Thank you! Ευχαριστώ!
Here's one of the papers in that paper's bibliography:
I haven't read it yet, but if the current one is any indication, it may be interesting.
PS: Joshua may be particularly interested in this one.
I forgot to remind everyone of Nate 's compilation of all the PDs first:
For anyone who's interested, here are my personal notes on PD3 and PD4...
PD3 Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.
εως, ἡ, A removal, τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Epicur.Sent.3 (ἐξαίρεσις a better reading, acc. to Demetr.Lac.Herc.1012.23); τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου Gal.14.681; τῶν ἀποφατικῶν Stoic.2.84; μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως with a reservation, Epict.Ench.2.2, M.Ant.4.1, Stoic.3.149, cf. D.S. 12.21 (pl.), Artem.1.52; καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσίν τινος S.E.M.8.479; εἶχεν ὑ. τοῦ μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι . . A.D. Adv.205.21: hence in Rhet., a treating as exceptional, Alex.Fig.1.7. 2 refutation, opp. πίστις, Phld.Rh. 1.202 S. (pl.). ὅπου where ἥδομαι
ἡδόμενον neuter participle λυπούμενον neuter middle/passive participle of λυπεω
συναμφότερον accusative singular masculine < συν + ἀμφότερον
[Don translation - "The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together." (Clunky translation, but a start.)]
Hicks translation
3The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.
Saint-Andre translation
3The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.
[St-Andre note 3] The word ἡδονή is often translated solely as "pleasure"; however, depending on the context I also translate it as "joy", "delight", "enjoyment", or even "happiness" in the modern sense because the Greek word ἡδονή refers to any physical, emotional, or mental state that is filled with sweetness (ἡδύς), whereas the English word "pleasure" carries stronger connotations of a purely physical state (although compare phrases such as "the pleasures of philosophy"). Furthermore, although there is no hard and fast distinction between ἄλγος as bodily pain and λυπούμενος as mental distress, the former word tends to be used more in relation to the body and the latter more in relation to the mind or emotions; see also Principal Doctrine #10. For other texts that emphasize the concept of a natural limit to enjoyment, see Principal Doctrines #11, #15, #18, #19, #20, as well as Letter to Menoikos, Section 133, Vatican Saying #35, and Fragment #548.
Fragment 68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it. [note] τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
Vatican Saying 33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. [note] σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἂν <διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.
Fragment 70. Beauty and virtue and such are worthy of honor, if they bring joy; but if not then bid them farewell! [note] τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τοιουτότροπα, ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ χαίρειν ἐατέον.
PD4 Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει· αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.
Parsed:
συμβαίνει
δὲ αἱ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν. (2 prepositional phrases) πολυχρόνιος
αἱ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν = the long-lasting days of sickness ("illnesses of long duration") περ intensifies following word "very" αρρωστιών f Genitive plural form of αρρώστια
πλεονάζω
Hicks translation
4Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.
Saint-Andre translation
4Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.
Translation from attalus:
4 Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.
Translation from Epicurus.info
4) Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.
LOL! That is one HAPPY pig! 
"pink" includes all shades of pink
I like that, too.
So, by definition: "Pleasure" includes all shades of pleasure in this analysis (which I think is the right one).
Which then follows on that where there is pleasure, there is not pain.
So, it's not the "removal of pain" that is the focus - as some commentators (and academics) want to do. The addition of pleasure *IS* the removal of pain ONLY because the two can't co-exist. Where there is pleasure, there is not pain. It is the addition of more pleasure - putting the focus on pleasure - that makes a statement the following possible...
Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.
Bah! I'm just prattling on like Epicurus at the end of Book 28! reneliza did a much better job and was much more succinct!
reneliza I think you're analysis is spot on and well articulated.
3. : a nonessential property or quality of an entity or circumstance
the accident of nationality
Lucian is a tremendous source of information.
And fun to read! (not belly laughing funny maybe, but I've gotten a chuckle out of him on numerous occasions as well as "Ha! Good one" too. He certainly didn't suffer fools or look kindly on pomposity.)
