Posts by Cassius

How some people can look at animals as "automatons" or "mechanisms" and think that they are "lower" and "have no souls" like we blessed humans do -- wow how idiotic and to *my* sensibilities I'll add "offensive"

Yes unless all three are in contact with reality the resulting stool cannot be stable.

HEY I was sure they would include that video of the CAT which saved the boy from the attacking dog, but I don't see it!

here it is!

I completely agree with where you're going.

The main fault I would find is that these guys should not talk as if this is surprising!

Quote from Don

That's not something that we thought another species would do.

Don I don't see that post as too political at all. I think the issues we are wrestling here are simple reality, and no less important (because they are the same) as the reasons Epicurus dealt with "justice" in the last ten PDs. The only way we can improve things is to understand how things work, and this appears to be how things work whether we like it or not. Once we diagnose the situation we can act to improve it, but if we refuse to look at what is really going on as part of human nature, we'll never be as successful dealing with it as if we started with a "realistic" view of what's going on.

Quote from Don

I think my initial reaction to the idea of feelings as a criteria of truth was when people don't take that second step. They use pain to stop looking and use the pain itself to say this is true. "I don't like this thing/fact/event, therefore I will reject it" I'm thinking flat-earthers for example

Yes that's why people react against the viewpoint, but reacting against the viewpoint does not change the validity of observing that this is the way people work. We can't "fix" anything if we don't come to terms first with what is actually happening as a part of human makeup.

Hello and welcome to the forum maxfreeman

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

This is one of the many areas where I think the explanation I gave is basically channeling what Dewitt had to say. No doubt one of the most controversial aspects of it is that it equates "feelings" with the five senses as faculties that work by reporting "honestly" (pre-rational; without "opinion") but I think that has to be the common thread of anything that is a "canon of truth" - something that we can look to for what is our ultimate reality. "Our" human ultimate reality is all that is relevant to us - "absolute" "universal" reality "from the perspective of God" is a false idea that has no basis in "fact." Probably in legal terms that's why we look to the "reasonable man" standard in court rather than to something like "what God would have done."

I suppose you would have to be careful about the meaning of the term "cognition" but it strikes me that at least in terms of common understanding, this would put Epicurus squarely at odds with the Ayn Rand slogan "Emotions are not tools of cognition" for example here. (I think this is often restated among the Randians as "feelings are not tools of cognition.")

I can't leave the topic of "reporting honestly / pre-rational / without opinion" as the key aspect of a canonical faculty without going back to the issue of how that would apply to anticipations. It seems pretty clear that Epicurus was considering the process thinking to include the storing "mental pictures" which constitute our understanding of the meaning of words, and he was urging us to make those as clear as possible as an aid to proper thought. That would be the part that Diogenes Laertius described as:

(BAILEY uses "concept" here but the Greek is apparently prolepsis / preconcept / anticipation)

Quote

The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’ Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view.

To me the best way to reconcile this is that the "first signification of every name" is a mental summary that INCLUDES the information we obtained from the 5 senses, and the feelings, and the preconceptions, but it's not identical with the preconception itself. This is where DeWitt i think is definitely on the right track, as considering preconceptions to be an automatic intuitive pre-concept input rather than a fully-formed "concept" or "word" or "mental picture" itself. Anticipations in that theory would be a faculty that provides organizing procedural functions, like the eyes assemble light waves and process what we call "sight" that then GOES IN to the final mental picture, but isn't the final mental picture itself. All the various sights and sounds and smells and tastes of birds that we have experienced in our lives GO INTO THE CREATION OF our stored mental image of "bird," but those experiences are not identical with our stored mental image of bird.

In the same way, all our various experiences (Feelings, Emotions) of loving our families, spouses, friends, artwork, etc GO INTO THE CREATION OF our stored mental image of "love" but are not equivalent to that stored mental image.

That's where anticipations can be "not true to all the facts" as referenced in the letter to Menoeceus where it appears to say that people have "wrong" conclusions about the gods, even though those conclusions are based in part on anticipations. The five senses/feelings/anticipations are not magical keys by which we are in touch with "absolute truth" -- but they are the only faculties we have for experiencing what is "true to us" and testing that truth over time to have confidence that our conclusions are repeatable over time and can be expected to recur over and over again reliably. Since there is no god, no universal point of reference, no "absolute" truth, then the only kind of "truth" that really exists consists of repeatable test results over time.

Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false.

