Posts by Cassius

It's interesting that the correct title of the book may be "On Signs and Sign Inferences"

Ok this is from the second article that Don linked, so there's definitely a revised edition of the De Lacey translation which we need to get our hands on:

Here is something that needs to be researched:

The source is : https://www.academia.edu/4198417/Philod…semiotic_debate

Well thanks for the kind words, but I think a large part of the issue is that Sedley and De Lacey and most of the rest probably have a different goal than I do. They seem to be writing for each other in the Academic world, in which the people writing their books are expected to be familiar with the state of academic writing and be familiar with the arguments. So they end up chasing each other further and further down rabbit holes which are indeed worth exploring, but they aren't writing to try to focus on and to "popularize" the main take-home points of the philosophy to everyday people. Once they describe the details the academics think (and maybe rightly so) that their job is done. They aren't paid and they aren't claiming to be social reformers.

As a secondary factor I think there is a lot of pressure in Academia to toe the establishment line on the value of formal logic and to maintain respect for the core Greek authorities (of whom they don't number Epicurus, except to the extent they can force him into the Stoic mold with "absence of pain" analysis).

In all fairness to them they've built up a lot of good information, but it's long past time for people outside of academia to realize what the issues are and run with them. This issue of the role of "logic" is explosively counter-trend to the majority viewpoint, and is equal if not more serious than the views of religion and pleasure. In many ways a form of "atheism" is standard now in academia, and the academics are very familiar with unconventional views of pleasure as well. But I actually think that this "logic" analysis challenges the what they see as the real keys of their kingdom, so it doesn't get nearly as much notice as it should.

And of course as you're saying in your comments, it IS very dense and complex, so it takes some work to ferret out what's really going on here.

OK back to the topic because I want to compare my views with what others are seeing.

Ok having read to the end of Sedley's article I think he acquits himself well and his whole article is in my view supportive of Epicurus. It's also in my view largely consistent with De Lacey.

I don't think this was the target of the article and so I don't criticize him for it, but it seems to me that Sedley dives deeper and deeper into detail without ever coming back at the end of the article to discuss why the whole issue is significant.

That is OUR task, to clarify and articulate the important lessons to be learned from the fight between Stoic and Epicurean methods of "logic."

And at the moment I am not inclined to think I need to change my assessment that DeLacey has the practical importance of the issue well summarized here:

Thus the Epicureans were at war with those (Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics) who held that inferences from signs ( i.e., true opinions) are not reliable unless they can be stated into formal logically valid syllogisms. In other words, the ability to play games with words to make up a logically consistent assertion is not what establishes truth for us. Rather, its always the ability to judge the contours of truth by our canonical faculties is what establishes truth for us.

So the reverse of the Stoic position is actually the case and seems to be the position the Epicureans took: it is only when an opinion can be confirmed through repeated and reliable observations of the canonical faculties that something is established as true for us.

Not gonna get off on this right now, but we ought to make note that if this assertion is correct it plays into "isonomia" and probably "nature never makes only a single thing of a kind." I haven't looked up this reference in Lucretius:

Page 261 and 262 are very dense where Sedley is asking why the Epicureans seemed to concede a part of the argument.

We'll ask Don to comment particularly on that one!

What's going through my mind too is that these are the 70 BC Roman Epicureans like Torquatus who were willing to deviate from Epicurus, so I wouldn't concede that any concessions made by them were necessarily made by Epicurus himself.

Yes this is really the whole ball of wax. The Platonist /Stoics are playing "word games." They are asserting that by means of incantations -- If this, then that - and similar syllogistic reasoning they can deduce "universals" that they attach a truly mystical significance too, and the Epicureans were fighting all the way against that. Our wishes and our words do not create reality -- reality is reality, and we simply do the best we can to describe it in words. There are no "forms" or "ideas" or "concepts" floating in the air waiting for us to discover them.

At this moment I am rushing to finish David Sedley's article to see if I am going to be forever struck-through-the heart disappointed in him, or whether he basically agrees with DeLacey's point I keep underlining. I am sure there was and is a lot of pressure on him to go with the Stoic/Platonic position.

Yes I am thinking that "On Signs" and "On Methods of Inference" are probably one and the same Herculaneum scroll

Probably a very important summary of the Epicurean position that our opinions should be based on observation and experience and not on "pure logic"

Yes I reall DeLacey talks a lot about inconceivability and this makes sense to me as an "empirical" rather than logical test:

In fact it also may hark back to our discussions elsewhere on the "feeling" of certainty.

Despite the terminology difference I find this to be pretty similar to what Delacey is saying.

Here's an interesting one:

I interpret that to mean "The Stoics are playing a word game."

Don't worry, Godfrey. Don is going to come to our assistance and figure all this out for us! In fact I think I'll take another nap and wait.

So Sedley rejects the "contrposition" term:

This seems sort of clear. The Epicurans followed analogy and induction. (I remember DeWitt saying they use deduction too.)

The Stoics follow "elimination" method, which I presume is what is referred to in "contraposition"?

Good grief. So according to Sedley there is a second edition of DeLacey's translation of Philodemus on Signs. I don't see that listed anywhere though --

Presumably that won't change his commentary much but I sure would like to see the updated text.

You're seeing exactly what I saw Godfrey. Even now I'm not sure what to make of the terminology. Maybe the Sedley article Don found above will help us all.

Is the reference above to "On Signs" the same as "On Methods of Inference"? It would seem likely but I haven't verified that, so it's interesting if DeLacy has already "translated" the title for us.

I just finished reading Remark O. Overall it is a very memorable slash and burn of Stoics, Priests, Government officials and others who claim virtue in public but do the opposite in private (and sometimes in public too).

It does seem to me that he has a good understanding of Epicurus, but it's hard to say whether he is going to extend it philosophically or just be content to cite him in support of his contention, which is something like that everyone in facts acts to pursue what they find pleasing so we should be honest about it.

No doubt it's easy to see why he is labeled an "egoist" but that just obscures the deeper issues in my view. I would say that Ayn Rand is faily labeled an "egoist" but I am also convinced that scratch the surface of her philosophy and she is throughout Platonist and even Stoic in her worship of reason. Labeling someone an egoist might be a decent indicator of Epicurean views (because the stoic majority views that negatively and labels most all Epicureans as egoists) but unless you drill down to the specifics you probably can't be sure what is going on in the original writings.

Here I would say there is a good chance that Mandeville combines his view of pursuit of pleasure with considerably more Epicurean philosophy. His ethics at least here do seem based on pleasure, but I don't see much if any recognition of the need for friends of the same viewpoint or much if the practical advice about evaluating the total balance of pleasure and pain.

Maybe since he is a doctor (I gather?) He is more of a materialist, but if so that's not in this section of this poem.

And I haven't seen any references to epistemology here though that's not unexpected given this subject.

So more reading would be necessary but I would rate based what I've read so far as someone who seems to be willing to go further than most in support of some of Epicurus' most controversial ethical positions.