Posts by Cassius

Thanks for that link. This reminds me too of what is maybe a similar word "duty" and the Latin variant "officiis." I remember I spend a lot of time with Cicero's "De Officiis" when I first came across it. But I totally agree with this: "Using the word justice has sooo much cultural baggage in English."

Welcome to Episode Sixty-Four of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at EpicureanFriends.com for more information.

In this Episode 64 we begin our discussion of Book 5.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Latin Lines 1-90 (Book 5)

Munro Notes

1-54: who, o Memmius, can adequately extol the man who dis- covered this system of true wisdom I not Ceres, not Liber, far less Her- cules can be compared with him : they only gave to men physical comforts or freed them from physical dangers: he bestowed on us the blessings of right reason and freed us from the far worse terrors of super- stition and of the passions: surely then lie deserves to be ranked as a god, the more so that he first explained the true nature of the gods.

55-90: following in his steps I teach the inexorable laws by which all things are bound: having proved the soul to be mortal and shewn how images in sleep cheat the mind, I go on to prove the world to be mortal and to have had a beginning, and to describe how all its parts were formed; what creatures sprang from the earth, what never existed; how fear of the gods fell upon men: the natural courses too of the heavenly bodies I will explain, that men may not fancy they are directed by the gods and be enslaved by religion.

Browne 1743

Who can, with all his soul inspired, compose fit numbers, worthy the majesty of so great things, of these discoveries? Or who, in words alone, can sing his praise, and equal his deserts, who from the labour of his mind has left such benefits, and bestowed rewards so glorious on mankind? No mortal man alive, as I conceive, for could I raise my verse to reach the dignity of things he knew - he was a god, my noble Memmius, a god he was, who first found out that rule of life which is now called true wisdom; and who this human life, so tossed with storms, and so overwhelmed in darkness, has been rendered by his art so calm, and placed in so clear a light. Compare the benefits long since found out by those who now are gods. Ceres, they say, discovered first the use of corn, and Bacchus gave to me the knowledge of the vine and its sweet juice. Yet men might still have lived without both these, as many nations, we are told, do now. But no true life could be, without the mind easy and free, and therefore with better right is he to us a god, whose gentle rules, received throughout the world, bestowed on men tranquility and peace.

If you should think the great exploits of Hercules exceeded his, you are carried far from truth. For how could the wide, gaping jaws of the Nemaean Lion, or the terrible Arcadian Boar, affright us now? How could the bull of Crete, or Hydra, the Plague of Lerna, encompassed with his poisonous snakes? Or Geryon, with his triple face, and the collected strength of his three bodies? Or what can we now suffer from Diomedes' horses, from their nostrils breathing fire, dreadful to Thrace, the Bistonian Plains, and all about Mount Ismarus? Or what from the Arcadian birds of Stymphalus, feared for their crooked talons? Or that huge dragon, fierce and terrible in look, that, twining round the tree, guarded the gold fruit of the Hesperides? How could he hurt us here, removed far from us near the Atlantic shore, and the rough seas, where neither Roman nor barbarian dared to visit? And other monsters, which that hero slew, had they not been subdued, how could they hurt us now, were they alive? Not in the least, I think. For now the world abounds with frightful beasts, that fill with dreadful terror the forests, the high mountains and thick woods; yet these places commonly 'tis in our power to avoid.

But unless the mind be purged, what wars within, what dangers wretched mortals must endure? What piercing cares of fierce desire must tear the minds of men? And then, what anxious fears? What ruin flows from pride, from villany, from petulance? What from luxury and sloth? The man therefore that has subdued these monsters, and drove them from the mind by precept, not by force; should not this man be worthy to be numbered with the gods? Especially since of these immortal deities he has spoken nobly and at large, and by his writings has explained to us the laws of universal nature?

His steps I follow, and now pursue his rules, and by my verse I teach that things must needs subsist by the same laws by which they were first formed; nor can they break through the strong bonds that Nature has fixed to their being. Of this sort the soul, in the first place, I have proved to be originally derived from mortal seeds, nor can it remain eternally undissolved; and that images commonly deceive the mind in our dreams, when we fancy we see a person that has been long since dead.

