Posts by Don

The mention of ataraxia in the letter to Herodotus is noteworthy, too:

Quote from Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus

[82] ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

[82] But mental tranquillity (ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths. (Hicks)

And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them. (Yonge)

The troubles one is released from have to be fear and anxiety of gods, death, etc., since the section directly preceding this about the importance of atarxia is:

Quote

We must also recollect that that which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and perfectly happy, and that then one’s thoughts and actions are in contradiction to the will of these superior beings; they also,[454] being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as that could affect them. What do I say? It is not even belief, but inconsiderateness and blindness which govern them in every thing, to such a degree that, not calculating these fears, they are just as much troubled as if they had really faith in these vain phantoms. (Yonge)

Great find on the Massie paper, Cassius !

I've read the Epicurean section specifically but should read the rest, too.

However, I do find several excerpts very interesting, including:

Quote

Not only are kinetic pleasures unavoidable and should be welcomed, but in a sense katastematic pleasures are paradoxically the target that all quests for pleasure (even kinetic ones) secretly aims at. To see this, we need to ask whether the ultimate object of desire is really an object. Pleasure is commonly understood as delight

in something, enjoyment of something. In other words, pleasure assumes an object and construes itself as a relation to this object. ... the common experience of pleasure is one in which desire recognizes its dependence on an object that, even when consumed, remains an alterity. For this reason all our common desires seek the impossible since they seek the unlimited. Epicurus’ answer, articulated in the concept of ataraxia, consists in seeking a pleasure without object, a pleasure without anything outside of itself; true happiness can only be construed in terms of self-sufficiency.

With self-sufficiency, the need for another disappears insofar as one traces a limit within which one can maintain one’s own existence. As we saw, the problem inherent to any attempt to fulfill one’s desires is the endlessness of desire and ataraxia is meant to be the answer, the only form of pleasure that ends the madness of desire. Freedom from disturbance and suffering is a matter of putting a halt to the unlimited. This is possible

because there is at least one formula which, in principle, could resolve the conundrum. To resolve the frustration of unsatisfied desire, the seeker of pleasure must discover in herself (in her own very existence), the object of her delight. The pleasure that is found in being (rather than in having or doing) is a pleasure beyond desire because it is a pleasure without object, or, if we must still talk of an object of desire, this object is not alien to the seeker anymore. Self-sufficiency (autarkeia) is therefore the hallmark of ataraxia and the search

for happiness turns out to be a search for freedom, since it does not depend on anything but itself.

I realize that's a rather lengthy excerpt, but I think it's a novel take on ataraxia as well as the katastematic/kinetic issue. There is nothing wrong with kinetic desires, in fact, they should be "welcomed." But Massie is positing that ataraxia, the katastematic pleasure, is something that only has the person's existence itself, the joy of being, as the source of its delight. I like that idea, and it bumps up against or is adjacent to DeWitt's "the greatest good is life itself" but avoids DeWitt's tautological conundrum since "If life is the greatest good, but the greatest good is that to which everything else points to, so life points to living,, etc." (I've been down this road many times so I'll let it lie there.) Massie has a novel take in that ataraxia is joy in living free from frustration, disturbance, and suffering in the mind. I would still maintain that ataraxia is achieved by getting rid of the fears of god, death, etc., etc., but once those are removed, ataraxia is the joy one gets from *being* in that *state* of freedom from fear, disturbance, etc. The one who is feeling ataraxia is self-sufficient in their own being, while continuing to enjoy the varied pleasures that come along from kinetic pleasures. Again, I like the "swimming in the ocean, surfing on the waves" metaphor that Godfrey helped refine a while back.

So, did Epicurus experience ataraxia in his last week? Using Massie's approach, I would continue to say yes, to the extent that Epicurus was able to experience anything other than pain.

