The Normativity of Nature in Epicurean Ethics and Politics

It's by Tim O'keefe so you know what's coming, and it doesn't take long - in the very first paragraph, he starts talking about types of desires as if they can be ranked as ideal forms -- with NO MENTION of the issue made plain by Torquatus - which is that the division arises from the difficulty involved in attaining them, not from some intrinsic "natural" or "unnatural" quality.

Here he is reversing the sequence. Epicurus taught that we do not pursue pleasure because it is good, but because it is pleasurable, as there is no "good" other than pleasure. Okeefe is implying that there is something else besides pleasure which is entitled to the name "good" which we can then apply to pleasure:

Next: this observation would not be surprising to O'Keefe if he were not intent on looking for "intrinsic" goods other than pleasure. But of course O'keefe is surpised, because O'keefe is not following Epicurus' train of thought:

And here is the conclusion:

The reason O'Keefe finds the relationship between nature and goodness "far from straightforward" is because O'Keefe refuses to follow Epicurus to his conclusions. Nature gives us only pleasure as the guide to what is desirable, and there is nothing "good" other than pleasure.