Posts by TauPhi

It happened few centuries after classical antiquity but Massacre of Verden in 782 somehow always stuck with me as a great example of Christianity spreading its love to pagans. Few people lost their heads over king Charlemagne's pious decree. Funnily, he almost got canonised if I remember correctly.

Quote from Cassius

But if the "prolepsis" of justice or gods did not exist, we would never begin considering or discussing those concepts in the first place.

In similar fashion we could argue that if prolepsis of unicorns did not exist, we would never be able to talk about unicorns. Unicorns, justice and gods are complex concepts that we understand by the act of reasoning. Pre-concepts are simple patterns - building blocks which are used by the act of reasoning to create complex concepts. Prolepsis of gods or prolepsis of justice is an oxymoron. It's like saying simplicity of complexity.

We can talk about unicorns easily because we combine plethora of patterns we can merge by the act of thinking to understand unicorns as a concept. In similar fashion we can easily talk about 'duocorns', 'tricorns' or 'quadrocorns'. No-one reading this post has ever heard about such creatures but everyone can easily imagine these because everyone has developed sufficient amount of patterns to be able to comprehend such complex concepts. The same process applies to justice and gods.

Thanks, Bryan . All these examples indicate that Epicurus was still capable of reasoning. That means he wasn't in extreme pain. Extreme pain cuts you off from yourself, ie. you have no control over what you think or do. It's like you decide to stop breathing for a moment. All is good. You're in control but after a short while your body will force you to breathe whether you like it or not. Extreme conditions lead to extreme measures and 'emergency mode' of our bodies has very little interest in our acquired wisdom.

It doesn't matter how wise a person is. No-one is capable of controlling the nature of pleasure and pain. We can learn how to efficiently gravitate towards or from these feelings but we can't change their nature. Pleasure is always pleasure. Pain is always pain. The same way we can't control the nature of our senses. We can use the sense of sight for seeing but it doesn't matter how wise we get, we can never learn to control the nature of sight and use it for hearing.

Claiming that a wise person in extreme pain does not cry out or groan is like claiming that a wise person in extreme pain can see things with their ears. No-one has ability to rule over the faculties of feelings and senses.

It would be nice if we all were Rambos and when tortured with electrocution to the point where there's electricity shortage in the whole village, we would merely behave like we had mild morning constipation. Unfortunately, when exposed to extreme pain (that is pain that overwhelms completely and removes the ability to reason) no-one is Rambo. Wise or not, everyone behaves like a wild beast facing unbearable pain.

Yonge most likely made a mistake. Hicks, Bailey, Mensch, White and Lesniak (Polish translation) all translate the fragment in favour of groaning and screaming.

I found below quote in a book I'm currently reading and the quote reminded me of this thread. The quote comes originally from Aristotle's 'On the Soul' - Book 2. I'm not exactly a big fan of Aristotle (to put it mildly) but the quote caught my attention since it links two of Epicurean canonical faculties (senses and feelings) with desire. For your consideration:

Quote

[...] But all animals have at least one sense, touch: and, where sensation is found, there is pleasure and pain, and that which causes pleasure and pain; and, where these are, there also is desire, desire being appetite for what is pleasurable. [...]

Aristotle De Anima : R. D. Hicks : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

archive.org

Quote from Kalosyni

I just found this result on Google:

Ah, nothing beats AI generated slop.

'Does generation Z worry about Friday the 13th?.

AI answer: 'Some people may be potentially superstitious and some may not be potentially superstitious. Some sources suggest that some people in the past were more superstitious but some sources indicate that the other sources do not definitively support the claim that initial sources sourced in potentially superstitious people suggest that sometimes Friday is the 13th which is a potential worry to some people. Or not.'

PhiloSophos: Philosophical Connections by Dr Anthony Harrison-Barbet

A great resource for anyone interested in Western Philosophy. It contains interlinked profiles of 126 philosophers with 'connections' at the end of each profile. And these connections are the real gems of this web site. They show philosophers' influences, which ideas they shared, which ideas they opposed and which ideas they modified. It's a very clear way to see the development and interconnectedness of Western philosophy.

Please read 'How to use the profiles' section first to understand the whole concept and its execution.

