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Lucian is an interesting author including being called the first sci-fi author. Since he was writing satire, we need to interpret his works carefully. It's sometimes hard to tell when he's reflecting reality, expanding on stereotypes, turning things upside down.
It's been awhile since I read him but this was a good reminder!
Something doesn't feel right to me with that phrase "the value of truth" is "relative." I agree with Cassius that Epicurus would be comfortable saying there is no absolute capital-T Truth. No Platonic ideal of Truth. But I don't think you can really talk about the "value of truth" being relative or absolute. I'm not even sure what the "value of truth" means. There are things that are true and things that are false. And as Lucretius says, if it seems false, arm yourself against it.
However, I think I know what you're getting at in that second part. If by "honoring our truth" you mean proclaiming the truth of atoms and void and pleasure etc. loudly, publicly, and always, I think that would be a mistake. We make choices and rejections based on real situations to aim for pleasurable outcomes. Plus, check out the characteristics of the Epicurean sage in that they will make speeches if requested and other situations. Epicureans will not be the street-corner preacher handing out pamphlets and carrying a sign. We will share our Philosophy both individually and in groups of interested or receptive people, but we don't require people to listen to us. We're practical, prudent, just, and can take advantage of situations that arise to share what we know to be true, not false.
The "natural Philosophers" are those opposed to Epicurus in this instance. He actually wrote a book against them: A Summary of Arguments Against the Physicists/Natural Philosophers. The same word is used for them in both the list of Epicurus's books and in DL X.134: physikōs. In this case, these are the philosophers advocating for Fate.
I found myself thinking of the A, T, C, G letters of DNA that can be rearranged in innumerable ways during this episode.
I would first ask: Why do you feel the need to evangelize to the dying person? If the person is actually close to death - hours, days - and you care for the person, is it more important to be right or to create pleasurable memories for yourself and not create a situation that sets up conflict in your last moments with this person.
Epicurus seems to have addressed this in the Letter to Menoikos (DL X.134):
[134] It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny (Fate) which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder ; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. [135] It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.
From my reading, Epicurus seems to allow the "runner-up" position to be accepting "the legends of the gods." It's not the truth of the nature of things, but at least it doesn't afflict one with being subject to Chance and Fate.
And, as always, examine what will happen if a desire (here, the desire to evangelize to the dying) is achieved and if it is not. What is achieved by your bringing this philosophy to the dying? Are you doing it for selfish reasons (I'm right and you're wrong! I win!) or doing it to alleviate pain in a friend or loved one? If the dying one is in reality not troubled, why do you want to achieve the desire to evangelize?
I don't see this as a question of the relative value of truth. I see this as a scenario in which prudence needs to be exercised for the most pleasurable outcome overall.
I just Googled "sweet spot synomyms:" sweet spot definitely won't do lol!
LOL!!
Very very well stated Don. It seems so obvious! And yet, here we are in a corner of the internet while every academically-trained student or teacher is teaching or studying something much different than that. I suppose it would be helpful to diagnosis how we got here, but probably the first order of business is to stop the bleeding and look first to the development of a stable community of people who see things differently, and are willing to stand up for that position.
Sometimes I feel like hoisting a pirate flag and adopting some kind of "'men' without a country" imagery
i hope you still approve. I added a little more just as you were posting 
For me, it all goes back to Epicurus teaching us to "Ask this question of every desire: what will happen to me if the object of desire is achieved, and what if not?" (VS 71)
It's not about specifically going out to increase or decrease desires. Which desires are you going to try to achieve and which ones are you going to let go. If the feeling of pleasure is your guide, you're going to work to achieve those desires that will bring you a pleasurable, blessed life. If you don't examine your desires and just let your life be "one damn thing after another" you may experience pleasure or pain but you are at the mercy of Fortune and chance. Why would you want to leave your one precious existence up to chance?
It comes back to the boundary markers. We have limited time. The desires we can achieve and the pleasurable experiences we can have are finite. The kinds of desires that will lead to a pleasurable life are not infinite. All pleasure is good, all pain is bad. But that doesn't mean we set out to experience every pleasure nor shun every pain. With pleasure as our North Star, we can "limit" our desires to those that will get us through life most pleasurably. There are innumerable paths we can take through life. Pleasure gives us a goal by which to choose a path.
