Posts by Don

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…y=ei)/dwlon&i=1

Here's the Perseus entry (with links to LSJ and other dictionaries) for the original Greek term for Epicurus's "images".

I find it interesting that the term came to be used for "idols" of gods in the New Testament. They sound the same-ish: idol/eidōlon, but also that idols are "images" of the gods or reflections of them.

Matt , thank you for posting that! I was unaware of the terms apophatic and cataphatic. You raise some very interesting points and important personal anecdotes.

Obbink's notes on Matro

The following are excerpts and notes from columns 27-36 of Obbink's Philodemus On Piety which outline the participation of Epicurus himself and the early Epicureans in religious festivals and other rites and practices. Obbink also shared more detailed notes in his book, so I may try and share some of those pages in later posts. For now, the material below has proved quite interesting...

Quoted in col. 27, On Piety: Epicurus, On Gods (Περί θεών): as being both the greatest thing and that which excels in sovereignty possesses everything; for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs (καθαράς και 'αγιους δόξας) about the divine (του θείου) and had understood that this nature [or 'this entity'] is great and august (και μεγάλην τε και σεμνην). And it is particularly at festivals (εορτή) that he, progressing to an understanding of it [ i.e. divine nature], through having its name the whole time on his lips, embraces it with conviction more seriously..."

Notes

σεμνός (< σεμνην)

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=semno/s

revered, august, holy

Col. 28/9: Epicurus wrote to Phyrson during the archonship of Aristonymus (289/8 BCE) about Physon's countryman from Colophon, Theodotus, Epicurus says that he (Epicurus) shared in all the festivals... Epicurus celebrated the festival of the Choes and the urban mysteries and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him (prob. Theodotus) to celebrate this feast of the Twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously ('ολως) and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them.

Notes

For festivals, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthesteria

The Choes were part of this festival dedicated to Dionysus

The "urban mysteries" refer to the Attic Dionysia, either the Lenaea (in the month of Gamelion, Epicurus's birth month) or Lesser Mysteries during 20-6 Anthesteria, both in honor of Dionysus.

I find it interesting that the festivals mentioned were dedicated to Dionysus. It could just be coincidence that those are mentioned; or Athens had a lot of Dionysian festivals; or Epicurus had an affinity for Dionysian festivals or the god. No way to tell from what I've read so far.

Col. 29: Epicurus advised them to retain asservations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeus himself (maintain the practice of swearing by Zeus by name νή Δία!)... Not merely "it must be so!"

Notes

So, Epicureans, feel free to pepper your writing and conversation with νή Δία! "By Zeus!"

Col. 30: during the archonship of Charinus (291/0 BCE) and that of Diotimus (285/4 BCE), Epicurus wrote letters warning against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table.

Notes

Much of these lines is reconstructed. Extant:

δε Χάρι...

Διοτίμ....

την κα[θ' ιεράς τρα-

πεζης [συνθήκην μη

παραβαί[νειν· καί

Col.31: Epicurus, in a letter to Polyaenus, writes: "(It is necessary for us) to conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard (kriterion). Let us sacrifice to that gods devoutly and fittingly on that proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions on matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems. And concerning obeisance (προσκυνήσεις) in [Epicurus's] On Lifecourses [Περί βίων]"

Notes

- devoutly and fittingly 'οσιως και καλως

- "in accordance with the laws (νόμους)" can also be translated as in accordance to custom" http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=no%2Fmos2

- obeisance (προσκυνήσεις) refers to "the custom of kneeling, prostration, or throwing kisses before statues of them gods or as marks of honor to important humans." Obbink recounts in the notes the story of Colotes embracing Epicurus's knees during a teaching session when Colotes was overcome with reverence toward his teacher.

Col. 32: Philodemus writes "statues of the gods Epicurus says that he reveres... ... he says that he employs observance in every natural conception of god taking up [one word missing] divinely [one word] to speak auspiciously."

Notes

- reveres = σέβομαι "to feel awe or fear before God, especially when about to do something disgraceful; to feel shame, religious awe"

- observance

- "natural conception of god" (της του δαιμονος επινοιας) Note we're using daimonos instead of theos here. Not sure why.

Col.33: Epicurus in a letter to Herodotus: "Even if there should be war, it would not be terrible, if the gods are propitious.