Hor., Sat. 1.3.66 = Horace's 'Satires' Book I, Satire III, line 66
Relevant fragment with line 66 highlighted:

[...]
But WE put virtue down to vice's score,
And foul the vessel that was clean before:
See, here's a modest man, who ranks too low
In his own judgment; him we nickname slow:
Another, ever on his guard, takes care
No enemy shall catch him unaware,
(Small wonder, truly, in a world like this,
Beset with dogs that growl and snakes that hiss);
We turn his merit to a fault, and style
His prudence mere disguise, his caution guile.
Or take some honest soul, who, full of glee,
Breaks on a patron's solitude, like me,
Finds his Maecenas book in hand or dumb,
And pokes him with remarks, the first that come;
We cry "He lacks e'en common tact." Alas!
What hasty laws against ourselves we pass!
For none is born without his faults: the best
But bears a lighter wallet than the rest.
A man of genial nature, as is fair,
My virtues with my vices will compare,
And, as with good or bad he fills the scale,
Lean to the better side, should that prevail:
So, when he seeks my friendship, I will trim
The wavering balance in my turn for him.
He that has fears his blotches may offend
Speaks gently of the pimples of his friend:
For reciprocity exacts her dues,
And they that need excuse must needs excuse.
[...]

Sen., Ep. 105.4 = Seneca's 'Moral letters to Lucilius' Letter 105, fragment 4:

[...]
As to not being feared, a moderate fortune and an easy disposition will guarantee you that; men should know that you are the sort of person who can be offended without danger; and your reconciliation should be easy and sure. Moreover, it is as troublesome to be feared at home as abroad; it is as bad to be feared by a slave as by a gentleman. For every one has strength enough to do you some harm. Besides, he who is feared, fears also; no one has been able to arouse terror and live in peace of mind.
[...]

I must say I have enjoyed reading this thread immensely. Thanks to all involved. I decided to put in my tuppence worth, so here we go.

An Epicurean pleasure is one of the canonical faculties which makes it completely independent from reason. Canonical pleasure is a feeling but "feeling pleasure" is something completely different and these two are not interchangeable. What we commonly describe as our feelings (pleasure, desire, grief, sadness, joy etc.) is our awareness (= reasoning) of a situation we find ourselves in. In this sense, our feelings have nothing to do (as they are dependent on our reasoning) with canonical feelings in Epicurean terms.

Desire is a non-canonical feeling. It's our awareness (again, cerebral activity) which signals to us that we find ourselves in a situation that is not optimally pleasant for us and we crave the change. "Feeling desire" is always linked with "feeling pain". Similarly, "feeling happiness" is always linked with "feeling pleasure".

The problem seems to arise when we mix canonical pleasure with "feeling pleasure" (= mental awareness of being at the right time in the right sandbox with the right toys) and try to decide how this "Frankenstein pleasure" measures in relation to desire. Not a good idea. To sum up, I'm thinking this:

1) desire is always painful when we treat desire and "feeling pain" as conscious feelings (awareness of our situation)
2) Epicurean canonical feelings of pleasure and pain cannot equate to any conscious feelings (including desire)

Epicurus' classification of desires shows really well that Epicurus knew that desires are feelings in the sense of conscious (mis)understanding of our situation. He knew that when reasoning is involved people are prone to make mistakes in their judgements. Types of desires is a neat tool to increase our chances to reason well and to make choices that minimise pain and maximise pleasure.

Quote from Don

Uh, yeah. That's the "evidence" for Epicureans being "pamphleteers"?

Clearly. On top of that, better evidence couldn't by cited to prove that Epicureans were also the inventors of laserjet printers.

This is an interesting question. We're in the realm of speculation and most likely we will never know for sure but I always found the beginning of the letter to Idomeneus quite peculiar: "On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. [...]"

How could Epicurus know that it was the last day and why he called it blissful? To me, it sounds a bit like: "There's nothing much to be done, so I feel relief as I made a decision to pull the plug today and end the suffering".

Maybe it would be worthwhile to closely inspect original Greek to shed more light on this sentence?

Link to a doctoral thesis on Epicurean epistemology by Ana Gavran Miloš from University of Zagreb. I skimmed through the work and it caught my eye as an in-depth analysis. Might be worth a look for anyone interested in more advanced Epicurean study. Table of contents is at the end right after bibliography.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/199709901.pdf

Cassius Can you upload version 1.0.2 to the filebase for me? It seems I don't have permission to do it myself.

Changes:
- fixed the alignment in sections 101/102 for Bailey's translation (thanks to Bryan for noticing the misalignment)
- added Sources section at the end containing comprehensive list of websites used for the creation of the document

The attached pdf contains complete Book X of Diogenes Laertius' "Lives of Eminent Philosophers" in Greek and in three English translations (Yonge's, Hicks' and Bailey's) available in the public domain.

The idea is the same as with my recent Epicurus' public domain translations but this time it's a complete book 10 containing both Epicurus' and Laerius' words. I tried to make it look like an actual book so the file contains everything one may expect to see in a digital book - title page, clickable table of contents, numbered pages etc.

Table of contents contains 12 entries. These are 'chapters' I came up with to divide the book. 6 entries are highlighted by design - these are Epicurus' words. Additionally, every page has a heading with information whether the current section was written by Laertius or Epicurus and shows estimated time of the composition (similarly to the translations headings).

