Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

That's my own photo taken mere minutes before I posted.

Wait what? You are in DC? Then will we see some photos of you at the Jefferson Memorial?

Episode 137 - The Letter to Menoeceus 03 - On Death (Part One) - is now available!

Excellent thank you! do you have the link for that image? I think I was aware that he had Creech, but I would love to confirm that he had the 1743 Daniel Brown edition, which IMHO is so much better written than the 1682 Creech.

Yes a table of comparisons would be good, especially if it would help us prioritize the differences in order of importance.

I have always considered the "Cyreniacs want pleasure NOW" difference to be overstated - I would have to think that if they were here to defend themselves we would find that that allegation is an oversimplification and that they would have an answer for the criticism.

More to the point is that I would gather than being closer to Socrates, they were probably more theistic and not at all into the atomism that forms the basis of the Epicurean affirmation that there is no supernatural realm and no life after death. Where the Cyreniacs stood on epistemology is also something of a mystery.

It's impossible for me to believe that Epicurus was taking a step "backward" into any form of asceticism. More likely, he was developing and extending the arguments against other Socratic/Platonic positions, while keeping the emphasis on pleasure and pain as the guides of nature, and extending the emphasis to ALL kinds of pleasure and pain, including mental as at least as significant as physical pain and pleasure.

Yes as to the last post. Here is the excerpt from one of Jordan's posts that we discussed this past Wednesday night:

Quote

Indeed, it was through Epicurus that I discovered and became attracted to philosophical hedonism as a pragmatic way of life. However, like many others, I eventually grew disappointed with Epicurus’ philosophy because of his strange and paradoxically ascetic hedonism — for Epicurus, pleasure is merely the absence of pain, particularly the mental pain of anxiety. In other words, Epicureanism is a form of negative hedonism which values the avoidance of pain over the seeking of pleasure. Whatever merits an analgesic philosophy like this might have, it certainly wasn’t my ideal of hedonism. Indeed, I was delighted when I read that a contemporaneous hedonist school made fun of Epicureanism by saying that this state of absence of pain is the condition of a corpse!

And that witticism is how I discovered the Cyrenaic school.

I think Jordan is wrong in that paragaph to characterize Epicurus the way he does, but Jordan is in good company - it's my understanding that this is the reasoning that led Nietzsche away from Epicurus too.

The phrase "strange and paradoxically ascetic hedonism" is the key. Yes, there is something "strange and paradoxical" going on, but the issue is not in Epicurus, but in the mainstream way he is interpreted. Yes you can isolate a couple of passages in the letter to Menoeceus and conclude that Epicurus taught "valuing the avoidance of pain over the seeking of pleasure." But when you read the WHOLE philosophy and the many texts that do not at all support such an interpretation, then it becomes possible to see that those passages in the letter to Menoeceus are not really saying what it appears in isolation that they are saying.

Quote from Don

From the information above, it looks like there are parallels as well as divergences between Epicureanism and Existential Therapy.

I am still not sure how to get my head around the full picture. I think we all have a fairly good understanding of the positions that Epicurus took.

But do we even have a beginning list of what positions "Existential Therapy" takes. Where do we look for such a list, and what authority defines it?

Quote

Existential thinkers avoid restrictive models that categorise or label people. Instead, they look for the universals that can be observed transculturally.

This kind of statement is usually as far as I have ever gotten in reading. I think I follow what this statement means and it makes sense to me.

The issue I presume looms large, however, is that Epicurus takes many specific positions on issues such as life after death, supernatural gods, and absence of ideal forms which would define Epicurus' take on the nature of existence.

Is it fair to presume that an "Existential Therapist" also takes positions on basic questions about the nature of existence?

Quote

Existential therapy is a form of psychotherapy that explores the difficulties that an individual experiences but from a philosophical perspective.

So the question is "From WHAT philosophical perspective?" I presume in order for there to be any coherence there much be recognized boundaries on what "Existential Therapy" teaches as to the nature of existence? If so, what are they? I would not be particularly interested in recommending anyone get therapy from someone - even a "professional" - who approaches life from a Platonist or Stoic perspective.

A friend recommended a podcast called expatmoneyshow.com. Like many podcasts** it seems to be pushing a service that is for sale, but I have listened to a couple of episodes (one about Uruguay included) and it is very interesting and well done.

**But unlike the Lucretius Today podcast!

Quote from Kalosyni

As I read this: "You have been nonexistent for an eternity before birth and will be nonexistent for an eternity after you die" -- it had a rather sobering affect on me -- and a feeling that I needed to sit down to make sense of it.

