Posts by Cassius

Gosh Joshua's post reminded me of something I can't believe I forgot.

Root304, you may also be interested in Thomas Cooper:

Thread

Thomas Cooper MD

[Admin Note: I am going to hijack Godfrey's post (which was originally here) and start a new thread from it on the topic of Thomas Cooper MD, materialist and friend of Thomas Jefferson]:

I would very much like to move Thomas Cooper into the "avowed Epicurean" category, but unfortunately I have not been able to find any references to Epicurus or Lucretius in Cooper's surviving writing which would allow me to do that. Hopefully at some point in the future someone can help me marshal the evidence…

Godfrey

April 4, 2021 at 6:53 PM

So far as i can find Cooper never wrote about Epicurus, but his writings include "The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism" which argues that "materialism" is the true doctrine of the old and new testaments, and gives lots of cites from the Bible in support of the point!

He also wrote: A View of the Metaphysical and Physiological Arguments In Favor of Materialism which makes the same arguments but not from a scriptural point of view.

I feel sure that Cooper was a closeted friend of Epicurus, but he held a very public teaching position at the top of a very public university in a very Christian state (South Carolina) so I feel sure his absence of mentioning Epicurus was self-censorship to try to survive in his teaching position. But regardless of that his arguments are very Epicurean-compatible IMHO.

Yes that's a good thought as to Gassendi, though I don't recommend the approach of looking for commonalities either.

There is an english version of Gassendi available. We worked on a digital transcription but didn't get it in very good final form.

Check this location:

Gassendi’s Epicurus – NewEpicurean

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty Four of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue in Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and address some difficult material about the properties and qualities of atoms and bodies and what it means to exist. We probably raise more issues than we answer in this episode, so please review the show notes and we will come back to these issues in the next show.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey

And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

[74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

[75] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others. And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men’s natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.

[76] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

[77] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements. But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men’s souls. Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

HICKS

After the foregoing we have next to consider that the worlds and every finite aggregate which bears a strong resemblance to things we commonly see have arisen out of the infinite. For all these, whether small or great, have been separated off from special conglomerations of atoms; and all things are again dissolved, some faster, some slower, some through the action of one set of causes, others through the action of another. It is clear, then, that he also makes the worlds perishable, as their parts are subject to change. Elsewhere he says the earth is supported on the air.

[74] And further, we must not suppose that the worlds have necessarily one and the same shape. On the contrary, in the twelfth book "On Nature" he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite. For nobody can prove that in one sort of world there might not be contained, whereas in another sort of world there could not possibly be, the seeds out of which animals and plants arise and all the rest of the things we see. And the same holds good for their nurture in a world after they have arisen. And so too we must think it happens upon the earth also.

[75] Again, we must suppose that nature too has been taught and forced to learn many various lessons by the facts themselves, that reason subsequently develops what it has thus received and makes fresh discoveries, among some tribes more quickly, among others more slowly, the progress thus made being at certain times and seasons greater, at others less.

Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention, but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions which the tribes inhabited.

[76] Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special names, in order that their communications might be less ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And as for things not visible, so far as those who were conscious of them tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation certain names for them, either sounds which they were instinctively compelled to utter or which they selected by reason on analogy according to the most general cause there can be for expressing oneself in such a way.

[77] Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality. For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

Episode 123 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we tackle the implications of "properties" and "qualities" of matter in the context of "time."

Root304 that is a tough one because there's an ultimate level of total incompatibility. However I suspect that one book you might be interested in would be DeWitt's "St Paul and Epicurus" which you can read in full at this location:

Epicurus.info : E-Texts : Title

Don laughs, but wait til you hear the episode and it will REALLY be confusing! However, the first step toward unraveling things is to at least "put it out there" what we want to talk about! If intersecting circles is the essence of a Venn diagram, then this is really tricky.

To amplify on this one:

4 - Bodies also have "qualities" which can and do change without changing their essence, which include slavery, poverty, riches, war, peace, rest, motion. (See Loeb / Hicks edition of DIogenes Laertius, page 600.)