Lucian: Sale of Philosophers
19
Her. What name?
Fifth D. Dion; of Syracuse.
Her. Take him, and much good may he do you. Now I want Epicureanism. Who offers for Epicureanism? He is a disciple of the laughing creed and the drunken creed, whom we were offering just now. But he has one extra accomplishment — impiety. For the rest, a dainty, lickerish creed.
Sixth D. What price?
Her. Eight pounds.
Sixth D. Here you are. By the way, you might let me know what he likes to eat.
Her. Anything sweet. Anything with honey in it. Dried figs are his favourite dish.
Sixth D. That is all right. We will get in a supply of Carian fig-cakes.
Sale of Creeds | Vitarum auctio [The Lucian of Samosata Project]
Although this is interesting and maybe completely irrelevant:
He died during the 143rd Olympiad (208–204 BC) at the age of 73. Diogenes Laërtius gives two different accounts of his death. In the first account, Chrysippus was seized with dizziness having drunk undiluted wine at a feast, and died soon after. In the second account, he was watching a donkey eat some figs and cried out: "Now give the donkey a drink of pure wine to wash down the figs", whereupon he died in a fit of laughter. His nephew Aristocreon erected a statue in his honour in the Kerameikos. Chrysippus was succeeded as head of the Stoic school by his pupil Zeno of Tarsus.
47. One of Alexander's acts in this connection was most comical. Hitting upon the "Established Beliefs" of Epicurus, which is the finest of his books, as you know, and contains in summary the articles of the man's philosophic creed,37 he brought it into the middle of the market-place, burned it on fagots of fig-wood just as if he were burning the man in person, and threw the ashes into the sea, even adding an oracle also:
"Burn with fire, I command you, the creed of a purblind dotard!"
But the scoundrel had no idea what blessings that book creates for its readers and what peace, tranquillity, and freedom it engenders in them, liberating them as it does from terrors and apparitions and portents, from vain hopes and extravagant cravings, developing in them intelligence and truth, and truly purifying their understanding, not with torches and squills and that sort of foolery, but with straight thinking, truthfulness and frankness.
Lucian of Samosata : Alexander the False Prophet
I don't see anything about "favorite food."
PS. Just to be clear: that reference to "Established Beliefs" *is* the Principal Doctrines or kyriai doxai
Have something on this for later.
What's the other "shout" or triumph-song passage in the texts?
So do we think that the heads were affixed to full bodies either seated or standing?
Having the heads mounted on a column-like structure in th middle of a room is one thing but two full figures either sitting or standing would seem possibly a different matter
No, it's also my understanding that the plinth/block was intended as the mode of display.
What about the hole in the sides?
To the best of my knowledge, those were where arms could be attached.
How to become more grateful, and why that will make you happier, healthier and more resilient
Epicurean context (selections):
VS17 It is not the young man who is most happy, but the old man who has lived beautifully; for despite being at his very peak the young man stumbles around as if he were of many minds, whereas the old man has settled into old age as if in a harbor, secure in his gratitude for the good things he was once unsure of.
VS19 He who forgets the good things he had yesterday becomes an old man today.
VS35 Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.
VS55 Misfortune must be cured through gratitude for what has been lost and the knowledge that it is impossible to change what has happened.
our current modern cultural understanding of the word "pleasure" is very narrow.
I wonder if that's a problem with the word or with the current cultural understanding. Personally, I'd say the latter. For me, putting "pleasure" in the context of "pleasure/pain" is helpful in getting past the semantic baggage of conceiving "pleasure" as simply a "hedonistic" elated feeling. Pleasure encompasses everything we feel that isn't painful or causes us pain. "Simple" as that. 
That's why Epicurus could claim (and rightly from my perspective) that homeostasis and equilibrium are pleasurable.
Display MoreI've always thought a clip of just Epicurus's eyes from one of the famous portraits or busts sandwiched between
SFO
(eyes)
TSE
would make an interesting Tshirt design with small print of Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus on top and Do all things as if Epicurus were watching one the bottom
Then EpicurueanFriends.com on the back?