In a letter to Polyaenus: [Epicurus says he] has "lived and would continue to live a pure life with Matro himself, if the gods are propitious (same word as above)

Epicurus's brother and advanced student, Neocles, is quoted as saying: "it's is necessary to distribute piously assistance from our money for the gods" in writing to Phyrson (Phyrson decould be "a man second to none in political affairs.").

Notes

propitious (ἵλεων < ἵλαος propitious, gracious, merciful; kind, mild, gentle)

Matro: "i.e., Epicurus said that, if the gods were propitious, he would continue to live a pure life, Matro and all" Obbink has an extensive note on Matro. He was a παιδαγωγός paidagogos a slave-chaperone for students.

Neocles is literally said to have "achieved miraculous or marvelous (δαιμόνιον) advancement in his (Epicurus's) teachings") δαιμόνιον is the divine power, Deity, or in-dwelling spirit that also gives us the word eudaimonia and kakodaimonia. See also above in Column 32.

Columns 34 and 35 are very fragmentary, and I've commented on col. 36 previously.

Quote from Elayne

Whenever people start talking about piety, I feel a strong desire to goose them in the ribs. I feel like they are missing the point somehow. Metaphorically, they need a dose of a trickster god. Reality has too much of a ... playful feeling, maybe... for me to adopt piety as a goal. Imo there is enough humorousness in Epicurus' own words that I think he completely got that. Philodemus... I'm not so sure.

I generally agree with what you've posted, Elayne . I did want to say again (ad nauseum, mea culpa) that I think "piety" is SUCH a loaded word to use for ευσέβειας (eusebeia), the word the author (let's say Philodemus) of On Piety (let's call it ) uses in the text. Eusebeias is the "proper observation of tradition in relation to the gods." And Philodemus's text is an apologia of Epicurus's and the founders' eusebeias to counter those who would accuse them of acting otherwise. This was deadly business back then, so Philodemus is deadly serious.

I've read excerpts from some of Philodemus's other works (especially in Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus) and see echoes of Epicurus's style there. Likewise, some of Epicurus's quotes on On Piety sound like he took his eusebeias seriously, too, so context is important in these things, too.

Matt I think I see where you're coming from, but I had to react to your quote here:

Quote from Matt

In my opinion, a person accepting Epicurus and his theology is someone who is no longer seeking mysticism and is entirely comfortable with not really discussing the gods in any meaningful way.

I would probably agree with the first part. We aren't asked to become one with the Divine as in some forms of mysticism, but Epicurus and other texts do call us to emulate or even "imitate" (e.g., in On Piety) the gods. I'm still not sure what to do with that, although it seems I should continue to understand its significance. Which brings me to your second point.

The "not really discussing the gods in any meaningful way" point though strikes me as missing an opportunity in Epicurus's thought. The gods/divinity/theos was obviously a paramount concern of Epicurus. It's in the first Principal Truth. It's right at the start of the Letter to Menoikeus. Epicurus, the founders, Philodemus (or possibly Phaedrus) who wrote On Piety, etc., all wrote entire treatises on the right relation to and conception of the gods. The gods or divinity or "that which is blessed and imperishable" were obviously of grave concern to the classical Epicureans, and I maintain it behooves us to understand why. As modern people with a secular, scientific mindset, many of us (myself included) often disregard religious "superstition" or "mysticism", and Lucretius certainly lambasted religio as a source of evil. But, if we "sweep" the gods under the rug within Epicureanism, we run the risk of becoming cafeteria Epicureans, picking and choosing the tasty morsels only without understanding the work that went into the meal. Okay, I admit that I belabored that analogy to the breaking point And some may say "I'm just choosing and avoiding." But I think we run the risk of the modern Stoics when they sweep the quasi-religious Logos under the rug as almost an embarrassment. When someone brings it up, they obfuscate and rationalize and re-interpret the Logos away. I am coming to believe that Epicurus and the founders had a much more nuanced, complex, and sophisticated notion of the "divine" than the Stoics or other contemporaries had. A notion that wouldn't necessarily have to be shut up in a drawer or swept under the rug. That's "coming to believe" btw; I'm not there yet.

