Posts by Don

Quote from Godfrey

There are these:

PD3 The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.

PD4 Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh. (well it's not pleasure but it's continuous, fwiw)

Usener 116 from Cassius , Usener 146 from Charles , and PD 4 both use the word συνεχώς or a variation. The problem is it has a wide range of meanings! Continuous, continually, without interruption, at frequent intervals, etc.

PD3 doesn't actually have a word meaning continuous! Here's my clunky literal transition of PD3:

"The limit of the degree of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is not bodily pain nor that which disturbs the mind nor either of these together."

Sounds good, Cassius !

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... not a function of some "essence" within the atoms that make up the automobile.

I'd even add ...or even some essence within the atoms in your mind that formulate the desire.

PD 30 is an important passage here as well:

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Epicurus Wiki translation: Those natural desires which create no pain when unfulfilled, though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to groundless opinion; and if they are not dispelled, it is not because of their own nature, but because of human vanity.

And also this Nussbaum translation:

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Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, p.153: Whenever, among those natural desires that do not lead to pain if they are not fulfilled, an intense eagerness (spoudē suntonos) is present, they too are the products of false belief. And it is not on account of their own nature that they are not dispelled, but in account of the human being's empty believing. (Philodemus uses the word suntonos of the sort of anger the Epicurean will avoid.)

Natural desires (phusikōn epithumiōn) that are not necessary are NOT necessary due to some inherent nature of their own but because of the groundless beliefs/opinions that give rise to them. There are not good or bad desires, like pleasure is a good and pain is bad. That's why Epicurus provides the categories that he does and doesn't say some desires are good and some are bad.

You are correct, Cassius . Both of those in the original text are pathē.

I would agree that desire and feeling or reaction or "internal sensation" (that's my personal least favorite translation incidentally) are closely connected.

The English idiom "She really had her heart set on going to the theater tonight" describes a desire. And I find it fascinating that it almost directly translates the Greek epithumia. The desire - the thought of going to the theater here - causes a reaction or feeling of pleasure, but the desire or experience has to come first. You can't just experience pleasure by itself. There has to be an experience that happens to you (externally experienced by your physical perceptions) or a thought of some kind (internally experienced by your mental perception) to cause the feeling of pleasure or pain to arise. I don't believe you can just say "I am experiencing pleasure" or "I feel pain." Why? What is happening to you in that moment that is making you experience one of those two? It can be a number of things:

• Thinking about a future desire
• Remembering a past pleasure
• Having a painful experience in the present
• Engaging in a present pleasurable activity

While you can't separate the pleasure or pain from the experience - as Epicurus says we're either feeling pleasure or pain - you have to have the experience first to be able to react with one or the other. The pleasure reinforces the experience as choiceworthy, but not every pleasure (pleasurable experience) should be chosen due to the consideration of whether this individual pleasure in the present promotes a pleasurable life overall.

Godfrey had a good comment:

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the key point is being keenly aware of your feelings, understanding that they are indeed a criterion of truth.

That echoes Epicurus's statement: Ask of each desire (epithumia): What happens if it is fulfilled and what if it's not? (VS 71)

And

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[129] Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling (pathē) the rule by which to judge of "every good thing" (pan agathon*). And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy (**hairetē), just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned.

*agathon is the same word used in the third line of the Tetrapharmakos: "The Good (agathon) is easy to obtain."

**hairetē "to be chosen" is the same used throughout Epicurus's writings when he talks about "choice and avoidance."

Epicurus is using "pleasure" to mean "pleasurable experience" in this passage. I find it interesting that this passage doesn't address desires. He doesn't say specific desires are choiceworthy or not, but some pleasurable experiences are not choiceworthy.

In section [127], Epicurus describes the natural, necessary, and empty desires. Why are they empty? They don't lead to pleasure since he goes on to talk about the pathē of pleasure and pain in 129. Desires in and of themselves are neither choiceworthy or not. It is the actions taken in response to those desires that cause us pain or pleasure. Now, it can be a mental, internal activity that causes pleasure or pain and so can be judged choiceworthy or not. You may not "see" the action. But there has to be an action or experience first before we can "feel" either pleasure or pain.