Munro 1886

WHO is able with powerful genius to frame a poem worthy of the grandeur of the things and these discoveries? Or who is so great a master of words as to be able to devise praises equal to the deserts of him who left to us such prizes won and earned by his own genius? None, methinks, who is formed of mortal body. For if we must speak as the acknowledged grandeur of the things itself demands, a god he was, a god, most noble Memmius, who first found out that plan of life which is now termed wisdom, and who by trained skill rescued life from such great billows and such thick darkness and moored it in so perfect a calm and in so brilliant a light. Compare the godlike discoveries of others in old times: Ceres is famed to have pointed out to mortals corn, and Liber the vine-born juice of the grape; though life might well have subsisted without these things, as we are told some nations even now live without them. But a happy life was not possible without a clean breast; wherefore with more reason this man is deemed by us a god, from whom come those sweet solaces of existence which even now are distributed over great nations and gently soothe men’s minds.

Then if you shall suppose that the deeds of Hercules surpass his, you will be carried still farther away from true reason. For what would yon great gaping maw of Nemean lion now harm us and the bristled Arcadian boar? Ay or what could the bull of Crete do and the hydra plague of Lerna, fenced round with its envenomed snakes? Or how could the triple-breasted might of threefold Geryon, [how could the birds with brazen arrowy feathers] that dwelt in the Stymphalian swamps do us such mighty injury, and the horses of Thracian Diomede breathing fire from their nostrils along the Bistonian borders and Ismara? And the serpent which guards the bright golden apples of the Hesperides, fierce, dangerous of aspect, girding the tree’s stem with his enormous body, what harm pray could he do us beside the Atlantic shore and its sounding main, which none of us goes near and no barbarian ventures to approach? And all other monsters of the kind which have been destroyed, if they had not been vanquished, what harm could they do, I ask, though now alive? None methinks: the earth even now so abounds to repletion in wild beasts and is filled with troublous terror throughout woods and great mountains and deep forests; places which we have it for the most part in our own power to shun.

But unless the breast is cleared, what battles and dangers must then find their way into us in our own despite! What poignant cares inspired by lust then rend the distressful man, and then also what mighty fears! And pride, filthy lust and wantonness? What disasters they occasion! And luxury and all sorts of sloth? He therefore who shall have subdued all these and banished them from the mind by words, not arms, shall he not have a just title to be ranked among the gods? And all the more so that he was wont to deliver many precepts in beautiful and god-like phrase about the immortal gods themselves and to open up by his teachings all the nature of things.

While walking in his footsteps I follow out his reasonings and teach by my verses, by what law all things are made, what necessity there is then for them to continue in that law, and how impotent they are to annul the binding statutes of time: foremost in which class of things the nature of the mind has been proved to be formed of a body that had birth and to be unable to endure unscathed through great time, mere idols being wont to mock the mind in sleep, when we seem to see him whom life has abandoned.

Bailey 1921

WHO can avail by might of mind to build a poem worthy to match the majesty of truth and these discoveries? Or who has such skill in speech, that he can fashion praises to match his deserts, who has left us such prizes, conceived and sought out by his own mind? There will be no one, I trow, born of mortal body. For if we must speak as befits the majesty of the truth now known to us, then he was a god, yea a god, noble Memmius, who first found out that principle of life, which now is called wisdom, and who by his skill saved our life from high seas and thick darkness, and enclosed it in calm waters and bright light. For set against this the heaven-sent discoveries of others in the days of old. Ceres is fabled to have taught to men the growing of corn, and Liber the liquid of the vine-born juice; and yet life could have gone on without these things, as tales tell us that some races live even now. But a good life could not be without a clean heart; wherefore more rightly is he counted a god by us, thanks to whom now sweet solaces for life soothe the mind, spread even far and wide among great peoples.

But if you think that the deeds of Hercules excel this, you will be carried still further adrift from true reasoning. For what harm to us now were the great gaping jaws of the old Nemean lion and the bristling boar of Arcadia? Or what could the bull of Crete do, or the curse of Lerna, the hydra with its pallisade of poisonous snakes? what the triple-breasted might of threefold Geryon? [How could those birds] have done us such great hurt, who dwelt in the Stymphalian [fen], or the horses of Diomede the Thracian, breathing fire from their nostrils near the coasts of the Bistones and Ismara? Or the guardian of the glowing golden apples of Hesperus’s daughters, the dragon, fierce, with fiery glance, with his vast body twined around the tree-trunk, yea, what harm could he have done beside the Atlantic shore and the grim tracts of ocean, where none of us draws near nor barbarian dares to venture? And all other monsters of this sort which were destroyed, had they not been vanquished, what hurt, pray, could they have done alive? Not a jot, I trow: the earth even now teems in such abundance with wild beasts, and is filled with trembling terrors throughout forests and mighty mountains and deep woods; but for the most part we have power to shun those spots.

