Posts by Don

I've been giving your response some thought and have have done some additional investigation. τὰ ποιητικὰ, upon further study as well as consultation of the Epicurus Wiki, means "those things which produce" or "those things which are capable of making". τὰ ποιητικὰ are the subjects of the sentence.

Therefore εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν would mean something like "IF those things which produce the pleasures of the profligate..." So we're talking explicitly about those things which produce the feelings of pleasure for the profligate.

So, IF these things...did what?
...ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων...
"... set free the fears of thinking about meterological phenomena, death, and pains..."

The remainder of the doctrine then tells us that IF these things which produce the pleasures of the profligate dispelled these fears and taught them the limits of pleasure, we would have no reason to reproach them (i.e., the profligate).

The Epicurus Wiki gives a good full translation:
"If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life."

Yonge (1895) gives the following: "If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretence for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter."

All of this, from my perspective, then clearly shows that Epicurus did not believe the pleasures these profligate individuals were experiencing were indeed dispelling the fears of death, etc., nor were they teaching them the limits of pleasure, and that this DID open the profligate up to reproach and blame.

This appears to be a direct refutation of the sensual, hedonistic Cyrenaics and to rebuff the argument that some leveled against the Epicureans as debauched hedonists. Epicurus could point to his tenth Principal Doctrine and say, "If the pleasures of the profligate really dispelled the fears I say are important and taught them them the limits of pleasure as I teach, you could lump me and my friends in with them. But I find the profligate worthy of reproach because they are not having their fears dispelled not are they learning the limits of pleasure."

I look forward to reading your thoughts, Cassius ! Thanks!

I sincerely found your post very thought-provoking, Elayne . Thank you for some intellectually-stimulating reading.
That being said, I'm not sure that I accept all of your premises. Let me further explain my perspective, and then I welcome your response and others'. That's what I'm here for: to share, to discuss, and to learn.
I certainly agree that pleasure is given to us by nature to serve as "the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing." (Letter to Menoikos). Yes! Fully onboard with that. So, my initial point was not necessarily that sociopaths or psychopaths are not feeling pleasure. I think they could be subjectively feeling pleasure. However, I think an argument could be made that their brains are "wired" differently than the majority of people. In which case, are their feelings of pleasure reliable guides for them? Why else would medications be prescribed for some?
Parallel to that, there are people who are physically unable to feel pain and are unable to tell if they are being injured. There is a literal physical impediment to their being able to use a feeling of pain to make choices and rejections. Could not there also be people who are unable to feel pleasure correctly, similar to those who can't feel pain or even whose sight may perceive the distant square tower as round? Epicurus writes to Herodotus that "Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true." If one is blind or visually impaired, they cannot use the sense of sight to perceive the world and to base any choices or rejections on it. If someone's mental sense of feeling pleasure or pain is impaired, can they use those as reliable standards?
Additionally, Principal Doctrine 25 instructs that "If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony." (St-Andre translation) Is the psychopath or sociopath doing this? Are they "turning too soon to some other kind of goal" and so keeping their thoughts and actions out of tune? I would interpret the "natural goal of life" to be "living pleasurably." I would further interpret "living pleasurably" as defined by Principal Doctrine 5 (emphasis added): "It is not possible to live pleasurably without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life."
It is my contention that we can decide if someone is living a pleasurable life or if they're living with a delusion by applying this standard. Similarly, from my perspective, Epicurus also tells us that we can see famous and rich people thinking that they are going to be living pleasurably but they're just swapping one set of pains for another (Fragment 479). We could say they believe they're living pleasurably but they're delusional in the general sense of the word.
Living pleasurably is not the same as feeling pleasure. A prisoner (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. Someone living in abject poverty (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life.

Elayne , I would concur with your post. I hope I didn't imply "rest was preferable." I would agree that Epicurus is saying "most people" don't know how to be at rest or how to be active. An Epicurean should be able to find pleasure in both stillness/rest and activity/motion. So, an alternative translation, taking advantage of the stereotypical translation of μεν... δε...would be:

On the one hand, for the majority of people, being at rest is to be in a stupor and numb; on the other hand, being active for them is to be raving like a rabid dog.