Here's C. CASSIUS LONGINUS TO CICERO in a letter (Cic. Fam. 15.19)

Perseus Under Philologic: Cic. Fam. 15.19.1

Quote from Cassius

Ok so it does in fact seem you are using ataraxia to describe a specific type of being untroubled (about gods and death primarily, but maybe including a few other things), and that you don't include the trouble of the sharp pain of advanced kidney disease to be within the scope of the word.

Correct. Ataraxia appears to be achieved by rooting out fears and anxiety, leaving the mind to be free of those disturbances.

PS. I would also include that it is achieved as well through an understanding of natural science and how the world works, including celestial and meteorological phenomena, and also living virtuously. It is having the mind in a secure harbor, undisturbed by fears and anxieties.

The words used in the letter to Idomeneus are ψυχὴν χαῖρον (psykhē khairon) "gladness/joy of mind". χαῖρον is "rejoice at, take pleasure in a thing" which is a form of the word χαρά, one of the kinetic pleasures listed with euphrosyne. So, he's specifically saying he places the joy of his memories against the pain of his illness there in the letter. But that doesn't preclude an experience of ataraxia with respect to fears and anxiety.

Hicks at Perseus: 22] Ἤδη δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα (Idomeneus) τήνδε ἐπιστολήν:

"Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δ᾽ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."

Quote from Cassius

Well I was about to say a separate thread, but as I think about it (and as the Facebook comment implies) the question is probably tightly tied to ones idea of how to spend ones time in the best way, so let's say here.

Sounds good.

Quote from Cassius

Don: unless ataraxia is limited to "mental" disturbance I cannot see how Epicurus experienced ataraxia during his last week, given his pain , and I am not sure I would say he did experience ataraxia at that time even if the definition of ataraxia were limited to mental issues, just as I think aponia is not limited to bodily pains.

...

I would see human ataraxia as denoting real experience delimited in time and not a lifetime sum.

We first have to come to an understanding of what we both mean by "ataraxia." And I'm not saying we both have the *same* understanding, or that either of us has the correct understanding. Here's my understanding.

I completely agree with your mention of "not a lifetime sum." I apologize if I implied that in my saying "Epicurus spent his life cultivating his peace of mind, banishing the fears of death and the gods." What I meant to convey was that you don't just experience ataraxia ex nihilo. Ataraxia grows out of ones practice and study to eradicate the fears and anxiety of death, the gods, and so on.

Ataraxia is the pleasure of experiencing a mind free from anxiety, fear, etc. It is a mind (psykhe) without ταραχή (tarakhe) "trouble, disorder, confusion." So, αταραξία (ataraksia) conveys a mind "without trouble, without disorder, without confusion." Consider another instance of αταραξία in Fragment 519: "The greatest fruit of justice is serenity." (δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.) If we act justly, we don't have to have anxiety, fear, and worry about our fellow humans. This is echoed in PD17: "One who acts aright is *utterly steady and serene* (ἀταρακτότατος ataraktotatos), whereas one who goes astray is full of *trouble and confusion* (ταραχῆς tarakhes)."

Ataraxia is experienced as a mind untroubled by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, trust in that you are treating people justly and can expect the same in return. Once those fears and anxieties are rooted out, they don't return. One characteristic of an Epicurean sage (which we can assume Epicurus himself would have been as close as possible to as anyone) is "once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into the opposite (of wisdom)."

For me, ataraxia is not some "special" state one achieves in special circumstances, not some kind of meditative tranquility, not some kind of transitory fleeting feeling. Ataraxia is the prolonged/persistent feeling of a mind untroubled by fear, anxiety, and so (as outlined above). It is the solid foundation of a state of mind through which one can experience the world free from those fears, anxieties, and so on. On Piety by Philodemus provides the line (1532-3) "...we (Epicureans) all regard our doctrines/teachings (dogmata) as the true cause of our own tranquility (ataraxia)."