Quote from Don

I do not believe he meant that the truth of a fact can be determined by how we feel about it

Not trying to be smart here, but I think the answer is that that part of a fact which constitutes whether a fact brings us pain or pleasure IS determined by how we feel about it.

You're asking this is a different way but it's central to a lot of what we talk about and I see it this way - here's my proposed take:

just like how we see or smell or hear or taste or touch a thing is an irreducible primary that we can't go behind, so is the "feeling" we get when we react to something.

Yes indeed this is probably why primarily Godfrey's point probably raised this in your mind, because he referenced fracturing of society with the implication and my reaction being that it causes all sorts of problems that people experience pain and pleasure (they "feel") in an individual way that may or may not be fully "true" to all of the facts.

But that's EXACTLY the point and why the feelings are part of the criteria of truth!

Just like what we see of something does not give us the full story of a thing (it may also have attributes of smell, taste, touch, sound) whether we feel pain or pleasure at the experience of the thing may not also give us the "full picture of it" -- and that's what i think you are worried about when you say "the truth of a fact can't be determined by how we feel about it."

But in fact looking at it from the perspective of how we see or hear or taste something, those too are individual experiences which are reported honestly to us by the senses, and there is no way to go behind that sensation - We have to credit them for exactly what they say to us, which is the point we're discussing nearby in PD24, even though they don't give us the "full picture" of the object under consideration.

Whether the apple when we taste it gives us pain or pleasure is in fact only a part of our experience of the apple, but the pain or pleasure we feel is an irreducible primary just like its red color or its taste or its texture.

Nobody promised you a rose garden - nobody promised that you would be able to take a limited number of experiences of any type and add them together and get the "full picture" of the thing being observed.

So make the point more clear the point I would suggest:

Rather than: "the truth of a fact can be determined by how we feel about it"

We might reword : "the way we feel about something, which is to us a "truth," is in fact determined by how we feel about it."

Now someone might say that there are different aspects of what it means to "feel something" that need to be clarified, but if we analogize "feeling" to the five senses, it seems to me that the "we must take it at face value because it is reported honestly" rule is still in force.

And we're also being led astray because when we say "the truth of a fact can be determined by how we feel about it" we collapsing the word "truth" as it means some kind of almost godlike objective perspective which is absolutely correct -- when in fact we should never think of "truth" in that way given the contextual nature of our universe. That's an improperly idealistic view of the meaning of "truth" which should always be understood to mean "true as revealed to us by our human faculties."

Agree or disagree?

I see this as important because this is the immovable object which stands in the way of utopian ideas of universal harmony and the like. Since people "feel" differently about things, just like they see and hear and touch and taste things differently, there is no way there will ever be universal agreement on exactly what activities are desirable and undesirable in life. And I personally translate that into why Utilitarianism - "greatest good for the greatest number" - is not a workable description of a social goal.

Next week's podcast changes the subject only a little - in addition to the atoms not having any of these qualities like color, the point is made that most certainly the atoms can't think on their own.

That means we are still on the subject of how their are no Platonic/Aristotelian absolutes or essences arising in the atoms, so if you guys have suggestions on things to include or ways to elaborate on that point, don't hesitate to ake suggestions!

I need to confirm the start and end points but I am expecting this to be the core of it:

Quote

Now farther, those beings we see indued with sense, you must needs own are produced from insensible seeds; nor is there anything we perceive by common experience, which refutes or opposes this opinion. Everything rather leads us on, and compels us to believe that animals, I say, proceed from principles that are void of sense; for we observe living worms come into being from stinking dung, when the earth, moistened by unseasonable showers, grows putrid and rotten.

Besides, beings of all kinds undergo continual changes; the waters, the leaves, and the sweet grass turn themselves into beasts; the beasts convert their nature into human bodies; and the bodies of wild beasts and birds increase and grow strong by these bodies of ours. Nature therefore changes all sorts of food into living bodies; and hence she forms the senses of all creatures, much after the same manner as she quickens dry wood into fire, and sets everything in a blaze. You see now it is of the utmost importance in what order these first seeds are ranged, and, when mingled together, what motions they give, and receive among themselves.

But tell me, what is it that lays a force upon your mind? What moves you? What drives you into another opinion, that you should not believe a thing sensible can be formed from insensible seeds? Perhaps you observe that stones, and wood, and earth, when mingled together, can produce no creature indued with sense; but you will do well to remember, upon this occasion, that I did not say things sensible, or sense, could instantly proceed from all seeds in general, which go to the production of beings, but that it was of great consequence of what size the seeds are that created a being of sense, with what figures, motions, order, and position they are distinguished. Nothing of which we observe in wood, or clods of Earth. Yet these, when they are made rotten by moisture, produce worms, because the particles of matter, being changed from their former course by some new cause, are so united and disposed, that living creatures are formed, and creep into being.