I thought it might be helpful for this discussion to put the major players into historical context. How far removed from Epicurus was Cicero? How about Diogenes Laertius? Who was a contemporary of who? Who had access to whom?

Here's a little scorecard:

Name, birth and death, Years +/- from Epicurus' birth

• Socrates (470 – 399 BCE) (E -129)
• Democritus (b. c.460 BCE) (E -119)
• Plato (428-423 – 348/347 BCE) (E -87)
• Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) (E -43)
• Epicurus (341 – 270 BCE) (E 0)
• Zeno of Citium (c. 334 – c. 262 BCE) (E +7)
• Metrodorus of Lampsacus (331 – 277 BCE) (E +10)
• Hermarchus (325 – 250 BCE) (E +16)
• Zeno of Sidon (150 – 75 BCE) (E +191)
• Philodemus (110 – 35 BCE) (E +231)
• Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 BCR) (E +235)
• Titus Lucretius Carus (b. 94 BCE) (E +247)
• Quintus Horatius Flaccus ("Horace", 65 – 8 BCE) (E +276)
• Epictetus (55 – 135 CE) (E +396)
• Diogenes of Oenoanda (wall dated 117 – 138 CE) (E +458)
• Diogenes Laërtius (b. 180 - 240 CE) (E +521)

I have been reading the Gosling & Taylor and Nikolsky articles in the Library here. They are fascinating and I thank Cassius for recommending them. I simply took the kinetic/katastematic categories to be accepted fact. Those articles are an eye-opener in arguing persuasively that that isn't necessarily so.

I can see your perspective (Oops, no pun intended there). These kinds of ambiguous or hard-to-interpret lines reinforce facts like we're dealing with:

• a language in which no one alive today can really be 100% fluent (Latin as it was spoken and understood by actual Romans)
• a manuscript transmission for which it is impossible to know if it was 100% accurately transcribed.
• a philosophy for which we've lost so much primary source material and have to rely on fragments and so much secondhand and often hostile commentators.

It's not impossible to take all these into account and interpret texts and try to follow Epicurus' path, but it is often all seen through a glass darkly to bring that whole vision analogy back in...

OMG! That *just* stuck me as I write that! I *think* I Corinthians 13:12 could be saying something parallel (but supernatural) to that line in Lucretius in a similar poetic manner. The Amplified Bible has:

12 For now [in this time of imperfection] we see in a mirror dimly [a blurred reflection, a riddle, an enigma], but then [when the time of perfection comes we will see reality] face to face. Now I know in part [just in fragments], but then I will know fully, just as I have been fully known [by God].

Please don't misinterpret! This Pauline poetic metaphorical language about vision just struck me. I'm not implying or ascribing ANY supernatural or Christian content in or connection to Lucretius, just that using poetic metaphor in DRN like this conveys something - for us - like our vision isn't capable of seeing the reality of atoms with our eyes through our limited vision but Epicurus was the first to be able to "see" reality face-to-face through those "barred doors" and to share that with us so we could "see" it, too.

Okay, I realize I'm descending down the rabbit hole on this one. Time to climb my way back to the sunlit world and move along in the poem.

εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν <καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων> ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

A big "if." If this is the case, we have no argument against the profligate. But...
The word translated as just "profligate" here is ἀσώτους which literally means "those having no hope of safety, the abandoned, the profligate, Latin. perditus." And the Latin word then conveys "the destroyed, the ruined; the wasted, the squandered; the lost."

From these connotations, we can easily see that Epicurus does not hold out the prospect here that the ἀσώτοι have a chance of resolving all their fears of death, suffering, etc., through their wanton "pleasures" ἡδονῶν. That is why Epicurus does indeed have complaints against them. They have no hope of safety - they literally need to be saved as if they're still at sea and drowning - and Epicurus is out to save them from themselves.

Fair points, Cassius Allow me to rephrase my thoughts.

By using "wanting" I wanted to convey that if you're envious, you want something. You're lacking something you want, something you feel that you deserve. From my perspective, Lucretius is saying our vision is jealous in the sense that it "wants" to see all of Nature's secrets, greedy to see everything hidden from view... but it can't. But our vision just isn't capable of seeing atoms, so Lucretius is telling us how we can perceive them by analogy and by using our other senses (including our mental sense).

