Posts by Bryan

We do have two complete manuscripts, Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus, as well as the partial Gottorpienses -- all Carolingian and from the 800's.

Being able to read and write in Greek was a standard part of the education for the whole class of wealthy Romans. Many refused to read books written in Latin -- and it was common to question if producing "Latin literature" was even desirable. Latin is really a stark and unadorned language.

Cicero considered it patriotic to write fully in Latin, but he admits (just as Lucretius does) that writing completely in Latin is more difficult for him than expressing himself in Greek. In his private letters he switches between Greek and Latin within the same sentence very frequently. And, despite what Shakespeare has told us, Caesar's last words, if he said anything at all, were "καὶ σύ, τέκνον;" Greek was not used to "show off," many literate Romans were just thinking in Greek.

For Epicurean texts generally, the evidence points more to Christian indifference -- they were not burning our books, but they were not preserving them either.

"Look well and listen well whether any of our assailants bring forward a single argument from Anaximenes and from Anaxagoras, when, though the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies were more recent and taught largely, even their ashes are not so warm as that a single spark can be struck out from them against the Christian faith."
_{Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter 118.12}

Some early Christian writers, before Christianity's integration into the Empire, also viewed the Epicureans as a bit of an example based in the Epicurean rejection of a conventional education. For example Tertullian, who was the first major Christian writer to compose in Latin, shakes his finger at Rome as says:

"We reject your spectacles equally to the extent that [we reject] their origins, which we know to be derived from superstition – and because we stay away from the very things for which they are conducted. There is nothing for us to say, see, or hear with the insanity of the circus, with the imprudence of the theater, with the atrocity of the arena, with the vanity of the exercise ground. How do we offend, if we prefer other pleasures? If we do not wish to be accused of knowing [them] – the fault is ours, perhaps, but not yours! But we reject the things which are pleasing to you all, nor do our things delight you all: given that it was permitted for the Epicureans to determine a certain truth of pleasure – that is, calmness of soul (animī aequitātem) – so too [it should be permitted] for the grand concerns of the Christian life."
_{Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 38}

Also relevant:

"If human nature is capable of wisdom: then artisans and peasants and women and, finally, all who bear the human form ought to be taught so that they may become wise – and so that a wise public may be formed from every language, condition, sex and age… the Stoics sensed this to such a degree that they said philosophizing is necessary even for slaves and women – and Epicurus as well, who invites those untrained in all literature into philosophy…"
_{Lactantius (fl. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.25.4 & 7}

We do have Alexander of Abonoteichus publicly burning Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines in the marketplace, but he was an insane occultist and not a Christian.

Along the same lines, I'll throw in some quotes from Epicurean sources:

"And you, sir, should consider it something most blessed (μακαριώτατον τι) to have rightly grasped what is best of all among what exists that we are able to conceive!"
_{The Oxyrhynchus Consolation, P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 16-26}

"…but all are found to be charlatans – while being looked upon according to the outlined method – while keeping far away from saying the necessary things about friendship (or from the other things that contribute to living blessedly (μακαρίως)) -- [the outlined method] from which indeed I also saw Philísta properly adorned from youth by such a reasoning [i.e., by Epicurus' philosophy] until death – and just as is proper for one who had not yet taken on any vices."
_{Carneiscus of Lampsacus, Philísta, P.Herc. 1027, fr. 192, col. 11, 12}

"… that which the other philosophers ascribe to [a god]. They must surely know that [a god] does not have a spherical bodily form, nor a tendency towards arguments, anger, or pettiness, but rather has a bodily form that approaches the sublime, and a disposition that disregards all that is impure, being entirely devoted to blessedness (μακαριότητα) and incorruptibility."
_{Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), De forma dei, P.Herc. 1055 col. 21 (column 25)}

"(Μακαρίζω) I bless you, O dear one, because – clear of all education – You have rushed toward philosophy!"
_{Epicurus via Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53}

"while spending a blessed (μακαρίαν) and at the same time the final day of my life, we were composing these things to you all. Strangury has also followed along – and dysenteric feelings do not leave out the excess of their extent."
_{Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.22}

"nor [does the wise man suppose chance to be] an uncertain cause of everything – for he does not believe that either good or evil is given from [chance] to men for living blessedly (μακαρίως). Nevertheless [he does suppose that] the beginnings of great goods or [great] evils are supplied by [chance].”
_{Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.134b}

"...We say that pleasure is the beginning and the end [i.e., the fulfilment] of living blessedly (μακαρίως)."
_{Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.128d}