Quote from Godfrey

When I think of a desire, I think of something which is a conscious thought. Examining a particular desire can stimulate a pre-rational feeling or reaction (pleasure/pain), which serves as a guide to whether or how we pursue that desire. Then we can consciously think about our desire and our feeling about it; this is where rationality fits into the Epicurean scheme as I understand it. As opposed to beginning and ending with rationality and squelching the feelings, which leads to very bad outcomes.

I would concur with your characterization between desire and feeling/reaction. I also think that order is correct as well: the desire stimulates a feeling of pleasure or pain. And desires can be anything! The desire "I want another drink" can stimulate pleasure, but if the desire comes after a full night of drinking out at a bar, can you use your rational prudent faculty to say "No, that is going to bring me more pain than it's worth in the morning. I want to avoid that and strive for more pleasure later."

Likewise, "I want to buy this expensive car" is a desire and may bring pleasure at the thought of driving the high performance engine. However, if your other desire is to retire early, can you say, "No, I should postpone that desire and invest prudently so I can retire early."

Thoughts?

Oh, I have to disagree with Cassius on this one. A desire is not the same as a feeling. I'm coming to think that "reaction" is a better English word to use in the context of Epicurean philosophy than feeling. How do we react to something: With pleasure or pain, positively or negatively?

I keep coming back to the original Greek word pathē "what is done or what happens to a person" when considering the Canon.

The Greek word used by Epicurus for desire is επιθυμία epithumia "a desire, yearning, longing." This is obviously related to the θυμός thumos, the part of the soul, "heart," mind that is the seat of emotions and desires. To have an epithumia is to literally "set your heart/mind (thumos) upon something." Homer talks about the thumos as their emotions, desires, internal strength. Your desire - your epithumia - is based in your emotions; your reaction - your pathē - is more your response to something. Your desire elicits a reaction.

That being said, one's reaction pathē is a pre-rational response to a stimulus.

What worries me is reacting only upon one's "gut feeling" which is what I sometimes feel we're talking about. What does it mean to act upon a reaction of pleasure or pain? To me, Epicurus seems to allow for rational understanding of and processing of our canonical faculties. Being prudent is using our rational faculties. What is the proper use of reason and what is over-using or misusing our reason?

To bring this back to the thread at hand: If we desire to retire early - if we have an epithumia geared toward early retirement - this obviously elicits a pleasurable response in us. Acting upon that pleasurable response would lead us to prudently plan - i.e., use our reason, our rational faculty - to bring that epithumia to fruition.

Quote from Godfrey

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Success is having everything you need and doing everything you want. It is not doing everything you need to have everything you want.

This is the crux of all the gobbledygook in the two pasted posts. Choose your values, your pleasures, and set goals to achieve them. If you are living pleasureably, it's possible that you won't feel the need to retire early. Or at all! If early retirement is a pressing desire for you, by all means go for it, but prudently.

A key piece of Epicurean philosophy as I see it is to examine and understand our desires and pursue our pleasures...

I agree with Godfrey here. For anyone looking for an Epicurean "daily practice" that's it: What will happen if this desire is fulfilled or if it is not. My only caveat is that when you say "... Pursue our pleasures..." that we don't forget that that sometimes involves choosing short-term pains in pursuit of our pleasures. Living a pleasurable life is the goal, and pursuit of pleasure should be a guiding principle but we need to use both the stop (pain) and go (pleasure) reactions to make decisions. Like the pain of exercise can lead to a healthier and more pleasurable life no matter the length of that life.

Epicurus calls us to live earnestly, seriously, in the best way possible (spoudaios), free from toil (aponia) and disturbance (ataraxia), with joy, merriment and good cheer (euphrosyne), with graciousness, kindness, and goodwill (kharis). If we can find pleasure in what we are doing, that is the best life. And as Godfrey says that's not a life from which we necessarily want to retire but if we do, we plan prudently and with an eye to continued joy and goodwill. I'm convinced one reason Epicurus wrote a will - because he would be dead, the ultimate retirement, and what happened after death would be nothing to him - the reason was it gave him pleasure here and now to plan for when he was gone, he was concerned about his friends and students and wanted them not to worry. Their worry was his worry, and that pain spurred him to relieve that pain. Same way with retirement. Is there pain with the thought of retirement that you need to relieve? Prudent planning doesn't guarantee anything. But it does address "what can I do here and now to alleviate my anxiety as realistically as I can?". Don't leave things to Chance.