As to the barred doors of Nature, I have thoughts. (Hard to believe, I know ) From my perspective, this is nothing more than Lucretius exercising his poetic muscles. This language is simply describing, in a poetic manner, the idea that Epicurus was the first to reveal the secrets of nature that no one else could figure out. Before Epicurus, nature's processes were accepted as being under the control of the gods or other supernatural forces. The processes behind "the nature of things" were hidden behind "the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature" to simply use poetic language. That's so much better than just saying "Epicurus figured things out that no one else figured out before him because he was really smart." There is no one or no thing standing guard at actual or figurative doors. It's simply poetry: the honey on the rim of the cup of wormwood.

I was listening to Episode 9 in my car on my way to work this morning and found myself desperately wanting to chime in as you all were discussing the jealous/envious aspect of vision.

My take on that line was that it is our faculty of vision itself that is greedy, envious, that is wanting, etc. There's no outside agency that's jealous.

Inanother sense, it is we, through our sight, who feel we are entitled to see everything! Nothing should be hidden from us. Who is nature to hide something from our vision?!

I also got this corroborated somewhat in a book I found via Google Books which gives a translation as "The grudging nature of our vision had shut is off from proof as to which atoms have left at a given time."

Great episode!

An eloquent piece of writing! Thank you for sharing!

Quote from Nico Lab

I am most definitely human. Singularity has not affected me yet.

As you can tell, I'm not a scholar of Epicurus, I originally trained and worked in Psychology, but simply wish to increase my understanding of his readings and how this can benefit my understanding and practice of herbal medicine and the concept of health and what we are 'told' it means and what it meant to Epicurus.

Many thanks, Nicola.

Welcome! With all the bots online, I'm sure Cassius was just being cautious. I'm new here myself and have found the forum welcoming, intellectually stimulating, good-humored, and fun! Rest assured, I don't believe any of us are "scholars" here but amateurs in the literal sense. Epicurus himself claimed to be self-taught so we're following in his (big) footsteps. Your background and training should prove helpful and interesting.

Hope your stay here is a pleasurable one!

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

This is an interesting fragment. It's import, at least for me, was not initially apparent. Then I read the other thread in this topic and became intrigued. If we dive into the original Greek, we find some interesting things. To take the first phrase:

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων

simply means "the greatest number of people" or "the majority of people." So, what we're going to be discussing are most people, not a select few, i.e., not sages, not Epicureans, but the hoi polloi.

μὲν and δὲ simply connect phrases and can in some senses be translated something like "On the one hand… on the other hand…" or just "but." It sets up a contrast. So, let's take the other two phrases without them.

τὸ ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ

"Being still, being at rest, being quiet is 'ναρκᾷ'" which means "numbness, deadness, to be in a stupor." Consider that ναρκᾷ narka is related to English "narcotic" and "narcolepsy."

τὸ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

Consider the meanings of κινούμενον, the participle form of the verb κῑνέω:

• to set in motion, move, remove
• (grammar) to inflect
• to meddle
• to change, innovate
• to begin, cause
• to urge on, stir on
• to arouse, exasperate, anger, taunt, abuse
• (passive) to be moved, to stir, to move

So "being in motion, moving (contrasting with τὸ ἡσυχάζον) is 'λυττᾷ'" which connotes "rage, fury; mania, raging madness; fanaticism" or even "rabies (of dogs)!" Again, this sets up a contrast with ναρκᾷ.

So, an alternative translation could be:

For the majority of people, being at rest is to be in a stupor and numb; but being active is to be raving like a rabid dog.

It seems to me to be saying that there needs to be a balance in rest and activity or that stillness isn't seen to be important by most people. Implying that stillness and rest *are* important for the Epicureans. "Most people" think being still is like being under the effect of a narcotic (to put a modern twist on it). Additionally, when "most people" are active, they're just running around raving in a mania to be just simply doing something, they can't be alone with their own thoughts, they can't be still and taking pleasure in rest. Likewise, they can't take pleasure in activity either. They're just raging around manically like they have an advanced case of rabies!

The Epicurus Wiki also has a good commentary on this saying.

