Posts by Don

I always imagined a "welcome mat" sized dog. They're not kidding around! That's one large dog to beware of!! Thanks for posting.

I found myself smiling just reading your description of next steps! Good luck!

Thank you again so much for letting us in on the process! I find this fascinating. I took a jewelry making class (way back) in college, so this has been a pleasant trip down memory lane for me. I never did any casting, but other students did. I'm kicking myself for not trying it now. But living vicariously through your experience had been a pleasure!

Quote from Cassius

But I have never heard, found or read "Bayle's magnificent article."

We need to go looking for that and presumably it will merit its own thread or subforum.

https://books.google.com/books?id=bsuWr…picurus&f=false

I couldn't see if anyone had mentioned this before, so apologies if I'm repeating known info: I saw the Greek on several Epicurus rings and realized that was not Epicurus' name but ΝΕΑΡΚΟΥ (Nearkou, "Of Nearkos"). Who was Nearkos? Turns out he was probably the engraver:

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NEARKOS (Νέαρκος). - Alleged gem engraver. The name, which appears on three gems (ΝΕΑΡΚΟΥ on a carnelian with a manly head; ΝΕΑΡΚΟΣ on an amethyst with a manly bearded head; ΝΕΑΡΚΟΥ on a carnelian, of doubtful authenticity, with a manly head) cannot, according to Brunn, be attributed to 'engraver.

Source (used Google Translate for English)

Unfortunately, it's no real surprise that someone would have this perspective on philosophy or "the Ancients." In our contemporary culture, Philosophy (capital P) is primarily thought of as a dry academic subject with nothing to offer everyday life. There are some who are attempting to change this, but the overall idea if you asked someone about "philosophy" would be like the person who replied to you online.

If more people thought like Epicurus, we'd be in a better spot: A philosopher's words are empty if they do not heal the suffering of mankind. For just as medicine is useless if it does not remove sickness from the body, so philosophy is useless if it does not remove suffering from the soul.

Cassius wrote:

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I suspect that in this discussion so far everyone will largely agree that the answer to that question is "yes, there is no absolute justice" - but probably not without hesitation.

I'll admit I have hesitation when it comes to not having an absolute standard of justice. I consider something like equality for all genders and races to be universal. Can I justify this on Epicurean grounds? Maybe. Epicurus didn't see a problem with having women and slaves be an active part of the Epicurean community. The "standard" of neither harmed or be harmed comes into play arguably, too. But Epicurus did own slaves. Isn't slavery a universal injustice? Doesn't it do harm to those enslaved. Epicurus freed at least some of his slaves in his will, so he must have seen the value in setting them free. But are we going to argue that slavery was just when it was practiced in Ancient Greece? But not just in 19th century America? We have PD38 to refer to:

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...actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just.

Is slavery "not to accord with the general concept"? Is gender equality "not to accord with the general concept"? If so, are these universals? If not, why not?

I agree that this subject is not easy. But if we are to call ourselves Epicureans, we need to wrestle with it. If we can't come to grips with what we believe Epicurus is saying, then maybe we're not Epicureans but rather humanists or atheists or agnostics or something else. If I want to call myself something, I have to understand what that means. If I can't defend or follow a path, I need to step off that path and find another. I admit I'm willing to look at what it means to call myself an Epicurean right now. If I find I can't agree or defend an Epicurean perspective, I'll find another path. BUT I think it's important to discuss and argue these fundamental points. It will either strengthen my Epicurean resolve or demonstrate to myself that I'm maybe not an Epicurean after all. This opportunity to talk through these issues is truly one of the values in finding this forum.

Quote from Cassius

In the spirit of keeping it coming, I think:

(1) The issue of being clear in our technical discussions about "ranking" and "divisions" and "types" of pleasure. Here we have a fascinating and important discussion that can be pursued with a wide variety of types of people (both inside and outside the Epicurean framework) without too much pressure from emotional issues.

But we also have :

(2) The issue of the apparent subjective/relativistic nature of pleasure, the acceptance of which is explosively rejected outside the Epicurean framework of Nature. In fact it is hard to even discuss personal attitudes toward pleasure without first coming to terms with the practical implications of concluding that people will disagree on how to pursue pleasure. That probably takes us off into the infrequently discussed issues such as the last ten PDs, and this issue (which might be the most important of which) has to be kept tightly tied to the Epicurean framework for us to make progress on dissecting it. Talking about this issue with people outside the basic Epicurean framework is hardly even possible because you run into immediate and emotional issues about what "should" be the best pleasures, and if you can't agree that that "objective" framework makes no sense then you can hardly even get off the ground.

This is good.Thanks for summarizing! Here are my thoughts.

1) I don't think we can "rank" or "divide" individual pleasures. What we can classify (for lack of a better word) are the *consequences* of pleasures. Do someone's present pleasures move them along the path to future pleasures? That's always been my argument for why we *can* censure the "pleasures of the profligate" (PD10). Their actions, while subjectively pleasurable for them in the present, do not assure them of future pleasures.

