Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

. If you equate a "concept" with a criterion of truth then you lock yourself forever into a particular opinion which would never again be changeable through that faculty, and that's not the way we view the five senses or the feelings of pain and pleasure, which are continuously reporting whatever they receive regardless of preconceived notions.

This is why I'm so excited about the work of Dr Lisa Feldman Barrett. Her explanation of infants and children forming concepts of concrete and abstract "things" strikes me as that "repeated exposure" idea of prolepses. But those concepts are not immutable. I go back to Philodemus's On Anger where he writes about the ability to control our anger by the exercise of "putting-before-the-eyes" of the consequences of our anger before we're actually angry. This fits nicely with Barrett in that this exercise would change our concept (I'm saying prolepsis) of the emotion of anger so that the next time we construct that emotion from sense data and our innate concept/prolepsis of that emotion, our mind has a different prediction and hence a different - hopefully more appropriate - outcome: ex., Don't lose your mind and yell and swear at the person in traffic (they may be rushing to the hospital).

I've found a lot of echoes of Epicurus in Barrett's work from what I've been reading. It's made me more open to the "repeated exposure" idea of formation of the prolepses.

Quote from JJElbert

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And that's correct (in a vacuum), right? How or why would he intuit that? I think I need to revisit that Letter.

I don't have a citation to hand, but see Lucretius on this point. I think he says that in the absence of air-resistance a ball of wool and a ball of lead will fall at the same speed.

This?

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Which but for voids for bodies to go through 'Tis clear could happen in nowise at all. Again, why see we among objects some Of heavier weight, but of no bulkier size? Indeed, if in a ball of wool there be As much of body as in lump of lead, The two should weigh alike, since body tends To load things downward, while the void abides, By contrary nature, the imponderable. Therefore, an object just as large but lighter Declares infallibly its more of void; Even as the heavier more of matter shows, And how much less of vacant room inside. That which we're seeking with sagacious quest Exists, infallibly, commixed with things- The void, the invisible inane.

Thanks for those insights, Martin ! In light of what you said, I went back to Diogenes to see what the Letter to Herodotus said:

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60] "Further, we must not assert `up' or `down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space --or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity--appear to us to be at the same time `up' and `down' with reference to the same point ; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum. [61] "When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms' own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

It seems a bit more nuanced than I remembered. He seems to say that atoms can move any direction but their downward motion is due to their "weight" which, in a manner of speaking, is correct! The fact that he also says that "Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones," took me by surprise. I didn't remember that. And that's correct (in a vacuum), right? How or why would he intuit that? I think I need to revisit that Letter.

In looking through Obbink’s work, I found mention of some important words in the original Greek text and thought they might shed some light on some of the extant writings of Epicurus where we have questions. Then again maybe not. So, here it goes. For this entry, we’re looking at prolepsis which is mentioned only twice in On Piety.

Column 45, Line 1300
Obbink (starting around line 1280, emphasis added and notes added as parenthetical statements for clarity):
And they (Epicurus and the kathegomenes) are continually saying everywhere (in their writings), lest I go on too long by adding treatises by them (i.e., to put it briefly), that of all existing things it (the divine) is the best and most holy, most worthy of emulation, having dominion over all good things, unburdened by affairs, and exalted and great-minded and great-spirited and ritually pure and purest and propitious. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold the most pious views about the gods, and they charge the rest with holding the opposite views, in as much as they (other, non-Epicurean philosophers) teach contrary to the naturally acquired generic conception (prolepsis), and [verb missing] the purest views as regards the ineffable pre-eminence of the strength and perfection of the divine… [gap - 1 col c.90 words]

Unfortunately, Obbink’s note to column 45 doesn’t help much. Here is an excerpt:
“Epic. Ad Moec. states that the assertions of the many about the gods are not derived from [prolepseis]. … prolepsis, a technical term for which Epicurus was notorious, reflects a process of reasoning that forms a major part of Epicurus’ epistemological programme. The source tradition is unambiguous that he thought it was at least possible to have a prolepsis of god or divine nature, but otherwise we do not hear much about it in this treatise, nor does it seem to have played a major role in Philod. De dis … When Philodemus says here that the others teach about the gods in a way that is contrary to the prolepsis of them, the concept is probably deemed to be unproblematic and to be fully sketched out by passages such as KD 1, Ad. Menoec. 123, and the definitions of the pious and impious man above, 1130-65. (i.e., lines 1130-65 in On Piety)

For reference, lines 1130-65 discuss the pious person preserving the immortality and “consummate blessedness of God [i.e., the god, the divine nature] together with all things included by us” and the impious man who “banishes” these qualities from the divine. The pious person “we honour for his piety, whereas the other we despise as manifestly depraved.”