Which brings me back to your original question: "Was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?" Given *my* understanding of ataraxia as outlined here, my answer would be "yes... to the extent that he was in possession of his mental faculties between bouts of severe pain." But even when in pain, I would say he still experienced the world with his mind grounded in ataraxia. He would have had no anxiety about the gods. He would have had no fear of death. He knew he treated people fairly and that we was surrounded by friends. He had made as many preparations for the future of his school as was possible and took pleasure in imagining his friends and students continuing on after he ceased to exist. That to me is the textbook experience of ataraxia, so, yes, Epicurus was experiencing ataraxia during the last week of his life to the extent that his failing body would allow him to be cognizant of it.

Quote from Godfrey

Hicks uses the word "accumulation", Bailey uses "intensified", DeWitt uses "condensed", White uses "concentrated"; the other translations in Nate's compilation use variations of these.

The word used there in the PD09 is κατεπυκνοῦτο which means "force into a small compass, compress, condense." Another translation seems to be "to be thickly planted" and "consolidate."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, καταπυκν-όω

It's related directly to πυκνόω which means "pack close together, contract, condense, compress" and can even be used to refer to frozen water.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πυκν-όω

Did you want to open up a different thread to discuss the ataraxia issue or just keep going here? I have thoughts (of course)

Quote from Godfrey

Just to be clear, am I correct in saying that pleasures do differ, but only in intensity, duration and breadth? This is both how I read PD09 and how I reason it out.

For instance, pleasure/pain in the toe is different from pleasure/pain of equal intensity and duration in the tongue, because of the different nerve endings in the two locations. If we could spread each of these instances of pleasure/pain over both the toe and the tongue, they would be the same. But as long as that doesn't happen, they're different. This, then, becomes a formula for how pleasures/pains vary.

Pleasure do differ, that's my interpretation of PD09 from the grammar. But I'm still not sure I understand where you're getting the specific parameters of intensity, duration, and breadth from the words that are in PD09.

From what I read, Epicurus is specifically saying "Every pleasure *cannot* condensed nor be present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts." The "if.." clause cannot happen, and so the pleasures do differ from one another.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia.

To drill down on this, was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?

According to my understanding: Yes.

Of course, we can never know what was happening in Epicurus's mind. That said...

Epicurus spent his life cultivating his peace of mind, banishing the fears of death and the gods. Ataraxia is the quality of having a mind free from turbulence, free from fear, free from anxiety. Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia. He had come to accept there was no life after death. He had no fear of some divine punishment. He had memories from the past and a company of friends in the present to comfort him. He was well aware of his physical illness and its outcome. There was undoubtedly times where physical pain overwhelmed him. But I don't think that means he didn't experience ataraxia in his mind. He felt the unimaginable pain, but didn't need to accompany that pain with anxiety, needless mental suffering, or similar turbulence in his psykhē, his "soul."

Quote from Cassius

(But I see that the guys at the Epicurus Wiki did not follow hicks) http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_9/

They seem to agree with Hicks without adding the necessary parenthetical statement at the end like Hicks. It's the use of those two imperfect verb forms that clinches the idea:

Quote from Epicurus Wiki

Yet the pleasures do differ, Epicurus implies, since they cannot be thus condensed -- another syllogism by negative hypothesis, demonstrating that the opposite is in fact true.

Quote from Cassius

Or is there possibility of error in the WIkipedia analysis?

The Wikipedia outline is correct and corroborated elsewhere. It's just is the cleanest and most straightforward presentation I found. I think this same analysis goes for PD10 and PD11 but I'm holding off on those for now.

In going back to @Nate 's compilation and looking at the Greek construction of the "if" clauses, I think Hicks gives the proper paraphrase:

Quote from Hicks, PD09 (emphasis added)

9. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,--if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.

It seems to me (check my Greek, please!) that the specific construction of PD09 falls under the unreal present as defined in that Wikipedia article and elsewhere:

Present unreal conditions

Unreal (counterfactual) conditions referring to present time are made with εἰ (ei) followed by the imperfect indicative in the protasis, and the imperfect indicative combined with the particle ἄν (án) in the apodosis

[142] [ιχ.] Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

"The unreal conditionals either describe a situation which is contrary to fact, or which is unlikely to happen." (Source)

So, my contention is that, while PD09 is worded rather idiosyncratically, Epicurus is basically saying that pleasures do differ from each other and they can't actually be condensed. Which makes sense to me since he says elsewhere in PD18 that: 18. "Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed ; after that it only admits of variation..." How could there be variation if all pleasures were the same?