I think a lot of people do that. Even those who call themselves atheists seem to gloss over the issue, because it is so sobering. I think this is one of the best ways to clarify the urgency of the pleasure question. The "live like you are dying" metaphor is really a pretty good one.

We do not disagree - that is why I said "full description."

But there are others out there in the world who insist that "tranquility" IS a sufficient description of the Epicurean goal, and that is my reason for the rhetorical question.

Pleasure as defined by normal definitions includes both joy and delight and tranquility. The reverse is not the case in normal or academic discourse - tranquility is not considered to include joy and delight.

As I see it f we want to convey that we value both goals in the online world of discussing Epicurus, the global word which must be emphasized is Pleasure. If we fail to make clear the sweeping definition of Pleasure, the result is that we imply that Tranquility is a separate and equal or even higher goal. At that point we will be indistinguishable from those who consider joy and delight to be second tier goals and that joy and delight are expendable or merely instrumental toward some supposedly higher word.

That's exactly what the elevation of "katastematic pleasure" has done in many cases - dilute and demote the sweeping nature of the word "pleasure." And whether we like it or not, people who focus on "tranquility" and "katastematic pleasure" as replacements for "pleasure" are everywhere in modern online discussion of Epicurus, so this is an issue to keep constantly in mind.

Every time a young person reads somewhere that Epicurus held the highest good to be "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia," another opportunity to reach someone for the message of Epicurus is jeopardized. Some take the time to get to the bottom of the issue, but my belief is that many do not. Had it not been for my reading DeWitt rather than Wikipedia and the Academics, I would have walked away from Epicurus just like Nietzsche did, and this website would not exist.

(And that's not to equate my level of perception as being anywhere Nietzsche's, but only to observe that I would consider his ultimate assessment of Epicurus as insufficient would be correct, did I not take this position about the relationship between pleasure and tranquility.)

It makes sense to pursue tranquility for the sake of experiencing Pleasure without disruption or distraction, but it does not make sense to pursue pleasure for the sake of "absence of disturbance." In the former, Pleasure is clearly communicated to be the goal, and we can all pursue Pleasure in whatever form we find pleasurable. In the latter, no clear goal is conveyed at all, and we are left to look elsewhere for a clear goal. (And this "left to look elsewhere is IMHO exactly why that formulation is so popular.)

The fact that you (Don) thought it appropriate to clarify what I was saying in the question shows that this is an issue where we have no consensus form of communication even here at EpicureanFriends. By no means do I intend to deprecate the value of tranquility to life - I always consider pleasure to include tranquility.

But outside of here there is a consensus - and the consensus is that Tranquility rather than Pleasure is what Epicurus held to be the ultimate goal. And with that switch in words comes a huge transvaluation in meaning.

To me that is why it is very good that we continue to have this back and forth discussion, and why I am glad you raise it. Otherwise the point would be lost on all but the very few who really dig into the reasons for the terminology issues. If this website is to do anything for the world of discussion of Epicurus on the internet, it will be in keeping this issue front and center.

Quick comment: When Joshua told the story related by Stephen Greenblatt about his mother, Joshua made a comment to the effect that not everyone was a big fan of "The Swerve" (Greenblatt's book). I left the comment in while editing but just to provide background, in the past we've had some debates about the focus of the book (lots of detail on church politics in the middle ages / not a lot of focus on Epicurean doctrine).

It's also possible that Greenblatt overstates the importance of Lucretius to modern science. But I don't think Joshua or I or most of us here would discourage anyone from reading the book if they find the subjects he covers interesting.

Much of the criticism comes from academic "experts" who aren't really arguing from the point of view of Greenblatt's intended audience (laymen who are not experts in Epicurus or church history).

I have a copy of the book myself and I wouldn't hesitate to recommend it to a generalist reader, but in doing so I would take care to explain what the book is and what it is not. If you go in with proper expectations that it is a generalist history of the church and manuscript preservation with only maybe one strong chapter on Epicurus, then I would say it's a perfectly fine book.

If you want a general big picture combined with details of Epicurean doctrine, go to DeWitt. That's why I always recommend DeWitt first to a reader who really wants to learn about Epicurus.

If you're looking for a generalist book which might perhaps hook a non-philosopher reader to want to read more about Epicurus then "The Swerve" may well be a good choice. Hey, it's a "best seller" if I recall, so that gives the topic some credibility in literary people who might ordinarily shun straight philosophy.

