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Set-up:
You must take a year-long vacation, but your memory of it will be erased, all your photos and notes to yourself will be lost or deleted, and anything you buy during that time will also be taken away at the end. In essence it will be as if it never happened, except for the people that you talked to during that time will still remember.
Question:
Given the above scenario, what do you do during that one year time?
SillyApe I would say there are differing views amongst forum members about "risk assessment" and "risk avoidance".
In the opening of Book 2 of Lucretius ' De Rerum Natura, we read:
Tis sweet, when, down the mighty main, the winds
Roll up its waste of waters, from the land
To watch another's labouring anguish far,
Not that we joyously delight that man
Should thus be smitten, but because 'tis sweet
To mark what evils we ourselves be spared;
'Tis sweet, again, to view the mighty strife
Of armies embattled yonder o'er the plains,
Ourselves no sharers in the peril; but naught
There is more goodly than to hold the high
Serene plateaus, well fortressed by the wise,
Whence thou may'st look below on other men
And see them ev'rywhere wand'ring, all dispersed
In their lone seeking for the road of life;
As far as space travel of any kind, my own feeling is to watch others do it rather than do it myself. Zero gravity is very hard on the human body, and there is the potential for mission mishaps and failures. I find it amazing that anyone even chooses the risk. It is just a hobby of mine to read up about what is happening.
As far as the above Lucretius quote, I would take it to mean that you just can't stop war (or space travel), but you can be happy when you yourself are safe and free from the troubles that accompany those endeavors.
Welcome to the forum SillyApe 
Just to avoid confusion ("to come up with" can be: invent or find/remember), the numbered sentences are all historic (CIL is the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum).
Thanks and editing my above post 
Here is a very long way of saying it (lol):
For an eternity I did not exist, but then I was born.
I died, and now for an eternity I will no longer exist.
Nothing of me remains to be concerned about this.
If I may add:
olim non fuimus, nati sumus unde, quieti nunc sumus, ut fuimus, cura relicta (CIL 8.4840) [This one is a bit long]
non fui, fui, non sum, non desidero (CIL 6.38506) [Too Buddhist for me…]
non fui, et sum, non ero, non mihi dolet (CIL 6.9258) [Too Stoic for me…]
non fui, deinde fui, modo non sum (CIL 2.404) [Getting closer]→ "Non fui, nunc sum, non ero"
Seeing various collected versions and also the very last, brings up wanting to try out a version myself. (Edit 12:29 ET)
I put it all into Google translate and this is what I got:
once we were not, whence we were born, now we are at rest, as we were, care left (CIL 8.4840) [This one is a bit long]
I was not, I was, I am not, I do not miss (CIL 6.38506) [Too Buddhist for me…]
I was not, and I am, I will not be, it does not hurt me (CIL 6.9258) [Too Stoic for me…]
I was not, then I was, but I am not (CIL 2.404) [Getting closer]
→ "I was not, now I am, I will not be"
Plus this article:
This morning I saw a headline in the Washington Post about libraries loaning out ghost hunting kits. 
Here is the USA, as we head into the "Halloween Season" time of the calendar (which seems to get longer and "bigger" each year) I have been thinking about how important it is to be grounded in a realistic worldview of matter and phenomenon having natural causes. Back in the September first Monday Zoom, we discussed what this worldview should be labeled, and the concensus in that meeting was the label "materialism". However I see a problem with that label because it has a double meaning (the belief that money and material possessions are the most important thing in life - which is not what Epicureans believe at all) and wondering if we could come up with a better label. I think that the "philosophical materialist worldview" is a very important aspect of Epicurean philosophy for many reasons.
I found this article about a poll of 1000 people in which 41% said that they believe in ghosts. Here is an excerpt:
Never before in history have people recorded so many ghost encounters, thanks in part to mobile phone cameras and microphones. It seems there would be great evidence by now. But scientists don't have it.
Instead, there are lots of ambiguous recordings sabotaged by bad lighting and faulty equipment. But popular television shows on ghost hunting convince many viewers that blurry images and emotional reactions are proof enough.
As for all the devices ghost hunters use to capture sounds, electrical fields and infrared radiation – they may look scientific, but they're not. Measurements are worthless without some knowledge of the thing you're measuring.
You can read more about it:
Here is the thread that I created on meaning:
Figures on social media platforms, such as john vervaeke
I had to look him up because I don't know anything about him. I found this summary of some of his ideas.
The idea that the loss of religion is causing a "meaning crisis"...my first reaction is this: "correlation does not equal causation".
Perhaps (and this just an idea) the "meaning crisis" is that people neither feel a sense of belonging with people within their immediate surroundings AND the people all around them have such vastly differing worldviews (and political views)...which makes the development of a sense of belonging very difficult. So I am thinking it is not so much what exactly people believe but that everyone is believing differently from one another. (And even family members can hold vastly differing views). Add in to that, that there are so many varying hobbies and interests in life, so that finding someone to talk to with who has the same interests (and who has time to talk) can be difficult.