"an unwavering observation of these [desires] knows how to lead every choice and avoidance back to the body's health and the soul's undisturbedness – since this is the fulfillment of living blessedly (μακαρίως)"
_{Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.128a}

"Efforts, considerations, moods, and graces do not harmonize with blessedness (μακαριότητι) – but these things arise in weakness, fear, and in additional need from those nearby."
_{Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.77a}

"Friendship dances around the inhabited world – proclaiming, indeed, to all of us to be awakened to the blessing."
_{VS 52}

"it is not the young who is considered blessed (μακαριστὸς) -- but the old man who has lived correctly."
_{VS 17}

"Οf the things that wisdom provides for the blessedness (μακαριότητα) of one's whole life – by far the greatest thing is the Possession of friendship."
_{ΚΔ 27}

"pious is the He who preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness (ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α) of a god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards a god [is he] Who banishes either [immortality or blessedness from the gods]."
_{Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.40.1138}

"He also calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most happy ([ἥ]διστον καὶ μ[ακαρι]ώτατον)" in the work On Holiness – and He considers it necessary that all that is base is guarded by our mind paying attention to good attitudes – for making familiar all that happens to us for having happiness and particularly for having [it be] adequate."
_{Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.44.1258}

"…[Epicurus does not exclude them] nor those people who toil through their disturbances over thoughts concerning the best and most blessed natures (μακαριστοτάτων φύσεων): but [Epicurus] says that he calls them to feast well and also the others – all those in the household, with no one excluded from outside – as many as have goodwill both toward himself and toward his friends. for [Epicurus says that] doing this is not engaging in demagoguery – the empty and unnatural kind of demagoguery – but they are acting within what is proper for nature: [they are] remembering all those who possess goodwill toward us, so that they may join together in sacredly cooking what for all their own blessedness (μακαρίαι)… …is fitting…"
_{Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Epicurus, Book 1, P.Herc. 1232, f. 2 (col. 27) | f. 9 (col. 28)}

Let me throw this quote in:

"However, with the study of grammar being twofold [1] the one promising to teach the elements and their combinations and being in general an art of writing and reading, and [2] the other being, in comparison, a deeper ability: not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind – it is not our purpose now to invalidate the first; for that it is useful is agreed by all men, and amongst these men we must place Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the professors; in his book On Gifts and Gratitude he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn the written letters [i.e., become literate]. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all people."

^{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.49}

But learning to read is of course a lower bar than having a (1) generalized liberal education or (2) specific professional training, both of which Epicurus considered unhelpful, for example:

"...because [the members] of your [Epicurean school], indeed, argue quite well that there is no need for him who is going to be a philosopher to know literature."

^{Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.4.12}

Hello Patrikios

Thank you for the question. Yes, we are accustomed to the list of (1) sensations, (2) feelings/experiences, and (3a) anticipations, but KD 24 gives us instead (1) sensations, (2) feelings/experiences and (3b) whole appearance-based attention of mental perception.

Because all true ideas are based upon impressions from external sources, the use of "appearance-based (phantastikḗ)" here is only further explaining the object of mental focus. (A false idea is an idea that is not based upon appearances from external sources. If there is no object or circumstance that corresponds to an idea, the word used for that idea is a label for something that does not exist.)

(3b) "Epibole tes dianoias (the attention of mental perception)" is equivalent to our modern use of "attention" or "focus." This is the action of our mind.

(3a) "Prolepsis (anticipation)" is a general "mental sense" of something. This is the object of our mind's action.

For example, you can "focus" your attention to your "general sense" of what a cow is. Or, to use the technical language, you can use your attention of mental perception toward your anticipation of a cow's qualities.

Even when considering (i.e., mentally focusing) on non-visible objects, that mental focus is still "appearance-based" due to the fact that it must be based on analogy from what is visible to correspond to reality [i.e., be "true"].

This all could beneficially be given a chart or a graph, but I would avoid overlaying it on the modern brain. Below is an my attempt from over ten years ago, but it’s not very good.

Yes it is bad but something about Epicurus looking like a zombie and shaking to rave music had me laughing.

Quote from wbernys

Forgiveness restores peace

Certainly true!

In fact, if Plutarch is correct, Epicureans were even known to say, “Let even this have forgiveness” more literally it means "Let even this have a mutual understanding" which is a certainly a helpful mantra to have in mind for working well with others.

"ἐχέτω δὲ συγγνώμην καὶ τοῦτο" – ὡς λέγουσι!
“Let even this have pardon" – as they say!
Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1118D

This is a rough version of Book Two.

The next book will take a year.

Quote from Don

I don't remember Epicurus talking about the intermundia.