Lots of good show notes as we complete the section on Death. I will get this edited and postEd ASAP.

A good time to remind everybody that as Kalosyni indicates this issue has many aspects.

For those facing the emotional trauma of losing someone there is also the very well stated chapter in A few Days In Athens about the pain of losing someone.

For those who are looking to pin down the intellectual differences between Epicurus and Abrahamic religion or dealing with the issue of "would it be better to not have been born" there are the quotes that Joshua cited in the show from Sophocles and Ecclesiastes.

For both and everyone this episode is a good way to focus on the answer to the question:. When you and Epicurus both accept that you have been nonexistent for an eternity before death and will be nonexistent for an eternity after you die, do you really think that Epicurus taught that the full description of all you want out of life is to be "calm?"

Someone can also correct this poor rendering of the passage, but Joshua reminds me of the saying that the safest place for a ship is in port but that is not what ships are made for....

So the art of sailing successfully in dangerous waters is a useful analogy for a lot of things

I am going to run out of time for comment right now but these issues also involve the question of "reasoning by analogy" and the issues discussed in Philodemus On Signs / On Methods of Inference

Part of the reason for my own position would also involve the "Nature never creates only a single thing of it's kind" deduction. We have loads of analogies to things which pulsate and go back and forth, but the suggestion that there was once a one-of-a kind event is not made more plausible to be unique by calling it a "singularity"

At the very least this would cause me to deduce an unending series of big bangs, but at the same time I do not accept the plausibility of the universe not being infinite in size, so I do not believe it plausible that the universe can collapse on a "center".

So my own view which is admittedly my own view and nothing more is that the most likely scenario given present observations is an unending series of bangs in unending number throughout an "infinite" space (not sequentially around one center).

I am sure that will get you an F in physics class but that is my personal deduction that I am willing to live my life by given my current reading to date..

And of course that comment raises the issue of how we deal with "experts" and questions of "scientific consensus" and all that, which Ren mentioned above. That in itself is worth a long discussion.

I think Pacatus you have raised the real issue underlying the question - which includes the relationship and use of both direct evidence and "circumstantial" or "indirect" evidence.

Epicurus has no direct observational evidence of atoms or void, but he found strong circumstantial evidence from the observation of other things which he could observe directly. We therefore logically do not require direct evidence on all issues, but we require that any theories be consistent with what evidence does exist.

So when we use words like speculation and evidence we have to be very clear what we are talking about.

As I see it there is a LOT of circumstantial evidence from all else that we observe that "nothing comes from nothing..". We do not have direct evidence of what came before the "big bang" (which itself we infer from circumstantial evidence as we did not see it occur).

It is my personal position that the overwhelming evidence of nothing coming from nothing in all other observations is not invalidated as a good working model of the universe as a whole by the argument that "we have no direct evidence of what came before the big bang."

These are complicated epistemological issues that cannot be resolved purely by demanding "direct evidence* from our own observation. In order not to be accused of blind faith ourselves we have to have an understanding of our own rules of reasoning and waiting and opinion making as in the PDs in the early 20's

I believe this is one, which Munro translates as borders (Book one)

159] If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of any thing, nothing would require seed. Men for instance might rise out of the sea, the scaly race out of the earth, and birds might burst out of the sky; horned and other herds, every kind of wild beasts would haunt with changing broad tilth and wilderness alike. Nor would the same fruits keep constant to trees, but would change; any tree might bear any fruit. For if there were not begetting bodies for each, how could things have a fixed unvarying mother? But in fact because things are all produced from fixed seeds, each thing is born and goes forth into the borders of light out of that in which resides its matter and first bodies; and for this reason all things cannot be gotten out of all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power

I will have to track them down over the weekend. I wonder if they are a special translation decision by Humphries

Great! Would the "shores of light" references in Lucretius fit in this picture?

Humphries Book One:

But now, since all created things have come

From their own definite kinds of seed, they move

From their beginnings toward the shores of light

Out of their primal motes.

...

There must be

A proper meeting of their seeds in time

For us to see them at maturity

Grown by their season's favor, living earth

Bringing them safely to the shores of light.

Humphries Book Two:

They give her eunuch priests

To demonstrate that men are sometimes found

Unworthy of their fathers, ravishers

Of the maternal godhead, and such men

Must not send offspring to the shores of light.

Humphries Book Five:

And why

Must every season bring disease? And why

Is early death so free to walk the world?