Feeling a sense of isolation can create a crisis for human beings, as we have evolved within family and community.
How would you as an Epicurean answer this meaning crisis? Do you even accept the terms of things needing "meaning"? I have my own thoughts which I'll add later.
I think I started a thread on meaning not too long ago (will need to see if I can dig it up). And there are other threads and places that meaning is discussed.
"Things needing meaning"?
-- the meaning of life? (I'd say this question comes from "religious salesmen")
-- feeling like what you do is meaningful? (worthwhile, pleasurable, gives good results in the long-term, brings happiness)
-- making meaning for yourself? (having a method for choosing the things that you do)
-- that your life matters? (feeling a sense of connection with others, and that they care about you and you care about them)
I have not studies much about Aristotle, and I found this interesting (and fun) video:
As far as I understand, the difference between Epicurus and Aristotle is that Aristotle ends with moderation and the middle ground, rather than an individual's specific experience of pleasure and pain (and for Epicurus the choice and avoidance will vary depending on circumstances). So Aristotle's goal ends with virtue, rather than pleasure.
Just a "fun-fact" ...according to Wikipedia, this time of year (August/September) would be the time in ancient Greece for the Metageitnius Apollo festival.
Metageitnia (Ancient Greek: Μεταγείτνια, μετά + γειτονία literally change of neighborhood) was an Ancient Greek festival held in Athens during the month Metageitnion (August/September) in the honor of Metageitnius Apollo.[1][2] The month of Metageitnion was named after the festival Metageitnia, which celebrated the migration of Theseus from Melite to Diomeia.[3] The celebration of the festival itself declined over time and was replaced by the Apaturia.[4] The festival evolved into a celebration of migrations, immigrations, departures, and colonizations among the Ionians - Metageitnius Apollo presided over the metoikia (the abode).
The Metageitnia is also mentioned by Plutarch in the treatise On Exile in Moralia.[5][6]
Source: Wikipedia
And, in Epicurus' will he requests the rememberence of the day of Polyaenus during the month of Metageitnion.
Happy Twentieth Everyone!
The drive is stronger than the actual pleasure. Seems that regarding sex, we are wired to seek and want it more than be satisfied by it.
This perhaps depends on one's attitude and practice with regard to observing sensory experience.
A comparison can be made to eating food. There is hunger, but if the food is eaten too quickly then that can result in less satisfaction. If the meal is carefully planned and savored, and eaten slowly with an attitude of observation of every sensation, then that can result in greater satisfaction.
U489
489. Nature teaches us to think nothing of what fortune brings, to understand that when prospering we are unfortunate and when not prospering we are fortunate, to receive undisturbed the good things that fortune brings and to stand ready for its seeming evils. For what is good or evil to most people is fleeting, and wisdom has nothing in common with fortune.
Don ...this sounds "stoic"...and it is from: Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 30 [p.209.12 Nauck].
While parts of it are okay, other parts do not sound Epicurean to me. Porphyry is not quoting Epicurus, but instead he is giving his own thoughts on Epicurus.
Epicurus recommends gratitude for what is good. (There is a Vatican Saying on that, if I recall.)
At any rate, it's important to be clear that the senses are not right or wrong themselves, it is the interpretations we draw from the senses that can be right or wrong.
This gave me some difficulty in the past, so I want to see if I can finally get it. Can we say that the senses are the mechanics of how the mind collects "data"? Then just like a microscope may have a scratch on the lense, the eye could have a defect which slightly alters the incoming data? It would take some further effort to determine that there was a distortion in the data, by running further experiments or comparing what others are observing - and the data wouldn't be 100 percent incorrect, only skewed. This would be dealing with "correct vs. incorrect".
But then there is a different judgement of the morality of something when the words used are "right vs. wrong". So for example a video recorder can record information, but it takes human judgement to both interpret and say if something was "right or wrong".
Not sure how much it matters to say "correct vs. incorrect" compared to "right vs. wrong" for everyone else, but it seems to helps me. Another wording could be "accurate vs. inaccurate".
Which then we could ask: Do the senses always report accurately? (I am still not getting this 
).
Wishing you a Happy Birthday Bryan
If it looks like the place that I moved it isn't quite right, please let me know, by private message, what you think might be a better location.
And, with regard to a particular thread, if you think we need to add a sub-forum section as a better location, please let me know.
Hi Everyone, I am going to be doing (a little at a time) some filing of older threads located in the "General Discussion" section into their respective category based on their title.
If you are the orginator of a particular thread, then the forum should give you a message that your thread has been moved. If it looks like the place that I moved it isn't quite right, please let me know, by private message, what you think might be a better location. Thanks!