Column 66A, Line 1887
Obbink:
For all (perhaps “infinity”?) [several words missing] is thought of, just as time is defined (or divided or distinguished), as being a naturally formed generic conception (prolepsis); and just as also in book 32 (of Epicurus’s On Nature), he says that because the existence of the gods is apprehended with clarity (i.e., vivid knowledge of the gods), although as a unified entity among underlying existents, and their (gods’) nature is less able to be perceived by thought than other existents, and generally towards [~25 words missing] who towards [one word missing] but of all those [word missing] self-completing [one word missing] all.

I found it interesting that time here is included in the examples of “naturally formed generic conceptions” or prolepses. I thought I remembered that “time does not exist” according to the podcast discussions of DRN Book 1: We're wont, and rightly, to call accidents. | Even time exists not of itself; but sense Reads out of things what happened long ago, | What presses now, and what shall follow after: |No man, we must admit, feels time itself, | Disjoined from motion and repose of things.

So, is the author (Philodemus or Phaedrus) here saying that “time” is also a prolepsis, a preconception that we learn? That would be an interesting development. If prolepses are formed by repeated exposures to a concept or thing, I suppose a concept/prolepsis of time could be formed. Here’s Obbink’s take...

Obbink has this in the notes to column 66A:
“1885-6 καθαπ[ερ ορι]ζεται χρο[νος : here the fact that the gods exist in the first instance as conceptualized by humans is illustrated by comparison to the ontological status of time, which according to Epicurus is not even a per se entity (but rather an accident or attribute of other entities), yet is not in consequence any less real. Rather, it is in an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects. For the status of time as an accidental property of things see Epic. Ad Herod. 68-73; Demetrius of Laconia ap. Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 10.219-27, where time is styled an ‘accident of accidents’; Lucr. I. 459-63.

“1887 προληψιν : formation of the prolepsis of the gods (and the implied lack of it among opponents) is also discussed adobe, 1300, and it (or something very like it) is said to have obtained among the ‘first humans’ in cultural history above at 224-31. On the prolepsis of the gods see further Epic. Ad Herod. 76-7, Ad Menoec. 123-4; Luce. 5.1161-1225, 6.68-79; Cic. De nat. Deor. 1. 43-9.”

I hadn't heard of that one! I've heard of CGPGrey from other sources but never dug into their work. This is a good opportunity. Thanks for the recommendation [runs off to podcast app to search and subscribe...]

That's my take. Epicurus's whole "down" thing never made much sense to me. Once you have swerving and collisions, you've messed up any original parallel trajectories. Okay, an atom moves in a straight line unless acted on (not sure if that's accurate, but I'm not too concerned about that).

In any case, I found the Vsauce video thought-provoking and enjoyable. It's a fun YouTube channel, and we got to see Michael do a program once with Adam Savage of Mythbusters. A fun night of popular science stuff!

Admin Note: On 12/12/24 the name of this thread was expanded so that it can be used to extend conversation on this topic. The original title was simply "Atoms Fall 'Down.'" The title now refers to other aspects of movement at well so we can include reference to the movement of atoms also in the context of bodies and images.

I'm not sure how applicable this might be, but just watched a Vsauce video on the meaning of "Down". Since Epicurus maintained that atoms fall "down" unless they "swerve" I found Michael's explanation of"down" interesting. I never put this much thought into it... Which makes the Vsauce channel so enjoyable!

Here you go:

Taking a quick trip through some columns in the book tonight and wanted to share one line from column 47, ll.1340-1350:

(Paraphrase) To be sure, people in general honor or believe in something divine like a god who is benevolent, kindly, propitious, etc.; whereas we Epicureans all regard our doctrines as the true cause of our own tranquility (αταραξιας ataraxia)."

I liked the sound of this, but there's actually a lot going on here in the original Greek. I'll post a little more tomorrow.