Good points, Cassius .
I will say that Epicurus does tell Pythokles to ἀφαίρει (aphairei) his desires if he wants to be rich.
The verb means "take away, set aside" and is used in mathematics for "subtract." Similar to "limit" but with different - and possibly significant - shades of meaning.
Okay, to understand Epicurus's limits, we have to know what words he used. You knew this was coming, right?
Below are selections where English uses the word limit. I wanted to see if Epicurus consistently used the same or different words in the original. This is NOT an exhaustive list. If you're curious about a text not listed, just ask. The primary words Epicurus seems to use are horizō and peras and their variations. See below.
Fr. 548. Happiness and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature.
Fr. 548. τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον [happiness and blessedness] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία (alupia "no pain") καὶ πραότης παθῶν (praotēs pathōn "mildness/gentleness of the pathē) καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς [psychēs "soul, mind"] τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.
ὁρίζουσα (horizousa) < fem. participle of ορίζω (horizō) = to divide or separate from, as a boundary. (Note: This is the origin of English "horizon")
So to pare down that fragment: Happiness and bliss... are produced by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a mind's disposition that sets its limits in accordance with nature.
PD 3. The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together.
PD 3. Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.
Ὅρος (horos) limit, rule, standard. A boundary or marker stone (compare horizō)
Horos and horizō are also used in PD 11 to state the limits of pains and desires, PD 15 to describe that "Nature's treasures have boundaries"
VS 25 uses horizō. Poverty is great wealth if measured by *the goals of nature* (tō tēs physeōs telei (< telos)) , and wealth is abject poverty if not limited (horizoumenos) by the goals of nature. ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὁριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.
PD 10. If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind—the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain—if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, [then] we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.
PD 10. Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ [τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν] ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς [τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων], ἔτι τε "τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν" (to peras tōn epithumiōn "the end/extremity of desires") ἐδίδασκεν (taught), οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅ περ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.
πέρας peras "end, limit, boundary, goal, that which comes to an end" Peras is sometimes opposed to archē "the beginning, origin" Note that pleasure is termed in one place by Epicurus as the archē and telos (goal, fulfillment) of the blessed life.
So now we have horizō and peras.
Peras is the word used in PD 18 in "The limit of pleasure in the mind is obtained by calculating the pleasures themselves and the contrary pains, which cause the mind the greatest alarms."
PD 19 is interesting! Check it out!
Infinite and finite time afford equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reason.
19 Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.
Peras (in plural πέρατα perata) is the word used for "measure its limits". But check out the word for infinite ἄπειρος apeiros < a + peras!! "No end"! The word literally means "it never ends".
Perata again used in PD 20: The flesh assumes the *limits* of pleasure to be infinite, and only infinite time would satisfy it. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end (telos) and *limit* of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life and has no longer any need of infinite time.
Again in PD 21: the limits of life (ta perata tou biou)
These are some of the peras synonyms given by Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English-Greek Dictionary A Vocabulary of the Attic Language:
accomplishment, bound, cessation, completion, conclusion, culmination, finality, finish, fulfilment, goal, measure, period.
It seems to imply something that has a natural boundary or that has come to some natural end or has been determined to have a boundary (had a boundary marker set).
Consider too the Greek preposition Peri "around" (e.g., perimeter).
Here's my perspective, as of this writing. Let's call it a work in progress:
The canonical faculties are Sensations, Mental Perceptions (or Prolepses), and Feelings (of Pleasure/Pain).
I want to say I read this elsewhere on the forum so bear with me:
We sense something in the real world either through our physical senses (smelling, tasting, touching, etc.) OR our mental Perceptions (thinking) THEN this elicits a reaction of pleasure or pain.
So, in light of this, I think a desire is a mental perception to which we have a pleasurable or painful reaction. But what are desires like? Or made of?
One selection where Epicurus talks about desires is:
...keep in mind that some desires are natural whereas others are groundless; that among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural; and that among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, some for physical health, and some for life itself.
