Posts by Cassius

It may be that resistance to grappling squarely with the total individual relativity of "pleasure" is related to the concern that doing so would open the door too wide to the "unrestrained hedonism" analysis that so many fear (but which Epicurus embraces with so much fearlessness in defining the greatest good as simply pleasure).

just to muse on while I am thinking about it, it comes to mind to consider pleasures of touch.

You can compare for example warm and cold, rough and smooth. But each of those feelings may be either pleasurable or painful depending on conditions, I would think, and even degrees of smoothness ( for example) are not necessarily more or less pleasing (I would not think).

It may in fact not be possible to do much more than describe types of pleasure and what we feel about them in terms of personal preference at various times, but those descriptions may never translate into any form of "scale of pleasure" in general.

That may or may not be the case, but either way I can see the position we take on that being highly relevant to general discussions about pleasure.

I don't see that discussed very much and I am not sure why. Seems like an important point, even if the point is "it can't be done."

As to the "intensity" factor I think I would cite:

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another

I think you are absolutely right that the answer is and must be subjective.

But does that mean that it is impossible to put into words any factors that describe the feeling of pleasure other than how long it lasts?

( ..... He asks rhetorically to no one in particular.... )

Right I am not trying to ask a trick question or box anyone in. I am not sure I can answer it myself.

But I think it is legitimate question which we should be able to use the texts to answer.

Another way to ask the question might be:. "What factors should I consider in deciding what pleasure is greatest? Can you give me any help with that?"

I think "duration" / "time" is documentable in the texts (per the quote above).

I think "intensity" is probably also documentable in terms of the references to "pure pleasure" ( I will look for the PD reference).

But I suspect there are or should be other factors, or else we should have an explanation as to why there are not.

(Edit:. This is a topic we've referenced before so I am interested in any comments from anyone and not only Don)

How do you describe in words the attributes of one pleasure that make it more or less pleasant than another?

Thank you. What I am asking you also is "What do you take 'most pleasant' to mean"?

I don't start to many totally generic threads like this one but this seems to be a good time to reinforce what Joshua has said a couple of times in recent podcasts: That after you accomplish getting a general basic understanding of Epicurean philosophy you're "only at the beginning" because you then need to apply it.

It seems appropriate to reinforce that: We spend a lot of time discussing very specific details, and we need to do that because that's the only way to understand the big picture.

But once we have the big picture we're then faced with the real question: application. It's as if our minds are computers and the Epicurean philosophy takes us through the reboot sequence, and maybe through the loading of certain basic application programs.

But once the basic operating system, and the basic application programs are loaded, we then face the even harder question: How do we use what we have learned?

Just to refresh my memory Don do you have a preferred interpretation of what is translated as "the greatest pleasure"?

This will be an example, in fairness to DeWitt, that there are other contemporary writers who will give you that impression of isolationism in much stronger and unfair terms than does DeWitt.

If I recall correctly, Martha Nussbaum's Therapy of Desire is terrible in that regard (and in other regards as well).

The whole issue of skepticism and dogmatism and knowledge and epistemology and canonics is all very tricky, and it seems it is one of the least well developed in Epicurean discussions and even here on the forum.

There is a lot of information in Philodemus "On Signs / On Methods of Inference" that would bear on these topics that we simply haven't had time to explore, but I really encourage anyone interested in that line to start the relevant discussion threads.

Because therein (in epistemology) lays the answer to a lot of the confusion about Epicurus, in my view.

Quote

Epicurus declared himself to be "self- taught" and he arrogated to himself the title of Sage or Wise Man, a concept familiar to the Greeks.

The former title was reserved by Epicurus for himself alone, a seeming arrogance which elicited the sneers of his detractors.

I admit I have not checked the footnotes, but the first "arrogated to himself" I would not read as meaning "he was the only one in the world" and as to the second sentence I would expect that if there was accuracy in that, it might have been relevant only within "his" school, among the people with whom he interacted. Both of those would be reasonable. (and in connection with the "philosopher" name, you've probably read the controversy about Epicurus' attitude toward Leucippus, and that it is alleged that Epicurus held that he did not even exist. DeWitt argues (if I recall) that the meaning of that controversy was that Epicurus did not consider Leucippus worthy of the title of philosopher, given Epicurus' view of Leucippus' errors. So it may be that part of what we're talking about here was sort of a colloquial "worth of the title of philosopher."

I readily admit that I am speculating about all this, but I would strongly suspect that everything anyone has to go on is speculation: inference built upon inference upon inference, and that not everyone in the chain of inference was attempting to be charitable. So great caution is to be advised on all sides.

These are the kinds of questions that aren't really resolvable, but in my mind I refer them all to "what would be the most consistent with the philosophy as a whole," and the kind of unflattering "cultism" that people tag him with is hardly the only possibility and not the one most consistent with the philosophy.

I would never assert that Epicurus was perfect and without inconsistency, but since what we have are the broad outlines complemented by some significant detail that points to an overall level-headed man and level-headed bunch of people, I think it's always a poor idea, and unfair, and even illogical, to jump to an unflattering conclusion as the strongest possibility.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Well, but when it produces more pleasure in the end than normal life, why shouldn't I sacrifice virtue and dignity for more long-time pleasure?

