Posts by Cassius

Those are great suggestions thank you!

As to number seven, that's mainly a reference to:

PD06. Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.

PD39. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

PD40. As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

And:

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. (from the Torquatus material in On Ends Book 1)

I think my reference to not very good was more a reference to could be better style rather than a problem with the content. As I glance over it now I am still good with the basic thrust of it.

Yes we still have a lot further to go on that! I was afraid I was pushing too hard but you are right it is on these very basic issues that everything turns. It's probably too basic to just say "trust the senses" but in a real way that is what it comes down too. Established the means of proof and what amount is required is something everyone has to think about and come to terms with.

Please ask more questions on this and that will help push us forward !

Welcome to Episode Ninety-Seven of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Today we continue with that material starting with line forty-seven, and we have Charles back with us for the discussion.

Now let's join the panel with Martin reading today's text:

[47] And on the same principles we shall assert that even temperance is not desirable for its own sake, but because it brings quiet to our hearts and soothes them and appeases them by a kind of harmony. Temperance is in truth the virtue which warns us to follow reason in dealing with the objects of desire or repugnance. Nor indeed is it enough to resolve what we are to do or omit, but we should also abide by our resolve. Most men, however, being unable to uphold and maintain a determination they have themselves made, are overmastered and enervated when the image of pleasure is thrust before their eyes, and surrender themselves to be bound by the chain of their lusts, nor do they foresee what the issue will be, and so for the sake of some paltry and needless pleasure, which would be procured by other means if they chose, and with which they might dispense and yet not suffer pain, rush sometimes into grievous diseases, sometimes into ruin, sometimes into disgrace, and often even become subject to the penalties imposed by the statutes and the courts.

[48] Men however whose aim is so to enjoy their pleasures that no pains may ensue in consequence of them, and who retain their own judgment, which prevents them from succumbing to pleasure and doing things which they feel should not be done, these achieve the greatest amount of pleasure by neglecting pleasure. Such men actually often suffer pain, fearing that, if they do not, they may incur greater pain. From these reflections it is easily understood that intemperance on the one hand is not repugnant in and for itself, and on the other that temperance is an object of desire, not because it flees from pleasures, but because it is followed by greater pleasures.

[49] XV. The same principles will be found to apply to courage; for neither the performance of work nor the suffering of pain is in itself attractive, nor yet endurance, nor diligence, nor watchings nor much-praised industry itself, no, nor courage either, but we devote ourselves to all such things for the purpose of passing our life in freedom from anxiety and alarm, and of emancipating both mind and body, so far as we can succeed in doing so, from annoyance. As in truth, on the one hand, the entire stability of a peaceful life is shaken by the fear of death, and it is wretched to succumb to pains and to bear them in an abject and feeble spirit, and many have through such weakness of mind brought ruin on their parents, many on their friends and some on their country, so on the other hand a strong and exalted spirit is free from all solicitude and torment, as it thinks lightly of death, which brings those who are subject to it into the same state they were in before they were born, and such a spirit is so disciplined to encounter pains that it recalls how the most severe of them are terminated by death, while the slighter grant many seasons of rest, and those which lie between these two classes are under our control, so that if we find them endurable, we may tolerate them, if otherwise, we may with an unruffled mind make our exit from life, when we find it disagreeable, as we would from a theater. These facts enable us to see that cowardice and weakness are not blamed, nor courage and endurance applauded, for what they are in themselves, but that the former qualities are spurned, because productive of pain, while the latter are sought, because productive of pleasure.

[50] XVI. Justice still is left to complete our statement concerning the whole of virtue, but considerations nearly similar may be urged. Just as I have proved wisdom, temperance and courage to be linked with pleasure, so that they cannot possibly by any means be sundered or severed from it, so we must deem of justice, which not only never injures any person, but on the contrary always produces some benefit, not solely by reason of its own power and constitution, whereby it calms our minds, but also by inspiring hope that we shall lack none of the objects which nature when uncorrupted craves. And as recklessness and caprice and cowardice always torture the mind and always bring unrest and tumult, so if wickedness has established itself in a man’s mind, the mere fact of its presence causes tumult; if moreover it has carried out any deed, however secretly it may have acted, yet it will never feel a trust, that the action will always remain concealed. In most cases the acts of wicked men are at first dogged by suspicion, then by talk and rumour, then by the prosecutor, then by the judge; many have actually informed against themselves, as in your own consulship.