All that being said, I wasn't around when you were active before, and I welcome your perspective and participation! It's a pleasure to virtually meet you

Quote from Susan Hill

I’m afraid I have to essentially agree with Matt at this point. I have not found anything further that makes Epicurus’ theology more robust, integral, or informative to human life. He does not seem to have developed much by way of a praxis, so any further development would require comparison with other, possibly complementary theologies, or innovation. Epicureanism is missing the kind of in-depth philosophy of mind and consciousness that eastern schools have, so I do see anything like transcendence, moksha, or enlightenment being part of this package. I really think a mystic must look elsewhere..

Hi, @Susan Hill . It's good to see your posting. I would encourage you to take a look at some of the posts I've been making on Obbink's Philodemus On Piety if you're interested. There's more there than I expected. But I do hear what you're saying when you write "anything further that makes Epicurus’ theology more robust, integral, or informative to human life." A huge problem is that we have SO many texts missing. If we had all 30+ volumes of On Nature and Philodemus's library and... But *if*. And we don't.

I also concur with your desire for praxis. I believe we can infer some things. We know Epicurus encouraged memorization. And there are ways to memorize texts by study, recitation, copying/writing. I think all these would be acceptable Epicurean praxis. There's also keeping a Gratitude journal given the importance of gratitude in Epicureanism. I also don't see a contradiction in some mindfulness practices and Epicureanism. I think getting a better handle on your mind would increase one's ability to discern the proper path to pleasure and make better choices and rejections. It should also allow one to enjoy pleasure in the moment: carpe diem! The places in On Piety that talk about forming correct views/notions/convictions of the gods may have some praxis-related options whether we decide they physically exist or not.

Quote

I do [not] see anything like transcendence, moksha, or enlightenment being part of this package.

I'm assuming you left out a "not" in there, and I would agree. But I would say the reason there is no "transcendence, moksha, or enlightenment" is because there's nothing to transcend, nothing to be enlightened of. If anything, we need to unlearn our acculturation, see the physical cosmos as that which only exists, and make our choices and rejections wisely in the full recognition that we only have one life.

One of my favorite sayings is (to paraphrase): "Flee from all indoctrination, and set sail on your own little boat."

I also had mystic tendencies for a time, investigating Christian mysticism (i.e., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cloud_of_Unknowing , etc.), Buddhism (especially Zen and Tibetan varieties), and others. It all came down to the theology that I couldn't believe. Rebirth and karma seemed viable for a time to me, but I became disenchanted. That's also one of the things that turned me off from Stoicism and how I eventually discovered Epicurus. I'm not saying I'm 100% sold on the Epicurean Garden path, but I've found it fruitful both from a philosophy of life perspective and as an academic hobby.

I hope you continue to engage in the discussion whether or not you decide to think of yourself as an "Epicurean." I think you have an interesting and valuable perspective.

Came across this cartoon online the other day and it made me chuckle.

To get a little better insight into Obbink's translation, I looked in my copy of Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus to see where it might be quoted. Surprisingly, I found something helpful both in itself and in making me dive back into specific servings of On Piety one being col 25.

First, Obbink references two other works in regards to column 25: P. Oxy. II 215 col 1,4-24. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papyrus_O…215?wprov=sfla1

[The first part talks about those people who sacrifice only because they fear the gods. The author thinks "in this there is still no firm basis for piety." Then continues.] But you, sir, consider it a thing of the greatest blessedness to discern properly that which we can conceive as the one best thing among existing things. Marvel at this notion and revere it in freedom from fear."

https://archive.org/details/oxyrhy…age/30/mode/2up

That sounds and awful lot like Sedley's idealist view of the Epicurean gods. Whether they exist or not seems to miss the point. "Marvel at the notion" this papyrus says.

There's also Philodemus's own De mus. col. 4,6 (fr. 386 Usener) Philodemus, On Music, Vol. Herc. 1, I c.4,6: (Obbink) "Let it suffice to say now that the divine needs no mark of honour, but that it is natural to honour it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering with each individual usage (to each of the gods in turn) theit traditional sacrifices."

