I would say Epicurus' and the school's general advocacy of cultivating gratitude comes close to a modern idea of positivity.
However, don't be lured into the trap of toxic positivity either:
"[Arcesilaus] died in a fit of madness, as Hermippus says, after drinking a good deal of unmixed wine, he had by then reached the age of seventy-five, and no man was more highly regarded by the Athenians."
Hicks translates that section as (my emphasis): He died, according to Hermippus, through drinking too freely of unmixed wine which affected his reason; he was already seventy-five and regarded by the Athenians with unparalleled good-will.
"My own verses about him run as follows: Why, Arcesilaus, did you draw unmixed wine so unsparingly as to take leave of your sense? I pity you not so much for your death..."
And Hicks in 4.45 (again my emphasis): [45] I have written upon him as follows: Why, pray, Arcesilaus, didst thou quaff so unsparingly unmixed wine as to go out of thy mind? I pity thee not so much for thy death as because thou didst insult the Muses by immoderate potations.
There's also Diogenes chapter on Chrysippus:
On one occasion, as Hermippus relates, when [Chrysippus] had his school in the Odeum, he was invited by his pupils to a sacrificial feast. There after he had taken a draught of sweet wine unmixed with water, he was seized with dizziness and departed this life five days afterwards, having reached the age of seventy-three years, in the 143rd Olympiad. This is the date given by Apollodorus in his Chronology. I have toyed with the subject in the following verses5 :
Chrysippus turned giddy after gulping down a draught of Bacchus ; he spared not the Porch nor his country nor his own life, but fared straight to the house of Hades.
[185] Another account is that his death was caused by a violent fit of laughter ; for after an ass had eaten up his figs, he cried out to the old woman, "Now give the ass a drink of pure wine to wash down the figs." And thereupon he laughed so heartily that he died.
Drinking unmixed wine is certainly frowned upon since it brings on giddyness and takes away reason, but I'm still skeptical of seeing it as a metaphor for committing suicide, although it was deemed dangerous it appears. Barbarians were known to drink unmixed wine which is one reason they were "barbaric." There is an interesting article I found online:
Yet more dramatically, Alexander himself – according to one account – brought on his early death at 32 by drinking a separate toast to each of his twenty dinner guests one by one, and then finishing off a twelve-pint pitcher of unmixed wine.
...
Unmixed wine was deemed dangerous: many a Greek poem lamented it as the cause of an untimely death. Even Cleomenes (died 490 BC), the hardman King of Sparta, couldn’t handle wine “in the Scythian fashion”, i.e. without water, instead tippling his way into lunacy. Given such risks, unmixed wine was reserved only for drinking forfeits.
...
So next time you find yourself knee-deep in unmixed wine, toast the drink of the uncouth and ungodly – and steel yourself for the madness that must follow…
Unmixed wine brought on dizziness, lunacy, etc., but it was also a potent remedy to feeling pain. That would be my suggestion as to why Epicurus called for akraton "unmixed wine" on his last day. He was in severe pain, not to hasten his death. He knew his death was already imminent from the amount of pain he was in.
Additionally, I continue to maintain that VS47 is not talking about suicide. As a reminder for anyone:
Vatican Saying 47 - Epicurus Wiki
Epicurus Wiki does a good job of giving a literal translation of Metrodorus' saying: "...shall we give ourselves in surrender but when that which is necessary extracts [us] (from life)..."
When death comes eventually for all of us, we should not "rage against the dying of the light" but look back on life with satisfaction and not cling like fearful superstitious children, wishing for immortality or a life after death.
I did something similar to the m Epicurus' nicknames for others in Diogenes Laertius a couple years ago:
about savoring a pleasure, and not growing disgusted by or otherwise ruining a pleasure
VS35. Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for. οὐ δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν.
The word translated here as "ruin" (λυμαίνομαι) means, at root, to mistreat. The implication is that not honoring the good things you have achieved is a sign of disrespect and shows a lack of appreciation.
~ Saint-Andre, https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html#n35
I agree Don....
Cicero seems to equate pathē with ταραχή (tarakhē) "disturbance of mind; dis-ease" which is the opposite of αταραξία (a-taraksia) "lack of disturbance."
Which is not to say that Cicero was wrong as to the general usage of the term, if indeed that is what the other philosophers besides Epicurus were doing. I gather Cicero was correct about that, unless there is some reason in other literature to disbelieve him (?)