[51] But if there are any who seem to themselves to be sufficiently barricaded and fortified against all privity on the part of their fellow men, still they tremble before the privity of the gods, and imagine that the very cares by which their minds are devoured night and day are imposed upon them, with a view to their punishment, by the eternal gods. Again, from wicked acts what new influence can accrue tending to the diminution of annoyances, equal to that which tends to their increase, not only from consciousness of the actions themselves, but also from legal penalties and the hatred of the community? And yet some men exhibit no moderation in money-making, or oice, or military command, or wantonness, or gluttony, or the remaining passions, which are not lessened but rather intensified by the trophies of wickedness, so that such persons seem fit to be repressed rather than to be taught their error.

[52] True reason beckons men of properly sound mind to pursue justice, fairness and honor; nor are acts of injustice advantageous to a man without eloquence or influence, who cannot easily succeed in what he attempts, nor maintain his success if he wins it, and large resources either of wealth or of talent suit better with a generous spirit, for those who exhibit this spirit attract to themselves goodwill and affection, which is very well calculated to ensure a peaceful life; and this is the truer in that men have no reason for sinning.

[53] For the passions which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without committing any wrong; while we must not succumb to those which are groundless, since they yearn for nothing worthy of our craving, and more loss is involved in the mere fact of wrong doing, than prot in the results which are produced by the wrong doing. So one would not be right in describing even justice as a thing to be wished for on its own account, but rather because it brings with it a very large amount of agreeableness. For to be the object of esteem and affection is agreeable just because it renders life safer and more replete with pleasures. Therefore we think that wickedness should be shunned, not alone on account of the disadvantages which fall to the lot of the wicked, but much rather because when it pervades a man’s soul it never permits him to breathe freely or to rest.

[54] But if the encomium passed even on the virtues themselves, over which the eloquence of all other philosophers especially runs riot, can find no vent unless it be referred to pleasure, and pleasure is the only thing which invites us to the pursuit of itself, and attracts us by reason of its own nature, then there can be no doubt that of all things good it is the supreme and ultimate good, and that a life of happiness means nothing else but a life attended by pleasure.

Episode 96 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. Today we continue our examination of Epicurean Ethics by reading further into the Torquatus narrative contained in Cicero's "On Ends." Our topic today is additional proof that Pleasure is the Supreme Good.

Good news - the great majority of editing of today''s edition is complete, and we should have the complete episode posted by tomorrow night at the latest.

Before you cause a heart attack here in those who have not heard the episode, the reference was to the argument some make that the motive to be a Christian is the pursuit of eternal pleasure - which is not an argument every Christian accepts, by any means !

I would never have thought it, but in trying it I am actually now preferring the "Radiant transparent" theme, which has the top of a mountain as a background image. I'm not sure that a mountain is the best image - might hint of Stoics climbing their mountain of virtue - but the blue sky works well to set off the page on desktop and mobile. This might actually be the most advanced-looking theme of them all. Dark, but not too dark.

This weekend I upgraded several aspects of the software and found that we now have a new set of "Dark" themes that will likely be more satisfactory than the old ones. I am leaving the "Default" theme with the light blue "Radiant" theme (because I understand that "most people" prefer light themes, and we Epicureans always play to the crowd, ya know..... ) However I prefer dark themes myself, and I think anyone who uses a dark theme should try out a couple of the Radiant Dark versions to see if they prefer them. As you know that's easy to do from your phone or desktop by scrolling to the bottom of any page, select "Change Style," and then simply click on one of the available options. Let me know if you have any questions about theming issues.

Wow it is interesting that they may have been added as late as that. I had presumed that the date was much earlier. Great research!

Well they are mainly addressed to the aspect of fear of nonexistence from the aspect of the feeling of pain from "missing out" on something after we are dead. The fear of any aspect of the experience of being dead in itself is dealt with fully as being impossible based in PD02.

Anonymous comment from a Facebook reader on Episode 95:

"About the latest podcast. As a beginning student of Epicureanism, I found Elaine's summary of pleasure and pain very useful in order not to end up in rabbit holes. I reread it regularly to keep seeing the main lines. You could also put a kind of warning on the texts on the website how reliable they are (Philodemus) by whom they were written and for what purpose (Cicero) and how they can best be interpreted. New people are warned then about the rabbit holes."

I am afraid my roach analogy betrays how much time I spend living in an old farmhouse.

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How are the gods described as spending their time? I was digging around but couldn't find what I was looking for. Is that in Cicero's writings?

