in my view of Epicurus' teaching, pleasure is EVERYTHING that we find to be desirable, including our attachment to our friends and our family and our "country" and innumerable other things. I think it is dangerous to narrow the definition at all beyond "what we feel to be desirable" and that means that certainly mental constructs and abstractions are pleasurable and desirable too.
This is clarifying for me. I think I can agree with this definition. Is this an interpretation of yours Cassius or is it shared by others in this group? Is there evidence among the texts that this is a definition that aligns with Epicurean Philosophy without the risk to becoming too intangible? As you know, I'm a novice in these topics, so even though it's intuitively clear to me that it can all be sensational pleasure, I do try to see how one situation or another would translate into actual sensational pleasure, in the shortest - or more probablly succesfful time frame - to regard it as good or bad (hence my argument against the war, and C. Longinus logic for going at it).
Epicureans held that mental pains and pleasures can be / often are more intense than "physical" ones. We don't have much problem seeing that in terms of visual art and music and dancing, but it also extends to literature and to any and all other forms of abstractions as well.
And these, I think, sort of reinforce my point about pleasure having to be actually felt, because if we leave it at them just being something that happens in the mind, we're one inch away from falling into idealizations again. And I remember, from what I learned in DeWitt, that even such abstract stuff as humor or fear at the end get translated into things we feel, because there are atoms in our body moving from one place to another that allow us to feel the effect of these abstractions on us. So, from my understanding so far, yes, everything has to end in something physical, to be real. Literature and music produce emotions in us, that are atoms (molecules if you will) that make them real. What other "pleasures of the mind" can we think of to see if they hold up to this test? Can you tell me of some pleasures of the mind that stay just there, as mental constructions and as such "are pleasant" without producing an effect in our bodies?
So absolutely I think that a person can employ Epicurean philosophy not only to die for a friend, as Epicurus specifically included, but also to die for any number of things if we find our value (our pleasure) to be deep enough in that objective.
So far into my studies, I don´t see this. I know we shouldn't fear death, because if we're dead we won't feel pain, but following your line of thought Cassius where you point out that painlessness is not the objective, death only achieve painlessness, but deprives us from keeping feeling pleasures, so I don't see any scenario where, absent of terrible pain, it would be desirable to get into a scenario of certain death for someone, anyone; I know this doesn't sound romantic at all... but aren't we the pragmatists? Thinking of going towards certain death for someone else, seems to me the most idealistic thing. On the other hand, if death is not certain, and you could do a calculus of putting yourself at certain risk of death, like, let's say, donating a kidney, to help someone you love and that will bring you more pleasure afterwards, well yes, I think it's something worth doing. Since I'm no oracle, to me, there are situations that are better to be regarded as certainly conducive to death, like war, and some that are not. When you enlist to fight, if you havent' come to terms with the possibility of dying, you're fooling yourself. So for me, it's a no, from the outset. Keeping in the pragmatist line, why is your loved one exposed to this danger that could hurt him so bad and probably end your life? Isn't it a consequence of their life choices? And also... if they're the ones to go, we are certain they're not suffering anymore, and we know, that our pain of losing them won't be eternal, and if it's goint to be long, it's not going to be very intense.
I want to clarify that for argument's sake I'm taking postures that are actually rather extremist for me.