A VERY ROUGH draft of the idea using a public domain image.
Hmm... I'm not sure I follow your reasoning, although it wouldn't be the first time we've talked past each other. So I'll prattle on myself.
When I read "X is the product of war" I read that as "War is necessary for X."
I yhink I understand what you're saying about ALWAYS and CAN BE, but I read that as making it possible to say, "I want to feel pleasure so I'll go to war." or "War gives me pleasure."
Some people may feel pleasurable feelings while fighting a war, but, overall, I would have to posit that war is not a choice-worthy source of pleasure because you are putting yourself in danger of being killed and other - let's say - hazards. And, yes, I'm judging whether someone's pursuit of pleasure is choiceworthy or not in this case. I think I have precedent for that from Epicurus himself.
Even on the side of the one who does not choose war but has war thrust upon them, war does not "produce" pleasure. Here's how I'm playing out that scenario in my head (Oh, save me Zeus! I'm going down the road of hypotheticals!!!)
So, given this scenario, I would not say the "pleasure" I feel after the war is a "product" of the war. I felt pleasure for fleeting moments while fighting the war. I will hopefully feel more pleasure as a result of the absence of conflict and a return to peace and stability. But the war did not "produce" pleasure. It may have created an environment conducive to experiencing feelings of pleasure more likely, but I'm just having problems with that phrasing of produce and product.
PS. I reread Cassius 's post in the light of morning and pulled this out:
QuoteThe test is always in the consequences, because if a thing in fact generates any degree of pleasure, it is pleasurable at least for that moment. Maybe not a wise idea at all, but the proof of whether any pleasure is generated is in the actual result for the time that pleasure is generated, rather than all the ultimate consequences of pain which may or may not occur later.
I think we're saying similar things here and in my paragraph that starts "Some people may feel pleasurable feelings while fighting a war..." Here I'm thinking of mercenaries and those who feel pleasure in the sense of power (I'm assuming) they feel engaging in battle. Maybe even those who are "fighting for a cause" although this latter may fall in my bullet points. Although I still maintain that mercenary pleasure isn't choice worthy for the same reason endless strings of drinking parties are not choiceworthy.
The "pleasure of relief" in my mind is not pleasure - it is just relief.
Pleasure is for bodily sensations.
Enjoyment is for mental sensations
I would suggest "the feelings are two: pleasure and pain." Everything we feel is either pleasure or pain. It may be mild or intense, but it's either pleasure or pain. Relief is pleasure. Anxiety is pain. Enjoyment is pleasure. Happiness is pleasure. Aponia, ataraxia, khara (joy, exultation) , euphrosyne (mirth, good cheer, merriment), etc. are all pleasure. Take any "feeling" and it will fall somewhere on the scale of pleasure or pain. Even equilibrium or homeostasis is pleasure according to Epicurus. I personally am becoming more convinced that that is exactly what aponia and ataraxia are.
And in other cases happiness and joy can be the product of war, if under the circumstances war is necessary to obtain or preserve the peace.
Something about this statement doesn't sit with me well. But maybe it is right up there with: humans kill animals for food and eating them gives us life. The level of abstraction has missing pieces. It may take me several more days to ponder this.
It strikes me (literally at first blush) that that statement has an echo of "we can only experience pleasure if we go through pain."
Happiness and joy are not the product of war. I'll give you that undergoing the pain of conflict may be necessary to obtain or preserve peace, but I wouldn't phrase it as happiness and joy are the "product of war." It may be necessary to endure the pain of war, but war does not "produce" happiness. The end of war may allow the environment in which happiness may be found, but I'd be careful about using produced or product. That implies causation.
I don't know if I'd be able to do it, but, theoretically, pleasure can be found in small things during a war with the right perspective... Even if it is as small as "I'm still alive to live tomorrow. I can still feel." Pleasure is emphatically not always the big joyful feeling. It can be as small as taking pleasure in breathing, feeling the breathe in and out.
The philosophical boil has to be popped:
Well, there's a mental image! 
But I see where you're coming from.
