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Robert You may find this interesting:
https://www.hcsjournal.org/ojs/index.php/hcs/article/download/123/112/216
This paper will give you a general idea why so little is available in English (mostly because very little is available in general).
Right now, it appears there are only few unpublished columns for PHerc. 26 (which is 'On Gods - Book 1') and fragments of PHerc 152/157 (Book 3) which you've already found on Twentiers' site (an excellent place to look for Epicurean texts).
'Freedom' by John Norris in not an Epicurean poem. In fact, the author could be the very antithesis of an Epicurean philosopher. Nevertheless, I hope you enjoy the poem as much as I do. It's a pretty neat depiction of 'Lathe Biosas' lifestyle.
Please find the transcription and the link to a book published in 1699 where this poem comes from (page 113).
I.
I do not ask thee Fate, to give
This little span a long Reprieve.
Thy pleasures here are all so poor and vain,
I care not hence how soon I'm gone.
Date as thou wilt my Time, I shan't complain;
May I but still live free, and call it all my own.
II.
Let my Sand slide away apace;
I care not, so I hold the Glass.
Let me my Time, my Books, my Self enjoy;
Give me from Cares a sure retreat;
Let no impertinence my Hours imploy,
That's in one word, kind Heaven, let me ne're be great.
III.
In vain from Chains and Fetters free
The great Man boasts of Liberty.
He's pinnion'd up by formal Rules of State;
Can ne're from Noise and Dust retire;
He's haunted still by Crouds that round him wait,
His lot's to be in Pain, as that of Fools t' admire.
IV.
Mean while the Swain has calm repose,
Freely he comes and freely goes.
Thus the bright Stars whose station is more high,
Are fix'd, and by strict measures move,
While lower Planets wanton in the Sky,
Are bound to no set Laws, but humoursomly rove.
David Sedley's article closely related to the topic of this thread:
EPICUREAN THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM HERMARCHUS TO LUCRETIUS AND PHILODEMUS
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to trace the development of Epicurean epistemology from the death of Epicurus in 270 BCE to the latter part of the first century BCE. The story gains interest from the fact that these Epicureans were, as would be expected, scrupulously loyal to the doctrines of their founder as they interpreted these, but at the same time found themselves obliged to elaborate and strengthen the inferential methodology he had bequeathed, initially in order to resist the sceptical critiques of the New Academy, and later in order to justify their school’s empiricism in opposition to the rationalistic Stoic theory of inferential validity. The protagonists are Colotes, Polystratus, Timasagoras, Zeno of Sidon, Philodemus and Lucretius, with Cicero an important witness.
Full article can be found here:
View of Epicurean theories of knowledge from Hermarchus to Lucretius and Philodemus
You can learn about few studies in favour of abiogenesis, conveniently overlooked by the author of the article, here:
Nothing definite yet but definitely interesting.
TauPhi is this ok?
It is. Thank you.
Cassius Please also remove 'any consideration'. I rejected that the pleasure of the one might be evaluated as "greater" than the pleasure of the other but I did not and do not reject the act of thinking about it. I'm all in for considering anything and everything anyone is capable of thinking about.
A good place to start would be 'Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker' (The Fragments of the Pre-Socratics) by Hermann Diels (1903). This book would probably answer all your questions. Unfortunately, it's never been translated into English. The good news is we have the next best thing - 2 books by Kathleen Freeman:
1) 'The Pre-Socratic Philosophers; A Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker' (1946)
2) 'Ancilla to the pre-Socratic philosophers: a complete translation of the fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker' (1948)
1) is available on archive.org. If you have an hour or so to spare, read through pages 285-326. The amount of information, heavily supported by testimonia and actual fragments, is all you can wish for and then some more. The arrangement by subject-matter is also helpful to quickly see similarities and differences between Democritus and Epicurus.
2) is not available on archive.org but it's digitally available at 'sacred-texts' website (link below). The link will take you to the ancilla containing fragments of plethora of Pre-Socratics. It's the only place online I'm aware of where all Democritus' fragments are available in English.
And that is why having a position on how to resolve the heap paradox is so important.
Have you proposed an answer to that?
I disagree. The resolution of this paradox is not important at all. It's just a word play based on vagueness of human language. How much do you need to love to love someone very much? How dense a fog needs to be to be called a dense fog? How many times do you need to jump to be very tired? An attempt at answering such questions is pointless.
In regard to whether 10% is reasonable, and how many more % can be added and stay within reason, that is the question.
I'm sorry, Cassius but I don't consider this the question. It's just a reformulation of how many grains of sand make a heap.
And the dividing line cannot reasonably be "whether I have seen it before."
"Whether I have seen it before." has very little to do with "understanding of nature based on our experiences and acquired knowledge". Please don't simplify my argument like that.
I think that the real question is what is the dividing line between "TauPhies-like creatures" in the first paragraph and the examples in the second. What is it about the examples in the second paragraph that justifies labeling them as "dreams" versus simply "Tau-Phi-like creatures which are 10% stronger or 10% longer-lived" than the example we have here and now?