Attalus's site gives this translation:

"Now, these very important things may still be said at the present: that the divine does not need any honor; for us, nevertheless, it’s natural to honor it, above all, with pious convictions, even through the rites of national tradition, each according to his proper part." http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus2.html

I see the "notion" has turned to "conviction" in the second but I can see similarities in those two words. Again, this still seems to echo Sedley's idealist argument to me. The word used in P. Oxy. 215 is διαληψις. This is also used in On Piety in Column 10 and translated as "understanding" specifically as "an understanding according to similarity" when talking about the nature of the gods. I'm okay with any of those translations in context. And that similarity, in some cases, is the formation of the idea of the gods through similar "images" or eidola perceived by the mind.

But to return to Tsouna (finally), she references col 38 of On Piety and says in a note, after admitting that Philodemus's argument can be difficult to understand given the condition of the papyrus and textual difficulties, she notes the main thrust of his argument appears to be:

Epicurus and the founders DO assert that the gods do have harmful or beneficial influences on us; BUT genuine piety not fear is what makes people just (NOT as the theologians who tell scary stories about the gods contend). Also, the gods do not actually "do" or "give" goods and evils to men, nonetheless, they are responsible (αίτιοι) "in a way" and only partially, not wholly. Col. 38 says " Those who keep their oaths and are just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those (gods)."

Tsouna also summarizes Obbink in that he outlines interpretations: the gods are responsible for harms/benefits by being implemented in various physical processes of causation; or that our *ideas* of the gods function as direct causes of harm/benefit for people.

So, again, to me, it seems to come back to the physical existence of the gods doesn't really matter. It is our notion or understanding or conviction of the gods' blessedness etc. that can cause us benefits and an incorrect view of piety that can cause fear and harm.

Still digging in but I felt this was important to get down.

Quote from Don

I plan to go back to investigate that translation of "psychosomatic dispositions" tomorrow.

As I promised myself, I found that "psychosomatic dispositions" in Column 44 translates the word διαθέσεις (diatheseis).

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…y%3Ddia%2Fqesis

So, yes, it does just mean someone's bodily or mental "disposition" so there's no word that's being translated "psychsomatic". Obbink just included that as a modifier to clarify the translation of διαθέσεις.

Interestingly, it does include the sense of arranging things in order. So, column 44 encourages us to guard against all "defilements" (μιαρον miaron http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…try%3Dmiaro%2Fs ) and to use our intellect to "comprehensively" view the best disposition to "fit all that happens to us to blessedness (makariotē-)"

Agreed.

Plus it's not necessarily a more vs better, it is a future vs present. It brings to mind VS35: Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

Quote from Matt

I am even "more" late commenting.

That's the benefits of having a forum for all those asynchronous conversations

I wanted to say that your point about "what a person does with this information" is an important one. Thanks for phrasing it that way!

That's one of the reasons that I'm personally working through Obbink's Philodemus On Piety. I think it's important to get a better idea of both what Epicurus and the founders thought and what they did with it. Did they participate in the festivals? Why? What practical application does the "existence" writ large of the gods have for the early Epicureans? For us?

I find it both a practical as well as a pleasurable academic exercise.

One argument against eternal life being preferable vis a vis pleasure that I read recently was from a Philodemus quote in Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus.

As I remember it (didn't look up but remembering), the argument ran:

An infinite life would allow us to be always looking forward and not paying attention to (or appreciating) pleasures *actually* occurring to us in the present. We could "get away with" not pursuing pleasure in the present but to be always planning for future desires.

I found that intriguing and hadn't read that before.

That's a good question. One point is that he seems to be equating the political charges and comedic portrayals of philosophers, especially Socrates (as the extreme case) but also others that were exiled or punished. My take is that Philodemus seems to feel that comedy playwrights shouldn't be "slandering" philosophers as if philosophers should be respected and immune from lampoon. It seems that he's also implying that Socrates may have brought this on himself by being so public in his questioning and gadflying of the people. He made enemies. Socrates basically made a nuisance of himself, and Philodemus is saying, "See what it got him?!" It also seems like he's saying that "we know what those comedic playwrights are like! Don't play into their hands." So Philodemus is saying that Epicurus was such an upstanding and civic-minded philosopher that he was not subject to comedic ridicule, and we should emulate his example.
On the other hand, Epicurus's insults and name-calling were against rival philosophers and not political figures. So maybe Philodemus felt those kinds of activities were acceptable in defending Epicurus's philosophy against rivals. More of an in-house debate instead of a public "airing of grievances."

