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But more importantly...
For me, these thoughts completely relativize everything I do. And they make me appreciate the good things I have and the life that I lead, life itself, so precious to me. They don’t make me despair or turn nihilist. They make me love existence and want to do more to help others love it.
I will add that "online gaming" can engender and preserve friendships that would otherwise wither. I know people that have maintained friendships from high school and college or created lifelong friends with online gaming. Even separated by miles and time zones, friends get together to play while at the same time talking and maintaining ties. They still get together in real life when possible, but online gaming is a platform that allows regular camaraderie.
Following up on a post of mine from Cassius' thread about PDs in narrative form on a list of 44 PDs in a 1739 Greek/Latin translation:
I used a 1739 Greek with Latin translation to compare with the text at Perseus Digital Library:
1739: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nn…id=27021597768674761-1400
Perseus Greek (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1
Perseus English (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1
I used the Greek text to compare with each other since 1739 had 44 Principal Doctrines and Perseus (i.e., Hicks, 1972) had the "normal" 40! I wanted to see what was different. And were there differences!! Starting at 44, I had to go all the way back to PD18 to get the lists to coincide! Note that right there, PD18 is split into two by the 1739 list. Some Hicks were divided by the 1739, a couple 1739's were combinations of Hicks, and so on. To follow the numbers, capital Roman numerals are the 1739 list, Arabic numerals are the Hicks (usual) translation PD numbers. So, XXIII/21 means that XXIII (i.e., 23) in the 1739 translation = PD21 in the usual list we're all accustomed to. I also want to go back and research some more, because I seem to remember that an earlier book (16th century CE?) also had 44 in their list. My primary reason for posting this here is that the list of 40 that we're used to is by no means sacrosanct or was it originally the way to divide them up. And, I would contend, precisely because Kyriai Doxai was NOT divided into a list of discrete sayings. Also, the only reason I'm using Hicks is because it's easy to copy/paste. I don't necessarily agree with his translations.
For now, enjoy...
I/1. through XVII/17.
XVIII/18. Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed ; after that it only admits of variation.
XIX. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.
XX/19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.
XXI/20. [If] the flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time.
XXII. [If] the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.
XXIII/21. through XXV/23. then...
XXVI/24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether.
XXVII. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.
XXVIII/25.
NOTE: PD26 appears as alternative text for XXXII below!
(ALTERNATE TEXT for XXIX, combines text from PD27. and PD28. from Perseus: Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγισόν ἐσιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίαις μάλισα κτησει δει νομιζειιν συντελουμένην. XXIX. Ex iis, quae ad totius vitae beatitudinem sapientia comparat, longe maxima est amicitiae possessio. Et in mediocribus opibus securitatem, amicitiae possessione maxime perfici putandum est. Google Translate: Of those which wisdom brings to the happiness of the whole life, the possession of friendship is by far the greatest. And in moderate wealth security is to be thought best accomplished by the possession of friendship.)
(ALTERNATE TEXT for XXX: λ'. Ἡ αυτη γνωμη θαρρειν τε εποιησεν ὑπερ του μηθεν αιωνιον ειναι δεινον, μηδε πολυχρονιον. XXX. Eadem sententia confidentiam parit, quod nullum sit aeternum malum, neque diurturnum. Google Translate: The same sentence gives birth to confidence that there is no eternal evil, nor long-lasting.)
XXXI/29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary ; others are natural, but not necessary ; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion. [Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires which bring relief from pain, as e.g. drink when we are thirsty ; while by natural and not necessary he means those which merely diversify the pleasure without removing the pain, as e.g. costly viands ; by the neither natural nor necessary he means desires for crowns and the erection of statues in one's honour.--Schol.]