Besides, those who contend that a sensible being may be raised from sensible seeds, (and this you are taught by some philosophers), must needs allow those seeds to be soft; for all sense is joined to bowels, nerves, and veins, all which, we know, are soft, and consequently liable to change and dissolution.

Thanks for the comments! Good to know you guys think we're pretty much in the zone where we should be. As to Godfrey's comments:

Quote from Godfrey

...in ancient Greece everyone was speculating beyond the evidenceWhich just reinforces the point that the methods of inference are perhaps more important than the actual conclusions reached.

Yes I think this is very important. This is the root of the difference between Epicurus and the others. When we go beyond what is directly in front of us, WHAT METHOD do we use in order to take positions, if they can be taken at all?

I think there are some pluses and minuses about the way we are approaching Lucretius "cold," and this is an area I want to improve. It's easy to get stuck in the weeds and not realize or emphasize the full implications of where we are in the process. The rejection of reliance on "reason" and the insistence on giving credit to the "faculties" is just huge and should not be lost sight of.

Quote from Godfrey

But during the podcast I kept thinking of the implications of this in terms of our fractured society and the plethora of "alternative facts" circulating.

You're stating it in terms of "alternative facts" and that may or may not be the best perspective. What comes to mind are these cliches about "your feelings don't change my facts" and the many variations about that. I think the direction this takes us is that for better or worse, and no matter how we wish it might be otherwise, different people have different feelings about things, and those subjective feelings are as important a part of our human reality as those things which we consider to be more "objective." I agree this has profound implications for society.

Bur for now rather than carry it straight to the social implications, I think there are many more practical day to day implications that we need to bring out.

Anyone had a chance to listen to this one yet? Given our current discussion where we are talking about the details of PD 24 I think the material we discuss from Delacy about what is considered to be true based on analogy only (rather than direct observation) is pretty relevant.

Quote from Don

It's not the senses themselves that are confused but ourselves being confused about what our sensations are telling us due to our groundless beliefs.

Yes i agree with your conclusion, but I'll pick nits and smile and say that "throw your other sensations into confusion...." could be improved because the "senses" are never confused, are they?

I do like the phrase "present reality" - I think it's a premise that's what real to us is what comes to us from the senses, so calling that 'reality' is a good reminder.

As far as "throwing other sensations into confusion" that seems less than optimum, because I doubt Epicurus would say that the senses can ever be confused - it's our opinion about them and what they say that can be confused.

"rejecting altogether the criterion" may be less than optimum too as the reference to what "criterion" is supposed to mean seems lacking.

I'm looking forward to what you think about the last phrases.

Quote

If you reject any sensation absolutely, and you do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgement between right and wrong opinion.

i think its always one of the best approaches to compare different translations so thanks for those variations. I tend to think Saint Andre is going off the beam in this one but even when we think a version is less accurate it helps to discuss where and why we disagree.

In evaluating that PD24 I think it's critical that we consider the DeLacy categories we've been discussing recently, because it seems likely that what we are discussing is not just an issue of "true vs false." We have to consider the "multivalent" aspect that several possibilities can be considered "true" at one time, even if they are not the same, and that leads us to a deeper definition of what 'true' should be considered to mean. We need to start out with the understanding that there are many things that we will never be able to judge directly, but which we need to form conclusions about based on analogy, so we need a complete understanding of what "truth" means in that circumstance. I think that Epicurus is probably considering that aspect in this wording and that is why it seems needlessly complicated. The reason its not easy to reduce it to simpler form is that we have to be careful not to oversimplify into our own more superficial definitions of "true" and "false."

I ran out of time earlier to play with this but I will do that now:

As for that translation above from PD24, I would like to blame Bailey for it, but I have rarely if ever seen one by anyone else that makes for clear reading either.

Like Joshua said, the point in the end is not really so difficult but the wording is labyrinthine:

24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

We probably ought to work on a paraphrase!

Camotero it's great that you are giving thought to where to start. Given the Epicurean emphasis on being up front and frank and not "hiding the ball" like they accused Socrates of doing, no matter what you choose to emphasize you're in the role of leader and it's not necessarily a problem that you're asking them to repeat things that they don't fully understand. On the other hand if they don't understand it at all there's not much point in it. I keep thinking that perhaps the most fruitful path to explore is epistemological issues kind of like in the pattern that Jefferson was thinking (in what I quoted above).