The dividing line is our understanding of nature based on our experiences and acquired knowledge. People who get confident about reality based on what they can imagine are prone to venture boldly into the realms which may or may not exist. Problems start when they conflate reality with their imagination.
10% longer-lived? Sure, we know that variation in human lifespan can be higher than 10%. Reasonable possibility.
1000 year old? We never observed living humans even close to that. We currently don't know a way to extend our life by that much. Can we imagine people living that long? Sure. We can imagine innumerable creatures having lifespans from 0 to infinity. Do they exist? We don't know but it's not reasonable to claim that they do only because we can imagine them, is it? This is what Velleius did in his description of isonomia.
Is it predictable and expectable that given that there are humans on earth who live to be 100 years old, that there are beings on other worlds who live to be 1000 years old?
I exist. If I live in boundless and eternal universe, it's predictable and expectable that there are infinite number of TauPhies-like creatures inhabiting the universe. This is a possibility inspired by reason.
I exist. If I live in boundless and eternal universe, it's predictable and expectable that there are infinite number of SuperTauPhies that are stronger than Superman, older than Methuselah and wiser than Solomon. This is a possibility inspired by dreams.
Epicurean universe is boundless and eternal but it is also limited by what kind of matter can exist in it (atoms' types are innumerable but not infinite and natural laws govern matter's interactions). In Epicurean universe if A exists, infinite As exist. If B exists, infinite Bs exist. But it absolutely doesn't mean that if A exist, B exists as well. That kind if inference is not grounded in reason but in dreams.
[...] This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals [...]
Velleius' claim is an example of inference grounded in dreams. I highly doubt his description of isonomia is correct. Isonomia in this form could be used to justify the existence of pretty much anything and everything and it's not compatible with the universe bound by natural laws.
The way I see it - predictions and expectations influenced by what we think we know about the world around us are reasonable. If they are influenced by ungrounded imagination, they may or may not materialise but I definitely wouldn't base my life around them. Facts are useful. Dreams are entertaining at best.
I added a bit of paint, but sticking to gold/bronze/silver turned him into a bit of a ghost, so I'll try again with more realistic colors.
I like it like that. He looks like a ginger vampire and that explains a lot about his philosophy. Firstly, everyone knows that gingers have no soul so it's clear that Epicurus got jealous and depreciated the importance of soul's existence. Secondly, gray skin is a sign of anemia. Let's face it - he asked for it. He thought bread and water could produce the highest pleasure. He obviously sucked at being a vampire since he didn't know about the benefits of drinking the blood of virgins.
I've compiled a book containing Plutarch's 3 essays dealing with Epicurus. It's an alternative translation to the Loeb volume. It's also much easier to read, search and copy as the book contains plain text instead of scans and ocr layer on top of them. Original Greek is also included starting from page 92. Everything in this document is in Public Domain so you can use it however you wish. Let me know if you spot any problems with it and I'll make sure to fix them.
Cassius , please consider adding this document to the 'Files' section if you find it worthwhile.
[Note by Cassius: New readers should be aware that Plutarch was strongly opposed to Epicurean philosophy, so this material should be read and understood as being written from an adversarial viewpoint.]
This reminds me of the hymn "Onward Christian Soldiers".... marching as to war, with the cross of Jesus going on before (that's from memory, I may have misquoted).
And your comment Godfrey instantaneously reminded me of A Perfect Circle song called "Counting Bodies Like Sheep To The Rhythm Of The War Drums". A great song and a great warning against outsourcing one's thinking and putting one's life in the hands of another.
I came across this observation from Numenius of Apamea who wrote the passage some 500 years after Epicurus and I thought it may be interesting topic for us to discuss. Epicurean school in antiquity was uniquely resistant to any change or innovation. When other schools went through distinct periods in their development - Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism, Early Stoa, Middle Stoa, 1st Academy, 2nd Academy, umpteen academy etc. - Epicureanism had never developed. No new ideas were introduced, nothing was really questioned or corrected, there were around 10 scholars in succession that we know of who run the school and yet no-one really deviated or influenced in any significant way the teachings of the school.
So what do you think? Why was Epicurean school like a tardigrade in a state of cryptobiosis? Was the school's stagnation a feature or a bug?
On the contrary, there was no great necessity that the Epicureans should have preserved the teachings of their master so scrupulously; but they understood them, and it was evident that they taught nothing that diverged from the doctrines of Epicurus in any point. They agreed that he was the true Wise-man, remained unanimously with him, and therefore were fully justified in bearing his name. Even among the later Epicureans it was an understood thing, that they should contradict neither each other nor Epicurus in any material point, and they consider it an infamous piece of outlawry; it is forbidden to promote any innovation. Consequently, none of them dared such a thing, and those teachings have always remained unchanged, because they were always unanimous. The School of Epicurus is like a properly administered state in which there are no parties who have the same thoughts and opinions; hence, they were genuine successors, and apparently, will ever remain such.