Let me throw in some quotes as a jumping-off point, I may be misunderstanding.

"...that Cosmoi such as this are also infinite in number is able to be thoroughly comprehended, and that such a Cosmos also has the force to be produced both in a cosmos and in the intermundia [μετακοσμίῳ] – which we say is the separation intervening between cosmoi"
^{[Epicurus to Pythocles, Lives 10.89a]}

"Acknowledging the divine to be eternal and incorruptible, [Epicurus] says that a god has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things are made by chance. For the divine reposes in the intermundane spaces [ἐν τοῖς μετακοσμίοις], (as they) are thus styled by him (for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of the divine denominated "the intermundane spaces [τὰ μετακόσμια]" and that the divine surrenders himself to pleasure, and takes his ease in the midst of supreme happiness) – and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them."
^{Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies) 22.3}

Quote from Don

I find it hard to believe Epicurus would advocate for giant humans with quasi-blood floating in a no-place without a world to inhabit.

Philodemus' On Piety makes a clear case for this -- the idea is that a process can be eternal -- just as if a waterfall was always fed it would never stop existing, and all waterfalls are impervious to bullets, swords, and other direct damage.

Worlds are closed systems, so the waterfalls in a world will eventually stop -- but between worlds there is no closed system and the flow of matter is infinite.

Are you saying that Philodemus was going his own direction with the statements in that work?

Also, I feel as though Cicero tracks well here and can be supported from other angles, are you saying Cicero is making this up?

"And since it is agreed that the gods are most blessed, and that no one can be blessed without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, nor can reason reside anywhere except in human form, it must be admitted that the gods are of human appearance–yet that form is not a body but as it were a body, and it does not have blood but as it were blood. Epicurus, however, who has not only seen with the mind but also handled, as it were with the hand, things hidden and deeply concealed, teaches that the power and nature of the gods are such that they are perceived not by sense but by mind, and not with any solidity nor as countable things, like those which he, because of their firmness, calls steremnia; but rather through images apprehended by likeness and succession, since an infinite series of similar images arises from innumerable indivisibles and flows toward us, while with the greatest delight the mind, fixed and intent upon those images, grasps by understanding what the nature is that is both blessed and eternal."
_{Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.16.43 - 20.56 (Velleius' monologue)}

Quote from Don

Amen (to use the religious term... still looking for a good Epicurean alternative).

I am being cheeky at this point -- you know the term better than most! The “religious-based” affirmative of choice was:

"νὴ Δία"
Philodemus quoting Epicurus, On Piety, 1.31.877-898

"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Non Posse, 1101A

"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Against Colotes, 1112E

"ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία"
Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 2 sup.)

"νὴ Δία"
Eusebius of Caesarea quoting Epicurus, Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27.10, 779A

"νὴ Δία"
[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 25 fin.

"νὴ Δία"
The Oxyrhynchus Consolation, P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11

Quote from Pacatus

Quote from Bryan

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).

We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.

We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.

The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"

Quote from Pacatus

Quote from Bryan

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).

We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.

We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.

The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"

Quote from Cassius

prolepsis to be an experience

Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.

The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.

Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).

Hypokeimenon - Wikipedia

If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."

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_{Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 ^CE), Miscellenies, 2.4}

"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation ^[1] as attention directed toward something evident – and ^[2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."

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^{Philodemus (_fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911}
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."

--------------------------------------------

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}

"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."

"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

---------------------------

Quote from Cassius

prolepsis to be an experience

Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.

The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.

Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).

Hypokeimenon - Wikipedia

If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."

----------------------

_{Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 ^CE), Miscellenies, 2.4}

"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation ^[1] as attention directed toward something evident – and ^[2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."

----------------------------------

^{Philodemus (_fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911}
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."

--------------------------------------------

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}

"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."

"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

---------------------------

Plutarch also records a long list of mocking epithets. In an effort to explain the apparent antagonism between the epithets and VS79, I think we can look at:

ΚΔ 39 "He who has best composed himself regarding his lack of confidence from external circumstances is the person who has made things kindred for the cases in which this is possible, and for the cases in which this is not possible [at least has made] things not foreign. However, for as many cases as he could not even to do this: he made himself unmixed (and removed as many as it was profitable to accomplish this)."

This leave us with:

And for those people who "we enjoy not interacting with" it seems also possible to "enjoy critiquing them" even to the point of "enjoying critiquing them with critical epithets."