Quote from elli

Another example is here : «Κενός ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφ’ οὗ μηδέν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γάρ ἰατρικής οὐδεν ὄφελος μή τάς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὔτως οὐδέ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μή τό τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος».

"A philosopher's words are empty (or vain) if they do not heal the suffering of man. For just as medicine is useless if it does not remove sickness from the body, so philosophy is useless if it does not remove suffering from the soul". (Emphasis added)

I think Elli and Cassius 's points here perfectly illustrate the Epicurean relative perspective. Something isn't "empty" or "vain" in an absolute sense. There are no Platonic "empty desires" for example. It is the results of something by which something is judged empty or not:

Which words of the Philosopher are empty?

Those that do not heal the suffering of man.

Thank you, Elli for spelling this out initially above!

Elli , am I correct in understanding that here:

ὥσπερ γάρ ἰατρικής οὐδεν ὄφελος μή τάς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὔτως οὐδέ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μή τό τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος»

that οὐδεν means something like "nothing/no/none" so those lines could be translated something like:

"... For just as medicine means nothing (has no benefit (ὄφελος)) if it does not remove sickness from the body, so philosophy means nothing if it does not remove suffering from the soul".

I'm asking because the juxtaposition of both empty and nothing/no/none seems possibly significant to me.

Good old Pan the goat-god! Now THERE was a pleasure seeker! The video did evoke ancient Greece. Thanks for sharing!

I was wondering whether Pan the god and pan "the whole" were cognate. It looks like they may not actually be connected surprisingly.

According to the Wikipedia article for Pan (god) (yeah, it is Wikipedia so follow up with its sources!):

Many modern scholars consider Pan to be derived from the reconstructed Proto-Indo-European god *Péh₂usōn, whom these scholars believe to have been an important pastoral deity^[5] (*Péh₂usōn shares an origin with the modern English word "pasture").^[6] The Rigvedic god Pushan is believed to be a cognate of Pan. The connection between Pan and Pushan was first identified in 1924 by the German scholar Hermann Collitz.^[7][8] The familiar form of the name Pan is contracted from earlier Παων, derived from the root *peh2 (guard, watch over).^[9] According to Edwin L. Brown, the name Pan is probably a cognate with the Greek word ὀπάων "companion".^[10]

And according to the Online Etymology Dictionary:

pan-

word-forming element meaning "all, every, whole, all-inclusive," from Greek pan-, combining form of pas (neuter pan, masculine and neuter genitive pantos) "all," from PIE *pant- "all" (with derivatives found only in Greek and Tocharian).

So two different Proto-Indo-Eurpoean roots entirely: *peh2 "guard, watch over" led to Pan the god and *pant- "all" led to το παν "the universe"! That surprised me.

Quote from Charles

Whether or not we choose to label Epicurean Philosophy as hedonistic is another debate, but what is shared between Epicureans and Hedonists/Libertines/Utilitarian Ethics is both; our recognition of pleasure as *good* and choosing actions that result in pleasure for ourselves and sometimes our close ones if it benefits us. This is ultimately where the title of the thread becomes relevant as no matter what those who critique us & pleasure will group us in with other pleasure seekers or isolate us and then choose to attack, with issues of morality being a formidable argument according to the attacker's perception. But what does everyone here think? How exactly do we hold each other accountable, including pleasure seekers who wouldn’t label themselves Epicurean and aren’t familiar with our concepts of frankness and justice, but otherwise share many of our values?

I will admit that my first reaction was "It's not my responsibility to answer for all those who call themselves 'Hedonists/Libertines/Utilitarians' If people lump us all in together!"

But, upon further reflection, it doesn't do us any good to get painted with the broad brush of prejudice and not defend ourselves. We need to have a proper reaction at the ready. I don't know what that is, but let's ponder it together.

I do think it's very important the way you phrased it: "according to the attacker's perception." They're the ones who need correcting. They're the ones with whom we have to engage. What do we need to get through to them and how?

Additionally, I don't think we can hold Hedonists/Libertines/Utilitarians accountable. We are not all part of a big tent. They don't need to listen to us and vice versa.