As for the comedy, I greatly enjoy Aristophanes. I understand his plays are FULL of contemporary satire directed against "celebrities" of the day, especially Cleon whom Aristophanes despised. I also find it interesting that Socrates himself is supposed to have stood up and taken a bow during performance of The Clouds. Evidently, he enjoyed the notoriety.

Column 71 has some interesting points:

“They [i.e., people manipulated by philosophers ro rulers by means of the poets’ false tales about the gods] will suppose that the gods are terrifying tyrants, and most of all because of their own bad consciences they will expect great misfortunes from them. Thus, as far as we are concerned, on account of the belief which they do no have, they would accomplish nothing [i.e., no proper conception of the gods]. But those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it [i.e., the gods’ happiness] was seen [i.e., in the past experience of humans in cultural history] to come from doing no harm to anyone, they [i.e., readers of the present work] will endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble… [most of a column missing, ~60 words, continues at bottom of next column]... to change sides and, not having learnt to be grateful for past goods and to bear up against natural pains and of death [probably continues as not to fear death]...

A few points of interest to discuss here. It appears again to show the gods’ existence in an ambiguous light. We are asked by the author to “imitate” the “blessedness” of the gods “in so far as mortals can.” The word used is μιμεισθαι (mimeisthai) which does indeed mean “to mimic, imitate, represent, portray” but also “of the fine arts, to represent, express by means of imitation, of an actor (or painting, music, sculpture).” I might think of it as “Fake it till you make it”.

The word used for “blessedness” in the original Greek in column 71 is none other than our old friend ευδιμονιαν (eudaimonian)! I would have expected something like μακαριοσ (makarios) as used in KD 1 and elsewhere in Epicurus’s writings, since markios and related words lile markariotes are used in the text of On Piety. For example, in column 24, the author says:

“Therefore they [the kathegemones] simply and necessarily supposed that he [Epicurus] left unquestioned [or “posited” or “allowed the existence of”] the existence of blessed and eternal beings.”

The words translated here as “blessed and eternal beings” are ζωια μακαρια και διαιωνια (beings blessed and everlasting).

The word makarion appears again in a phrase in a fragmented column 43 along with και αφθαρ[τον] (blessed and imperishable). Column 44/45 uses variations on makarios:

“... and to dispel what is foreign to its nature [i.e., a god’s], and to marshal all its overpowering strength, nor in On Gods does he [Epicurus] say anything conflicting withone’s doing these things. And in On Holiness he calls the life of perfection [or ‘completeness’] the most pleasant and most blessed, and instructs us to guard against all defilements, with our intellect comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions, for the sake of fitting al that happens to us to blessedness and especially having it in good order…” [more of column 45, I’ve included in previous posts]

The “life of perfection the most pleasant and most blessed” translates “τον τελειοτητος βιον ‘ηδιστον και μακαριωτατον” ton teleiotetos bion hediston kai makariotaton. “Teleiotetos” is related to “telos”, something’s goal/completion/etc., so I can understand the ambiguous translation. Hediston is related to hedone “pleasure”! And finally we have makariotaton “most blessed.” The last mention of blessedness right before the end is also makariote--.

To return to column 71, the echoes of the Principle Doctrines and other familiar precepts of Epicurus are striking at the end:

- to be grateful for past goods

- to bear up against natural pains

- [to have no fear] of death

- to do no harm

I also expected something like kalos when column 71 says “to make themselves so noble…”; however, the word is “μεγαλοπρεπεις.” “to make oneself a great man, magnificent.; grand, elegant, or splendid in appearance; full of majesty; majestic.” So there’s a lot more going on there than simply “noble.”

I plan to go back to investigate that translation of "psychosomatic dispositions" tomorrow.

Quote from Cassius

Yes I think we are together. I can easily see the Epicureans criticizing attitudes that are excessively or improperly "virtue hating" and "all-harassing" while still agreeing with the criticism of Socrates, since the Epicureans considered Socrates to have been very defective in his teaching and therefore probably worthy of the ridicule he received.

I'm still not sure we're together. Philodemus is describing the comedy playwrights themselves as hating virtue and harassing everybody. Philodemus's tone "momentarily rises in vehemence" (as Obbink notes). The Epicureans are in no way taking a share in this description. Philodemus is disgusted with the comedy writers (whether in reality or just to make a point isn't clear). In some ways Philodemus is equating the political persecution of philosophers and intellectuals with their derision in comedy.