Okay, I posted mine just prior to Mathitis Kipouros 's second post. Just read that one. I'll admit my reaction to the second post is less negative!

"Luxury is being able to appreciate any food. Comfort is eating the right kind and the right amount of food." I'm not sure I agree with the definition of luxury there, but I think I get the sentiment.

I'll look forward to reading other's reactions.

To be frank, my first impression of the copied text is "That's a LOT of buzzwords!" "Lifestyle design"? "... brain-intensive replacement for consumerism with an S-shaped learning curve."? "The Web of Goals can be seen as an evolving life-story that automatically minimizes waste (any kind of negative side-effect) and allows for the maximum possible number of opportunities in a rich world, or maximum resilience in a poor world."? It sounds like a MadLib from a marketing and self-help seminar.

Okay, that's my negative reaction to the presentation of the material.

Now, that being said, if one's plan is to retire early, that's fine. But are you taking pleasure in the journey to get there? If following the tenets of "simple living, minimalism, frugality, DIY ethics, survivalism, car-free living, and others" gives you pleasure, by all means, simplify, learn how to DIY, manage your life car-free, and so on. If it becomes an obligation to live by minimalism and frugality, that's not Epicurean. "Being forced to do something is bad but we are not forced to live with being forced to do something." (My translation of Vatican Saying 9) Epicureanism is about being prudent in your choices and rejections, judging what will or will not happen if your desires are fulfilled or not. The goal is a joyous life. Whether that life is minimal or not, is judged by one's reaction to that lifestyle and whether you can find pleasure in it.

I also don't think it's fair to Epicurus to say he retired early. He founded and served as head of a school. He wrote voluminously. He most likely taught, wrote letters to his friends in far-flung places. Plus he obviously took pleasure in these pursuits. I'm not clear where his money came from to purchase his house and The Garden, possibly an inheritance but also money from students, but he must have been prudent in his finances to be able to will the Garden to his students. Self-sufficiency is not the same as early retirement.

Personally, I think it is more important for me to find pleasure in what I am doing - as much as possible - than to follow some rigorous "brain-intensive" plan. That's not to say I wouldn't make prudent plans if I won the lottery and retired early, but even playing the lottery (infrequently!!) is pleasurable. It gives me a chance to consider "what if?" but I don't dwell on my inevitable loss. And I realize the lottery is not an ERE strategy, but it's probably as close as I'll get to retiring early.

Quote from Godfrey

Just some food for thought. (ouch)

LOL! Well played, Godfrey !

But seriously, I think you're onto something there. It helps to bring things down to everyday experiences. Epicurus was all about writing clearly and making things understandable and not hiding behind fancy, convoluted arguments. You're following in the footsteps of Epicurus here! Pass the chips!

The pivotal word here is ασχολούμενος.

Here is the entry for the root verb ασχολεω at Perseus Digital Library for two dictionaries.

Two pertinent definitions seem to be "to be engaged in one's own business; performance of a public function." I would agree with Elli's "occupied." The word seems to imply that one is engaged in their own business, focused on their work to the exclusion of other pursuits. Not necessarily that they're not taking time for leisure purposefully, but that they're "pre-occupied" with the daily grind.

For more, here's the entry for ασχολος.

And for ασχολία.

Take a look at those and please share your thoughts.

I'm always suspicious of super- words. Dangerously close to supernatural. However, "supersensory" seems to imply a sense "above" the other senses in DeWitt's case. And by "subsensory" idols, he seems to mean "images not able to be perceived by the traditional 5 physical senses."

I wish he'd have spelled it "eidols" or used "images." Idols is such a loaded word.

Here's an interesting article that talks about our other "senses" in addition to taste, smell, etc. I wonder what Epicurus would make of synaesthesia?

I went back to the Letter to Herodotus directly prior to that excerpt from DL X.50 above:

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And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts.

Here the term phantastikē epibolē is not used, and I'm working through the Greek. But the it does say we perceive with the mind and the sense organs.

For not being sure if you could go much further, I think you've done very well!

I do think you're onto something, and the Barwis excerpt appears to me too to be directly relevant to the discussion. Thanks for that!

I plan to delve back into the texts at some point armed with your information here.

