Posts by Don

I am *always* open for digging into these translation questions! Thanks for the opportunity.

First, we return to the manuscript:

DigiVatLib

And for ease of comparison (differences in transcription underlined):

Bailey:

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

Alberto Enrique Álvarez:

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

You're right! One letter and one word difference. Now, what word is in the manuscript??

Well! Would you look at that! ... ὀργῆς !!! That third letter is *clearly* a gamma γ and not a theta θ, but Bailey et al., of course, knew what was in the scribe's mind when he wrote that. Nope! Unless there is a question of what letter is in a manuscript, I am not amenable to the idea of "correcting" texts if a plausible translation can be made from *what is actually written*!

So, I fully agree with Álvarez's transcription. This just continues to confirm to me that we absolutely HAVE TO go back to the manuscripts when they are available. And I like Álvarez's point about the juxtaposition of laughter and anger. Bailey et al. change the word to ορθης (orthes) "right, correct" (as in ortho-dox) to make it easier on themselves, I think. I'm a little unsure about the use of "maxims" in Álvarez's translation, so I'd like to break the manuscript line apart and dig into the grammar briefly...

...καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν "and never, ever (strong negation) to say...

...τὰς .. φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας. "the letting loose philosophical sounds"

ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς "from (or "done by" or "out of") anger"

The "maxim" of Alvarez comes from φωνας:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φων-ή

LSJ has:

III. phrase, saying, “τὴν Σιμωνίδου φ.” Id.Prt. 341b; “ἡ τοῦ Σωκράτους φ.” Plu.2.106b, cf. 330f, etc.; of formulae, “στοιχειώματα καὶ φ.” Epicur.Ep.1p.4U., cf. Sent.Vat.41 (= Metrod. Fr.59); “αἱ σκεπτικαὶ φ.” S.E.P.1.14, cf. Jul.Or.5.162b, etc.

but I think that citation of Sent. Vat. 41 could predicated on the orthes of Bailey et al. But really all the word can mean is voice, cry, sound, etc. It's where we get out English "phone, phono-."

This text translates ἀφιέντας as "overlook":

XX. For Polystratus

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>be saved by this plea, and might obtain our due reward at your hands. And for the sake of other people also you ought to…

www.loebclassics.com

So, I can get the clunky literalish translation:

"One must laugh and seek wisdom and tend to one's home life and use one's other goods; and never, ever let loose speaking philosophical sayings out of anger."

... or something with that idea.

It's also the name of Eros Έρως the Greek god of love and desire (Roman: Cupid)

Quote from Kalosyni

Of Love

Περὶ ἔρωτος (erōtos)

love, mostly of the sexual passion

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἔρως

Quote from Blank_Emu43

Note: I am not certain if this is the correct place for this thread, apologies if it isn't.

No need to apologize at all! This is a perfect spot for this question (and even if it wasn't, Cassius and Kalosyni are adept at moving threads around. )

This is a very good question. I have thoughts, but I'm not going to just write off-the-cuff on this one. I think we're going to have to think about a potential life vs the non-existence of the one that died. More later. Thank you for initiating the conversation!

Quote from Cassius

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

While I'd say "yes" to Cassius 's question posed here, I refer the reader to my pedantic post no. 48 above.

Quote from Cassius

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?

It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words). I may also use "change" and "stability" (NOT "static") but also something like unreliable pleasures vs. those pleasures one can be confident in having. Pleasures that depend on energeia are subject to being able to perform the actions necessary to experience them, while the other kind are available without putting forth the effort of activity. *That's* the importance of a word like aponia. It's not painlessness (as far as I can see), it's effortlessness, from ἄπονος (áponos, “without toil or trouble, effortless, painless”).

Quote from Cassius

(1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing.

Call me pedantic, but I wouldn't characterize the two kinds of pleasure in exactly that way. Both "acting toward" and "fulfilling" are action words from my perspective. Maybe "experiencing pleasure while acting on a desire" and "resting in the experience of a fulfilled desire"? But even that doesn't sound right to me. The key concepts from my perspective are action and rest. Maybe - maybe! - mirroring Aristotle's idea of energeia and dynamis although I'm still REALLY shaky on my understanding of those terms.