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From column 62A,

"And in his [Epicurus's] Symposium concerning the rites (he says) 'Let us celebrate the festivals' (τας εορτας [συναγω]μεν tas heortas synagomen) and 'Make auspicious sacrifices to a god' (θεώ[ι καλλι]θυτειν ειλ[.... ...] theōi kallithytein)"

προσευχεσθαι γαρ εν τωι Περί [Βιων] οικείον είναι [ημεί]ν φησίν.

I promised something on prayer yesterday, so to fulfill my self-imposed obligation , here's what Epicurus said about prayer according to column 26 of On Piety. The original is above and is mostly intact in the papyrus.

For he says in the On Ways of Life, προσευχεσθαι is οικείον for us.

προσευχεσθαι [proseukhesthai] means "prayer", specifically to offer prayers or vows; offer prayers or worship. The word can be broken down into pros- "toward" + eukhesthai "to pray"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…ry=proseu/xomai

This is, in fact, the word used to mean "pray" in the New Testament as well as previously in classical Greek. I'm looking forward to reading more about the manner of this praying.

And Epicurus says prayer is οικείον [oikeion] meaning "fitting, suitable, proper."

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=oi)kei=os (see definition IV)

So it would seem worship of the gods held some kind of benefit for Epicurus even if that benefit did not come from the gods themselves.

I'll dig into columns 26+ in the next few days and keep all posted. I'm intrigued.

1:31:00 ~ 1:34:00ish in that episode sounds to me even more like the creation of prolepses in infants and small children! Dr Barrett even talks both about abstract concepts like emotions and concrete concepts. I'd say like justice and Socrates to use Epicurean examples.

Quote from Cassius

I will download and listen. Don are you talking about episode 129?? https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6L…DM2MTA3Mw?ep=14

Yes. 129.I

Listening to the podcast in entry above RE: TED talk: Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett

on way to work today.

Around 1:19:00, she talks about the formation of concepts (a scientific term, not colloquially), and it struck me that her explanation could be describing prolepses.

Interested to hear if anyone has a similar reaction.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

. And I can't make heads or tails of this first section on the arguments for the existence of the gods.

Don do you have a sense of how much of the confusion is due to the material itself being difficult vs how much is due to it being fragmentary?

A little of both. The papyrus is in bad shape in a lot of places; however, there's enough continuous text to confidently reconstruct a substantial portion of the author's work.

One issue is that there's a lot of technical, philosophical jargon in the original text. With the fragmentary nature of the papyrus, there's a lack of context for these terms. If we had the whole papyrus and a larger body of Epicurean texts there wouldn't be any question what is meant by similarities, "unitary entities," etc. As it is, it's like reading a textbook through Swiss cheese. Or trying to read a book with a strobe light for a desk lamp. Consider something like...

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The unanimous Declar[----]n ... thirteen ... ... America, When in the Course........ events, it becomes necessary for........... dissolve ....... bands................ with another, and to assume a[ ]g the ..... of the earth, the separate and equal .,................. Laws of Nature and of Nature's God......... a decent respect to the opinions of m[ ]kind requires................. declare the causes ...... impel them to the s......... W[ ] hold these truths to be self-evi[ ]t, that................ equal, that they are endowed.............. Creator with certain unalien[. ] Rights........... Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Hap[ ]ess.

Okay, so I literally have Obbink's work of On Piety right in front of me, reading through text and commentary up through Column 26 tonight... And I can't make heads or tails of this first section on the arguments for the existence of the gods. I'm getting the impression that even Obbink doesn't fully understand but uses literal translations and other means to obfuscate that fact.

I'm being a little hyperbolic, but not much.

As I understand the text, the primary goal here is not to lay out a systematic argument but to state specific examples from the authoritative texts of Epicurus (On Holiness, On Nature, On Lifecourses), Metrodorus (On Change, On Gods), Hermarchus (Against Empedocles), and Polyaenus to refute those who would accuse the Epicureans of atheism or impiety.

At some points, the gods (per the Epicureans) are material beings it seems.

But in others, they are described as being made up of similar or identical atoms making them "unitary beings" not subject to being corruptible. In other spots, they are made up of images (eidola) and the analogy given by Obbink is that of a waterfall (the constant flowing) or the flickering images of a motion picture that provide us the mental picture or idea of movement or a static image. The gods are compounds of this sort... Which sounds to me like Sedley's idealist view.