But unless the heart is cleansed, what battles and perils must we then enter into despite our will? What sharp pangs of passion then rend the troubled man, yea and what fears besides? what of pride, filthiness and wantonness? what havoc they work? what of luxury and sloth? He then who has subdued all these and driven them from the mind by speech, not arms, shall this man not rightly be found worthy to rank among the gods? Above all, since ’twas his wont to speak many sayings in good and godlike words about the immortal gods themselves, and in his discourse to reveal the whole nature of things.

In his footsteps I tread, and while I follow his reasonings and set out in my discourse, by what law all things are created, and how they must needs abide by it, nor can they break through the firm ordinances of their being, even as first of all the nature of the mind has been found to be formed and created above other things with a body that has birth, and to be unable to endure unharmed through the long ages, but it is images that are wont in sleep to deceive the mind, when we seem to behold one whom life has left....

Episode 63 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's episode, we complete the discussion of the perils of romantic love, and with it, the end of book four. As always, please let us know if you have comments or questions in the thread below.

I think pollen season has started here and I can barely keep my eyes open, so that's my excuse! But I am going to work to keep up my motivation so I can post our final podcast of book 4 tonight - this time on most productive sex positions! Maybe I can stay awake for that.

Gosh I somehow missed seeing Bryan's cite in his text -- sorry! Might as well paste that here, keeping in mind that Plutarch was not disposed to characterize the Epicureans in a kindly way:

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No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: ‘We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.’ And yet again, these other words are theirs: ‘There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh.’ And yet in the constitution of laws and policy, which Colotes so much praises, the first and most important article is the belief and persuasion of the Gods. Wherefore also Lycurgus heretofore sanctified the Lacedaemonians, Numa the Romans, the ancient Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion universally all the Greeks, through prayers, oaths, oracles, and omens, rendering them devout and affectionate to the Gods by means of hopes and fears at once. And if you will take the pains to travel through the world, you may find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without houses, without wealth, without money, without theatres and places of exercise; but there was never seen nor shall be seen by man any city without temples and Gods, or without making use of prayers, oaths, divinations, and sacrifices for the obtaining of blessings and benefits, and the averting of curses and calamities. Nay, I am of opinion, that a city might sooner be built without any ground to fix it on, than a commonweal be constituted altogether void of any religion and opinion of the Gods,—or being constituted, be preserved. But this, which is the foundation and ground of all laws, do these men, not going circularly about, nor secretly and by enigmatical speeches, but attacking it with the first of their most principal opinions, directly subvert and overthrow; and then afterwards, as if they were haunted by the Furies, they come and confess that they have grievously offended in thus taking away the laws, and confounding the ordinances of justice and policy, that they may not be capable of pardon. For to err in opinion, though it be not the part of wise men, is at least human; but to impute to others the errors and offences they commit themselves, how can any one declare what it is, if he forbears to give it the name it deserves?

Michelle --- Along the same lines as your post I see this post on Facebook today:

Bryan where is that quote from Metrodorus found?

Quote from Don

(Does the pain of that makes it choice-worthy?)

I think that (the decision to leave, fight, or comply) is an entirely contextual decision, and an example of the urgency of the need to smash the idea that Epicurus defined the goal as absence of pain so that he could emphasize that total painlessness through the avoidance of every pain is the first and greatest commandment. Someone who takes such a position would be impelled toward compliance toward things which we could find as abhorrent as any of the outrages you've referenced earlier.

Quote from Don

If you're weighing the choice of whether or not you're going to commit an act contrary to the laws of the community in which you live, you're free to do that. BUT be aware that if you're not caught right away, that doesn't mean your home free... Until the day you die. You want to live your life that way?

I think you're correct. Of course the big picture includes the possibility of revolting (Cassius Longinus model) or leaving (which Epicurus did from Mytilene and Lampsacus, right?)

Quote from Don

Is this what Epicurus is implying here in 34 & 35????

Well, you could call it "implying" or maybe even "stating clearly"

34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

Quote from Don

Epicurus's conscience deterrent seems woefully lacking and without real teeth. It *almost* seems - dare I say - idealistic, and expects humans all to be subject to the same fear.