(ALTERNATIVE TEXT for XXXII from PD26: λβ'. Των επιθυμιων ὁσαι μη επ' αλγουν επαναγουσιν εαν μη συμπληρωθωσιν ουκ εισιν αναγκαιαι, αλλ' εθδιαχυτον την ὀρεξιν εχουσιν, ὁταν δυςτοριζοι, η βλαβης απργαζικαι, δοξωσιν ειναι. XXXII. Cupiditates illae; quae dolorem non inducunt, si consummatae non fuerint, non sunt necessariae: sed adpetitum habent, qui facile dissipetur, quoties paratu difficiles, aut detrimenti effectrices esse videantur. Google Latin translate: Those desires; which do not cause pain, if they have not been completed, they are not necessary: but they have an appetite, which is easily dissipated, whenever they appear to be difficult in preparation, or productive of harm.)
XXXIII/30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion ; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion.
XXXIV/31. through XXXIX/36.
XL/37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all.
XLI. For in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.
XLII/38. through XLIV/40.
I'm curious what y'all think about this question, "What place do games have in Epicurean philosophy?"
Answer those three questions about games and you're well on your way to answering your question.
It also sounds like you and your friends enjoy them together. Another plus.
That's my take.
Ah, but Cassius , can you come up with a word that starts with P to encapsulate all that?? 
Very interesting. That somewhat predates the King James version.
Added in English? Or as we might suspect was this a German organization innovation?
Good question. They didn't delve into that, although the topic was English translations. The Geneva Bible (an English translation) was the popular one, in addition to the Bishops Bible and Tyndale.
Note: I *think* Estienne also did a Diogenes Laertius edition?? Did he put the numbers in?? Note also there were originally 44 "principle doctrines" not 40 in earliest numbered system.
With that said, I am surprised that there is not more focus on friendships here. Unless I am missing something?
One complication is that we're all spread across the world.
That said, Kalosyni and Cassius have led efforts to have more online social opportunities including book discussions, happy hours, monthly 20th gatherings, etc. Those have been wonderful opportunities to meet real people, have conversations, and establish friendships as far as one can across vast time zones. If one wants to call those acquaintances or friendships is a matter of semantics I suppose. I've personally felt welcomed here, and have shared, privately and publicly, tragedies and triumphs with friends I've made here. I also probably wouldn't have "stuck with" Epicureanism these past five years if not for this Garden. That's my personal response.
That said, if you're talking about expecting more discussions concerning friendship, I could see that being beneficial. I'm glad to hear that the philosophy has been beneficial in your friendships! That's the kind of practical application that is encouraged here. But I could see more threads on "what does Epicurean friendship mean in the modern world without Gardens available?" to be interesting and helpful.
That turned into a longer post than initially intended 
I hope that addresses your concern a bit.
Thanks, Nate, for the insight into your creative process.
You'e got it. Among others, this doctrine is BEGGING for consonance.
I agree, from a purely poetic perspective (to carry on the consonance :-)). Just to be clear to everyone, there is no alliteration in the original and the -os ending of kalos, dikaios, phronimos is due to Greek case endings. That's not to say Epicurus (or the Epicurean author) didn't like the way they sounded together, but it would have happened anyway with those endings.
You're almost required to use "pleasurably" as well and stick to p-consonance. I've seen enjoyably or happily or that sort of this, but with hedeos, bringing out the "pleasurably" seems paramount.
I take φρονιμως as "practically", though "prudently" would be equally if not more appropriate
Prudently has the problem of being perceived as Victorian, although I like it better from a semantic perspective. "Practically" works from "practical wisdom."
I sort of dislike the idea of καλως because I just haven't been able to digest the idea well. What is "beautiful" that is not also "prudent"? What is "beautiful" which is not also "just"? Surely we are not talking about "physical arousal at the human form", but rather some sort of "appropriate manner in which a lifestyle is lived", so "properly" is what I take. Still, I don't quite like "properly" because it's sounds sort of ... eh ... it's the best word that I've found to translate καλως. Even given my self-imposed "P"-consonance, I think "properly" (so far) best expresses the idea of "living excellently".
Kalos is SUCH a catch-all term for all things proper, noble, excellent. Strong's defines the usage as "beautiful, as an outward sign of the inward good, noble, honorable character; good, worthy, honorable, noble, and seen to be so." If "principled" had an adverbial form, that might work. So, yeah, "properly" is probably the proper possibility.