Oh! I **really** like where you're going with that, Cassius. I especially liked this section:

Quote from Cassius

But no single mental picture is a "concept" any more than a single photon or processing of light is a "sight." Cameras produce images but don't "think" about them. Our brains/minds presumably assemble all these things through pre-rational processes, and that "pre-rationality" is the essence of what I would think Epicurus would insist is required for a faculty to be described as canonical. Error comes in opinion and the assembling and uses of opinions (the rational process). Whatever anticipations are, I firmly think that Epicurus saw them as "pre-rational," and that would fit a faculty that "automatically" assembles individual mental pictures just like the eyes and the ears assemble light and sounds without "thinking" about them.

(Pours a glass of wine, seats himself in a comfy chair) Please, go on!

Quote from Cassius

I would say one of the most continuously difficult parts is that of separating (1) instances of data provided by the "mental presentations/anticipations" from (2) conceptual reasoning, in which concepts are formed after a lot of thought and deliberation and reasoning. I continue to think that if we were to equate "mental presentations/anticipations" with "concepts" we would be confusing two distinct things (the process vs the result) into a single thing (the concept which the result of thinking) and we'd have a feedback loop which would introduce rationalism into the canon and would be why that Epicurus himself only had THREE legs, but the "other Epicureans (in my view mistakenly) came up with four.

This is why I was so surprised when I realized I saw the three components of the Canon listed and the epibolē were included but not the prolepses. I am convinced the doctrine is talking about the Canon. DL seems to imply that the *Epicureans" added a fourth leg to the Canon but PD 24 seems to imply that aisthēsin, pathē, and epibolē were legitimately a three legged Canon too.

Are the epibolē and prolepses two facets of the same faculty? I believe we've discussed elsewhere on the forum the innate nature of the prolepses. The phrase phantastikē epibolē occurs in DL X.50 and 51

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Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented--which is the cause of error.] [51] "For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results ; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

"Mental picture" is the translation here in 50, and "perception of what is presented" in 51 of phantastikē epibolē. That's the trouble with translations! They can hide the same phrases in the original. And 50 and 51 are from the Letter to Herodotus, so this is Epicurus talking. Plus the fact that he's talking about opinion, falsehood, "when a fact awaits", etc., he's addressing the same concerns that arise in PD 24.

I finally had a chance to finish my commentary on PD 24, posted over on that doctrine's thread on the forum.

Principal Doctrine 24 (PD 24) is one of the more convoluted doctrines with multiple phrases and conjunctions. I would like to provide some commentary and break the doctrine down into manageable words and phrases for everyone to get a more coherent understanding of what Epicurus was communicating. You may also want to take a look at this doctrine’s page on the Epicurus Wiki:

First the original text:

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Εἰ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψει τὸ διεψευσμένον· ὥστ’ ἀνῃρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

Now, let’s break it down before we put it all back together. I’ll provide a (mostly) literal translation then provide commentary. “Phrases or words in quotes” will be followed by [their corresponding original text in brackets to allow you to follow along.]

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Εἰ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν...

Literal: “If” [Εἰ] you throw away “a single perception of the senses” [ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν]…

Note that ἐκβαλεῖς is also the same word used later in the doctrine (...ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.) So, we should be sure to use the same word in our final translation in each location! The word ἐκβαλεῖς literally means “to cast, hurl, or throw away from yourself.” So, think about this as one literally “throwing away” or “discarding” the information you are getting from one of your sensations here. Note also that αἴσθησιν aisthēsin is the same word used when explaining the components of The Canon, the criteria of truth. More on this below.

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...καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη...

Literal: ...and “you do not distinguish” [μὴ διαιρήσεις] between “the holding of an opinion or belief” [τὸ δοξαζόμενον] which is awaiting (confirmation) and what is present “now” [ἤδη]...

τὸ προσμένον gives the sense of waiting on something. It also can be used in the sense of “to wait for one in battle, i.e., to stand one’s ground against.”

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...κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας,...