Agreed. As Joshua pointed out in the episode, there are two general connotations for that word. Cicero doesn't like Epicurus' expansive use of the word pleasure (ηδονή hēdonē) as pathē and so just defaults to his (ie, Cicero's) preferred connotation of pathē from πάθος (páthos "pain, suffering") instead of the general more basic sense from pắskhō, “I feel”.
For me, there is no doubt that Epicurus used πάθη (pathē) in the sense from πᾰ́σχω (pắskhō, “to undergo”) + -η (-ē): "(in neutral sense) what is done or what happens to a person"
*Everything* that we experience falls under one of two pathē: pleasure or pain. All other "feelings" fall under those broad categories of pleasure or pain.
Cicero seems to equate pathē with ταραχή (tarakhē) "disturbance of mind; dis-ease" which is the opposite of αταραξία (a-taraksia) "lack of disturbance."
Welcome aboard!
[51] "For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results ; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results. [52] "And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.
A test of "truth" cannot and I would say therefore does not mean a test of "absolute" or "true for everyone" truth...Absolute Platonic idealist truth does not exist and it is a false standard to act as if it does.
While I agree "idealist truth" doesn't exist in the form of some Platonic ideal, truth as in the truth of existing things does exist. I would call that objective truth. The difference is "Is it true pigs exist?" Vs "Is it true that ice cream tastes good?" The first is the objective truth Epicurus was concerned with in using his Criteria. The second is subjective and contextual. If one starts questioning the truth of the existence of pigs, one rapidly devolves into a Socratic nightmare: "What do you mean by a 'pig'?" To my understanding, Epicurus stands on it being true that there is an objective reality with which we interact with our sensations.
From my perspective, those last two posts from Patrikios and Cassius blur the line between the objective truth conveyed by reality to us through our senses and canonic faculties and the relative "truth" of subjective opinions and concepts derived from the objective truth of reality.
Along those lines, I offer my commentary on dogmatic vs skeptic:
With those two options available, being a dogmatist or being a skeptic, it seems to me that the significance is that one path leads to declaring that knowledge can be known, that it is possible to "take a stand" on what can be known about reality. The other path leaves one "puzzled," "in want of knowledge.," or simply letting problems remain without resolving them or at least proposing solutions. The second path implies that we can't really know anything. Epicurus was opposed to this idea wholeheartedly.
Welcome (back) aboard!
Can't vouch for the quality of the translations, but FWIW (link to several volumes in English translation on Internet Archive):
Internet Archive: Digital Library of Free & Borrowable Texts, Movies, Music & Wayback Machine
Ulfilas Welcome aboard!
If you haven't read it yet, my personal (and others') recommendation these days is Emily Austin's Living for Pleasure: https://nextbigideaclub.com/magazine/livin…bookbite/38534/
Your journey mirrors a number of us who found our way here. Look forward to your contributions to our discussions!
Now again - not everyone is bothered by the claims of philosophical skepticism or sees the immediate relevance to them. If they are not so bothered, then more power to them, but we likely would not have Epicurean philosophy to talk about in the first place if Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda and Philodemus had not been bothered by them.
In light of this excerpt above and others' reactions to my post, I feel I need to define my position a little more.
Do I feel that having a strong argument against radical skepticism (and superstition and religion and other anti-Epicurean positions) is important? Absolutely! This is one of the through-lines from the establishment of Epicurus' school down to the present day. Epicurus didn't wall himself away from the world. He vigorously engaged with the ideas circulating in his day, and modern Epicureans are called to the same.
Religion, skepticism, superstition, et. al. do a terrible amount of damage, both to individuals and to society in general. Am I bothered that many of the hoi polloi are in the grip of superstition, ignorance of natural science, etc.? Of course!!
And this little corner of the Internet - Our little boat of the SS EpicureanFriends - is one way to make authoritative material available "out there" in the market of ideas and to welcome passengers aboard.
What I don't want to get uptight about are the details of 2,000+ year old physics.
Is Epicurus onto something with his Canonics, his Theory of Knowledge? Absolutely! Otherwise, I wouldn't be on this forum or be thinking of myself as an "Epicurean." Is it necessary to have confidence in the truth of a REAL existing physical world with which we can interact in a meaningful way and not believe it is some pale reflection of a Realm of Ideal Forms or the "proving ground" for an after-death existence or some other lesser-than existence? Absolutely! And Epicurus' grounding the truth of our reality - our existence - in the use of our natural physical and mental senses/sensations and feelings provides a bedrock, fundamental ground on which to stand. There IS an external physical universe with which we interact. There are a number of modern philosophies dressed up as science that need to be counteracted today, including "we live in a simulation" "we are constantly hallucinating" etc. As modern Epicureans, I firmly believe we need to understand the workings of the mind to be able to counteract these philosophies. Do I have a good grasp of their arguments? No, no I do not. There aren't enough hours in the day for me to read everything I want to read and do everything i want to do. But should I get anxious and frustrated and be in pain? Nope. I'll do what I can do. That's one reason I like the accessible style of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's popular books and those of others.
