Posts by Don

Of course there's a Wikipedia article on the infinite monkey problem.

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The question starts with a typewriter, and a monkey,

This made me smile. One usually doesn't see that combination of words in casual conversation.

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No doubt we could talk about the analogy from many different angles but the heart of the question seems to me to be some defined force of randomness eventually producing a highly organized result which would seem couinterintuitive given the starting point.

I'm sure a mathematician could calculate the probability. How many letters in all of Shakespeare's works, the probability of getting each letter at random, etc. The odds would be astronomical! But given an infinite (literal) amount of time, it could happen.

I completely concur with Cassius . Even if atoms arranged themselves in an identical *pattern* to us, it wouldn't be us. Death is the dissolution of this particular "incarnation" of consciousness. Death is a break. *I* will not exist after I die. There will be no sensation, and so death will be nothing to me. If an arrangement of atoms assembles into this pattern again, that's not *me.*

Monkeys may type Shakespeare, but they're not Shakespeare.

The pattern may copy me, but that's not me.

Oh but I think he's saying that not only are all possible options possible, they actually exist in all possible infinite cosmos. So every explanation actually exists out in the infinite cosmos and that's why Epicurus needed infinite worlds for this to be true.

I'm not saying I agree but that's the author's thesis.

It "feels" important to me that the word μύθος mythos "myth" just means a "tale, story, narrative." Myth implies to us specifically stories about the gods, but I don't think that's what Epicurus intends in his "then you will escape a long way from myth." To paraphrase, you will be far from talking fiction if you follow the Canon etc.

But, here are two of the relevant sections of the Letter to Pythokles:

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[87] "For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts ; for our life has no need now of unreason and false opinion ; our one need is untroubled existence. All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them. But when we pick and choose among them, rejecting one equally consistent with the phenomena, we clearly fall away from the study of nature altogether and tumble into myth. Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see how the former really take place, but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for their occurrence may possibly be due to a variety of causes. [88] However, we must observe each fact as presented, and further separate from it all the facts presented along with it, the occurrence of which from various causes is not contradicted by facts within our experience.

The word used in 87 translated as "facts" is φαίνω and means "that which appears to the senses." The assumptions and laws are arrived at by reason and are man-made. Epicurus is saying we need to not be lured in by fancy arguments or stories or what we think are worthy but by what we perceive by our senses. And then...

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"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating ... in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned.

So, with that last part, I can't rule out the articles authors thesis. Epicurus does say all the alternatives are possible or permissible or allowed. But I want to delve into that a little deeper in context and the original.

I had not heard the argument the author puts forward that Epicurus needed all possible explanations of phenomena to be true throughout the infinite cosmos. The reason for multiple explanations in other threads on this forum seemed to assume that we reserve multiple explanations until we have more sensory input to make a judgement of one over the others. What the author is saying is that the Epicureans demanded dogmatically that all explanations were, in fact, true: if not here in this cosmos, then in one of the other infinite number of cosmoi. That's both an intriguing and somewhat unsettling proposition. It does actually echo the multiple universe theory, but I'm not convinced that's what's going on. So, we're to accept that snow can be caused:

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"Snow may be formed when a fine rain issues from the clouds because the pores are symmetrical and because of the continuous and violent pressure of the winds upon clouds which are suitable ; and then this rain has been frozen on its way because of some violent change to coldness in the regions below the clouds. Or again, by congelation in clouds which have uniform density a fall of snow might occur through the clouds which contain moisture being densely packed in close proximity to each other ; and these clouds produce a sort of compression and cause hail, and this happens mostly in spring. [108] And when frozen clouds rub against each other, this accumulation of snow might be thrown off. And there are other ways in which snow might be formed. (Letter to Pythokles)

... By any and all of these causes throughout the infinite cosmos? That doesn't make sense to me. Later in the Pythokles, Epicurus writes:

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All this, Pythocles, you should keep in mind ; for then you will escape a long way from myth, and you will be able to view in their connexion the instances which are similar to these. But above all give yourself up to the study of first principles and of infinity and of kindred subjects, and further of the standards and of the feelings and of the end for which we choose between them. For to study these subjects together will easily enable you to understand the causes of the particular phenomena. And those who have not fully accepted this, in proportion as they have not done so, will be ill acquainted with these very subjects, nor have they secured the end for which they ought to be studied." (My emphasis added)

My interpretion here is that Epicurus is saying that the study of his philosophy will equip you to "understand the causes of the particular phenomena" and "see connections which are similar" and to reason from analogy with what your senses and the Canon provide you with. I will need to investigate the articles authors citations, so I don't want to dismiss his assertion out of hand on this topic.

