Posts by Don

Quote from Godfrey

In a manner analogous to pulling your hand from a hot stove, I would interpret jumping back from the "snake" as a reflex rather than an instantaneous opinion.

But how would we define a "reflex" in ancient Epicurean terms as opposed to other mental or physical activities?

Honestly, in some ways, I think we're trying to do two different things here, and I admit I've contributed. On the one hand, it seems to me, we're trying to get a grasp on Epicurus's understanding of the mind and sensations and prolepsis and how he understood thought and memory etc. On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc. Understanding the brain and sensation in a modern setting and requiring a lining-up of Epicurus's terms or ideas with that seems fraught with difficulties. I'm beginning to think it might be better to simply acknowledge that the two frames are irreconcilable, and move on to understanding each (the ancient and modern) separately.

Quote from DL 10.37-38

"In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. [38] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

"Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions (ἐπιβολὰς) whether of the mind *or* of any criterion* whatever (εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων), and similarly to our actual feelings (παθη), in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

I read this as Epicurus conveying that words can be - should be - referenced back to and denoting impressions of the senses. He urges Herodotus to test "opinions, inquiries, or problems" in reference to real sensations impressed upon the senses (including the mind) from the real, true external-to-ourselves world.

I see "or of any criterion"* as referring to the other senses - tasting, hearing, etc. - and he includes the mind (διανοίας "thinking faculty, intelligence, understanding" LSJ) specifically in that list of "sensations" as all members in his list of criteria.

The "every term... ought to need no proving" appears to also say that words need to refer back to a mental/physical sensation of some kind, an impression from the real world.

The criteria of truth then, to me, are the sensations, the prolepseis, and the feelings, precisely because they all interact directly with the "real external world." They are the impressions set upon us from the world outside ourselves. These criteria are our first line of contact, unmitigated by "opinions, inquiries, or problems", with the real, true, existing world in which we live.

Now, are opinions almost instantaneous sometimes, following directly on the heels of sensations and prolepseis? Sure! I have no problem with that. Consider you're walking through the woods, your sensations register a long skinny shape on the ground, your prolepseis have identified this shape as a danger in the past (the grooves are well worn in your eye's and mind's apprehension of the shape... so the "prolepseis" slips right into the groove, metaphorically).. your reason jumps in with "Snake!" and you jump back. It is only seconds later that you realize it was a discarded rope. Your opinion was in error, even though there was indeed a long slender shape that registered in your sensations from our external environment. Your sensations were true. Your prolepsis faculty registered the pattern seen and reinforced. Your feelings registered pain. It was your opinion layered on top that got it "wrong."

That's a VERY rudimentary scenario illustrating where my mind is at right now on this topic. To get a "modern Epicurean" take on things, I still think it is fruitful to dig into the work of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and her colleagues. I think that line of modern research has a lot of ideas worth exploring when it comes to really understanding how the mind actually works, and I still find a number of very interesting Epicurean echoes if not parallels in it.

Quote from Bryan

Quote from Don

(4/2b/?)

2b! But really all 1.

Ah! I think I see what you're doing there. So 1a + 1b = αἰσθήσεις?

I think I was originally seeing τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας being a riff on or related to the προλήψεις, but it's honestly been awhile since I considered it.

Quote from Little Rocker

Apologies if this is getting laborious

LOL! This is what some of us live for! Here's my take on this topic... as of this writing. Views subject to change in the time it takes me to type this!

Quote

DL. 10.49 (Hicks) "We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves."

Let me start at the beginning for my little digression here:

1." Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our (1) sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and (2) preconceptions (προλήψεις) and our (3) feelings (πάθη) are the standards of truth ; the Epicureans generally make *(4/2b/?)perceptions of mental presentations (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας) to be also standards." DL.10.31. (emphasis and numbers added; I'm going to leave 4/2b/? sit for a moment)

It seems to me that, according to Epicurus, αἰσθήσεις (sensations) include not only what we moderns would call "sensations" (tasting, touching, hearing, tasting, smelling) but also a mental sense that apprehends finely-grained images only sensible to our minds/psykhe. These are the direct impressions coming from external objects. To me, Epicurus is saying these are always the standard of "truth" ἀλήθεια "truth, opp. lie or mere appearance; truth, reality, opp. appearance" (LSJ) So, the sensations are our direct link to an external reality that exists in actuality and is not an appearance (or, to put it in Platonic terms) a mere shadow of a greater reality. There is no opinion offered on the sensation at this point. It is the seal that impresses itself on the wax. We can have an opinion of the artfulness of the seal or the appropriateness of the seal; but not until it is imprinted on the wax.