Quote from Pacatus

the source for terpsis: Warren, James (2002). Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University.

This review may be of help to is:

Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia – Bryn Mawr Classical Review

Quote

The rest of chapter 2 is an analysis of the longest surviving fragment of Democritus, B191. It begins, ” Euthymia arises in men through a moderation of joy and a good balance of life.” This confirms, says Warren, “that Democritus is no full-blooded hedonist,” since it advises that we pursue, not “the maximum amount of pleasure,” but only “a moderate amount of terpsis” And what is terpsis ? Warren translates it “joy,” and distinguishes it from “pleasure” ( hêdonê) as follows: whereas a feeling of pleasure “might or might not be beneficial,” terpsis“is a feeling we can accept as objectively good.” I find this implausible and would urge instead that Democritus’ distinction between terpsis and hêdonê anticipates Epicurus’ distinction between “joy” ( chara) and “pleasure”: joy is the mental state that has pleasure as its intentional object. (On this, see my article “Epicurus on the telos“, Phronesis 38 [1993] 281-321.)Warren cites B4: “Joy ( terpsis) and lack of joy are boundary-markers of what is and is not beneficial.” But Democritus is not saying here that joy is the feeling of pleasure that we get from what, being truly beneficial, is objectively good. He is saying that what is good (i.e., beneficial) must be measured in terms of what causes joy. And that sounds to me a lot like the moderate hedonism of Epicurus.

So, it appears Democritus uses terpsis, not Epicurus.

I would differ with the title of this thread: "Competing Greek Words for Pleasure in the Epicurean Corpus?"

I would suggest any terms are more like "Complementary Greek Words" or even "Supplementary" or maybe even "Greek Words for Varieties of Pleasure".. in the Epicurean Corpus.

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Don

On the one hand, in the case of other pursuits, the fruit comes for one only just upon complete perfection.

Don you are translating it as perfection, not completion?

I suppose I'm translating it as "complete perfection," but let's look again at the text. The key word where I'm getting "complete perfection" from is τελειωθεισιν:

Quote from Don

τελειωθεῖσιν (teleiōtheisin) is related to τέλος (telos) as in bringing something to its ultimate goal or end, hence bringing something to perfection. So, in this case, it means something like practicing other crafts or pursuits to perfection. The thing that comes immediately to my mind (for whatever reason) is playing the guitar. Seeing YouTube videos on music theory breaking down complicated rock pieces shows how much it takes to really perfect the technique of playing guitar.

Continuing with that playing guitar metaphor. You can't really "complete" learning the guitar. You can "perfect" your technique. My use of "perfection" should in no way be interpreted as some kind of sneaking in Platonic Ideal Forms or anything like that. The word is a form of τελειόω:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, τελει-όω

which means "to make perfect, complete; of things, acts, works, time, make perfect, complete, accomplish; to be made perfect, attain perfection; bring fruit to maturity, come to maturity."

The whole idea is that for other pursuits, you have to wait for the pleasure. There is a certain goal that must be reached, something must be brought to maturity, to a certain point of perfection or completion, before the "fruit" can be obtained.

I think this might also be a play on words with connotations like picking fruit/harvest ὁ καρπὸς and maturity τελειωθεισιν coming into play.

I would say that the "fruit/harvest/καρπὸς" doesn't even *necessarily* have to refer to pleasure. It's simply the benefit (the fruit) of other pursuits. But the enjoyment of something does seem to make more sense given the context.

Quote from burninglights

Compare Epicurus's description:

“Joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.” (DL 10.136)

With the following from Lucretius:

“This will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us. For without a doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.” (2.251ff)

From my perspective, you are spot on.

