adding this to the text.

Edit: I think where Epicurus was going with this is stated by Torquatus: the principle of the classification is that some pleasures are easier to get and some require more effort. That's the kind of thing you need to think about when you evaluate which path to choose in any course of conduct. He's giving practical advice on things to consider, not drawing bright lines.

I will be very interested in comments from other readers on this essay. There are several aspects of this article that reinforce my view that people should be cautious in trying to read too much into fragments from Philodemus or anyone else. It seems highly unlikely to me that Epicurus thought it wise to hyper-analyze any emotion any more than he would obsess on any one pleasure, because the issue is so contextual. In fact the very attempt to derive strict rules on anger or any other emotion, just like with any pleasure, would violate the core premises of the philosophy. There are several references in this article that make clear that the later followers of Epicurus were disputing among themselves about this, and we ought to first ask if they were on the wrong track by even following this path at all, rather than presume that they were in some desirable manner expanding or extending or improving on what Epicurus had taught.

Yes we need to think about these issues and that's the purpose of this thread, but attempting to come up with bright line rules for anger or any other emotion is probably exactly the wrong direction to take, because it is in the nature of the philosophy that such bright line rules do not exist in nature, but can only be generalized arising from the context of the totality of the individual's circumstances.

Ultimately, given how little Julia Annas seems to really derive out of the exercise, that may be one of the main take-aways from her work here.