BUT we do need to distinguish ourselves from other "pleasure seekers" because that's just not what we are. We believe (*I think*) that pleasure is the summum bonum since pleasure is what stands alone. Pleasure is not a means to an end. Pleasure is! Virtue is only a means to pleasure. Why do we try to practice wisdom, to be moral, and to be just? Because we believe KD 5: "It is not possible to live a joyous life without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living joyously. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a joyous life." Virtue is a means to an end: living pleasurably. Morality is a means to an end: living pleasurably. Pleasure is the end to which we're heading!

The reason that we're not libertines and decadents is that that lifestyle is not sustainable. It does not lead to living pleasurably. Sure, I can enjoy a few beers. Sure, I can enjoy a fine meal. But I don't want to stay drunk continuously and gorge myself on fine food every day. That's a recipe for pain.

The argument against Epicureans that murderers find murder pleasurable isn't necessarily easy to overcome. Murderers may truly believe that they find sadistic pleasure in their crime, and I'm not entirely convinced by that specious Epicurean argument that they will be troubled by knowledge that they cannot be sure they will go undetected. It sounds good but some people are sociopaths. BUT does it REALLY lead to a murderer living pleasurably. We REALLY have to define what we mean by "living pleasurably" I think. Almost by definition, someone who derives "pleasure" - and I deliberately put that in quotes - from their heinous crimes isn't living pleasurably by almost any rational societal understanding - prolepsis, if you will - of what "living pleasurably" means. That's another thing I believe that sets us Epicureans apart, knowing that "living pleasurably" has to be sustainable. We work towards maximizing sustained pleasure, not having momentary jolts of kinetic pleasures. That's what we work towards not just aponia but also ataraxia.

This is a fascinating and important thread to discuss. I hope I've added some food for thought and look forward to reading more from everyone.

I also found this at the Online Etymology Dictionary:

prudence (n.)

mid-14c. (c. 1200 as a surname), mid-14c., "intelligence; discretion, foresight; wisdom to see what is suitable or profitable;" also one of the four cardinal virtues, "wisdom to see what is virtuous;" from Old French prudence (13c.) and directly from Latin prudentia "a foreseeing, foresight, sagacity, practical judgment," contraction of providentia "foresight" (see providence). Secondary sense of "wisdom" (late 14c.) is preserved in jurisprudence.

I just came across this article online and wanted to get it linked before I lost it:

Julie Annas. Epicurean Emotions. University of Arizona, 1989.

I have not had a chance to read it yet except for the first paragraph or so.

Actually, the equivalent Latin (and English!) term would be "universe". From the Elementary Lewis Latin Dictionary:

ūniversus adj.

unus+versus, all together, all in one, whole, entire, collective (opp. singuli): provincia: civitas: mundus: triduum, three days together , T.: de universis generibus rerum dicere: ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum: in illum tela universi coniciunt, Cs.—Plur m . as subst, the whole body, all men, the mass, everybody : universi in omnibus fori partibus: si universi videre optimum possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret.—Sing n . as subst, the whole world, universe : in eodem universo (i. e. in universitate rerum): universi corpus.— Relating to all, general, universal : odium: oratoris vis: dimicatio, a general engagement , L.—As subst n ., in the phrase, in universum, as a whole, in general, generally : non nominatim, sed in universum, L., Ta.

I was just reading the Letter to Herodotus in working on my personal Epicurean outline and realized I had forgotten how much I love the word Epicurus (and other ancient Greeks) used for the universe:

τὸ πᾶν

Transliterated, this is:

tò pãn or simply "to pan"

This is the same "pan" as in "panhellenic" or "pantheism."

I've seen it translated as:

• the sum of all things
• the sum total of all things
• the universe as a whole
• the whole of being

... among others, sometimes using several of these in the same text for the same word: τὸ πᾶν. It takes all those English letters for 5 Greek ones.

I think one of the reasons it brings me so much pleasure is its simplicity. A definite article: τὸ, and a simple 3-letter word: πᾶν. I'm tempted to capitalize it, as in To Pan. Let the trumpets sound!

At its simplest, it could be translated The All or The Whole. It could also be translated as The Everything Everywhere. The word really encapsulates for me the elegance and succinct nature of the original classical Greek.

Sometimes it's the little joys that are the best

Just had to share.