Necessary desires are required for different reasons. And also...
PD 11: If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.
Here we are told we need to learn the limits of both pains and desires. I would say that pains are limited to short if severe, bearable if long; desires are limited to natural and necessary. Not that we can limit them, but that we need to learn the limits of them. But Epicurus also wrote:
VS 135. If you want to be wealthy, Pythocles, don't increase your riches but reduce your desires.
Seneca also uses this. In light of the last quote, it would seem to mean "be aware of the limits of his desires" although the original just says "take away desires." Concentrate on natural and necessary ones.
So, we've seen desires paired with pains. Now this:
VS 203. Insofar as you forget nature, you will find yourself in trouble and create for yourself endless fears and desires.
From this, we have to ask ourselves what are the similarities between fears and desires? Among pains, fears, desires? Can fears be groundless or empty like desires? Or natural? Or have limits? What allowed the comparison? Could fears be the mirror of desires? One attracts, the other repels? Could these be the mental parallel of the feelings of pain and pleasure? Fear and desire?
485. Unhappiness (kakodaimonia - the opposite of eudaimonia) is caused by fears, or by endless and empty desires; but he who is able to rein these in creates for himself a blissful understanding.
So, kakodaimonia can be caused both by fears and desires... So there is a common effect those two can have. So fear and desire, but not any desires - only endless, empty ones. And here it says one can "rein in" both fears and endless, empty desires. What does it mean to "rein" them in? Does that again refer to understanding limits or something else? It would seem to follow that eudaimonia/happiness can be caused by the opposite of fears (?) and limited (not endless) desires based on true Philosophy (not empty ones). And happiness is part of a pleasurable life.
A common thread seems to be limits. Pains are limited. Desires are limited. But fears and desires can be unlimited... But that's not a positive thing. Are some fears justified or based in true perceptions and sensations? And we know Epicurus talks about the limits of pleasure. Is Epicurean philosophy at its root understanding all natural limits? That wouldn't be a goal but a means to maximizing pleasure.
My reason for laying all this out is to see what desires are akin to in Epicurus's writings to see what similarities we can find and how they relate to the Canon, pleasure, and other parts of the philosophy.
Are we in agreement that desires are distinct from pleasures?
Yes!
I'm still wrestling with the word pleasure. This may be pedantic or semantic but, I don't think "a pleasure" is a thing. This strikes me as somewhat Platonic as if there's Pleasure out there. We can construct a sentence as " Pleasure is X." But I think pleasures have to be directly associated with an action, whether that's an external action (eating ice cream) or internal action (satiety after eating). More specifically, pleasure is only our reaction to an action.
As to desires v impulses, I'm thinking that that might be going too far down the rabbit hole to be useful. What's important regarding desires is evaluating them as to whether or not to pursue them. In order to do that we must be cognitively aware of them which is the point at which they become useful.
Agreed!
I think it's important to remember what word Epicurus used to refer to "desire" επιθυμία epithumia. From LSJ:
ἐπιθυ_μ-ία , Ion. -ιη, ἡ,A. [select] desire, yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, opp. προνοίᾳ, Th.6.13: generally, appetite, Pl.Cra.419d, etc.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. Id.Phd.82c; esp. sexual desire, lust, Democr.234 (pl.), Pl.Phdr.232b, etc.; αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ. X.Lac.2.14.
2. [select] . c. gen., longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν, Th.2.52, 7.84, etc.; “τοῦ πλέονος” Democr. 224; “τῆς τιμωρίας” Antipho 2.1.7; “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας” And.2.10; “τῆς παρθενίας” Pl.Cra.406b; “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν” Id.Criti.113d; ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι” Id.Prt.318a, Tht.143e; “γεγονέναι” Id.Lg.841c; εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι” Id.Ti.19b; “ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί” X.Cyr.1.1.5; ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards . ., Th.4.81.
II. [select] . = ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν Thalesap.Stob.3.1.172, cf. Lync. ap. Ath.7.295a; ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, Secund.Sent.8; πενήτων ἐ., of sleep, prob. in ib.13.