Are in fact rest, motion, and TIME properly considered to be Qualities / Events? I think so based on what I am reading. I point this out because it seems to me it is one thing to consider bondage/liberty/riches/poverty etc to be "qualities" but to consider "time" and "motion" and "rest" to be qualities stretches our normal use of the word "quality."

"Event" seems a much more appropriate word for time and motion and rest than "quality" or "accident," and that's likely another argument for using the term "Event" to describe this category.

OK I recognize that the circles in the diagram above don't intersect, so maybe it's not really a Venn diagram. That's where we need an improved version, because one of the points is that the word "properties" appears to be used in Epicurean texts as referring in some contexts to both (1) the unchanging aspects of atoms (weight, shape, and size) and in other contexts to (2) the essential aspects of some bodies which, if lost, lead to what we consider to be the destruction of the body, like loss of weight to a stone, or loss of moisture to the sea, or loss of heat to fire, which events would destroy that object at least in our perception of it.

Sorry for the delay in getting this week's episode posted, but it should be up later today. In the meantime as it goes through editing, here are some comments;

1 - Joshua brought up the highly useful idea of using Venn Diagrams to illustrate issues involving the relationship between Properties and Qualities. I'm going to slap together a preliminary version for discussion purposes but it's likely to be either wrong or woefully incomplete. It would be an EXCELLENT idea to get a good one however.

This one needs to be torn apart and put back together but it is a starting point for thought / discussion:

Takeaways:

1 - Nothing has permanent unchanging existence except atoms and void (no realm of Platonic ideals or Aristotelian Essences)

2 - The atoms have no unchanging eternal properties other than shape, weight, and size. The void has only one eternal and unchanging property: it provides space in which bodies exist.

3 - Human senses cannot penetrate to observe directly the level of unchanging atoms - our sensations occur on the level of "bodies" that we see in the world around us, and therefore our level of existence is subject to change.

3 - Some bodies we consider to have "properties," which are aspects like weight to stones which cannot be changed at our level of existence without destroying what we perceive to be its essence.

4 - Bodies also have "qualities" which can and do change without changing their essence, which include slavery, poverty, riches, war, peace, rest, motion. (See Loeb / Hicks edition of DIogenes Laertius, page 600.)

5 - Successful living requires being able to understand how the world we live in arises from the atomic level, and how some things change while others do not change, all without the creation or supervision of supernatural gods.

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Updated Graphic for this wednesday - thanks Kalosyni -

Most of that is beyond my experience to comment on, but it does call to mind this passage in the biography of Epicurus, which indicates to me that he would be interested in the direction you are studying. Hopefully others who are familiar with some of those therapies will have more helpful comment.

I know that looking over the forum can be "intimidating" to someone new to reading Epicurus, but I do hope you'll err on the side of speaking up too quickly and asking questions too fast, rather than feeling like your questions are too basic for the forum. It's very helpful to those of us who have been here longer to see how others are thinking, so as you come across issues that are new to you and you have questions, don't hesitate to ask!

Even worse this thread is "automated" so it doesn't pick up nuances like "Is this user name the real McCoy?"

I woke up this morning thinking about this passage from Lucretius Book One which provides an example of why the philosophical perspective is so important. Without a sound understanding of philosophy you can't withstand the constant assault from false religion and false worldviews:

Quote

102] But still I fear your caution will dispute the maxims I lay down, who all your life have trembled at the poets' frightful tales. Alas! I could even now invent such dreams as would pervert the steadiest rules of reason, and make your fortunes tremble to the bottom. No wonder! But if Men were once convinced that death was the sure end of all their pains, they might with reason, then, resist the force of all Religion, and contemn the threats of poets. Now, we have no sense, no power, to strive against prejudice, because we fear a scene of endless torments after death.