Literal: ...in accordance with perception of the senses, feeling, and true perceptions of the mind…

There’s a LOT to unpack here! First, I want to call your attention to that list of items:

- τὴν αἴσθησιν tēn aisthēsin “perception of the senses”

- καὶ τὰ πάθη kai ta pathē “and feeling (i.e., pleasure or pain)”

- καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας kai pasan phantastikē epibolēn tēs dianoias “and every true perception of the mind”

The description of the Canon, the criteria of truth, as outlined in Diogenes Laertius’s biography of Epicurus, contains the same list of items:

DL X.31: "Now in The Canon, Epicurus affirms that our “perceptions of the senses” [τὰς αἰσθήσεις] and preconceptions [προλήψεις] and our “feelings” [τὰ πάθη] are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make “perceptions of mental presentations” [τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας] to be also standards."

So, what is being communicated in this phrase is literally Epicurus’s criteria of truth known as The Canon. I personally find it interesting that this list, either written by Epicurus as an epitome or sanctioned by the Garden as a study tool does not include the prolepses but instead includes the phantastikē epibolē. Could the two, in fact, be synonymous? Are the preconceptions identical to the perceptions of the mind? I personally find it better to translate aisthesin as “perception of the senses” to contrast it with the phantasike epibole “perceptions of the mind.” Both are perceptions with one being tangible (e.g., touch, taste, smell, etc.) and one is intangible (the mind). Norman DeWitt wrote a provocative paper entitled "Epicurus, Περί Φαντασιας" where he delved in detail into the phantastikē epibolē tēs dianoias. He didn't make the synonymous claim, that's me. DeWitt translated the “phantastikē epibolē tēs dianoias” "(the incidence of a) true presentation of a single, existent object, though reduced to scale, as it registers itself upon the vision and mind of a sane, sober, and waking person." In any case, I find it intriguing in how the elements of The Canon are presented here in PD 24.

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...συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ,...

Literal: ...and “you will throw into confusion” [συνταράξεις] the remaining perceptions of the senses for a “groundless and empty belief” [ματαίῳ δόξῃ]...

This first word here, our verb - “syntaraxeis” [you will throw into confusion] - begins with συν- syn- which has the sense of “together, with…” and gives this verb the idea of throwing everything all together into confusion as well as to disturb or trouble. Consider this has a similar root to ataraxia “not disturbed or troubled.”

The λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις are the “remaining sensations, the rest of the senses” which are the others which you didn’t throw away: Remember our first line. Compare δόξῃ doxe “belief” also occurs in the word encountered earlier: δοξαζόμενον doxazomenon “to hold an opinion or belief.” A ματαίῳ δόξῃ is one that is groundless, vain, futile, empty, one with nothing to support it, more of an opinion than a true belief.

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...ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.

Literal: ...thereby you throw away [ἐκβαλεῖς] the “entire” [ἅπαν] “the standard of truth” (κριτήριον “criterion”).

And so we come to end of our first sentence! Here we encounter ἐκβαλεῖς from our first line. We’ll use “throw away” here as well. The criterion here, literally the Greek word simply transliterated, is The Canon, the standard of truth, which refers back to our list of the components of The Canon earlier.

So, let’s see what we have so far:

If you throw away a single perception of the senses AND you do not distinguish between a holding an opinion that awaits confirmation and what is present now in accordance with The Canon of truth (perception of the senses, feeling, and perception of the mind), you will throw all your other perceptions into confusion for a groundless opinion, thereby throwing away the entire Canon of truth.

If we break this up a little more, I think we can paraphrase it as:

Let’s say you don’t believe one of your senses, you cast it away from yourself. If you do this, you are throwing away the three legs of The Canon (namely, perceptions of the senses, of the mind, and the feelings of pleasure and pain) that must work together. If you don’t use them all, you won’t be able to tell the difference between an opinion that awaits confirmation (by the other senses) and what you can sense now in the present moment through The Canon. This is a groundless belief that is going to cause you trouble in correctly perceiving your remaining perceptions.

Well, that’s not simpler, but it tries to bring together similar concepts.

Let’s tackle the rest:

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εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις…

Literal: Additionally, if you will “affirm as true” [βεβαιώσεις] everything that is waiting confirmation “in the matters of opinion about thinking” [ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις]...

Note that Epicurus talked about beliefs that were awaiting confirmation in the first part of this doctrine. So, here he’s saying that “Let’s say you affirm as true everything that should be awaiting confirmation by your other legs of The Canon.” It sounds like you’re putting the cart before the horse. How can you affirm something before you have confirmation?

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...καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν,...