Perhaps even, after unwinding it to make it much more simple and repeatable, the point here:

24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need.

Yes I think that the material I cited has lots of good stuff in it, but it would need to be reworded for use with a young child. I think you are right especially about PD5 and the wise/honor/just issue being dangerously Platonic-sounding for someone who doesn't yet understand that those terms are relative/subjective rather than being absolute.

It might be that one of more of the Vatican Sayings is more easily employable. I've always thought that some kind of wording of 47 might be good:

47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

But I think depending on how long you feel like is workable, pretty much anything needs to be reworded for simplification.

That's a great question. Here are some first off the cuff thoughts.

One thing that immediately comes to mind and was apparently memorized would be perhaps the first five or so principal doctrines.

Another would be an excerpt from one of the opening sections of the six books of Lucretius. Of these:

1. Maybe most obvious would be from book one, and for this purpose, pure "ring," I have always preferred the Humphries version:
   1. When human life, all too conspicuous,
      Lay foully groveling on earth, weighed down
      By grim Religion looming from the skies,
      Horribly threatening mortal men, a man,
      A Greek, first raised his mortal eyes
      Bravely against this menace. No report
      Of gods, no lightning-flash, no thunder-peal
      Made this man cower, but drove him all the more
      With passionate manliness of mind and will
      To be the first to spring the tight-barred gates
      Of Nature's hold asunder. So his force,
      His vital force of mind, a conqueror
      Beyond the flaming ramparts of the world
      Explored the vast immensities of space
      With wit and wisdom, and came back to us
      Triumphant, bringing news of what can be
      And what cannot, limits and boundaries,
      The borderline, the bench mark, set forever.
      Religion, so, is trampled underfoot,
      And by his victory we reach the stars.
2. These sections from Torquatus in "On Ends" have potential to be edited into something usable
   
   1. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.
   2. The great disturbing factor in a man's life is ignorance of good and evil; mistaken ideas about these frequently rob us of our greatest pleasures, and torment us with the most cruel pain of mind. Hence we need the aid of Wisdom, to rid us of our fears and appetites, to root out all our errors and prejudices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish sorrow from our hearts and protect its front alarm and apprehension; put yourself to school with her, and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing flames of desire. For the desires are incapable of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but whole families, nay often shake the very foundations of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, quarreling, and strife, of sedition and of war. Nor do they only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their blind onslaughts solely against others; even when prisoned within the heart they quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life embittered. Hence only the Wise Man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set.
   3. Here is indeed a royal road to happiness—open, simple, and direct! For clearly man can have no greater good than complete freedom from pain and sorrow coupled with the enjoyment of the highest bodily and mental pleasures. Notice then how the theory embraces every possible enhancement of life, every aid to the attainment of that Chief Good which is our object. Epicurus, the man whom you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, and no one wisely, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. For a city rent by faction cannot prosper, nor a house whose masters are at strife; much less then can a mind divided against itself and filled with inward discord taste any particle of pure and liberal pleasure. But one who is perpetually swayed by conflicting and incompatible counsels and desires can know no peace or calm.
   4. On the other hand, without a full understanding of the world of nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presentation has its origin in sensation: so that no certain knowledge will be possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epicurus teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing knowledge and science they abolish all possibility of rational life and action. Thus Natural Philosophy supplies courage to face the fear of death; resolution to resist the terrors of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the mysteries of nature; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and distinguishes their different kinds; and, as I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Knowledge, which Epicurus also established, gives a method of discerning truth from falsehood.
   5. If then the doctrine I have set forth is clearer and more luminous than daylight itself; if it is derived entirely from Nature's source; if my whole discourse relies throughout for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses; if lisping infants, nay even dumb animals, prompted by Nature's teaching, almost find voice to proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain—and their judgment in these matters is neither sophisticated nor biased—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who caught this utterance of Nature's voice, and grasped its import so firmly and so fully that he has guided all sane-minded men into the paths of peace and happiness, calmness and repose? You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living? No! Epicurus was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in boyhood.
3. There are probably sections from Frances Wright that ring almost as poetry;
   1. I will have to think of appropriate sections and add them here
      
4. And this from Thomas Jefferfson's letter to John Adams, August 15, 1820:
   
   ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise.