Posts by Cassius

Smoothiekiwi in addition to what Don wrote above, part of the key is that the Epicurean worldview is not simply a lifestyle choice or a self-improvement technique that people pick up and put down like a diet or an exercise program.

It is an assertion about "the way things are" that takes positions on the nature of human life and the universe that Epicurus asserts to be true regardless of whether an individual chooses to believe it or not.

So someone who learns about what Epicurus taught adds to their knowledge regardless of whether they ever convince many others of its truth, or whether they have time to engage in as many pleasures as they might like. While it is nice to see numbers increase and more people share the view and add to the number of our friends, a large part of the benefit of the philosophy comes no matter how many or how few people accept it.

For example, as explained at the start of Epicurus Book Two:

Quote

SWEET it is, when on the great sea the winds are buffeting the waters, to gaze from the land on another’s great struggles; not because it is pleasure or joy that any one should be distressed, but because it is sweet to perceive from what misfortune you yourself are free. Sweet is it too, to behold great contests of war in full array over the plains, when you have no part in the danger. But nothing is more gladdening than to dwell in the calm high places, firmly embattled on the heights by the teaching of the wise, whence you can look down on others, and see them wandering hither and thither, going astray as they seek the way of life, in strife matching their wits or rival claims of birth, struggling night and day by surpassing effort to rise up to the height of power and gain possession of the world.

This might seem sort of unkind, but as explained the emphasis is on the relief from pain that you yourself would be otherwise suffering.

Also i think in further response to your comment Matt that it is pretty easy for us to recognize that the revealed religions are spouting nonsense, but not so easy to recognize that this is pretty much exactly what the "Academics" are trying to do through "logic" too.

We would have a lot more allies in the Academic world if the professional philosophers weren't trying to arrogate to themselves the same status of proclaiming what 'the good' is through geometry/match/abstract logic, just like Pythagorus and Plato were doing.

Quote from Matt

There are no other arbiters of what is real other than what conscious humans perceive.

And that's where Epicurean philosophy breaks ranks with just about everyone else (almost certainly with all the other philosophies and religions of the ancient world, and probably most of them today).

Book 4 of Lucretius is all about illusions and other distortions that appear to us, yet despite that confirms that the senses are all we have so that all reasoning still ultimately rests on the senses.

Add to that the previously stated earlier in the poem observations that the universe has no center, and no edge, and no beginning (or end) and you have the elements for concluding that the search for any perspective of objectivity from "outside" the universe or by a creator or from a center or a point of origin is impossible. You therefore eliminate the possibility of a standard of omniscience or a single "absolute" answer as the test of "truth."

That leaves repeatability as the ultimate test of the senses and what is real to us - what is confirmed through repeated observation is what is "real."

You have to assemble these thoughts from various places in Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius, Oinoanda (who states that the Flux exists but it is not so fast that our senses cannot make sense of it.) and various other places (Torquatus, Sextus Empericus). From all of them together you can assemble Epicurus' viewpoint that there is a reality apart from the observer, but the senses (which are the mechanism of getting info about that reality) have to be understood so you can assemble the data into something meaningful to you.

But you yourself are a combination of matter and void in constant motion, so we accept that there are limits on the accuracy of observation and that neither we nor the thing being observed are eternally the same.

The big issue underlying all this is not to let the realization of this truth throw you into nihilism and despondency or to thinking that your life is somehow worthless or worth less because of it. The whole contention that anything (like ideas or virtue or Jehovah) is eternally existing without change and is the proper standard of objective truth is nonsense and a sham in the first place.

I think that is the real issue that bothers people. Epicurus rejects the absolutist worldview and this disconcerts them, but he does not stop there as videos like this do. Instead Epicurus points to the correct answer on which we can build a successful life. It's really almost a religious life or death issue and that comes out in the the intensity of part Of Book 4 I quoted above. Toying with nihilism is not innocent fun. The person who tells you that nothing is knowable is not just wrong, he is a manipulative fraud with an upside down worldview (puts his head where his feet should be). That's very similar to the person who says it would be better to never have been born, or to take a "bring it on" attitude toward death, as Epicurus denounces in the letter to Menoeceus.

This is explosive stuff that Epicurus thought was worth fighting over just like determinism or false religion.

And thus the "canon of truth" was referred to as if Epicurus brought it down from heaven, due to its importance.

A large part of this discussion relates to the issues discussed in Book 4 of Lucretius, leading up to this section:

Quote

[469] Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?

[478] You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false. Or will the ears be able to pass judgement on the eyes, or touch on the ears? or again will the taste in the mouth refute this touch; will the nostrils disprove it, or the eyes show it false? It is not so, I trow. For each sense has its faculty set apart, each its own power, and so it must needs be that we perceive in one way what is soft or cold or hot, and in another the diverse colors of things, and see all that goes along with color. Likewise, the taste of the mouth has its power apart; in one way smells arise, in another sounds. And so it must needs be that one sense cannot prove another false. Nor again will they be able to pass judgement on themselves, since equal trust must at all times be placed in them. Therefore, whatever they have perceived on each occasion, is true.

[500] And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses.

[513] Again, just as in a building, if the first ruler is awry, and if the square is wrong and out of the straight lines, if the level sags a whit in any place, it must needs be that the whole structure will be made faulty and crooked, all awry, bulging, leaning forwards or backwards, and out of harmony, so that some parts seem already to long to fall, or do fall, all betrayed by the first wrong measurements; even so then your reasoning of things must be awry and false, which all springs from false senses.

Which is not to simply respond "Yes reality is real" but to say that before you can answer that question you need to be very precise about the definition of "real," and think about how your conclusions about what "real" mean are going to impact your attitude toward your life.

Also relevant to the role of philosophy in straightening out these issues is one of the best Seneca letters, much more Epicurean than Stoic: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_let…ilius/Letter_48 (Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbour's wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. 8. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy mankind. You have promised to help those in peril by sea, those in captivity, the sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men's hopes, men's resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. 9. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.)

OK I listened to the whole thing, and I think it raises a lot of important questions, which is good.

But it really doesn't suggest anything concrete as to the significance of what is being discussed, which is bad.

That's where Epicurus' views of "true" and "real" and "the senses" and "skepticism" and "dogmatism" and "knowledge" are so important.

Otherwise the layman listens to a presentation like this and thinks: "OMG they are saying the world isn't real! They're saying nothing is true! From which it's easy to jump to "Awe nothing matters!" and "Let's jump off that cliff" or "step in front of train" -- those things aren't "real" anyway.

It's the role of philosophy to straighten out thinking on these issues.

Without even watching more than a few minutes I think I will move this into Epistemology where it is directly on point. The video section is logical but we probably need this more as a basic epistemology post.

This is definitely a topic where we need to understand Epicurus' perspective and how he dealt with these questions.

This should prove to be a useful introduction to the issues involved in Plato's forms, from someone whose judgment is at least usually trustworthy and friendly toward Epicurus.

Plato and the one-over-many principle

Plato and the one-over-many principle

www.academia.edu

We have several threads in this subforum already, but one day I would like to see us produce a "Valentine's Day Special" audio program on the topic (Epicurus' Perspective On Romantic Love Issues). In the past we have discussed this idea in connection half-jokingly with the idea that an "Epicurean Love Advice" regular feature of some kind would be highly popular. Unfortunately we have never gotten it off the ground, but if we ever do, I am sure it would quickly be one of the most popular features that we've ever worked on. It seems appropriate that we would want some of our female participants to take a leading role in such a project, so that's something to keep in mind. Not many men seem particularly well-suited to give advice on this topic! (Another half-joke but likely a joke because of its truth.)

Let's talk about what topics such a program might cover, and how it might be organized. We have a lot of text material that can be incorporated, so what might make sense would be a guided discussion in which someone goes through a series of key points from the text (which are very practical and i think would be easy to use for this purpose) and then goes around the table to ask each of five or six people to discuss the issue from their point of view.

But let's talk here about what subjects to cover, what text material to use, etc. The closing sections of Book IV of Lucretius (beginning around line 1037) are an obvious start for a list of text references, but there are significant amounts in Diogenes Laertius and other sources.

It would be nice to do this for February 2021, but we can extend this thread as long as we need until we're ready to go, this year, next year, or whenever.

It may take several years before we can find someone who can lead this discussion with good humor and some degree of successful experience in the topic!

Quote from JMK1100

I am not a philosopher, nor a scholar of any sort.

Looking forward to hearing from you, and real-world experience and prudence, rather than academic training, is a great advantage.

I don't see any indication that any of the extensive introductions and analysis sections are by anyone but Jowett, and after reading the bio at wikipedia I doubt too many people would have dared to try to correct or give opinions to him about the texts - and maybe for good reason as he seems to have been a huge figure.

I am not sure whether I remember this from college or somewhere else, but Jowett seems to have been considered a huge figure in classical greek studies. I see on Archive.org that he did a full set of translations of Plato's Dialogues prior to the Loeb Classical Library (translated by Fowler?) seeming to take over as the main source.

It appears from this bio that Jowett had an extremely active and interesting personal history, with lots of fairly "liberal" or 'reformist' opinions that he freely offered, so i bet we are going to find that most if not all of the commentary is his.

Benjamin Jowett - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

One more (or perhaps a couple) of clips from the Jowett commentary that seem particularly important:

The following is not what Plato said in Philebus, but commentary from the writer (Jowett himself?) which seems pretty sound:

Now this is interesting too:

Quote from Don

doesn't even seem relevant to me!

Plato would probably sniff and say that's because you're not "golden'"

Quote from Don

Where's the honey on the rim of this cup of wormwood?

That one might be easy: the honey is in the pleasure you will take in looking down at the poor wandering souls who are confused and listless, and knowing (once you see through Plato) that you have the medicine that will help them. Plus of course you will have the pleasure of actually helping them.

More precisely, I will argue (but am not yet articulate enough to be convincing) that this knowledge of seeing through Plato will allow you to treat a particularly important subset of the people who are confused and listless: those who have read Epicurus but think they should pursue "tranquility" rather than "pleasure."

And of course my argument there is that once you see a very practical and important reason for Epicurus to have been concerned about arguing over whether "pleasure has a limit," you'll begin to entertain that the reason PD3, and portions of the Letter to Menoeceus, are written the way they are is to refute Plato, not to suggest that tranquility is something separate and higher than pleasure, as so many people (trying to apply their Buddhism and Stoicism) want to interpret it.

At that point I think you'll begin to entertain that:

(1) PD1 is mainly an antidote to the contention that there are supernatural gods;

(2) PD2 is mainly an antidote to the contention that there is life after death; and then in parallel

(3) PD3 and PD4 are mainly antidotes to Platonic arguments that pleasure cannot be the goal of life.

Having 'pleasure is the goal of life" somewhere near the top of the principal doctrines is pretty important to making sense of them. To me, the realization that these are refutations of Plato makes them much easier to understand and less likely to be twisted into some kind of "absence of pain as an end in itself" rabbit hole. And I am not happy to admit the "to me" part. I think that this seems signifcant "to me" and to others who are probably like me, is that we have previously been impressed with the Platonic/Stoic position that "logic" must rule, and we are looking for a "logical" solution to the trap that Plato has set with his arguments. My only consolation is that i think that a lot of Epicurus' students were that way too, which is the best explanation for why he wrote his material the way he did. Approaching the dispute the way he did, Epicurus is able to slap the "logic-seekers" in the face with their own logic. "Pleasure DOES have a limit, you dolts! Why did you and Protarchus and Philebus' boys ever admit to Plato that it didn't!"

Note: i am personally still unclear where Philebus himself ended up, and that's why I reference "Philebus' boys":

I may have the time to try a Zoom meeting Tuesday night if anyone is interested. We have not yet made any decisions on a weekly format but we can discuss that as the main agenda among whoever is available.

One thing we have not finalized is how "open' to make this. For now, let's do this on the basis of "if you are interested, message Cassius and he will check with those who are established regulars and coordinate introductions" basis.

In other words, if you would like to participate but have not previously joined a live meeting, please message me and we will follow our existing procedure of letting those who are regular attenders decide how fast to expand the circle.

For planning purposes let's pick 8:30 PM Eastern Time (USA) but if someone requests an adjustment we can consider that.

Godfrey I am going to tag you here due to your earlier comment about reading about "kinds of pleasure" in Gosling & Taylor. If (or anyone else) happens to get a chance to look at Philebus and develops any insight into the flow of Plato's argument, please let me know.

I am confident that Jowett's outline summary is correct. I think his point 4 is where we find the "pleasure has no limit so that means it can't be THE good" which is probably of prime importance in discussing Epicurus' 'limit of pleasure" argument. But Plato goes on in points 5 through the end to make arguments about mixed and unmixed and pure / impure, and their relation to wisdom, which probably also have responses in epicurus, but we have yet to drag those out into the open. PD18 and PD19 and maybe others may relate to this, and this might be key to Epicurus' argument that the infinite life can contain no more pleasure than our own, which is finite. If so, that too would be a hugely important point to understand better - instead of skipping over it as we often do now.

There is LOTS more to get out of Philebus which will help us with Epicurus.

This is the most clear outline of the argument in Philebus that I have found. it is from the introduction to the dialogue in the Jowett edition. It is not totally helpful and doesn't answer a lot of questions but it does list the topics being discussed, and that in itself is a great help:

Locations to Important points in text - Fowler:

Kinds of Pleasure: "For I think Socrates is asking us whether there are or are not kinds of pleasure, how many kinds there are, what their nature is, and the same of wisdom." https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/229/mode/1up

Is the Nature of the good perfect or imperfect, sufficient or insufficient? soc. Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect or imperfect ? pro. The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates. soc. Well, and is the good sufficient ?

pro. Of course ; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency. https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/233/mode/1up

The good cannot have need of anything else. soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything else, and if either be found to need anything, we can no longer regard it as our true good. https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/235/mode/1up

The Limits Argument:

Consider the hotter and the colder, is there any limit in them? soc. Consider then. What I ask you to consider is difficult and debatable ; but consider it all the same. In the first place, take hotter and colder and see whether you can conceive any limit of them, or whether the more and less which dwell in their very nature do not, so long as they continue to dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end ; for if there were any end of them, the more and less would themselves be ended. https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/245/mode/1up

Socrates suggests that a goddess higher than pleasure established law and order, which has a limit, to restrain pleasure, which does not have a limit:. soc. There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess , 1 my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm ; I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/253/mode/1up

Have pleasure and pain a limit? (27e) Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less phi. Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates ; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree. soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil ; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure ; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite ; but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind ? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail. https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008/page/259/mode/1up    Perseus Link

I will come back here and post a link to where Philebus may be found on the tufts.perseus site, but for now I want to link to what might be the best and most definitive free public domain edition: that by Jowett. This edition has extensive introduction and notes which I have not read, but in linking to pages and line numbers this might be the best way to link to sections of the text on the internet.

Let me be clear: Philebus is very difficult to follow, and I don't claim to have figured it out. It seems clear that there are points which are directly related to Epicurus, such as a very clear question about whether pleasure and pain have a limit. Socrates is very clear that he thinks pleasure does not have a limit, and it seems clear that Socrates things that Pleasure is disqualified from being "The good' for that reason, but Socrates combines this argument with other complicated arguments that seem to hinge on the nature of numbers, and i really don't understand where he is ultimately going with those: something to the effect that wisdom is the most important thing to have, apparently.

Here is the main archive.org page for Jowett : https://archive.org/details/b24750189_0004 and for Fowler: https://archive.org/details/b2900049x_0008 and the main Peresus page: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…3Atext%3DPhileb.

The start of the section on Philebus in the Jowett edition (extensive introduction and commentary): https://archive.org/details/b24750189_0004/page/518/mode/2up

The start of the dialog itself: https://archive.org/details/b24750189_0004/page/574/mode/2up

Start of the "Limit" discussion - page 593 of the Jowett text: https://archive.org/details/b24750189_0004/page/593/mode/1up This is according to Perseus section 27e.

I intend to do more work on the "limit of pleasure" argument that is found here, and this is the place where I plan to provide page and line number links. (To be clear, I have now changed my mind and will link mostly to the Fowler pages, since that is what Perseus uses and probably therefore is easier to search. We can use Jowett as needed for comparison, because Philebus is a very complicated argument.)

"Good luck" with your circumstances Alex. I am sure most of deal with varying degrees of serious problems and yes reading Epicurus is a refuge from the storms and gives hope and grounding to weather them.