In that selection you could insert in place of the underlined part these observations from the first five PDs and then understand them as providing us "the reasoning/power to strive against prejudice" and thus refute the major religious/philosophical positions that are the enemies of Epicureanism:

1 - "that perfect gods would not care to interfere in our affairs and thus we need not be concerned about them" (PD1)

2 - "that anything we cannot sense is irrelevant to us and thus the state of being dead can cause us no harm or good" (PD2)

3- "that Pleasure can be complete when it fills out experience, and thus we don't always need more" (PD3)

4- "that pain is never so potent that it can blot out all pleasure for the rest of our lives, so pleasure can be continuous and is always available as a guide to action" (PD4)

5- "that a life of true virtue IS a life of pleasure, and thus virtue is not its own reward." (PD5)

Happy Birthday to Democritus! Learn more about Democritus and say happy birthday on Democritus's timeline: Democritus

Yes I think that both perspectives are involved and important:

Epicurus would not have taken the philosophical position in support of pleasure that he took unless his position was provable as true by observing the real world practical benefit.

And at the same time:

Epicurus would have rejected the real world practical benefit of pleasure (just as we sometime choose pain over pleasure) if he had been philosophically convinced that a greater benefit were achievable either now or after death by following supernatural religion or "virtue" or "rationalism."

You've got to have both perspectives because they go together and reinforce each other.

One without the other is much more vulnerable to attack. Together they withstand both "practical" and "philosophical" attack.

Here are two brief Wikipedia articles that I think are highly relevant because they go to the core of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. What I am suggesting is that if this central issue ("the good" / "the form of the good") was among the most important things that Aristotle and Plato were arguing about, we would expect that Epicurus too would weigh in on the topic of "the good" very early in the Principal Doctrines. Unless and until refuted Plato and Aristotle's position that the most important thing in life to us is "the good" we would never expect to proceed further away from what Plato and Aristotle taught. The first step in the analysis has to be establishing that this "form of the good" is not to be looked to as the ultimate standard. You don't even begin to discuss "types of pleasures" or "which pleasures to choose" until you first establish that pleasures itself is the goal.

How do you do that in a single document (which as we discuss a lot, was not numbered in the original version)?

To me, we can look for that logical process is what we see in the PD's. The first point to establish is the proof that, if accepted, allows you to reject the view that there are no supernatural gods and that the gods do not and cannot punish you after death. You start with that first because everyone, even Plato and Aristotle, essentially point to religion and supernatural gods as the source of everything. And you don't just say "The gods don't exist and there is no life after death" because you're a philosopher and you're listing out proofs (logical arguments) not just raw assertions.

And then the second point that you establish, in order of importance after disposing of the supernatural claims, is you provide the proof that there is no logical argument against considering "Pleasure" to be the good. And you do that by directly addressing the most potent logical argument against pleasure, which is that (in Platonic terms) "since pleasure has no limit it is in the class of the more or less and therefore is not a superlative and cannot be considered to be the highest or best." And I see that as the reason for the otherwise convoluted wording "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful." All the rest of PD3 and PD4 as to pleasure and pain are subsidiary corollaries that address Platonic logical arguments against making "Pleasure" the highest good.

Seen this way PD01 through PD04 are not primarily therapeutic advice (though they do have that effect for those who are able to absorb them). They are primarily logical positions intended as cannonballs fired against the opposing philosophical positions that ruled Epicurus' world and still rule ours today.

Wikipedia:

1 - The Form of the Good Interestingly I see the shortest blurb on wikipedia about that is "Superlative Concept in the Philosophy of Plato."

The first references that are seen in The Republic to the Form of the Good are within the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates (454 c–d). When he is trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of justice, Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves" which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508 a–c), Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight" but it is "the cause of sight itself." As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the intelligible realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge". Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e)

The discussion surrounding this article implies that this "form of the good" is maybe the single central concept of Platonism. Amusing fact: "There is an ancient anecdotal tradition that Plato gave a public lecture entitled "On the Good" which so confused the audience that most walked out. At the end of the lecture Plato said to those hearers who remained: 'The Good is the One."

The article also points out Aristotle's criticism: " Aristotle discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good is thereby irrelevant to human ethics"

2. The Summum Bonum We have discussed this recently in our review of Torquatus. This article lays the phrase at the foot of Cicero: "Summum bonum is a Latin expression meaning the highest or ultimate good, which was introduced by the Roman philosopher Cicero^[1][2] to denote the fundamental principle on which some system of ethics is based — that is, the aim of actions, which, if consistently pursued, will lead to the best possible life. Since Cicero, the expression has acquired a secondary meaning as the essence or ultimate metaphysical principle of Goodness itself, or what Plato called the Form of the Good. These two meanings do not necessarily coincide. For example, Epicurean and Cyrenaic philosophers claimed that the 'good life' consistently aimed for pleasure, without suggesting that pleasure constituted the meaning or essence of Goodness outside the ethical sphere. In De finibus, Cicero explains and compares the ethical systems of several schools of Greek philosophy, including Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism and Platonism, based on how each defines the ethical summum bonum differently."

Unfortunately as best I can tell Seneca does a much more clear job of stating this issue than does Plato/Socrates. Here is a very clear statement, but even this statement indicates that we need to be careful what we mean by "limitless", because apparently "Limitless" also can be viewed as a definite quantity. It appears that "the ability to increase or decrease," or "the ability to have more or less" is the real problem they are identifying, and so we have to be careful with any definition of "pleasure" that indicates we can have more or less of it.

It appears to me that this is all highly abstract, and not directly related to the choice of particular pleasures on a moment to moment basis. The question of which pleasures should be chosen comes next, AFTER we first identify "pleasure" as the ultimate greatest good / goal / guide (rather than virtue or god or reason).

If we step too quickly from the question (1) What is the greatest good? to the question (2) How should I pursue pleasure? then we're likely to miss the answer to question one entirely, and get confused if we use the answer to question one as the answer to question two. They are two separate questions which the Platonic logical argument (to which Epicurus is responding) is addressing separately.

Quote

but virtue itself does not become less or greater.^[4] For the Supreme Good cannot diminish, nor may virtue retrograde; rather is it transformed, now into one quality and now into another, shaping itself according to the part which it is to play. 8. Whatever it has touched it brings into likeness with itself, and dyes with its own colour. It adorns our actions, our friendships, and sometimes entire households which it has entered and set in order. Whatever it has handled it forthwith makes lovable, notable, admirable.

Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.^[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.

This is not a long dialog and this statement is pretty close to the start so it is easy to get the full context by starting at the beginning:

Moral letters to Lucilius/Letter 66 - Wikisource, the free online library

Quote from Kalosyni

And then this points also toward what types of pleasures to pursue, and that "natural" pleasures can be fullfilled and are achievable (thus have a limit) -- and give a longer lasting feeling of fullfillment.

Ok I see this as an area of potential confusion that needs clarity.

I do not think that "can be fulfilled" and "achievable" should be viewed as the heart of the discussion in what is being talked about in PD3 or is the issue in responding to Plato as the basis for designating or not designating Pleasure as the greatest good.

It is not "possessing a limit" that itself makes "pleasure" worthy of being designated as the highest good. As Plato lists in Philebus, many things can have a limit. For example, it appears that Plato would say that all of the "virtues" have a limit because they are "superlatives." (See also the statement from Seneca in the post below.)

Virtue is complete in and of itself, in their view. If you're missing some element of virtue, then you're not really virtuous. For this reasoning look back at "in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind?"

He is stating that wisdom and knowledge and "mind" are complete in and of themselves, and therefore they are not rightly placed in the category of things of which you can have less or more. You're either "wise" or you're "not wise" -- he's saying that if you can add more wisdom to someone, then that person was not fully wise in the first place.

Unfortunately this discussion in Philebus is very complex and does not seem to be nearly as clear as it should be. In the part I quoted above I left out a long tangent that ends in this way:

and

I don't think we can adequately deal with this whole issue until we get a clear grasp of this argument, and I will be the first to admit that I don't have as good as grasp of it as I would like.

But what does seem clear to me is that we aren't yet talking about "individual pleasures" and we aren't at the level of being concerned with dividing up natural and necessary pleasures and choosing between them,

In this argument we are still at the basic level of whether "PLEASURE" can qualify as the highest good, as against VIRTUE, or PIETY or something like that.

And if we get ahead of ourselves and take this "limit" argument and derive from it that we should somehow "limit our pleasure" in life by means of the choices we make, then I think that's the straight road to asceticism, which is exactly where we DON"T want to end up if "Pleasure" is in fact the goal of life.