Hiram Crespo's substack has 5 latest articles dedicated to Metrodorus. I haven't read them yet so I can't say if they are any good but if anyone's interested:
So in both cases I think your original point of reasoning - that prolepsis must be pre-rational and is never a "conclusion"- is the way forward. That original point just needs to be followed to its logical conclusion so that we rigorously separate the faculty of prolepsis from including "conclusions" or "ideas" of any kind.
Thanks Cassius That's exactly where I struggle with regarding epicurean prolepsis of gods and I can't find any arguments that would justify Epicurus' claims. When you say this:
Regardless of whether you pursue the "real" or "ideal" view of gods, the prolepsis that Velleius is talking about need not be anything more than the selective pattern-recognition of "blessed/happy" and "deathlessness." After those patterns are realized as applicable to life here, other observations about living beings here, that nature never makes a single thing of a kind, that the universe is eternal and filled with life, etc, would be enough to extend the concept through conceptual reasoning to conclude that such beings do in fact exist somewhere in the universe.
I instantaneously say: There are no patterns for blessedness and deathlessness in nature that living beings are exposed to. These are concepts, ideas or conclusions humans can reason out but these concepts are not of proleptic nature. They are creations of reason ie. we have patterns for death and reasoning powers to comprehend the concept of the opposite. That's why we can comprehend deathlessness. Not because we are exposed to it but because we can create this complex concept (correctly or incorrectly) in our minds by the power of our minds and not by any criteria of truth. And that brings me back to square one.
I really like your photo album analogy, sanantoniogarden . This part especially highlights my own struggles with prolepsis:
Now an analogy which would apply to gods might be something like taking a picture of a ball, a bat, a base, manicured grass, chalk lines, and a foul pole, eventually suggesting a new file called "baseball". However abstract concepts like gods and the game of baseball would require a language to flesh out, I feel. Once again imperfect at best but maybe helpful to some.
There are several problems I struggle to resolve. "Baseball" file creation based on the series of photos requires reasoning ie. we can create complex concepts consciously (some of them correctly, some of them incorrectly) by processing input data using our minds (language included). Epicurus realised that human reasoning is far from perfect and reasoning introduces probability of error. That's why senses, prolepsis and feelings can only be considered canonical if they are cut off from reasoning. Otherwise, any kind of knowledge would be impossible due to constant errors (which is exactly what Epicurus tried to overcome and come up with a way to explain that knowledge - at least subjective one - is possible to humans).
Another problem that creeps in is the theory of eidolas (images) that every material object is supposed to emit. Epicurus claimed that our prolepsis of gods comes from eidolas that reach our mind directly and these images are put in our photo album under 'gods' file. (To be clear, I am still impressed with the eidola theory. To come up with something like that in ancient times is ridiculously impressive. Below I'm only highlighting the impossibility of prolepsis of gods derived from this theory. I'm not trying to be smart criticizing ancient atomists from the modern perspective).
These two problems lead to serious aporia in my mind:
1) Prolepsis is a canonical faculty, knowledge is possible but prolepsis of gods is logically impossible (we know now that eidolas is a failed theory and images of gods do not reach human minds travelling from intermundia). That means Epicurus blundered with his description of gods being incorruptible and blessed. He had no input data to form prolepsis of gods and make any claims about gods, whatsoever.
2) Prolepsis is a form of reasoning and cannot be considered canonical faculty or knowledge is impossible. That means Epicurus blundered with his description of canon or applied pure reasoning in his description of gods. Whether his reasoning is correct or incorrect remains forever undetermined as knowledge is impossible in this case and everything goes.
I hope someone can help me out with this because, for the love of god, when I put prolepsis, epistemology and gods in the epicurean equation, I can't solve it no matter how hard I try. Anyway, thanks sanantoniogarden for your post. It made me think, reason and use language (probably incorrectly on all fronts but, hey, I'm only human).
I think it's worthwhile to provide the beginning of Part 2 in Book X from Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics' (EN X, 2, 1172b) to show Eudoxus' views on pleasure. It's chronologically interesting taking into consideration that Eudoxus had died a year before Epicurus was born.
That pleasure is the Good was held by Eudoxus, on the following grounds. He saw that all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it; but in every case (he argued) that which is desirable is good, and that which is most desirable is the best; therefore the fact that all creatures ‘move in the direction of’ 1) the same thing indicates that this thing is the Supreme Good for all (since everything finds its own particular good, just as it finds its own proper food); but that which is good for all, and which all seek to obtain, is the Good.
His arguments owed their acceptance however more to the excellence of his character than to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true.
He also held that the goodness of pleasure was equally manifest from the converse: pain is intrinsically an object of avoidance to all, therefore its opposite must be intrinsically an object of desire to all.
Again, he argued that that thing is most desirable which we choose not as a means to or for the sake of something else; but such admittedly is pleasure: we never ask a man for what purpose he indulges in pleasure - we assume it to be desirable in itself.
He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good - for instance, just or temperate conduct - makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance the good.
1) As we should say, ‘gravitate towards.’ Eudoxus, an unorthodox pupil of Plato, was a astronomer, and seems to have imported physical terminology into Ethics.