I think his response would be that the options are (1) human feelings (the conscience you refer to) or (2) supernatural gods or (3) platonic ideals being somehow self-enforcing. Since 2 and 3 don't exist, (1) wins by a landslide!

Quote from Don

Epicurus's conscience deterrent seems woefully lacking and without real teeth. It *almost* seems - dare I say - idealistic, and expects humans all to be subject to the same fear.

No I don't think Epicurus was relying on feelings to be self-enforcing at all! He was relying on human feelings as motivators to human action, including armies, and police forces, and law courts, etc! This is another illustration of why it is absurd to think that Epicurus suggested everyone live in a cave -- these functions are vital to our safety as Epicureans (and to everyone else) so someone has to perform them, including Epicureans like Cassius, who took ultimate civil authority into his own hands in helping lead the revolution against Caesar.

So in the it is one of those dangerous aspects of life that some people have no conscience and are killers, just like wolves and lions. We in civil society will organize force to deal with them and if done rationally can hope to be successful most of the time.

Yes that face is a close match!

Permalink:

Elli did you find that your argument was rejected because of disagreement with your conclusion? What was the position of those who rejected your paper as to which figure represents Epicurus?

Even if I thought you were wrong (and I think you are right) I would still think that the discussion would have been very interesting to present to an Epicurean assembly. Maybe I am missing something (?)

Quote from Don

I'm still trying to work out the identity of the ethnos who do not have power or who decide to not enter into agreements.

You might want to consider the situation with children as well, or those who we would agree in fact have some kind of mental issue / disease that impairs their mental abilities.

Quote from Don

Obviously, I'm still thinking out loud. Maybe spend some time in JSTOR or Long & Sedley's Hellenistic Philosophers.

I may pause this one and continue to delve into parsing the remaining PDs.

Probably a good idea. Our discussion is taking on an almost "brain-twister" aspect and probably suffers from some of the same issues we've discussed in regard to hypotheticals in general. I think some of the basics are pretty clear (justice not being absolute and being contextual) but the discussion of in what situations the term even applies seems less clear -- but it does seem to be something worth exploring, since it appears Epicurus himself considered it to be important. I suspect the answer lies at least partly in that we currently have such an ingrained disposition to think that justice is absolute and applies everywhere that we have difficulty thinking outside that paradigm.

As to the hypothetical you posed (I know you love hypotheticals!) first, you know that Frances Wright was a big anti-slavery agitator, correct? But that at least through her books she was looking for resolution short of war....

Anyway:

Quote from Don

Does this represent no injustice since enslaved people have no power to enter into a social agreement?

This kind of question takes us toward the logical conclusions, yes......

You are focusing on the "no power to enter in the agreement..." but it's probably the same thing to focus on the "unwilling" part, in that masters in slave societies throughout history are generally "unwilling" to enter into agreement to change that.

So when a slave murders a slaveholder, would justice be involved? I would say no, because there was no prior agreement by the slave that is violated, and even if somehow the slave had originally agreed (indentured servitude an example?) then Epicurus is still saying that the justice changes when the circumstances cease to be of benefit to the involved parties.

Another example might be the Greek slaves.... do I not recall they they where largely a conquered people? So presumably they too did not agree to become slaves, so there to a Helot (is that the name) killing his/her master would not be "unjust" or "just."

I want to reserve the right to revise these answers because I am answering them off the cuff, and no doubt there are tricky implications as with all hypotheticals, but I think the GENERAL point is that its very difficult to generalize about "an Epicurean" either northern or southern or modern or ancient. I think surely most people who admire Epicurus would agree that a state of freedom is far superior than a state of slavery, and therefore as to our family and friends we would certainly want freedom for them. As to ever-widening circles outward from that, no doubt the same generalization holds, but also I would think no doubt it weakens the further removed you are from the situation. Today you might pull out your guns and go attack anyone in your city who claimed the right to hold slaves, but we don't do the same think in those parts of the world today where the right to hold people in what is essentially slavery is also claimed even today.