I want to break "justice" as δικαιως down into a familiar idea. Some read "justice" and think "The Second Coming" and "Sinners in Hell". Some read "justice" as "The Thin Blue Line". Neither is appropriate. So, I want to employ a more familiar word that expresses Epicurean Justice, which, fundamentally, is a peaceful agreement between people.
This is the one I'm having problems processing. To me, Epicurean justice has to do with fairness, not harming others, but making sure to take measures where others don't willfully harm you. We treat others properly.. but that's already being used. Politely doesn't seem strong enough. Maybe peaceably instead of peacefully? I'm going to have to ponder this one before I'm all in.
All that being said, I think you have a good dynamic translation... and I fully understand your
if someone wants a 1:1 transliteration ... just learn ancient Greek. καλως is only truly accurate as καλως.
FYI ..I was listening to an episode of the Data Over Dogma podcast today, and the host mentioned that verse numbers were added to the Bible in 1551. Before that, plain old paragraphs.
Which is interesting because it seems to PDs were also first numbered in the 1500s/early 1600s.
“It is not possible to live pleasantly without [living] practically and properly and peacefully, <nor practically and properly and peacefully> without [living] pleasantly; but one who does not take this sort of initiative to live practically, and properly and peacefully, cannot live pleasantly.”
That is my take on it after some digestion and deconstruction.
I like the alliteration but to which words are you pegging practically, properly and peacefully.
My take is:
practically φρονιμως?
properly καλως?
peacefully δικαιως?
I understand the sentiment but not sure I fully concur with the translation.... Unless you're going for a functional/dynamic translation rather than a formal/literal.
The words that evoke a negative response in my mind are:
- "proper" (Makridis)
- "rightly" (St.-Andre)
- "nobly" (Strodach)
For me, these words sound Aristotlean in that they imply some sort approved standard to abide by.
They all translate καλώς (kalōs) and ALL are legitimate translations of that slippery word.
Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
Synonyms for kalos include:
admirable idem, page 12.
artistic idem, page 42.
auspicious idem, page 53.
beautiful idem, page 68.
buxom idem, page 107.
capital idem, page 111.
comely idem, page 145.
creditable idem, page 183.
elegant idem, page 265.
estimable idem, page 283.
excellent idem, page 288.
exquisite idem, page 296.
fair idem, page 302.
favourable idem, page 311.
fine idem, page 321.
fortunate idem, page 340.
good idem, page 366.
goodly idem, page 367.
handsome idem, page 383.
happy idem, page 384.
high-principled idem, page 400.
honourable idem, page 405.
hopeful idem, page 405.
lovely idem, page 502.
lucky idem, page 504.
noble idem, page 559.
ornamental idem, page 580.
picturesque idem, page 611.
plausible idem, page 618.
pomantic idem, page 625.
principled idem, page 641.
promising idem, page 653.
propitious idem, page 653.
reputable idem, page 699.
righteous idem, page 715.
skilful idem, page 780.
specious idem, page 799.
spruce idem, page 806.
virtuous idem, page 954.
well-favoured idem, page 974
LOL! "Literally" Neither the manuscripts, even the best ones, nor Diogenes of O. can agree on the exact wording of this text. This'll be a good one to pull together some of what I'm finding in the various sources. This one in particular is a mess! I'll try to post this evening. For now, consider this a teaser
I've edited post 26 to include links to as many manuscripts and printed texts as I could find online. The consolidated list link at the bottom is a good catch-all. The fact that B is not available (as far as I can tell) is so frustrating! But I can have gratitude for what IS available.
(Edit: I've also posted the info to my profile; so, if anything new comes up, I'll be updating that one.)
Aldus Manutius (c. 1450 to 1515)
Trivia: Manutius' dolphin & anchor publishers mark was adopted as the symbol of the library science honor society ΒΦΜ.
And with the Latin too we have the possibility or probability that these translations date back to a period when the people who made them were fluent in both languages *and* had access to people who really understood the philosophy due to training from real Epicurean experts.
Not so sure about that. The earliest Latin translation I've found (so far as of my typing this line) is 1533.