2) Again, yes, people will pursue pleasure in different ways, but: (a) are the present pleasures they experience assuring them of future pleasures? and (b) are they in keeping with natural justice: to not harm and to not be harmed? I think those are the criteria by which to "judge" pleasure (again, for lack of a better verb). There are no best pleasures, or right pleasures, or correct pleasures in and of themselves. You all here in the forum have begun to move me in that direction. I'm still wrestling with this myself because I can readily think of pleasures that people insist are pleasurable to them that I think are abhorrent. I'm also not convinced that these kinds of "pleasures" are actually pleasures and not activating some other center in the brain, but let's for arguments' sake say they are pleasurable for these people in the widest possible definition. Then we judge them by the criteria a and b above: assurance of future pleasures and accordance with natural justice. Epicurean Philosophy says that we should accept some pain for future pleasures. I'm thinking here of rehab for the profligate's drug addiction, for example.

That's my take (at least in this moment ... I could change my mind)

It seems to me we're all on the right track moving in the same direction, maybe just in different lanes.

I agree with Cassius that there is no objective standard to judge one pleasure more pleasurable than another. Pleasure by its very nature is subjective.

Both Godfrey and I have mentioned the "pursuit." According to Attalus's website, Fragment 68 is from the following:

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Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

So, Plutarch says Epicureans say that the "pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved." This again emphasizes the process. It also echoes what Epicurus said about how important it is to remember past pleasures and look forward to future pleasures. We cannot have guarantees or assurances of stable health, but we can make choices that moved us in that direction. We can look forward to those future pleasures of stable health. We can be assured that we ourselves will make choices to move ourselves forward toward stable health (aponia) and peace of mind (ataraxia). I'm not advocating a "tranquilist" perspective but just talking about a process and attributes growing out of that process when we're making choices about what gives us pleasure in the future and the present.

Take Plutarch again:

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the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you.

From my perspective, one key word is "arises." This again implies a process.

I think there's a difference between talking about maximizing pleasure in our lives over time in the present and the future and talking about maximum pleasure of any one pleasurable event. The latter can't be measured by definition because we're talking about subjective phenomena.

This conversation is both very pleasurable for me as well as enlightening. Keep it coming!

I think you may be on to something here, Godfrey . If I hear you right, the pursuit of pleasure (Jefferson's pursuit of happiness) is the important part. As long as we are making choices that point us in the direction of our (subjective) pleasure, we're doing it right in the moment even if we're experiencing pain in that moment.

I found Fragment 68 to be applicable:

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68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

According to this then, from my interpretation, the "highest... joy (pleasure)" is defined as stable health and the confidence in maintaining it. We make choices to achieve this.

This is a fascinating thread and full of new information. Thanks for posting, Cassius !

I realize everyone here is already aware of all this, but I have to state that I find Lucretius's exposition of Epicurus's thinking on evolution (since I've read that Lucretius was arguably using Epicurus's multi-volume masterwork On Nature as his guide) amazingly -- shockingly -- prescient. I have a hard time wrapping my brain around the fact that Epicurus was formulating his ideas almost two-thousand years before Darwin: Evolution isn't aiming that's any goal. Tongues and arms evolve and, if they're useful for something, they continue to evolve.

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...nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them.

I find that someone so long before Darwin was writing like this absolutely awe-inspiring in the best sense.

I found a great illustration of the gradual, incremental, almost-imperceptible pace of evolution in a video of the evolution of the face. Paleoartist John Gurche charts his "direct ancestors" through human evolution ending with the artist's own face.

Here are some visual aids of what I understand to be the difference between "longest duration" pleasure and "long-term" pleasure:

Present >>>>Future

"Longest duration" refers to pleasurable experience over a single contiguous span of time leading to pain; pleasure clung to in the present with no consideration of consequences.

(ex., eating at the buffet as long as possible leading to indigestion and nausea in the future)

Present>>>>>Future

"Long-term" refers to pleasures over time punctuated by pains endured for the sake of the continued existence of the pleasure; or painful experience undergone in the present to have pleasure in the future.

(ex., Diet and exercise undergone for health and fitness)

Quote from Cassius

(As usual I want to note that i see this is a very fun and very useful discussion!)

Agreed!!

Quote from Cassius

But I do think that we still have a lot to do on the clear meaning of terms like "sage" and "fullness of pleasure." So that when Epicurus uses the term in the letter to menoeceus I would strongly presume that he is using it in a generic way and not as a term of art as in the comic book "Epicurus The Sage" for example.

I think I would agree with that if I understand what you're saying.

In the interest of making sure I'm being clear: I do NOT think that the Epicurean sage is akin to a buddha, bodhisattva, messiah, etc. The Epicurean sage is not a type of being, an official title, or an unattainable condition that only serves to make humans feel inadequate. It's more descriptive than anything else, a shorthand. A wise one is simply one who has learned to apply the philosophy in every aspect of their lives, who has internalized the doctrines and can readily pull them up in their mind to confront any situation when trying to make choices on courses of action to reject and accept.