That's a good question. I am personally applying that description of the best life from Torquatus in "On Ends" to the gods themselves, because I think that when he starts out that this is the best life we could imagine, that would apply to our imaginings of the gods as well. But your' right he doesn't explicitly say so -- as far as I am aware (unless there are some fragments in Philodemus "On Piety") the only description of the life of the gods occurs in Cicero's Velleius narrative in "On the Nature of the Gods"

Quote from Don

It seems people get hung up on the a- "not" prefix

Yes I am not primarily talking to you on this point, but to the external commentators who don't make your distinction of experiencing a positive feeling. It is my view that they are in fact either implicitly or explicitly trying to equate this particular statement "absence of pain" to "nothingness" and in so doing transmute Epicurean philosophy into Stoicism, Buddhism, or worse. What I plainly read in their material is that they are equating the particular experience of "calmness" or "tranquility to be the apex of human life and the goal of every human being. And to that I say "hogwash."

That is not the way the gods are described as spending their time, and it is not the way I want to spend mine. This is the way I understand to be the most accurate description of the best way of life, and therefore the goal to seek to be in line with at every point down that bowling alley:

Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?

I interpret the "with no pain to thwart or threaten them" as the ataraxia / aponia component of the description - as descriptors of various aspects of the goal, not as the goal itself. The advocates of ataraxia and/or aponia as of primary importance leave out everything else in that description, and it's my view that they do so intentionally to misrepresent the philosophy.

Not you or people here, of course, but the "commentators" I reference so often

Yes primarily PD19 and PD20 on unlimited time.

Kalosyni could you start a thread on those?

I am probably more with Kalosynis formulation rather than to say that ataraxia is equal to pleasure.

We're into the definition game when we say something "is equal to" something else, but this is something we have to be clear about. I would say that ataraxia is a way of experiencing some (any) other mental or bodily pleasure (without disturbance). I am still firmly maintaining that "absence of something" is not something that is a positive feeling or experience. It is something we can define as desirable, like absence of roaches in your house, but when you are experiencing absence of roaches as a good thing you are really experiencing your house in a way you like to experience it - without roaches.

Further, the real hazard of defining ataraxia as equal to pleasure plays into the hands of those who equate it with "peace of mind" and say that it is the true goal of life rather than pleasure itself.

This recalls Joshua saying in episode 95 that he does not enjoy spending too much time defining pleasure. I think that is a very good observation and it represents a goal we should have not to worry about these issues. But like Joshua also said after his first podcast, he felt like Cicero had us dancing like puppets on his arguments.

I don't think any of us here are negatively caught up in that, but a lot of people I see on the internet ARE. They desperately want to validate Buddhist or Stoic viewpoints by saying that the real goal of life is some sort of nothingness.

Everybody is entitled to their own opinion about things, but I think it's our responsibility (if we want more Epicurean friends) to make sure that argument doesn't get in the way of people escaping Buddhism and Stoicism to "the true philosophy."

I think so Kalosyni. The issue of length of life and worries about whether someone is missing something is probably more dealt with in other doctrines (fascinating in itself) such as those that talk about there being no need for unlimited time.

Humphries Book 1 of Lucretius:

1.07 You may,

Yourself, some time or other, feel like turning

Away from my instruction, terrified

By priestly rant. How many fantasies

They can invent to overturn your sense

Of logic, muddle your estates by fear!

And rightly so, for if we ever saw

A limit to our troubles, we'd be strong,

Resisters of religion, rant and cant,

But as things are, we have no chance at all

With all their everlasting punishments

Waiting us after death.

1743 Edition:

In either case, he doesn't appear to me the type of dynamic figure that I would be interested in taking lessons from!

Thanks for all that work Martin, and AMEN to THIS :

Quote from Martin

Once a friendship has been established, the bonding is actually much stronger and important than the equivalent of profitable trades between indifferent business partners.

well said!

Quote from Martin

Equating ataraxia with apatheia seems to be an oversimplification. Hossenfelder refers to his much bigger book on Hellenistic philosophy for details. For a proper understanding and possibly a refutation, that other book would have to be studied

And yes, it sounds like he is in the "Stoics and Epicureans are much the same" camp - despite the violent disagreement of ancient Stoics and Epicureans on the subject.

Quote from Martin

This resembles Hegelian style false logic and appears to be a misleading oversimplification. Epicurus' philosophy is better characterized by the statement that peace of mind is required to experience maximum pleasure but is not equal to pleasure.

I very much agree here too!

I don't have time to comment on the rest but I agree with your direction on each of them.