Each page contains one section as per Diogenes Laertius' notation and is marked as such at the top next to the chapter title. Every page has four sections - original passage in Greek is followed by three corresponding translations.

If you have an idea how to improve the file or you spot something that needs to be corrected, please let me know.

I hope you find the resource useful in your studies of Epicurean Philosophy. Enjoy.

Quote from Cassius

Did you do something similar with this PDF, or did you not run into such issues for some reason? If you used one version as the "master" reference for line numbering, which did you use?

Yonge's and Hick's translations are mostly aligned the same. Bailey took more liberties with his translation (including 2 sections where he decided to move large chunks of passages to another sections - 46 and 47 were transferred to 61 and 62 respectively).

For these reasons, my aliment algorithm looked like this:

1) if Y and H are the same but B is not - align B to match the rest
2) if Y and H are different, compare to B and if Y or H match B, go with the majority for alignment
3) if all are different, go to https://logeion.uchicago.edu/ translate Greek words at the end of one section and the beginning of the following section to determine the correct split

Quote from Cassius

Tau Phi I know what you've already done has been a huge amount of work, but let me ask this: Does the method of assembly you used make it possible with reasonable effort to:

1 - Do the same thing for the rest of DIogenes Laertius so that we have the full Book X in one place? That makes it much easier for word searching.

2 - In cutting and pasting from the PDF I am seeing a problem that I've had with other PDFs of my own in the past -- there's something wrong with the constructions involving "f" that corrupts the words.

1- It's very much doable. I've done 112 out of 154 sections already so there are only 42 sections left in Book X (27%). As far as I know, all three translators did the entirety of Book X so I don't see any reasons why this couldn't be done. I decided to do only Epicurus' sections because I wanted core texts in one place without any fluff.

2- I used Ghostscript to add ToC to the document and it looks like there's some issue with the characters' encoding during recompilation process. I'll try to find another way to do it. In the meantime, please use my initial file without ToC. It should work without any issues.

Thanks Cassius.

As I mentioned earlier, if anyone notices any mistakes or has some ideas how to make that resource better, give me a shout and I'll try to make it happen.

Thanks for the suggestion, Cassius. Detailed TOC is now added to the letters/doctrines and to each of the 112 sections as well.

Also, feel free to put this file into 'files section' for general accessibility, if you think it's worthwhile. This file contains 100% of public domain material.

There are 112 pages in the attached pdf file. Each page contains one section of Epicurus' core texts (the three letters and Principal Doctrines) as per Diogenes Laertius' notation and is marked as such at the top.

Every page has four sections. Epicurus' words in Greek are followed by three translations: Yonge's, Hicks' and Bailey's. I think such arrangement can enhance the study of the philosophy by increased understanding of each passage.

I know there are more modern translations available but I included only those translations which are complete (i.e. all core texts are translated) and are in public domain. This way, the attached file can be freely distributed and used without any constraints.

This is an initial version and most likely contains some errors. Please let me know if you see something in need of correction or you have an idea how the file can be improved. I'll do what I can to make it better.

Have a blast studying!

Quote from Don

Agreed. That's why I content that the prolepsis of the gods does not cover their blessed and incorruptibility.

Quote from Cassius

Thanks for focusing again on the question of which aspects of knowledge of the gods constitute prolepsis and which constitute opinions arising from reasoning.

I'm with Don on this one. Prolepsis, as all Epicurean canonical faculties, is separated from reasoning. The way I see it, prolepsis is a pattern recognition. If I see enough cats in my life, I'll recognize the next one as a cat without thinking about it. If I lift enough cups of coffee in my life, I'll apply a perfect amount of force to lift the next cup of coffee without thinking about it. Epicureans believed that humans' minds are directly hit with the images of gods, so humans were able to develop prolepsis of gods.

The moment we think: 'Sphynx cats are furless', 'Led cups with coffee are heavy', 'Epicurean gods are blessed' is when the reasoning kicks in. Canonical input data is being processed and opinions arise.

These five tables are brilliant, Bryan . Thank you for preparing them. One suggestion for the third table. Under 'Experiences' I think it would be more precise to go straight into ἡδονή - pleasure and ἀλγηδών - pain instead of '(i.e., feelings)'. Essentially, these are epicurean παθη.

Bryan's tables are pure essence of Epicurean's truth criteria. If someone wishes to investigate them in more descriptive form, I've prepared something for you in the attached pdf file. It's an extract from Sextus Empiricus 'Against the Logicians'. Four passages from books I and II. Definitely worth a read.

And if someone is interested in other ancient philosophers' takes on epistemology, you can easily find 'Against the Logicians' on archive.org.