Although now that I'm writing this, I need to be careful in steering clear of elevating the wisdom to make the decisions with the pleasure arising from those decisions. Although again... No, okay... The decision is just the means to the pleasurable end. Just as acting virtuously is a means to achieving pleasure. Okay, I think I pulled myself out of the nose dive.

Quote from Cassius

Another way of stating my concern is to observe that I think it is pretty clear that the goal and the guide in Epicurean terms is "pleasure." That means that the goal of life cannot be "to be a sage" and the guide of life cannot be "a sage" or "to follow a sage," and those terms strike me as particularly hazardous if we consider "sage" to be synonymous with "a wise man" and if we consider how important it is not to embrace "wisdom" as the goal or the guide of life.

Is it possible that all this discussion of "sage" is overlay by Diogenes Laertius using his non-Epicurean philosophical categories?

Epicurus himself uses the term σοφός as "sage" or "wise man" in the Letter to Menoikos:

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[126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life.

[126] ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν> οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν:

So if we are to accept the Letter as being from Epicurus's own hand, he referred to "the wise man"

I wouldn't say the goal of life is to be sage but that becoming wise is a natural result of following the Epicurean path. Wisdom/prudence makes the pleasant life possible along with being just and acting rightly (PD 5). One becomes wise in applying the philosophy and these characteristics ....uh, characterize (sorry) what behaviors one will exhibit by being adept at knowing how to apply the philosophy of pleasure in one's life. For those not fully proficient in the application of Epicurean philosophy, these characteristics can be a list of "fake it til you make it" behaviors. The more you practice the behaviors of a "sage" the more you'll see their usefulness if know how to make your choices.

Oh, but I think "longest period" and "long-term" are two different things.

Longest period = blissed out all the time, eating at the delicious buffet of delicacies for hours and hours; making pleasure last for the longest period isn't tenable or advisable.

Long-term = "I will eat enough of this delicious food on the buffet to fully satiate myself but I'm not going to gorge myself "for the longest period I can" because I know later (i.e., long term) that will cause me pain." Long-term involves making choices and rejections with an eye to what will cause you more pleasure later or maintain your fullness of pleasure (I have not read DeWitt's section on that yet... but I do remember seeing your graphic).

He was in pain, but there's no way to avoid physical pain if one is in a material body. We get sick. We get injured. But remember what Epicurus wrote:

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"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them ; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations."

So even in the midst of severe physical pain, Epicurus was able to apply his philosophy and experience pleasure. He remained a sage even to the last.

From my perspective, experiencing the fullness of pleasure doesn't mean one is blissed out all the time. That's what I meant about having mastery over your choices and rejections to maximize long-term pleasure. You may be experiencing pain right now, but the sage can - so to speak - keep their eyes on the prize of long-term pleasure. They have an expansive view of their life and aren't bogged down in their present suffering... even though it might be severe (e.g., the response to "torture" characteristics). The sage keeps in mind that severe pain is short, chronic pain has moments of pleasure (at least according to the Principal Doctrines).

In response to Cassius 's asking

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what is a "sage"? Do we limit "sagehood" to "teachers" or "leaders of schools"?

I'd say that the sage, ὁ σοφός, the wise one, is anyone - from a classical Epicurean perspective - who has achieved a level of mastery over their choices and rejections that allows them to continually experience the fullness of pleasure in their life. By virtue of this, one would hope that these are the teachers and leaders of Epicurean communities but it could theoretically be anyone on the Epicurean path.

Quote from Cassius

Sorry we just crossposted and I elaborated on my earlier post....

But I think your comment emphasizes my question. "Can't"? What does "can't" mean with a human nature possessing agency, and absence of fate?

Diogenes Laertius was compiling from who knows how many sources. Was this characteristic referring to Epicurus himself as written by one of his admiring students ("The Founder *can't* fall back into...")? Was it hyperbole ("Sages of *our* school *can't* fall back....")? The original original source could shed light on the issue you're bringing up... and, of course, we can't know that.

Your question made me go back and take another look at the text:

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα:

Those words are fairly adamant that it's a one-and-done (at least according to whatever source DL was using):

• ἅπαξ once, once only, once for all
• μηκέτι no more, no longer, no further
• μηδέ and not

That's a lot of "no, nay, never, no more" as far as falling back to the opposite disposition (opposite to being a sage).

I would also say that once you know something, you can't unknow it. Once you know the truth of the "true philosophy" you can't un-know it. It's part of your knowledge. So, while someone may behave as if they were ignorant or choose to act in ways contrary to their well-being or contrary to the truth, they can't do it (or say they're doing it) from a place of ignorance.

My take is that once there sage roots out the causes of ignorance and fear and comes to realize the veracity of the "true philosophy", they can't go back to being ignorant.