Hmm...
I *think* there has to be a rational aspect in this. The use of the words desire, craving, urge, etc. strike me as cognitive experiences. That's why Epicurus can say desires are the result of groundless beliefs or not.
One has a belief - a thought in your mind - that is either based on truth or not, based on whether we accept the truth of our sensations and mental perceptions or not.
That belief then leads to a desire. "I believe i need that." "I want that." I think this can even be subconscious - you just feel like you need something. Or you're hungry. That's a more immediate desire based on your sensation of an empty stomach.
Epicureans then weigh what happens if the consequence of that desire, urge, impulse, is achieved or it is not. In the case of hunger, you'll want to satisfy that desire... But how? And are you actually hungry (paying attention to Sensations) or are you emotionally or stress eating. I can be guilty of that! Not applying my Epicurean practices.
Those considered consequences elicit a pleasurable or painful reaction or feeling.
We then make a choice to pursue that desire or to flee from it based on that feeling.
Non-Epicureans don't weigh consequences necessarily. If they see a pleasurable experience arising from that desire, they follow it. No matter if it leads to pain down the road or not.
And just so you know, I'm basically going full stream of consciousness here. You all are just along for the ride 🙂
PS I got the Alice reference 
I think I agree 🙂
I'm trying to wrap my brain around your last statement:
It's not the desire itself that's a pleasure or pain, it's your reactions to it and to the consequences of it.
I definitely agree that desires are neither good nor bad, but I'm trying to decide if that means that I don't think they're pleasurable or painful.
We have a desire, what you're calling an impulse. What comprises a desire/impulse? It has to be a cognitive event or an act of reason. Right? We have to think about the desire. But we have a reaction to that rational act, a pre-rational reaction that is pleasurable or painful through our canonical faculty of the pathē/feelings. So, if I read you correctly: the thought or desire itself - the cognitive rational impulse brought into being by our material brain's function - cannot itself be a pleasure. But that impulse provokes a reaction in our reflexive pre-rational faculty.
So then...Is there such a thing as "a pleasure" or is it always "an experience of pleasure" or "a pleasant experience." Same for pain. Does pain exist as an entity or can it only be a painful experience. Pain cannot exit y outside of experience. Or can it. Is pain a thing? Is pleasure a thing? It can these two only be experienced?
I have a feeling that I'm meeting you by the rabbit hole in left field
I guess you could call that a pleasure of anticipation but I would just call it a desire to remove pain: an avoidance of pain.
Ah! But isn't the "desire to remove pain" a pleasure? You are in pain and have a pleasant desire to alleviate that pain. The desire and anticipation of relief is pleasurable. I know that's not the usual way to think about it! But I'm wondering - viewing it through an Epicurean lens - if that desire can't be considered a pleasure since Epicurus says "You have to tell me if your reaction to that desire itself is pleasure or pain. Why are you pursuing it? Because the consequence of that desire leads to more pleasure than pain."
Hmmm...
I don't think so. Let me talk through the headache scenario to see where I end up:
Headache - pain
Desire to remove that pain - pleasure in anticipating the removal; kinetic pleasure?
Desire to locate and take medication - same pleasure continues
Taking medication - kinetic pleasure similar to eating to alleviate hunger.
Removal of pain - stable pleasure
There is no neutral state according to Epicurus. We must be experiencing or feeling either pleasure or pain.
I don't think I agree with that, but let me talk this out.
Say I have a headache. An aspirin might remove the pain, in which case you could say that the resulting pleasure is a byproduct. Or a pleasant nap in the shade might remove the pain, where you could consider pleasure to be the active principle.
Is the decision to take the aspirin pleasurable? Does pleasure precede the removal of the pain in this way? Then when the headache is gone, is that a stable pleasure?
Yes, the nap is a pleasurable activity. Does that fall then into the kinetic pleasures.
Epicurus did seem to differentiate among kinds of pleasures: joy, merriment, ataraxia, aponia, the pleasures from eating bread and water if you're hungry, etc. BUT they are all pleasure, none better than others. And we decide on pleasures to pursue by their consequences.