I also need to investigate the Stoic refutation the author says is going on. I didn't see much about the Stoics' Logos. Is that what is causing their "centripetal" hexis? I'm intrigued by the paper, but I don't - at first reading - find his arguments compelling.

For those interested, here's the author's webpage at Radboud University. Looks like his PhD thesis was on Epicurean cosmology.

Mathitis Kipouros : I know we strayed from your original question/request. Did you get anything helpful for your toddler? Anything you'd like to revisit?

Quote from Godfrey

This thread is pointing out to me the idea of balance between the three faculties.

For instance if our feelings are particularly strong regarding something, that may suggest a need for gathering more information (sensations, input). Thinking in these terms, self-interested agents gain power through disrupting the balance of the faculties. For instance religion minimizes (undermines) the sensations and perhaps the prolepses by insisting on "faith." All that leaves is feelings with which to measure truth. And reason, which is ineffective without proper input. The same goes with filter bubbles. Or Platonists: look at the society Plato proposed in the Republic.

No wonder we have to struggle so much to understand our natural faculties....

Very insightful post, Godfrey ! I think balance is a very good way to put it. The idea of the three-legged stool does in fact seem to be a good metaphor for the Canon. I know that's not original to Epicurus, but that idea of balance and working together seems appropriate.

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I completely agree with where you're going.

The main fault I would find is that these guys should not talk as if this is surprising!

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That's not something that we thought another species would do.

Excellent point, Cassius !

I just finished watching an episode of PBS's Nova about animal intelligence. Unfortunately, the episode is not available to stream for free but here is a transcript. I can't see how someone would watch/read this and argue animals do not have a prolepsis of justice/fairness. And if a Prolepsis of that, what else? And I feel (it brings me pleasure) that I'm justified in making this observation since Epicurus himself looked to animals and infants to formulate parts of his Philosophy.

Transcript selection (emphasis added):

NARRATOR: Frans believes that primates, as they negotiate their social lives, are very aware of the competition. And so he's come up with another experiment, this one to test their sense of justice.

Do they realize if they're being treated fairly or not, compared to others?

FRANS DE WAAL: Normally, you would think the only thing an animal should care about is, “What do I get for my task? I work, I get rewards,” but, no, they're comparing with what the other one is getting.

NARRATOR: Frans begins the fairness test with the capuchin monkey. These small, clever animals are kept in large enclosures, but for the short duration of the test, they're in a lab area. Each monkey carries out a simple task: they have to give a small stone to the experimenter, in exchange for a reward.

When both get a reward of cucumber, everyone's happy. But watch what happens when the one on the right receives a grape reward, instead.

FRANS DE WAAL: If you start giving one of them grapes, which are far better than cucumber, then the one who gets cucumber becomes very upset and becomes agitated, emotionally agitated.

NARRATOR: It turns out, quite a few creatures, including ravens and dogs, will protest if they get the short end of the stick, as if they know that they're being treated unfairly. But what about a concern for injustice for the other guy?

Research with one of our closest relatives, a highly social chimp, called a bonobo, is revealing some surprises.

At the Lola ya Bonobo orphanage in the Congo, animals spend most of their days in the forest, but come inside for short periods of time for experiments like this.

One bonobo is inside an enclosure. The door is locked and can only be opened from the other side. Here, another bonobo, a stranger, is given a delicious pile of fruit.

So, what will she do?

BRIAN HARE: We recently discovered that bonobos can share with strangers, that they actually will sacrifice their own food for the opportunity to interact with another bonobo they've never met before. That's not something that we thought another species would do. When we think about nature as “red in tooth and claw,” that you would share with somebody you don't share any genes with, it's not in your family, they're not even in your group, I thought that was something that humans did. So the fact that a bonobo does that is remarkable.

It's the closest you can think of to doing charity in animals.

I think this is why the idea of people living in filter bubbles online causes me pain. #Cassius if this is too political it won't cause me pain if you delete this post

People experience a reaction of pleasure by having their preconceived or predetermined ideas reinforced whether or not they reflect a rounded view of reality or circumstances. But they might also be experiencing pain by having their worst fears compounded. They may become depressed, fearful, but may experience this as pleasure in having their personal views fed back to them in their bubble. "I must be right because that is all I'm seeing." I see this as a pleasure of the profligate/lost since it is not conducive to long term well-being/eudaimonia. They don't seek alternative perspectives or additional information to confirm or deny. They only seek confirmation of possibly erroneous preconceptions. That's one area where I was/am having real problems in accepting "feeling" as a criteria of truth. But as you've both pointed out, that's my painful reaction to the situation so I'm using that feeling to react to this. On the other hand... But... However... Aaah!