I think a lot of this comes down to my prior comment that an Epicurean does not feel his emotions less than any other type of person - he feels them MORE deeply, and he's going to be willing to take action against what we detest MORE QUICKLY than a true Stoic would (thus the commentary in Sedley's "Ethics of Brutus and Cassius" that Brutus and Cassius did not bother trying to recruit Stoics into the conspiracy (or, at least, there were few Stoics involved was Sedley's point). So I think someone concerned about social injust need look no further than Cassius Longinus and Francis Wright as role models -- they can go hyper-Frances Wright and devote their entire lives to social reform, on the grounds of the pleasure that it gives them to do so - if they so choose. It's just that an Epicurean can't look to Plato's realm of ideas or to supernatural gods for "justification" for that decision.

Don also relevant to this discussion is the example of Frances Wright, which I think we discussed elsewhere. Although I have some concerns with some of her interpretations, I think her "A Few Days In Athens" was probably one of the greatest contributions to Epicurean literature since the ancient world. To me, that means that she had a very good assessment of the importance of Epicurus, and his general direction at least as to supernatural gods, and issues like virtue (and I think as to life after death too, but as I write this I can't remember that part as clearly). The important thing for this conversation is that despite her great interest and knowledge in Epicurus, she essentially put the philosophy on the shelf and devoted the rest of her life to "politics" in ways that were only so-so successful.

Now I am not questioning her decision to do so if she personally thought at the end of her life that she made the right choice, but when I look back at her writing talent and communication skills I often wonder how much could have been accomplished at a more fundamental level if she had kept her sites trained on religion, and devoted her efforts to restoring an effective Epicurean philosophy school, rather than devote her time to politics.

Like I said everyone has to make these decisions for themselves, but I see the bad results of religion and absolutist philosophy to be so far-reaching that it is worth it to me (again, not saying this about everyone) to put aside at least most of day-to-day politics so as to focus on the "real" enemy that is largely behind most of the day-to-day problems anyway.

So that's part of my answer to your question -- if you REALLY want to crusade for social justice, consider the possibility that the ultimate purveyor of the worst social injustice is supernatural religion and absolutist / idealist philosophy, and that little will ever be accomplished against them unless some segment of people are willing to pick up the foundational philosophical work that Epicurus started.

Quote from Don

The powerful *should* protect the weak." There's no natural source for this. It simply derives from the humanist idealist perspective of the "intrinsic" value of human life.

The "intrinsic value of human life" has a very religious sound to it, doesn't it?

Quote from Don

I'm seeing the answer as "none" with the caveat that he also places great value on the life of the individual since this is the ONLY life you get... And we should strive to make it as pleasurable as possible.

That would be my conclusion too, with the emphasis being on the "intrinsic" part because nothing has "intrinsic" value except in relation to its use by a particular living being. As DeWitt says somewhere, only the living have need of morality or ethics (I need to find the particular quote so I don't mess it up, but it is part of DeWitt's conclusion that Epicurus held one's life to be one's greatest good, rather than pleasure, again with the issue being on the precise definition of the words involved, with pleasure being the goal but one's life being more like one's greatest "asset."

Quote from Don

On the other hand, this idea has been used to rationalize some heinous atrocities throughout history.

I think that this of course is what is said about "hedonism" in general, or the need for some kind of absolute morality in general, that if indeed no supernatural gods exist or no absolute morality exists, civil society is impossible. You recall what Diogenes of Oinoanda had to say about this, right?

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Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .................

Further ---

Quote from Don

What is an Epicurean response to these kinds of events - historically and contemporary?

Although one could easily argue that what Cassius Longinus was reacting to wasn't in the category of your examples, I don't think there is any philosophical difference between them, and we know what Cassius Longinus, Panza, and other Roman Epicureans did when they thought Caesar had stepped over the line. And of course in that context don't forget the very high-ranking-on-the list PD 6. "Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good."

... as well as Torqatus examples of justifying all sorts of fighting in Epicurean terms, plus his: "Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation." ... in which "restraint" probably has a very extensive application, at least in my view.

So in summary I don't think an Epicurean has to yield to anyone else in terms of the ferocity of their willingness to defend, with force if necessary, their view of what they think is "right" (meaning in terms of pleasure, of course). An Epicurean would just be clear-sighted and not try to justify his or her actions on nonexistent supernatural gods or absolute moralities.

Right I see your last comment as accurate about humanism, and I think you are correct it conflicts with Epicurus.

Now as to "don't worry...." I don't think he would go that far. Epicurus would have been very familiar with Persians and other enemies of Greece with whom no treaties had been possible (arguably) so yes I think that he is saying that with enemies with whom war is possible, "justice" is not going to be a relevant concept. On the other hand of course you would have to "worry" about them because the Persians were very capable of doing great harm to the Greeks, so it was necessary to deal with them with knowledge of that fact.