I think you're going in the right direction with that question, but by inserting "long-time" or "long-term" you would be focusing exclusively on the "duration" of the pleasure and I doubt that would be correct Epicurean theory. Duration would (in my understanding) be only one of the aspects, and you would need to consider "intensity" or some other measure:

Letter to Menoeceus: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

Even that quote might not be entirely clear but I think it is evidence that we measure pleasure by more than just duration in time.

And that question of determining "the most pleasant" is relevant to the bliss machine hypo at a fundamental level. The "unreality" that is the basis of so much objection to the experiment is I think sensing in part the issue that is referenced by Epicurus as "the most pleasant." The issue is probably not that there is an absolute scale of "most pleasant for everyone" or "the best pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" for everyone, but there is still an issue of "what kind of pleasure" is being experienced by the individual that is relevant to the question.

I think in general a "feeling of happiness" because it is a feeling is well within the category of pleasure. It's when people start to embellish "happy" with all sorts of other definitions that are not feelings that the problem comes.

Quote from Matt

I just feel like this hypothetical is in the realm of it being entirely implausible given the particular parameters. Its an idealist abstraction that doesn’t take into account reality. How reality works, how nature works, how human behavior works.

And I think you are describing Platonism / Stoicism / virtue exactly: "idealist abstraction that doesn't take into account reality, how reality works, etc.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

And thus it didn't really made sense to me why Epicurus seemed to try and to separate his students from the outside world

Did DeWitt say he did that, or did you pick that up as an artifact of what is generally "out there" on Epicurus? Either way, I don't think he "tried to separate his students from the outside world" at all. I think he taught them to embrace what was good in the world, and fight against what is bad, but in no way did he teach them to pull back into their caves. THAT is the modern or neostoic view that i think is just hogwash -- and says much more about those who say it, than it does about Epicurus, who can't be shown to have said it when the philosophy is viewed in total.

I am glad to see Don like my last post Some people might read some posts and think that Don and I are on significantly different pages on some important issues, and while we do have differences of perspectives, pretty much all the time all you have to do is get us "on the line talking" and you find out that there is very little difference in our positions. I think both of us like to be cautious in how we are being perceived, so we tend to write explanatory comments on things that give the impression of more difference of opinion than really exists.

But it's good that we are doing our best to be clear and I think as long as people don't get the wrong impression, the attempts to drill down in clarity -- such as on the hypotheticals issue - are very good for the forum.

Thank you Godfrey! If you recall Gosling and Taylor saying something similar to Joshua, and you can think of a location in the book to cite, please let us know!

I am sorry but I am too running around to be sure where to post on the latest comments on the pleasure machine issue. I'll try here:

My observation is that the big disagreement between everyone is deeper than the issue as stated. Some people are not willing to play the hypothetical game at all, so they reject the proposal because they refuse to accept the hypothetical. I think I saw SimonC make essentially that point, and I think Matt is echoing it in the post just above.

Failing agreement on whether we should accept the facts of the hypothetical, we can't fairly proceed to the ultimate question being asked.

And that's where it seems the discussion is at an impasse.

This *might* be related to Epicurus' refusal to accept the question of whether Metrodorus would be alive or dead tomorrow. He seemed in that case to be rejecting the facts of the hypothetical.

However would Epicurus reject ALL discussion by hypothetical? I doubt it.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

If everyone can truly be happy, why then claim the title to be the only wise man, as opposed to the philosopher title, for himself?

If you have a page and line number I'd like to see that, rather than just post general comments that in general I think DeWitt is the best available commentator. I don't accept that this was Epicurus' position (that he was the only wise man).

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Thus I get the expression that Epicureanism favours the creation of cult-like mentalities, where Epicureans claim to know „true beliefs“ (the same thing any cult leader would proclaim to know). What is your stance on that?

As explored in most of the responses, it depends on one's definition of a cult. That world has lots of bad connotations that would not apply. On the other hand certainly Epicurus was the leader of a group, and the group held its leader in high esteem (without necessarily thinking him perfect) and I think there are all sorts of observations that can be made to the effect that there is nothing wrong whatsoever with that.

Quote from Nate

It was totally a cult.

However, like the word "God", the word "cult" has been de-contextualized from its origins.

I wouldn't use Nate's first sentence because I think he's right in the second sentence - you have to be careful to define your terms before you emphatically apply them.

Quote from Don

f you're getting this impression from DeWitt, I'll be the first to admit I have problems with DeWitt. You'll notice some of my reviews of specific chapters of Epicurus and His Philosophers in this section. I have major issues with his Ranks and Titles section in chapter 5. I do not necessarily subscribe to a DeWittean interpretation in all things Epicurean.

Not to take this off on a tangent on DeWitt, but I think DeWitt might occasionally go to far in some areas, but in most areas his ultimate conclusions are pretty fair. You could probably pull some sentences that support calling the Epicureans a "cult" but by the time you finish the whole book and consider the whole philosophy (which I think DeWitt does better than most) then I don't think you reach any of the negative conclusions that we use when using the word "Cult" today. And just the opposite - it would be absurd to argue that the man who more than anyone else taught that authority should be challenged, and that nothing should be accepted that cannot be grounded in the evidence of the senses, was attempting to set up an organization of mind-numbed robots and to intimidate them into unquestioning belief in following his whims (which I think is a fair meaning of the word cult as we use it today).