In some ways, this section strikes me as the kind of argument about "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin." And I find nothing that dissuades me so far to see the gods as helpful exemplars of the goal of the Epicurean path. I'm still exploring. This section runs from column 1 to 25/26 so I've made it through once. I'm more interested in the next section, cols26-36, that talk about the Epicureans participation in rituals and rites.

I did find some good lines though:

"Therefore I think it is especially necessary to despise those who transgress or mock other observance as they do the traditional rites." ll. 720-730., col. 25-26

"Metrodorus reproaches even Socrates himself for saying, if indeed he did this, to Plato's Euthyphro: 'what is holy?' (τι οσιον εστι;)" ll.700-710, col. 25

"And if they have conducted themselves in a blameworthy fashion, with the result that they also aroused suspicion [ ], let the accusers formally charge those who have conducted themselves in this way." ll.680-690, col. 24.

"It is time to describe all men as impious, inasmuch as no one had been prolific in finding convincing demonstrations for the existence of gods; nevertheless all men, with the exception of some madmen, worship them, as do we..." ll. 650-60, col. 23

"Likewise Hermarchus in the final book of his Against Empedocles also cites this passage, adding: 'Concerning metaphor he (Empedocles) made use in human fashion of the connection with the divine entity for which worship and verbal attendance in cult take place'; and in Epicurus's case (or writings) this is shown by his eagerness for sharing in the mysteries at Athens..." ll.540-70, cols. 19-20

I'm also sharing a screenshot of column 26 since that is the start of the ritual participation section. I find the prayer quote interesting. I'm going to track down the Greek word for that... Tomorrow.

In this one she's talking about being aware of your mood or 'affect' which is basically just pleasure/pain//calm/aroused and using that to make choices (and, I might add, rejections)

https://www.tedxcambridge.com/talk/cultivati…-power-of-mood/

Just to be clear, I'm not saying Dr. Barrett is Epicurean. And I'm not saying Epicurus was prescient and knew this research. But I am saying I find it surprising that Epicurus seemed to intuit this line of inquiry, especially in the importance of understanding your pleasure and pain reactions or as Dr Barrett calls it, your affect.

That's sort of my take as well. Honestly, I'm just learning myself, having literally just discovered her work when I couldn't get back to sleep last night

I was listening to a podcast today with her that struck me as Epicurean as well.

https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cHM6…sode=NDM2MTA3Mw

Episode #129 at about timestamp 31:36

She's talking there about the importance of sense data etc.

Quote from Godfrey

I might be missing something but I don't see a link to the Ted talk. Is this it? talk? https://www.ted.com/talks/lisa_fel…hem?language=en

Also there's this really short youtube video:

I haven't watched these yet but the subject sounds fascinating.

LOL. A link would be helpful wouldn't it.

https://www.ted.com/talks/lisa_fel…es_them/up-next

I also recommend taking a look at the 5min animated summary of Dr. Barrett's research here https://lisafeldmanbarrett.com/multimedia/ I could see parallels between what she calls "affect" and the pathē.

I just started reading Dr. Barrett's book How Emotions Are Made (2017) and find it fascinating. I just finished the first chapter, so, in looking for something to listen to on the treadmill this morning, found her TED talk.

I see implications and applications to Epicurean philosophy (I think). She talks about the basic experiences all humans have from birth like pleasure and displeasure (I'm calling that pain). Overlaid on these basic sensations are the emotions our brains build from contextual clues and predictions from past experience.

This seems to me to be akin to the pathē being foundational to how we should react to any given situation and how we should decide our choices and rejections.

Her primary thesis, backed up by extensive research, is that our emotions are NOT hardwired. Those basic experiences are (pleasure, displeasure) but not what we call emotions (anger, fear, etc.) People experience the same physical reactions as different emotions in different contexts. This also speaks to me in light of my unease over talking about "feelings" as opposed to "reactions" of pleasure and pain.

I'll be interested to read what anyone thinks if they watch this or read about her research.

Quote from Cassius

Of course I would consider that to be a partial paraphrase of doctrines one through four, much more accurately stated than the tetrapharmakon version, while leaving out the reference to the gods.

Oh, the gods are there and it even references not fearing them:

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he has a true conception, untainted by fear, of the Divine nature