When nature, after struggle, tears the child

Out of its mother's womb to the shores of light,

He lies there naked, lacking everything,

Like a sailor driven wave-battered to some coast,

And the poor little thing fills all the air

With lamentation - but that's only right

In view of all the griefs that lie ahead

Along his way through life.

Now I turn

To our own earth's beginnings, to how the fields

All gently made decision what new birth

To send to the shores of light, or to commit

To the whims of the wind.

....

Time brings everything

Little by little to the shores of light

By grace of art and reason, till we see

All things illuminate each other's rise

Up to the pinnacles of loftiness.

MFSMITH -- Book One:

Since you and you alone stand at the helm of nature’s ship, and since without your sanction nothing springs up into the shining shores of light, nothing blossoms into mature loveliness, it is you whom I desire to be my associate in writing this poem *On the Nature of Things,* which I am attempting to compose for my friend Memmius.3 Through your will, goddess, he is always endowed outstandingly with all fine qualities. So with all the more justification, Venus, give my words charm that will ensure their immortality.

Thank you Don! Also I am going to try to get us to go through the arguments presented in Lucretius Book 3. I seem to remember that people have counted them, let me see if i can quickly separate them by topic. (just a start in this post)

Lucretius Book Three (Bailey)

1 - Death will be no different than the time before we were born:

[830] Death, then, is naught to us, nor does it concern us a whit, inasmuch as the nature of the mind is but a mortal possession. And even as in the time gone by we felt no ill, when the Poeni came from all sides to the shock of battle, when all the world, shaken by the hurrying turmoil of war, shuddered and reeled beneath the high coasts of heaven, in doubt to which people’s sway must fall all human power by land and sea; so, when we shall be no more, when there shall have come the parting of body and soul, by whose union we are made one, you may know that nothing at all will be able to happen to us, who then will be no more, or stir our feeling; no, not if earth shall be mingled with sea, and sea with sky.

2 - Even if our atoms come back together in the future we would not remember our past:

[843] And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.

3 - Death is no different than if we had never been born:

[862] For, if by chance there is to be grief and pain for a man, he must needs himself too exist at that time, that ill may befall him. Since death forestalls this, and prevents the being of him, on whom these misfortunes might crowd, we may know that we have naught to fear in death, and that he who is no more cannot be wretched, and that it were no whit different if he had never at any time been born, when once immortal death hath stolen away mortal life.

[870] And so, when you see a man chafing at his lot, that after death he will either rot away with his body laid in earth, or be destroyed by flames, or the jaws of wild beasts, you may be sure that his words do not ring true, and that deep in his heart lies some secret pang, however much he deny himself that he believes that he will have any feeling in death. For he does not, I trow, grant what he professes, nor the grounds of his profession, nor does he remove and cast himself root and branch out of life, but all unwitting supposes something of himself to live on. For when in life each man pictures to himself that it will come to pass that birds and wild beasts will mangle his body in death, he pities himself; for neither does he separate himself from the corpse, nor withdraw himself enough from the outcast body, but thinks that it is he, and, as he stands watching, taints it with his own feeling.

Hence he chafes that he was born mortal, and sees not that in real death there will be no second self, to live and mourn to himself his own loss, or to stand there and be pained that he lies mangled or burning. For if it is an evil in death to be mauled by the jaws and teeth of wild beasts, I cannot see how it is not sharp pain to be laid upon hot flames and cremated, or to be placed in honey and stifled, and to grow stiff with cold, lying on the surface on the top of an icy rock, or to be crushed and ground by a weight of earth above.

4 - We lose good things after death, but we lose the bad things too!

[894] ‘Now no more shall thy glad home welcome thee, nor thy good wife and sweet children run up to snatch the first kisses, and touch thy heart with a silent thrill of joy. No more shalt thou have power to prosper in thy ways, or to be a sure defence to thine own. Pitiful thou art,’ men say, ‘and pitifully has one malignant day taken from thee all the many prizes of life.’ Yet to this they add not: ‘nor does there abide with thee any longer any yearning for these things.’ But if they saw this clearly in mind, and followed it out in their words, they would free themselves from great anguish and fear of mind.

[904] ‘Thou, indeed, even as thou art now fallen asleep in death, shalt so be for all time to come, released from every pain and sorrow. But ’tis we who have wept with tears unquenchable for thee, as thou wert turned to ashes hard by us on the awesome place of burning, and that unending grief no day shall take from our hearts.’ But of him who speaks thus we should ask, what there is so exceeding bitter, if it comes at the last to sleep and rest, that any one should waste away in never-ending lamentation.