Obbink notes the Epicureans didn't escape completely unscathed by the comic playwrights.

"Epicureans" appear in Hellenistic comedy stereotyped as μάγειροι "the cooks in charge of preparation of private sacrifices" and satirized as pandering to delicacies and fancy tastes.

Obbink notes that there is no clear evidence or instances of "Epicureans" being satirized for their theological views "but rather their attitude towards sacrifice and religious feasting (in the context of Epicurus's stereotyped doctrine of pleasure)."

Obbink notes that Philodemus is claiming that "Epicurus *never* fell prey to comic derision," and Philodemus doesn't "retreat" from that position. "Yet he could have safely argued that comic portrayals never led in Epicurus's case to exile/execution, as he, like many others, believed about Socrates."

Quote from Cassius

Also the point about 'virtue-hating' and "all-harassing" -- I would suspect that might hint toward criticizing 'cynicism' or "nihilism" and that's a very interesting topic in itself.

Just to be clear, "virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth" is Philodemus's description of the comedy writers. So, he's contrasting, for example, the depiction of Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds with the fact that Epicurus never got lampooned by the comedy playwrights because Epicurus was so exemplary a citizen of Athens.

I’m going to return to columns 26-36 that discuss the Epicureans participation in the rites and festivals of ancient Greece. However, columns 36 to 59 talk about the benefits and harms from gods. This topic also appears in the Letter to Menoikeus 124 where the hoi polloi think of the gods bestowing benefits on those they like and harms on those the gods dislike. I originally thought this was an empty opinion; however, it seems, from this section of On Piety, that Epicurus and the kathegemones (“those who led the way,” i.e., the leaders of the school, e.g., Polyaenus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus) also held a version of this view. Note, too, that anywhere there is a reference to Book #, that’s a reference to Epicurus’s magnum opus On Nature.

Obbink’s notes on Column 36, lines 1023-42 (excerpt):

Here the kathegemones are said to have held a doctrine whereby there are produced benefits and harms for good and bad persons respectively [το περαινεσθαι ωφελιας εκ θεων τοις αγαθοις και βλαβας τοις κακοις]. Philodemus paraphrases, saying that for wise and just men (i.e., οι αγαθοι) there is a completion or production (by humans in general) of benefits and harms (from the gods) which are no less or even greater than those harms and benefits which people in general usually assume. The present passage thus adds another dimension to that expressed in Ad. Menoec. 124. For in addition to assuming the account there of why people in general think and talk as though the gods were a source of great harms and benefits (and, in a sense, are right about this), the present passage purports to give a rationale whereby the Epicurean sage will do so as well.

So, to retrace our steps, here are excerpts from lines columns 36 and 37 from the scroll itself:

And for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people they [Epicurus and the kathegemones] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived that benefits and harms which are no feebler [or ‘more deficient’ or ‘weaker’] or even greater [i.e., no weaker {harms} or even greater {benefits}] than people in general suppose [literally ‘attribute’ or ‘attach’ to the gods] are made complete [i.e., ‘are accomplished’ ‘are fulfilled’], not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in return for his benefit [or ‘of his benefit here’], and these things they [i.e., the kathegemones] say most piously. And in On Gods what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he [Epicurus] outlines in some detail. And in book 13 [of On Nature] he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people. And in book 35, in addition to clarifying somewhat this benefit, he says that even on account of thinking [5-7 words missing…]. And in his book On Destiny there is an exposition concerning the assistance [to humans] provided by them [i.e., the gods]. And in his letters to important individuals he is seen to pronounce consistently on this point;...