Remember, too, that "consist in motion and activity" is not technically what the Greek says. It's an instrumental dative there with "activity" being ἐνεργείᾳ which means "by (means of) 'energeia'."" It's pleasures through "kinesis" by means of "energeia." Well, that's clear as mud, right? It seems this is Epicurus again wrestling with the current philosophical debates and terms of his day, as energeia, kinesis, dynamis, etc., go back to Aristotle. And if you were a Greek philosopher in Athens *after* Aristotle, you had to contend with that environment. At its basic sense (to the best of my ability right now), Energeia is the putting into action of some potential (dynamis).

See also

Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

There seems to be in the "pleasures consisting in motion by means of 'being-at-work'" a sense of bringing about pleasure through the actual work of motion of the individual. The motion, through the work/activity/actuality of the individual, brings about the pleasure.

Look at the words in the Lucretius translation: move forward, swerve in our motions, will, gives to each one a start, movement, motions.

Those are all active working words there.

I am becoming more convinced that the banal "kinetic pleasures" translation hides SO much that Epicurus was trying to get across here.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, τέρψις

No Epicurean citations there.

There's no use of τερψις in Diogenes Laertius book 10.

Maybe in Philodemus? But he's not readily searchable.

Quote from Pacatus

Are there sources in the Greek, among the Epicurean corpus, for τέρψις and/or χᾰρᾱ́? And a distinction from Ἡδονή?

Quick response: χαρά is specifically one of the "kinetic" pleasures. I'll have to dig around about τέρψεις. That's a new one to me.

Lucrezio: immagini di manoscritti

O = Oblongus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 30, saec. IX in. (UB Leiden, VLF 30)

Q = Quadratus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 94, saec. IX ex. (UB Leiden, VLQ 94)

G = schedae Gottorpienses vel Haunienses, saec. IX (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, GKS 211, 2°)

GKS 211 2°: Lucretius, De rerum natura

L = Laurentianus 35,30 Niccolanianus (Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana)

Codici Laurenziani [sigle di Flores: plut. 35,25 (D); 35,26 (E); 35,27 (H); 35,28 (R); 35,29 (S); 35,30 (L); 35,31 (F); 35,32 (T); 53,01]: cerca in Teca Digitale.

I = Monacensis Latinus 816a (codex Victorianus) ante 1475 (BSB Monaco)

https://www.e-periodica.ch/cntmng?pid=mhl-001%3A1973%3A30%3A%3A196

Lucrezio: immagini di manoscritti

O = Oblongus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 30, saec. IX in. (UB Leiden, VLF 30)

Q = Quadratus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 94, saec. IX ex. (UB Leiden, VLQ 94)

G = schedae Gottorpienses vel Haunienses, saec. IX (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, GKS 211, 2°)

GKS 211 2°: Lucretius, De rerum natura

L = Laurentianus 35,30 Niccolanianus (Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana)

Codici Laurenziani [sigle di Flores: plut. 35,25 (D); 35,26 (E); 35,27 (H); 35,28 (R); 35,29 (S); 35,30 (L); 35,31 (F); 35,32 (T); 53,01]: cerca in Teca Digitale.

I = Monacensis Latinus 816a (codex Victorianus) ante 1475 (BSB Monaco)

https://www.e-periodica.ch/cntmng?pid=mhl-001%3A1973%3A30%3A%3A196

Same with Quadratus

Same with Quadratus

It looks like the digitized manuscript of the Oblongus is not available remotely:

https://catalogue.leidenuniv.nl/permalink/31UKB_LEU/18s393l/alma990037160190302711

It looks like the digitized manuscript of the Oblongus is not available remotely:

https://catalogue.leidenuniv.nl/permalink/31UKB_LEU/18s393l/alma990037160190302711

I'm intrigued. For ease of reference:

Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10.58

58] "We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense (Τό τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει) as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended,89 nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space ; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes : there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater ; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[59] "We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom (ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον); it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude ; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest (τε τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ)# things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

#Note in Hicks' English translation:

i.e. "uncompounded." But von Arnim's ἀμερῆ, "void of parts," is more suitable.