Literal: ...and that which does not need a witness…

Here, the contrast is made with those opinions/beliefs that are awaiting confirmation and those which do not need any witness. So, you’re affirming as true BOTH everything that is awaiting confirmation and that which doesn’t (i.e., that which is present to you now in accordance with The Canon).

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...οὐκ ἐκλείψει τὸ διεψευσμένον·

Literal: “You will not abandon” [οὐκ ἐκλείψει] "that which is altogether false" [τὸ διεψευσμένον];...

If you do all those things we just mentioned, you will not abandon “that which is altogether false.” It’s interesting that the verb here - ἐκλείψει ekleipsei - is the same word as English “eclipse” and had similar connotations in the Greek. Consider if you did abandon falsehood, you would blot out the light of falsehood for the light of truth. But, you’re still in darkness if you don’t come to your senses.

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ὥστ’ τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

Literal: ...therefore, you will “retain” [τετηρηκὼς] all “doubt” [ἀμφισβήτησιν] and all judgement [κρίσιν] of what is correct and what is not correct.

I’ve seen one online Greek text that has ἀνῃρηκὼς anerekos “abolish” instead of τετηρηκὼς teterekos “preserve, retain”. This is a CRUCIAL difference, and τετηρηκως is in the Oxford Arundel MS 531 manuscript so I’m accepting that as correct. And teterekos makes more sense when taken in context of the rest of PD 24. We preserve all doubt and judgement, we are not going to make any judgement either way and we're going to preserve our doubt.

I also think it’s interesting and important to note that the same word is used in two places at the end: ὀρθῶς orthos. This is the “orthos” in orthodox, orthogonal, orthodontist, etc. I feel it is significant because it also has the sense of “straight” and The Canon we’ve been referring to is a literal straight-edge, ruler, measuring rod. So, it would be nice to play this up in a translation, but it’s not that easy in English. You could say something like “what is and is not on the straight and narrow” but that’s pushing it.

So, the last section can be paraphrased:

If you affirm everything as true - both those opinions that await confirmation and those here and now evident to your senses - you will not abandon falsehood and retain all doubt and refrain from any judgement as to what is correct and what is not correct.

So, that “groundless belief” appears to be the unwillingness to take a stand and just accept that everything is true. You can’t make a decision! Epicurus seems to be calling us to trust in The Canon as our criteria of truth, to distinguish between what we don’t know right now - what’s awaiting confirmation - and what is evident to our senses right now in the present moment.

I hope this provides food for thought even if it doesn’t clear up the concepts put forward here in PD 24.

Quote from Cassius

Yes but I wonder if that is specific enough. Like in the monkey analogy people seem to default to a position that "anything is possible but the possibility may be infinitesimally small." Well, but that's the question, isn't it? is there really ANY possibility of certain things happening, and can't we be pretty confident in saying that some things can never happen, and shouldn't we try to be rigorous in separating the two? If we think about the monkeys that exist in reality, even given an infinite time I would not expect them by nature to be interested in hitting all the keys randomly and persistently enough to come up with a sonnet.

The "anything is possible" cliche is a dangerous one, I'm thinking.

It sounds like you're advocating the concept of Epicurean limits when talking about probabilities and possibilities. Is this echoing Epicurus's objection to geometry? Geometry can talk about ideal situations and shape but a "perfect" square doesn't really exist. We can use geometry as a tool but shouldn't confuse it for reality.

My sense is that this "monkey theory" in all its forms is an illustration of "just because something can be shown to have a mathematical probability of happening doesn't mean it has a corresponding possibility in reality." Those monkey probabilities are so infinitesimal as to be practically impossible in our cosmos. And whether you accept an infinite universe or a "practically infinite from a human perspective" universe, the chances of monkeys typing Shakespeare is not going to happen by random chance. That's born out by natural selection and evolution. Evolution is not random. Mutations are random but nature "selects" out those that provide an advantage.

Same for the monkeys. If something selects for keeping two and three "correct" letters together from Hamlet and builds in them, maybe it'll happen.

And there's little reason to think there are monkeys identical to our monkeys in an alternate cosmos.

Plus, getting all those monkeys in one place and keeping them at their typewriters for infinity is one grant project I doubt would ever be funded.

All this is to say that micro-applications of this randomness cannot be helpful in theory.

But if you want a copy of Shakespeare's works, visit your local library.