Epicurus was brilliant in his devising possible causes for vision, for memory, for hearing, for constructing mental pictures in our minds, for applications of "atomic" theory, but he was a human being living 2,000+ years ago with a brilliant mind but limited access to information. Understanding HIS arguments against radical skepticism and superstition should fully inform the style of our own arguments and inspire modern Epicureans to combat ignorance and superstition and religious dogmatism in our own day as he did in his.
Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!
The HUGE problem is that there are not a lot of surviving texts that speak specifically to prolepsis. That's one reason Bryan 's compiling uses of the word and related words is so helpful, seeing the word/s in context.
The are a VARIED number of interpretations of prolepsis, starting as far back as Cicero! I don't know whether we'll ever have the concept from an Epicurean perspective definitively described.
That said, with due respect to Cassius and others bringing in Meno and the theory of knowledge, I **personally** see prolepsis, ancient concepts of memory formation, the workings of the psykhē (mind/soul), to be of tangential importance to applying Epicurus' philosophy in the modern world to my way of living. I find the investigations that the ancients dealt in and how they arrived at their findings of fascinating intellectual curiosity. But eidola do not grind grooves into my psykhē to make subsequent similar eidola easier to intercept. Brains don't work that way.
What Epicurus does give me is a firm commitment to finding physical causes completely devoid of woo-woo. It might not be eidola and psykhē, but it is a physical, natural, material cause to my memories, thought, and other mental processes. The Letter to Pythocles is a testament to finding material, physical causes to phenomena.
So, I don't get hung up on the specific details taught in the ancient school; but I think there are principles that are directly applicable from then to now.
There's also the prolepsis of justice which doesn't physically exist but "we know it when we *see* it." That one, I've taken to be akin to the innate sense of fairness exhibited by various animals, ex.
There actually isn't anything physically painful about the idea "it takes too much time"...it is just a mental judgment that it doesn't seem worth the effort.
Ah! But I would posit that there is mental pain in considering all that time in the car, having to stop along the way, how much gas it might take, etc.
Sure, the motivation for the effort of learning a new skill or achieving a goal one wants is potentially pleasurable, but the effort experienced is painful in the form of repetitive exercises or practice. Frustration sets in that must be overcome. Feelings of inadequacy.
This comes very close, or is at least analogous, to the question of whether all "desire" should be seen to be painful.
My personal view is that not all desire is painful, and neither is all effort. And in the case of either desire or effort, even in those times where the desire or effort is painful, the ultimate question remains whether the resulting total pleasure is worth the total cost in pain.
I should have used "desire" instead of "motivation." And, using that, I suppose the desire is pleasurable to think of. I'm going to maintain that effort - expending energy for a given purpose - has pain associated with it. That's not too say you can't have "a good kind of tired" after expending it. But energy expenditure has some element of pain... Unless we're going to start talking about the "runner's high" and "being in the zone/going with the flow." Then, maybe?
Is effort always painful? (I don't think so myself).
Depends on the definition of pain and/or effort being used.
Any effort seems to me to be use of force or energy against some impediment or towards some goal which someone is trying overcome or to arrive at.
Sure, the motivation for the effort of learning a new skill or achieving a goal one wants is potentially pleasurable, but the effort experienced is painful in the form of repetitive exercises or practice. Frustration sets in that must be overcome. Feelings of inadequacy.
I don't think "effort" is the right way to think about it.
The pleasure of aponia connotes both "without toil or trouble, effortless" and "painless; free from pain."
A more productive way to think about pursuing pleasure is to get out of its way, to recognize the pleasure that's already present in our lives and to which we stubbornly refuse to admit into our lives.
Start small, recognize the beauty of a sunset, the lack of pain in a spot in your body, the company of loved ones. Don't just acknowledge it. Feel it. Appreciate it. Value it.
By struggling in an effortful way, one is adding an unnecessary level of pain. Sure, we choose pain sometimes for greater pleasure. My go to example is always exercise, but there are much more serious examples: ex., leaving an abusive relationship in which the oppressed partner has a "sunk cost" ("they can change. I can change them.)
A start is just to get out of pleasure's way. Let it in.
I'm not saying it's easy after years of conditioning. But sometimes we ourselves are our own worst impediment to feeling pleasure.