I think you're on the right track that he is separating (1) the practical (yes you do have to worry about your enemies lest they kill or harm you, so you better be prepared to respond and/or protect yourself), from (2) the philosophical (in such a relationship where no agreements have been deemed possible, "justice" is not a relevant concept, any more than it is a relevant concept in how you treat the hungry cobra or the lion or the bear. Certainly they deserve lots of respect, and we even get pleasure from seeing them in the wild, but we don't analyze our relationship to them in terms of "justice."

Quote from Don

I can't shake the idea that it has to be possible to determine if an action or law is just or not. Why else would Epicurus devote so many of the Principal Doctrines to justice?

Maybe we need to be very precise as to what it is that justice relates to. For example what does "courage" relate to? Will power? What does "temperance" relate to? Self-control? What does "wisdom" relate to? Practical application of knowledge?

In all of those areas, I think Epicurus is saying that the only test in that area of human life is whether it is the positive virtue, or the "un-" reverse of that virtue, is whether the particular display of that virtue in fact leads to pleasure, or in fact leads to something else, under the cirumstances then and there existing. As a result it would never be possible to judge beforehand whether the action is wise, or just, or prudent, or whatever, until we know the result.

Perhaps the area of human life that "justice" relates to is simply "our relationship with other people" and the question involved is "does this or that relationship in fact lead to pleasure for each person concerned, or does it lead to pain for one of more of the people concerned?

Is it possible that the question of just or unjust is as simple as that?

I don't think the question of whether a thing is wise, or courageous, or prudent/temperate has any other meaning --- citing Torquatus:

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XVI. It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, License, and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awakening trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected.

The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumor, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity, and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved.

On the other hand, for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially as there really is no motive for transgressing since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings.

Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

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And of course all that is in context of how the subject was introduced:

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Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.

Now maybe there is a limit to the point that the action can only be judged in retrospect, in that given our experience in human nature, we can guesstimate based on past percentages that certain courses of action are more likely to lead to pleasure than others. But the point which proves the rule is still that the only reason we desire the quality is that it brings pleasure. We may not be able to apply the talent or quality perfectly, because we cannot predict the future and we cannot take all circumstances into account. But in fact in order to even come close to applying these qualities as one would want to apply them, one needs to take into account as much experience and as much information as one can possibly apply toward the subject. And all of those experiences and pieces of information were the result of their prior contexts and circumstances, so there was never any art of seeing through to the will or god or to anything absolute, but simply doing the best job we can possibly do to evaluate all the circumstances and calculate our actions based on them to lead to pleasure. And surely if we thought that there was any other goal (such as pursuing the virtue in and for itself) we would miss our ultimate goal because we took our eyes off of pleasure as the final goal.

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22. We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.

The apparent point of 22 being that we are considering the real purpose (pleasure) and all the evidence available to us (which does NOT include any objective definition of the virtues) if we are to avoid doubt and confusion and do our best under the circumstances with which we are faced.

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Is it that obvious? Frankly, that's one thing that bothers me. Maybe I'm not cut out for Epicureanism after all. Maybe I am a Stoic or a Buddhist after all. This discussion is very interesting from that perspective too in making me confront prejudices and proclivities of my own.

Yes it's THAT obvious ;'-)

But that just makes you in the camp of about 99% of the world that hasn't been exposed, or hasn't confronted and come to terms with, the logical conclusions of Epicurean philosophy.

And that's why it is so helpful to talk to you about this.

If you, who are so well disposed to Epicurus otherwise, are not willing to cross what is probably the ultimate threshold, then we certainly can't have much expectation of being successful with people who haven't even been exposed to Epicurus.

Talking it over in this context helps a lot to move forward in articulating the argument in the strongest way possible.

It may in fact be that Epicurean philosophy will always be a small minority of people, but I am convinced it could be a LOT more than currently exists. Cicero complained that it was "taking Italy by storm" - but maybe the Romans were much more practical-minded than we are, and of course they were not infected with Judeo-Christian "poison" that Nietzsche denounced so strongly. Today's mixture of Judeo-Christian monotheism and humanism (monotheist religion without the god) is apparently much stronger than the old Greco-Roman religion, but I am convinced that we can hope to make strong inroads into it.