5 - Death is like sleep, and we don't feel pain while we are asleep.

[912] This too men often do, when they are lying at the board, and hold their cups in their hands, and shade their faces with garlands: they say from the heart, ‘Brief is this enjoyment for us puny men: soon it will be past, nor ever thereafter will it be ours to call it back.’ As though in death this were to be foremost among their ills, that thirst would burn the poor wretches and parch them with its drought, or that there would abide with them a yearning for any other thing. For never does any man long for himself and life, when mind and body alike rest in slumber. For all we care sleep may then be never-ending, nor does any yearning for ourselves then beset us. And yet at that time those first-beginnings stray not at all far through our frame away from the motions that bring sense, when a man springs up from sleep and gathers himself together. Much less then should we think that death is to us, if there can be less than what we see to be nothing; for at our dying there follows a greater turmoil and scattering abroad of matter, nor does any one wake and rise again, whom the chill breach of life has once overtaken.

6 - We complain so much about the pains of life, we should be relieved to be rid of them!

[931] Again, suppose that the nature of things should of a sudden lift up her voice, and thus in these words herself rebuke some one of us: ‘Why is death so great a thing to thee, mortal, that thou dost give way overmuch to sickly lamentation? why groan and weep at death? For if the life that is past and gone has been pleasant to thee, nor have all its blessings, as though heaped in a vessel full of holes, run through and perished unenjoyed, why dost thou not retire like a guest sated with the banquet of life, and with calm mind embrace, thou fool, a rest that knows no care? But if all thou hast reaped hath been wasted and lost, and life is a stumbling-block, why seek to add more, all to be lost again foolishly and pass away unenjoyed; why not rather make an end of life and trouble? For there is naught more, which I can devise or discover to please thee: all things are ever as they were. If thy body is not yet wasted with years, nor thy limbs worn and decayed, yet all things remain as they were, even if thou shouldst live on to overpass all generations, nay rather, if thou shouldst never die.’ What answer can we make, but that nature brings a just charge against us, and sets out in her pleading a true plaint?

7 - We are being ungrateful to focus on death and not the good things life has brought us:

[952] But if now some older man, smitten in years, should make lament, and pitifully bewail his decease more than is just, would she not rightly raise her voice and chide him in sharp tones? ‘Away with tears henceforth, thou rogue, set a bridle on thy laments. Thou hast enjoyed all the prizes of life and now dost waste away. But because thou yearnest ever for what is not with thee, and despisest the gifts at hand, uncompleted and unenjoyed thy life has slipped from thee, and, ere thou didst think it, death is standing by thy head, before thou hast the heart to depart filled and sated with good things. Yet now give up all these things so ill-fitted for thy years, and with calm mind, come, yield them to thy sons: for so thou must.’

8 - Out of Death comes New Things.

She would be right, I trow, in her plea, right in her charge and chiding. For the old ever gives place thrust out by new things, and one thing must be restored at the expense of others: nor is any one sent down to the pit and to black Tartarus. There must needs be substance that the generations to come may grow; yet all of them too will follow thee, when they have had their fill of life; yea, just as thyself, these generations have passed away before, and will pass away again. So one thing shall never cease to rise up out of another, and life is granted to none for freehold, to all on lease.

Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, before we are born, have been as naught to us. These then nature holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we are dead and gone. Is there aught that looks terrible in this, aught that seems gloomy? Is it not a calmer rest than any sleep?

[978] Yea, we may be sure, all those things, of which stories tell us in the depths of Acheron, are in our life. Neither does wretched Tantalus fear the great rock that hangs over him in the air, as the tale tells, numbed with idle terror; but rather ’tis in life that the vain fear of the gods threatens mortals; they fear the fall of the blow which chance may deal to each.

[984] Nor do birds make their way into Tityos, as he lies in Acheron, nor can they verily in all the length of time find food to grope for deep in his huge breast. However vast the mass of his outstretched limbs, though he cover not only nine acres with his sprawling limbs, but the whole circle of earth, yet he will not be able to endure everlasting pain, nor for ever to supply food from his own body. But this is our Tityos, whom as he lies smitten with love the birds mangle, yea, aching anguish devours him, or care cuts him deep through some other passion.

[995] The Sisyphus in our life too is clear to see, he who open-mouthed seeks from the people the rods and cruel axes, and evermore comes back conquered and dispirited. For to seek for a power, which is but in name, and is never truly given, and for that to endure for ever grinding toil, this is to thrust uphill with great effort a stone, which after all rolls back from the topmost peak, and headlong makes for the levels of the plain beneath.