I am not aware of the term in ancient literature. However, let me include this section from Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25, which seems to be related to the idea:

"…[1] Those movements that have been fully generated are fully produced according to the penetration of certain particles, and [2] those other movements are produced according to the proximity of particles, and also in some way [3] that movement which is not being raised up by nature, but produced by one’s spirit comprehending the memory and inductive consideration of its fulfillment in itself, more or less.

…of those movements that result according to the crowded-together atoms, but even the crowded-together atoms clearly move similarly. For they had a nature to fully generate such things and to begin such a task, the same atoms in accordance with a way arising from the same separation…

…one’s own actions are generated in the previously mentioned way, existing as productive of the same things. Yet, although they have a nature that could be productive of these and those achievements, many actions that people generate are made unproductive because of themselves – not through the same cause of movement of both the atoms and themselves. Against these unproductive generated actions we especially contend and rebuke, while resenting those who have a temperament from their birth in accordance with a disturbing nature – just as we do in the case of all living beings that choose to act counterproductively.

…we are contending with many people simultaneously and instructing about this issue, which is contrary to the cause of the same way of thinking that all motion is in accordance with necessity. Thus, whenever something is fully generated, [i.e., one’s consciousness], that comprehends a certain difference in the atoms in a certain mentally distinguishing way, but not as though from a different separation in space, [i.e., even though the soul can be distinguished from the atoms that compose it as its own emergent object, the soul is not physically distinct from the atoms that compose it.] one gains control of the cause of mental movements out of his own conscious choice. Then he simply delivers those conscious mental movements up to the primary natures of the atoms, and he makes this mentally generated movement entirely a standard that tests for truth.

…we praise others not merely through a cause of movement that originates out of themselves, but through that cause of movement that originates out of themselves toward the best tasks and mental perceptions. At this time, we contend with them in no way. But for us, along with… of atoms… to those that have applied themselves. And even while we are fully clearing out the cause of movement that originates out of ourselves… or not instructing about as many things as simultaneously…

…however one refers to his self-generated movement, it is clear it exists with a nature that is fully indicated by his experience of it – even while it is not referred to as itself or according to itself…

…according to our mental perception, our primary composition would – not out of necessity – force out some of the movement that has been fully generated up to the point of certain kinds of such a thing as our own non-necessitated movements being fully generated, while our primary atomic composition would force out some movement up to the point of a soul being produced – and even a soul having an arrangement and movement as great as this, given that some movement of this kind is necessarily generated from a composition such as this [i.e., the soul's subtle physical nature makes it susceptible to both moving and being moved].

But one’s atomic composition would force out some movement up to the point of movement such as this – specifically, the movement of this or that kind of soul – being fully generated not out of necessity. Or at least one’s atomic composition would force out some volitional movement whenever someone advances to the stage of life of such volitional initiations being fully generated not according to necessity, but by having the force of movement from himself and from his own cause…

…regarding those who sincerely struggle to move themselves toward the best tasks, we do not contend with those people, and they are not holding onto laziness. But neither do we venture to encourage or provoke them toward the most opportune things, as their temperaments have already coagulated from a nature which itself is poorly assembled, and which is not fastening and igniting the cause of movement for something in a different way to the coagulation of their temperaments, which is similar to… Although we are bringing forward the cause,[ i.e., the responsibility for our own movement], we do bring it forward for as many as…"

Odd synchronicity for the article and your comment, which both also occurred today! I was unaware.

Here are both versions for ease of direct comparison. My guess is that either Cicero alone is correct, or Diogenes is also correct and multiple letters were sent out.

Yes, thank you! This is new to me.. but, now that it is actually accessible, hopefully we all can dig in!

The section titles in the text are unlikely to have been placed by Lucretius, but are ancient·

The three manuscripts that De Rerum Natura is based on are Codex Oblongus (from the early 800s CE), Codex Quadratus (from the mid-800s CE), and the partial Codex Gottorpienses (from the late 800s CE -- of which less than half is preserved)·

Oblongus is the source for the titles, and contains 182 titles· The titles in Gottorpienses, in the sections that survive, agree with Oblongus (allowing for some errors)·

Quadratus does have spaces in its text in the same locations as the titles of Oblongus, but only ten of these spaces actually contain the titles·

This suggests that the titles were present in the lost manuscript that was used to create all three surviving manuscripts· The occasional use of Greek for the titles suggests they came from an edition that was created sometime before the 400's CE, (probably as early as the 100's CE)·

I think Dewitt was focusing on ἡ χάρις (grace) for this.... and even here the alpha privative (i.e., ungrateful) shows itself to be important to Epicurus' thought.

Great episode -- it’s nice to have Cicero fighting with us, to some degree, against the Stoics.

Thank you both for your encouraging words!