Welcome aboard, Rocco ! Hope you find the conversation and resources here helpful.

Quote from Cassius

But is he knowledgeable about philosophy? Can someone be happy without philosophy? Is happiness also relative? As the saying goes, "If ignorance is bliss is the shepherd living in a constant state of ecstacy?"

I'll give you that, but I also find it interesting how many people in this forum have said that they were attracted to Epicurean philosophy because it resonated with what they were already thinking. Epicurus's philosophy has a lot of common sense and personal responsibility aspects to it. Plus, we're supposed to be modeling nature. The shepherd in the field is closer to nature than someone living in Athens. Granted, they may still be trying to propitiate the gods for good weather, crops, safe births, etc. but "it is better to follow the stories of the gods than to be enslaved by the deterministic decrees of the old natural philosophers."

What does it mean to "practice" philosophy? To me, it means to love wisdom, to practice wise living, to ponder questions to which answers may not be immediately available. Epicurus gives us a wonderful framework within which to study those questions and live that life, but it's up to us to live, study, question, seek answers, and love and practice wisdom. Could the shepherd step onto the path of wisdom on the own? Sure. Is it helpful to find a community and a framework to go further in the path? Undoubtedly! But let's not denigrate the shepherd's natural innate potential.

I still have problems with the assumption of the "uneducated" shepherd. It makes them sound ignorant. They may not be formally educated, but that doesn't mean they weren't knowledgeable about their craft. Plus, shepherds I wouldn't think were just lying around on the grass for weeks at a time. They needed to tend the flocks, take care of the sheep giving birth in that season, shear the flocks or butcher the animals depending on what they were raising the sheep for, etc. The Romantic notion of blissfully piping away the hours, lounging with a wineskin, seems to ignore a broad swath of what it actually meant to be shepherd... Plus the uncertainty of enough to eat hung over the heads of everyone.

Just providing my little black cloud to hang over the hypothetical.

Quote from Godfrey

intensity, duration and breadth

You mentioned that these are listed somewhere. To which text or PD were you referring? Sorry, I'm missing the reference.

Quote from Cassius

I'd like to see our format in the "Texts" section here at Epicureanfriends become more like that in the future

The Perseus Digital Library doesn't have interlinear texts, but their ability to click on every word to access the authoritative dictionaries is priceless.

Quote from Godfrey

PD19. Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.

To be clear, where Saint-Andre uses "joy" the Greek is hēdonē "pleasure." My take on that PD is that if the definition of the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain (and after that it's just variety) it doesn't matter the amount of time, finite or infinite. If your pleasure glass is full, it's full.

But I always go back to this commentary from Diogenes Laertius when talking about Epicurus's take on eudaimonia:

Quote from Diogenes Laertius, 10.121

[121] Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.

It's always tricky when trying to compare what texts mean when different words are used: pleasure vs happiness. 121 doesn't say two kinds of pleasure but two kinds of well-being. I do NOT think we could substitute well-being for pleasure in PD19, but does verse 121 inform, in any way, our understanding of the PDs? Questions beget questions.

Quote from Godfrey

So to properly evaluate this hypothetical you need to get a sense of the uncertainties. We have Epicurus' letter describing his situation, but we don't know much about the shepherd. Do they love or hate their job? Are they allergic to grass? What's the breadth of their mental pleasure in this circumstance: does it align with their innermost desires? We therefore need to make up answers for all of these uncertainties, which of course is what makes this a hypothetical in the first place

It warms my heart to see someone else want more details on a hypothetical and these are ones I hadn't even thought of! Well done, Godfrey !!