[1003] Then to feed for ever the ungrateful nature of the mind, to fill it full with good things, yet never satisfy it, as the seasons of the year do for us, when they come round again, and bring their fruits and their diverse delights, though we are never filled full with the joys of life, this, I trow, is the story of the maidens in the flower of youth, who pile the water into the vessel full of holes, which yet can in no way be filled full.

[1011] Cerberus and the furies, moreover, and the lack of light, Tartarus, belching forth awful vapours from his jaws, . . . . . . . which are not anywhere, nor verily can be. But it is fear of punishment for misdeeds in life—fear notable as the deeds are notable—and the atonement for crime, the dungeon and the terrible hurling down from the rock, scourgings, executioners, the rack, pitch, the metal plate, torches; for although they are not with us, yet the conscious mind, fearing for its misdeeds, sets goads to itself, and sears itself with lashings, nor does it see meanwhile what end there can be to its ills, or what limit at last to punishment, yea, and it fears that these same things may grow worse after death. Here after all on earth the life of fools becomes a hell.

[1024] This too you might say to yourself from time to time: ‘Even Ancus the good closed his eyes on the light of day, he who was a thousand times thy better, thou knave. And since him many other kings and rulers of empires have fallen, who held sway over mighty nations. Even he himself, who once paved a way over the great sea, and made a path for his legions to pass across the deep, and taught them on foot to pass over the salt pools, and made naught of the roarings of ocean, prancing upon it with his horses, yet lost the light of day, and breathed out his soul from his dying body. The son of the Scipios, thunderbolt of war, terror of Carthage, gave his bones to earth, even as though he had been the meanest house-slave. Yes, and the inventors of sciences and delightful arts, yes and the comrades of the sisters of Helicon: among whom Homer, who sat alone, holding his sceptre, has fallen into the same sleep as the rest. Again, after a ripe old age warned Democritus that the mindful motions of his memory were waning, of his own will he met death and offered her up his head. Epicurus himself died, when he had run his course in the light of life, Epicurus, who surpassed the race of men in understanding and quenched the light of all, even as the sun rising in the sky quenches the stars. Wilt thou then hesitate and chafe to meet thy doom? thou, whose life is wellnigh dead while thou still livest and lookest on the light, who dost waste in sleep the greater part of thy years, and snore when wide awake, nor ever cease to see dream-visions, who hast a mind harassed with empty fear, nor canst discover often what is amiss with thee, when like a sot thou art beset, poor wretch, with countless cares on every side, and dost wander drifting on the shifting currents of thy mind.’

[1053] If only men, even as they clearly feel a weight in their mind, which wears them out with its heaviness, could learn too from what causes that comes to be, and whence so great a mass, as it were, of ill lies upon their breast, they would not pass their lives, as now for the most part we see them; knowing not each one of them what he wants, and longing ever for change of place, as though he could thus lay aside the burden. The man who is tired of staying at home, often goes out abroad from his great mansion, and of a sudden returns again, for indeed abroad he feels no better. He races to his country home, furiously driving his ponies, as though he were hurrying to bring help to a burning house; he yawns at once, when he has set foot on the threshold of the villa, or sinks into a heavy sleep and seeks forgetfulness, or even in hot haste makes for town, eager to be back. In this way each man struggles to escape himself: yet, despite his will he clings to the self, which, we may be sure, in fact he cannot shun, and hates himself, because in his sickness he knows not the cause of his malady; but if he saw it clearly, every man would leave all else, and study first to learn the nature of things, since it is his state for all eternity, and not for a single hour, that is in question, the state in which mortals must expect all their being, that is to come after their death.

[1076] Again, what evil craving for life is this which constrains, us with such force to live so restlessly in doubt and danger? Verily, a sure end of life is ordained for mortals, nor can we avoid death, but we must meet it. Moreover, we move ever, we spend our time amid the same things, nor by length of life is any new pleasure hammered out. But so long as we have not what we crave, it seems to surpass all else; afterward, when that is ours, we crave something else, and the same thirst for life besets us ever, open-mouthed. It is uncertain too what fortune time to come may carry to us, or what chance may bring us, or what issue is at hand. Nor in truth by prolonging life do we take away a jot from the time of death, nor can we subtract anything whereby we may be perchance less long dead. Therefore you may live on to close as many generations as you will: yet no whit the less that everlasting death will await you, nor will he for a less long time be no more, who has made an end of life with today’s light, than he who perished many months or years ago.