I just found this interesting excerpt, on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website, "Ancient Theories of Soul" - Section on Epicurus:
5.1 Epicurus’ Theory of Soul
Epicurus is an atomist, and in accordance with his atomism he takes the soul, like everything else that there is except for the void, to be ultimately composed of atoms. Our sources are somewhat unclear as to exactly which kinds of materials he took to be involved in the composition of soul. It is very probable, though, that in addition to some relatively familiar materials — such as fire-like and wind-like stuffs, or rather the atoms making up such stuffs — the soul, on Epicurus’ view, also includes, in fact as a key ingredient, atoms of a nameless kind of substance, which is responsible for sense-perception. Thus it seems that while he thought he could explain phenomena such as the heat or warmth of a living organism, as well as its movement and rest, by appealing to relatively familiar materials and their relatively familiar properties, he did feel the need to introduce a mysterious additional kind of substance so as to be able to explain sense-perception, apparently on the grounds that “sense-perception is found in none of the named elements” (L&S 14C). It is worth noting that it is specifically with regard to sense-perception that Epicurus thinks the introduction of a further, nameless kind of substance is called for, rather than, for instance, with regard to intellectual cognition. What this suggests, and what in fact we have independent reason to think, is that on Epicurus’ view, once one is in a position adequately to explain sense-perception, one will then also be in a position to work out an explanation of intellectual cognition, by appropriately extending the explanation of sense-perception. Let us consider briefly how such extension might work.
Perceptual beliefs, like the belief that ‘there is a horse over there’, will be explained, in Epicurus’ theory, in terms of sense-impressions and the application of concepts (‘preconceptions’; for discussion cf. Asmis 1999, 276–83), and concept-formation is in turn explained in terms of sense-impression and memory. According to Diogenes Laertius’ summary (L&S 17E1–2), the Epicureans say that
preconception is, as it were, cognition or correct belief or conception or universal ‘stored notion’ (i.e. memory), of that which has frequently become evident externally: e.g. ‘such-and-such a kind of thing is a man’. For as soon as the word ‘man’ is uttered, immediately its impression also comes to mind by means of preconception, as a result of antecedent sense-perceptions.
Moreover, sense-impressions, interpreted and articulated in terms of concepts or preconceptions, yield experience concerning evident matters, which in turn forms the basis for conclusions about non-evident matters. For example, extensive experience can make clear to one not only that the human beings one has interacted with have a certain feature (say, rationality), but also (later Epicureans will say, probably somewhat developing Epicurus’ position) that it is inconceivable that any human being could fail to have that feature (cf. L&S 18F4–5). And so, experience will not only make one expect, with a very great deal of confidence, that any human being one will ever encounter anywhere will be rational. Experience also, according to the Epicureans, supports the inference to, and hence justifies one in accepting, the (non-evident) conclusion that all human beings, everywhere and at all times, are rational (for detailed discussion, cf. Allen 2001, 194–241). This obviously is an extremely generous view of what experience, and ultimately sense-perception, can do! Once we recognize the enormously powerful and fundamental role Epicurus and his followers assign to sense-perception, we will not be surprised to see that they feel the need to include in the composition of the soul a very special kind of material that accounts specifically for sense-perception, but apparently do not think that, in addition to that, some further special material is needed to enable intellectual or rational activity.
In the Epicurean tradition the word ‘soul’ is sometimes used in the broad traditional way, as what animates living things (e.g., Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 37 Smith), but the focus of interest, so far as the soul is concerned, is very much on the mental functions of cognition, emotion and desire. A view that is common in the tradition and that very probably goes back to the founder is that the soul is a composite of two parts, one rational, the other nonrational. The rational part, which Lucretius calls mind [animus], is the origin of emotion and impulse, and it is also where (no doubt among other operations) concepts are applied and beliefs formed, and where evidence is assessed and inferences are made. The nonrational part of the soul, which in Lucretius is somewhat confusingly called soul [anima], is responsible for receiving sense-impressions, all of which are true according to Epicurus. Error arises at a later stage, when sense-impressions are interpreted by the rational part of the soul, in a way that, as we have seen, crucially involves memory. Sense-perception, conceived of simply as the reception of sense-impressions by the nonrational soul, does not involve memory (cf. L&S 16B1). Since the formation and application of concepts requires memory, sense-perception, so conceived of, does not involve conceptualization, either. The nonrational part is also responsible for transmitting impulses originating from the rational part, as well as (presumably) for a wide variety of other vital functions. (When Epicurus distinguishes between pleasures and pains of the soul and those of the body, incidentally, the distinction he has in mind must be between the rational part of the soul on the one hand and the body animated by nonrational soul, on the other.)
Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/#5.1