I have more to offer, but I see I'm running behind in the postings.... Let me catch up then wade back in if appropriate.

I agree that we're not far off from each other, Cassius ; although let me attempt to widen the gulf

I don't think/know if you're saying it, but I want to say explicitly that I don't believe prolepses can be equated with sensations. They're both pre-rational and things upon which reason works, but they're not the same.

To me, sensations register all incoming images/stimuli/whatever generated from the external world - sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, mental activity (bad terms, but there's a mental sensation per the ancient Greek theories). To me, the faculty of the prolepses identify patterns within those incoming stimuli - without assigning meaning or content! Simply identify "This pattern was detected before... This appears to be similar to another pattern identified earlier... etc." and THEN reason steps in and starts assigning meaning to those patterns... those patterns become more refined... the concepts assigned to them become more refined. It is the patterns within the field of sensations that are important to pay attention to.

That's my take. Running out the door to work this afternoon... Checking back in later.

Quote from Godfrey

I'm chewing on the idea that the prolepsis comes from the infant-caregiver relationship

I think you're onto something thinking along those links, Godfrey . Part of it comes down on answering the questions:

• "What is a prolepsis?
• What are the prolepses (as a group of phenomena)?
• Can we translate (literally and/or metaphorically) Epicurus's ancient Greek concept of mental/sensory functioning into a modern framework and still have it make sense?

There's the rub.

Quote from Cassius

At the moment I would tend to think the way Godfrey is going is most likely. It seems likely that prolepsis is, like the eyes or other senses, a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty that is neither right nor wrong. In contrast, even the assertions that "gods are blessed" or "gods are incorruptible" are chock full of conceptual right/wrong content.

So... it reads to me there, Cassius , that you don't think "gods are blessed and incorruptible" cannot be the content (so to speak) of a "a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty"? IF (and *please* correct me right out of the box!) that's your point, I'm tending to agree.

Epicurus tells Menoikeus:

• "First and foremost, believe that the god is a blessed and imperishable thing/being as is the common, general understanding of the god."
  • πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη
  • The verb, νομίζων, comes last in that first phrase and means "believe, hold, consider." At this point, he's not bringing in the prolepses.
  • I still say there is significance in that ζῷον can mean "living being, animal" OR "in art: figure, image" To me, it seems Epicurus hedges his bets in that one word.
  • ἡ κοινὴ (koinē) τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις "the common or general understanding of the god" has been ὑπεγράφη (hypegraphe) "traced, outlined" on our minds. I think this refers to Epicurus's proposed prolepsis of divinity. I consider ὑπεγράφη as laying in a rough, light outline of a drawing to later fill in the details with pen and ink and paint, covering up the original outline. It seems to me that Epicurus is encouraging us to stick to the outline and not cover it up with unnecessary decoration. That seems to be why he's insisting on the "blessed and incorruptible." BUT that seems to be more of an intellectual distillation process arrived at from sorting through all the religious ideas of the hoi polloi than what is *really* outlined in our minds (if I understand those Hidden Brain episodes and other research + Godfrey's caregiver hypothesis (See, I've raised your idea to a hypothesis now ).

Quote from Cassius

More likely than saying that our brains are stamped at birth "gods exist and are incorruptible and blessed," he's saying that our brains are stamped at birth with an operating system that, when exposed to certain experiences, are disposed to "anthropomorphize and to engage in teleological thinking." The results of that process are deemable to be true and consistent with all evidence only when we conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable, which means that they don't have anything to do with us or earth (that would indicate weakness). To reason otherwise contradicts our physics and all other repeatable and verifiable sensory observations.