The topic continues into column 38:

...similarly in Book 6 concerning adjudication [6-8 words missing] and that [he says] those who are oath-keeping [ευορκους] and just are moved by the most virtuous influences [literally ‘vibrations’ ‘repercussions’] both from their own selves and from those [i.e., the gods]. And similiarly in book 8; and [Epicurus and the kathegemones] define the notion of benefit in the same way as Polyaenus in the first book of his Against Aristotle’s On Philosophy declared his opinion that divine nature is the cause for us of these goods; and similarly Hermarchus that …

Now, this goes on like this for awhile, but in column 42 we find out that some theologians and philosophers perpetuated and preserved tales and poems of vengeful, wrathful gods to keep people in general in line:

And preparing an immense deception against the rest, they subsequently rush into terrible, hidden injustices, since they no longer feared anyone believed to be all-knowing. Therefore it was safer to keep silent. Consequently that was what those of the theologians and philosophers who were just did. For the truth did not escape them, but, since they observed that evil deeds were held in check by the tales because foreboding hung over the more foolish of mankind, in order that we might not render life as a whole a beastly form of existence, and since otherwise the hostility …[column missing…]

Now, later columns (44, 45 from my previous posts on 46 and 47) talks about the need to preserve the gods’ blessedness and incorruptibility as being truly pious.

Col. 48 talks about why these views are held:

“it is necessary to declare to them simply and in a fairly direct manner that every person must observe the laws and the customs as long as they (i.e., the laws and the customs) do not command any element of impiety. For the deity, I think, ought to have been deemed surpassing in all things, that is to say, the deity that is evident and honoured in ritual observance (or ‘in intelligent contemplation’), as Epicurus proclaims.”

Keywords here are “ritual observance/intelligent contemplation” translating εν τηι θεωριαι This ambiguous meaning goes back to my new translation of the characteristics of the Epicurean sage, namely this section https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…n-contemplation Some translations of that section of Diogenes Laertius say the sage will enjoy the spectacles more than others. I feel justified in my translation since Obbink here seems to be dealing with the same ambiguous dilemma of the word θεωριαι.

Column 49 gets at why some people said Epicurus wasn’t brought up on charges of impiety like Socrates was:

They [opponents of Epicureans] also claim that Epicurus escaped from the Athenian masses not because [2-4 words missing] he held less impious views, but because his philosophy had escaped the notice of many people.

Just slander? Or a manifestation of the lathe biosas?

Column 51 comes back to Epicurus’s practice:

And with regard to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must be entirely acknowledged that he acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith, and he kept them; and the demonstrations about his life which are in Zeno [one of Philodemus’s teachers] make clear to people this most important testament among his agreements [i.e., Epicurus’s will]. So far in fact was he from being harmful to anyone of mankind that not only did he honour his parents as much as the gods, nor was he fondly disposed only towards his brothers, … [missing pieces up to column 53] …

Column 53 talks about how Epicurus was kind to everyone, didn’t bring any lawsuits, and did not become the butt of writers of comedy! He lived “without falling prey to the virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth of comedy.” “Virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth of comedy” translates the Greek το μισοχρηστον στομα και παντα σινομενον επεσε της κωμωδιας (misokhreston stoma kai panta sinomenon epese tes komodias). I must admit that’s a pretty good epithet to throw at someone! The Greek misokhreston literally means “hating-the-better-sort”.

53 continues in column 54:

And he did not even utter a word against the sophistical orators who made mention of him; so great was the strength of the effective precaution against all things that could possibly annoy anyone in deed or word, or even give the impression of intending to inflict harm. For what some have ventured to say, namely that he went unknown to people, shows first of all that neither he nor his followers were harmfully disposed towards their fellow citizens; and then that no bitter slander or lawsuit on account of a major doctrine …

I should point out that “he went unknown to people” does NOT use any form of lathe biosas in the original Greek text but rather [εγ]ινωσκε[τ]ο. The idea here appears to be to assert how much more Epicurus was an upstanding pious citizen who didn’t bother anyone unlike philosophers like Socrates who got himself charged, tried, and killed. Column 56 even says that Epicurus was “conducting himself so many years in a manner not inactive towards the city [i.e., playing his full part in public life].” Cassius may find that last line interesting in light of the popular apolitical “hiding in a cave” descriptions of Epicurus.

Quote from JJElbert

I might be misremembering slightly! That does look like the right passage.

I thought you were kidding at first, Joshua ! LOL I didn't remember the ball of wool and lead!! That's amazing that he had that kind of insight about mass! Thanks for calling my attention to that!

Quote from Cassius

Don THANK YOU for continuing to posts these details as they are extremely helpful!

You're welcome. I've been having a lot of pleasure doing it, so I'm glad it's helpful.