Or say I'm depressed. I could take a pill, which might remove the pain, with pleasure as a byproduct. Or I could actively pursue activities meaningful to me, pleasure being the active principle.
Same here. Is the decision to take the pill pleasurable? According to Epicurus, it has to be pleasure or pain. Every action has to elicit a reaction either painful or pleasurable. He didn't leave any middle ground.
Thoughts?
Hello, JCRAGO. Well, Cassius certainly has explained his position in detail. And I want to say I'm glad you decided to post to the forum to give us all the opportunity to explore differing interpretations of Epicurus's philosophy. I apologize for taking so long to post something here.
You said: I am positively declaring that pleasure is the end of life and that the greatest pleasure is painlessness.
I can't see any Epicurean arguing with your first clause there!
As to the second clause, by painlessness, it appears you're referring to aponia (freedom from pain and exertion) paired with ataraxia (tranquility) as an example of a "static/stable pleasure" and contrasted with joy (khara) and merriment (euphrosyne) as "pleasures of movement." To me, Epicurus is not setting up a hierarchy here but merely describing different pleasures. This seems to be the only place he talks about aponia itself.
Elsewhere, Epicurus is quoted as saying he can't conceive of pleasure (the good) "without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms." (Fragment 67)
In light of that, I'm genuinely curious why you come to the conclusion that "the greatest pleasure is painlessness" or aponia? Why not ataraxia? Why not joy or merriment? Most people I've seen online gravitate to highlighting ataraxia, so your approach at least seems novel.
In your blog post, you mention "Sherman introduces a novel twofold distinction between kinetic pleasures: there is “specific” kinetic pleasure which makes us feel better by removing a specific pain and there is “non-specific” kinetic pleasure which makes us feel better by distracting us from a specific pain." I see no justification for this in the extant writings of Epicurus.
Removal of pain is discussed in Principal Doctrine 3, but that doesn't seem to me to support aponia as the greatest pleasure: "The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the entirety of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together."
The first clause does say that the "limit of the magnitude of pleasure is the entirety of the removal of that which causes pain." It doesn't say the state of painlessness itself but the removal of that which causes pain. And then Epicurus states that pleasure is what removes pain. When pleasure is present, pain and that which causes it are not. So, pleasure - the greatest good, the foundation and fulfillment of a blessed life - should be what we seek. Pleasure removes pain, so I don't think you can say painlessness (what you're calling "the greatest pleasure") removes pain. That seems a bit of a tautology.
I went looking for other translations that talked about "highest pleasure" and found the following:
DL X.130: "bread and water give the highest pleasure when someone in need partakes of them." Eating bread and drinking water are kinetic pleasures and merely indicative of the adage "Hunger is the best spice."
There's also Fragment 68 (quoted in Plutarch's "... Pleasant Life Impossible"): "To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy (khara, one of the kinetic pleasures) is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it." That fragment seems to elevate one of the kinetic pleasures (khara) to the greatest pleasure and also defines the joy as "a well-balanced, stable condition of the body" not aponia.
I'm reluctant to use Cicero as a source (others on this forum will most likely disagree) unless he's maintaining that he's directly quoting Epicurus's writings. Cicero's commentary, even in the mouth of Torquatus, is most likely skewed to his own motives.
I'm not going to get into whether you're being positive or negative by focusing on painlessness. I simply don't think you can single out one pleasure as the greatest when, to my understanding, Epicurus didn't.
Thanks, Charles, for noting:
"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them;
I find it interesting that the word συνεχώς doesn't occur in this excerpt from the Letter to Idomeneus but rather a word that means that the pain "didn't leave" so I think a better translation here would have been "unrelenting" since I've seen that word used with pain in English. True, "unrelenting" is "continual" pain (or is it "continuous") but shades of meaning matter.
I realize I may get annoying going on about this, but this continues to be over of my problems with translations. There are faux connections that can be made by noting English words when the original text doesn't necessarily reflect this.
I'm not in any way saying anything negative about Charles noting this! I don't want to be misunderstood here! I think this was a good catch on his part and a valuable excerpt to investigate! It's valuable to compare and contrast translations and see where they lead!