Hmmm.... I'm not sure I completely follow your train of thought there.... but I *think* I agree with where I think you're going?

Quote from Cassius

Epicurean style gods

And there's another rub! With the popular and scholarly debates about what an "Epicurean style god" *is*... this discussion continues to have interesting side quests and interesting digressions!

(NOTE: I'm sure these podcast episodes are also available where you happen to subscribe to podcasts. I'm posting the program's episode pages because they also had some additional resources that might not be in show notes on a podcast-subscription platform.)

I just started listening to the second episode of Hidden Brain listed below but felt obligated to share them. I've found them to be instructive and thought-provoking from a cultural evolution of religion perspective.

"Creating God"

Creating God | Hidden Brain Media

If you've taken part in a religious service, have you ever stopped to think about how it all came to be? How did people become believers? Where did the rituals…

hiddenbrain.org

"Our God-Shaped Brains"

Our God-Shaped Brains | Hidden Brain Media

Some think of religious faith as just that: a leap of faith. But psychologists are increasingly filling in the gaps in our understanding of how beliefs shape —…

hiddenbrain.org

These two have also made me question whether we really do have a prolepsis of "blessed and incorruptible" characteristics of gods.... or whether the ubiquitous nature of gods across cultures is really (as talked about in "Our God-Shaped Brains") due to our innate proclivity (prolepsis) for assigning agency even where it doesn't exist, to anthropomorphize, and to engage in "teleological thinking" (seeing purpose where none really exists). The episode talks about these innate evolution-adapted proclivities giving rise to gods/spirits/divinities across cultures. Not some innate "preconception" of "blessed and incorruptible" beings existing somewhere. It seems to me that that is worth considering... although I'm fully aware this goes against Epicurean orthodoxy! There are still prolepses involved in there being ubiquitous gods, just not the prolepses that Epicurus posited. And if a "modern" Epicurean wants to imagine gods as admirable archetypes to emulate, I don't see a problem with that (at the moment I'm typing this at least). However, if these podcast episodes are correct, in a manner of speaking, the hoi polloi can be "forgiven" for holding the beliefs they do about the gods... in a way, evolution made them do it.

I'll have to cogitate on this for awhile, but I'm posting here for consideration by forum members. I look forward to any and all thoughts.

I am woefully late to the game on this thread, but **finally** feeling well enough to wade (way) back into some of the the threads I missed.

One thought that came to mind reading this thread is that the word "democracy" didn't mean exactly what we take it to mean today in Ancient Rome and Athens. ...although honestly there are some similarities, both postive and negative. Attempting to cleave to the "no politics" rule of this forum, I'll not go into details. But it seems Philodemus is especially concerned about the people - the hoi polloi, if you will - being able to be swayed by the rhetorical abilities of individuals skilled in the art of speech-making. < sarcasm > I'm glad that's not a concern anymore! < / sarcasm>

When it comes to Philodemus, I always like to go back and see what we're physically dealing with -- not just translation, but what physical remains are the translators working with. Toward that end...

Website of Holger Essler

And one example from that page: Philodemus: De rhetorica 1 (PHerc. 232, 234, 247, 250, 398, 426, 463, 1115, 1427, 1601, 1606, 1612, 1619, 1813), encoded by Claudio Vergara, Corinna Lang, Marcel Moser and Vanessa Zetzmann, revision by Vincenzo Damiani and Holger Essler (WCE)...

DCLP/Trismegistos 62474 = LDAB 3650

What I also find fascinating are some of the multi-spectral images of the papyri! fragment right N 1619 fr. 4 (=P.Herc. 1619) (Not a drawing but an actual photographic image. That's cool!)

Quote from Matteng

Thank you, I am german (live near Würzburg where is an Epicurean science center on the university) so it is easy to read for me, perfect

That's good. If you find anything particularly interesting as you read it, please share.

It's in German but there's this:

Quote from Bryan

Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.