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Maybe this is too simplistic, but Don in #11 you asked a question because you were feeling unease (pain) regarding an idea. By asking the question you were able to gather more data, and based on that data and the background activity of your prolepses you were able to "assuage your pain." That, in a nutshell, is one example of how I understand the process of the Canon to work.

Godfrey , that actually helps a lot. I don't think that's simplistic at all. It's a simple explanation, and those are sometimes the best. You're talking about using pain as a goad to resolve the uneasiness makes sense.

I think my initial reaction to the idea of feelings as a criteria of truth was when people don't take that second step. They use pain to stop looking and use the pain itself to say this is true. "I don't like this thing/fact/event, therefore I will reject it" I'm thinking flat-earthers for example. I could use others but I'm trying not to get political. The Earth not being flat is demonstrably false if you look at additional evidence from science and the extension of our senses. But the idea of a round Earth is "painful" for them so they reject it. This is the kind of thing where I don't think feelings alone can be a criteria, BUT you work all three legs of the Canon and then you can reliably construct a mental picture of reality.

Am I making any sense or talking in circles? This thread has been very helpful, so thank you both for taking the time to respond!

Actually, that does help. I don't know if it resolves all my uneasiness (assuages all my pain?), but I think it certainly begins to address it.

So, that's why they Canon is three-legged. We need all three aspects: pain/pleasure, sensations, prolepses - working together, not one alone. I think this is why it came as such a shock (pleasant shock) that PD24 specifically cited the three aspects of the Canon in the original Greek. You need all three.

Thanks, Cassius ! That was valuable! Glad I asked

Cassius and Godfrey brought to my mind an issue I want to ...resolve? Raise?

When Epicurus says "feelings" are a criteria of truth, I do not believe he meant that the truth of a fact can be determined by how we feel about it. Did he? I don't think we can be like "I feel it is true in my gut so it's true." Or an I saying that doesn't feel right? It pains me to think that?

We had a thread a while ago that went into the point that "feelings" were a translation of pathē which refers to how one reacts to somethiing. It's important to my understanding that "the feelings/pathē are two: pleasure and pain." The feelings are how we react to something: with pleasure, or with pain. So am I just reacting with pain to the proposition I'm putting forward?

Objective facts (the sun rose in the east this morning, zebras are animals with black and white stripes, the sun is a star, etc.) are not dependent on "feeling" in the common usage as in "that doesn't feel right to me." They are or they're not based on objective, observable evidence. But does that mean that they elicit pleasure?

I admit I'm a little adrift here. What does having pathē be a criterion of truth mean? I can't (right now) accept it's a gut feeling. Or is it?

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I listened but found myself just nodding my head in agreement mostly.

You have to look at that whole phrase:

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...throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief...

It's not the senses themselves that are confused but ourselves being confused about what our sensations are telling us due to our groundless beliefs.

The "criterion" is simply pointing back to the Canon if you look at the original text. Criterion is basically a transliteration of the Greek here. That's why she uses it. A better translation to get at the connection would be "the standard of truth." (I also just realized that Epicurus's work on the Canon is literally Περί κριτηρίου η Κανών Peri kritēriou ē Kanōn. So, Epicurus himself refers to the Canon as the criterion.)

This one from Mensch in the 2018 edition of DL's Lives seems pretty accurate as well (although I have differences of opinion about her last few phrases). She does bring out those three parts of the Canon from the original Greek nicely though:

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If you reject any sensation absolutely, and you do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgement between right and wrong opinion.

I'm actually in the process of working through the original Greek. I'll try and post something over the next few days. One discovery I did make already is that that convoluted multi-embedded phrasing in the translations actually just works out to a listing - word for word - of the three parts of the Canon in the original Greek. That was unexpected. Consider that a teaser.

Also, I've found on this one at least that Saint-Andre seems to be mostly sticking close to the original text although I think he's being overly complicated as well.

Hicks translation

24 If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate between that which is matter of opinion and awaits further confirmation and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feeling or in any mental apprehension, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief, so as to reject the truth altogether. If you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation in ideas based on opinion, as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be taking sides in every question involving truth and error.

Saint-Andre translation

24 If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.