For reference, I'm pasting some links and notes here for later:
Diogenes Laertius: the Manuscripts of "The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers"
Diogenes Laertius: the Manuscripts of "The Lives of Eminent Philosphers"
Notes on the history of manuscripts and printed editions of Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Eminent Philosophers re-arranged in chronological order from the link above (as well as other sources):
List of manuscripts online:
Finding some more manuscripts and printed books, Greek and Latin, on HathiTrust.
This project is NEVER going to be done
I will say that I like the Latin translation of Principle Doctrines 2: Mors nihil ad nos.
That has a nice ring to it. Although Ο ΘΆΝΑΤΟΣ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ (ancient Greek: ho thanatos ouden pros hēmas) isn't bad either.
This needs a bit more parsing: I don't think that there's always a rational component to desires. I
With your explanations there, I fully agree!
Choosing whether or not to act on a desire is definitely a rational operation,
Yes.
I could see there being "subconscious" desires or ingrained habitual desires.
Edit:
I think I would also include addiction in this category.
Another enjoyable episode!
One thing that stuck out to me was Joshua's passing remark of his reaction to "Greek has different words for love." I couldn't resist providing some context.
The "ancient Greeks have different words for love" is analogous to "the Inuit have hundreds of words for snow." English can express just as many snow conditions as the Inuit just like English can express different conditions of love. However, translations of αγαπώ, φιλώ, etc. that all use English "love" completely mask the meaning of the Greek.
I'm especially aware of this after listening yesterday to an episode of the Data over Dogma podcast (start 38:10). They talked about John 21:15-17 and the different words translated as love in English. A Christian website, Got Questions?, summarizes the importance of the Greek words:
There is also an interesting contrast when you look at the Greek words for “love” used in John 21:15–17. When Jesus asked Peter, “Do you love me?” in John 21:15–16, He used the Greek word agape, which refers to unconditional love. Both times, Peter responded with “Yes, Lord; you know that I love you,” using the Greek word phileo, which refers more to a brotherly/friendship type of love. It seems that Jesus is trying to get Peter to understand that he must love Jesus unconditionally in order to be the leader God is calling him to be. The third time Jesus asks, “Do you love me?” in John 21:17, He uses the word phileo, and Peter again responds with “Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you,” again using phileo. The point in the different Greek words for “love” seems to be that Jesus was stretching Peter to move him from phileo love to agape love.
Just another example of how translation can either elucidate or obfuscate.
wouldn't it be logical to have categories of pleasure analogous to those of desires? If this is so, then I'm next suggesting that katastematic pleasures come from natural and necessary desires and that kinetic pleasures come from natural and unnecessary desires . OK, but how is this useful?
I'm intrigued by your idea, but not sure if I'm fully onboard...yet. Let me make sure I understand your suggestion:
Fully agree & acknowledge that Epicurus provides a categorization of desires and a categorization of pleasures.
Your positing that our basic needs (natural and necessary desires) give rise to katastematic pleasure - our "baseline" pleasure (the "ocean" in the water metaphor earlier above?) and this is a result of 20% of actions/choices/avoidances, giving rise to 80% of our pleasure in life. Kinetic pleasure (the "waves" in the metaphor above) arises from 80% of our actions but only contributes 20% of our overall happiness. So we need both the 80% katastematic and 20% kinetic to live fully pleasurable 100% lives. Percentages aside, you're proposing that the bulk of our "baseline" pleasure is going to come from meeting our "natural and necessary" desires, but the kinetic pleasure is ...to make up a new metaphor... the icing that really makes the cake delicious?
Is that summary aligning with your thinking?
If so, the one thing that strikes me as askew is comparing desires with pleasure. Desires to me are one thing; pleasure and pain are another thing. Desires imply cognition and rational decision-making, whereas pleasure and pain are sensations which we can't decide not to feel.
Like I said, I'm intrigued and you may be onto something... just still percolating.
That said, I do like your striving to make things practical and useful and to get off "the primrose path of Ciceronian obfuscation." (A NICE touch of wordsmithing that phrase is!)