I'm not seeing prolepsis as a faculty of thought. To me, there's only recognition of meaningful patterns on which thought can work to assign names or concepts. The analogy of the sieve is the best I can do right now, still feeling under the weather. I would agree that the faculty of prolepsis sucks in everything, but it's like that mechanical sorting bank that has slots for pennies, nickels, etc., in the crudest way. We're born with an innate sorting ability, otherwise our little brains would short circuit from all the stimuli. We have the ability to focus on patterns of significance in our environment. Now I'm not saying at this time how that translates into a "prolepsis of justice" etc., but I think I can get there from here.

Over the past few years, the most cogent suggestion as to what the faculty of prolepsis is the faculty of discerning patterns out of the cacophony of our sensations. It seems to me (to summarize what I've come to understand) that our sensations suck in all the applicable sensory stimuli - mental and physical - from our environment. The faculty of the prolepsis sieves those sensations to find discernible patterns, patterns that have been encountered before, repeated patterns that that faculty have significance within that cacophony. As we encounter them more often, we can find tune that recognition. A crude analogy is If a child's family has a "dog" , all animals are "dog" for awhile until the toddler discerns patterns that fine tune their recognition of patterns identified with other animals. Another crude analogy is the ability to discern patterns within a color blind test, ex.

The full circle is the flood of sensations. Prolepsis allows one to pick out the shape. Then reason/cognition steps in and assigns meaning, as in "that's the number 5."

To me pleasure and pain enter in after prolepsis but before assignment of cognitive meaning.

Quote from Twentier

Quote from Remus

This confirms, once again, that everything sounds better with a posh English accent.

Cellar door

Thanks, Eikadistes !

For anyone who doesn't get the reference:

Phonaesthetics - Wikipedia

When the topic of rights comes up, I turn to George Carlin and his "rights vs privileges"

For those who haven't heard it (language warning!):

Quote from Bryan

τὰ Συμβεβηκότα	Coniūncta	"Inseparable Characteristics"	"Properties"	Fundamental qualities, Inherent attributes
τὰ Συμπτώματα	Ēventa	"Separable Characteristics"	"Accidents" "Symptoms"	Potential qualities, Incidental attributes
This outline is specific to Epicurus. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα.

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So... Did I get that exactly opposite??

Quote from TauPhi

so-called accidents* - τά συμβεβηκότα

Just to be clear for anyone reading this, TauPhi 's footnote is exactly right:

Accident (philosophy) - Wikipedia

Quote

An accident (Greek συμβεβηκός), in metaphysics and philosophy, is a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. An accident does not affect its essence, according to many philosophers. It does not mean an "accident" as used in common speech, a chance incident, normally harmful.

Philosophically speaking then, as I understand, my having a beard is one of my accidents; my being a human is an attribute of mine.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Bryan

We smell and see the film that comes from our meal, for example.

Ok now *there* is another potential issue. I thought that "images" are received directly by the mind, without going through the eyes, and that the "images" technically speaking are not visible or otherwise detectable by the five senses. Is that not the implication of the discussion in Book 4 of Lucretius, and the implication of what Cicero says to Cassius about the mind selecting images as involved in thinking of someone who is not present?

My understanding is that *all* our sensations are based on "images"/fields/eidola. The mental faculty simply picks up the finest, most subtle images. But all sensations are based on touch, from the sense of touch itself to vision touching the images emitted by objects, to the mental faculty touching the finest most subtle fields.

Of course, we now know that this isn't how our senses actually work. But Epicurus posited a completely material theory of sensation, so he gets kudos for that.

The one I seem to return to again and again is at the ending of On Nature, Book 28, where Epicurus has gone on for feet of a scroll, he says, "So let the words which we have prattled suffice for the present." and the verb there is specifically a form of ἀδολεσχέω “to talk idly, prate” so it seems to me that Epicurus is being self-effacing. I really like that.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀδι^κο-χρήματος , ἀδο-λεσχέω

Quote from Cassius

a luminary in the world of library science

LOL 🤣 Please... Don't.... Stop. But seriously, "luminary" is FAR too kind (read: hyperbole).

Quote from Cassius

in an adjoining state so there may be some rivalry involved

Friendly rivalry Even Ohio and Michigan get along and cooperate in the library world.