Posts by Don

To add some additional details from my perspective using vocabulary from Episode 54 of the Lucretius podcast:

1) I believe the "pleasure" pill / machine would prevent the senses from being reliable, therefore, there would be no way to make choices based on reliable information.

2) Epicurus made repeated observations on the profligate life leading reliably to more pain than pleasure; therefore, that lifestyle is to be "censured" and not recommended if one wants to achieve the goal of leading a pleasurable, happy, blessed life.

Elayne , I did bring up PD 10 in the other thread in relation to the bliss pill, but I thought this thread was to specifically discuss the meaning and application of PD 10. But I'm happy to summarize my thoughts overall on that specific topic.

The more I consider the bliss pill / experience machine, the less helpful I think that thought experiment is. I'm equating the pill/machine with unicorns, centaurs, and other mythical things. Discussing whether or not to take the pill or hook yourself up to the machine is, from my perspective, as helpful as talking about how pleasurable would it be to ride a unicorn over a rainbow.

It's going to come up, however, in any general conversation about pleasure being the goal of life. That's why Wilson had to address it. I also agree with her that Epicurus would advise not to take it.

I still think Epicurus would not recommend taking the bliss pill or hooking yourself up to the experience machine for the following reasons:

• Pleasure is the goal, and specifically living the most pleasurable life.
• We use our senses and the reactions of pleasure and pain (and the prolepses) to know the real world.
• We use the information from our senses and our reactions of pleasure and pain to make prudent decisions about our actions to move ourselves steadily in the direction of living the most pleasurable life.
• If we are somehow cut off from the real world, our senses will not work.
  • If the machine, only our mind will be provided sense data and it cannot be checked through the other senses.
  • If a pill, not knowing how it works it's hard to say, but again there is an imposed block on senses by definition.
• Without our senses, there's no way to use the Canon to make decisions to live the most pleasurable life.
• Additionally, from what I can see, the pill and machine would impose someone else's algorithm on what constitutes pleasure on me. If you say, no the pill and machine make you see what's pleasurable to you, we're back to arguing whether unicorns or centaurs are better at chess.

Therefore, I don't think it's productive to tie ourselves in knots discussing such a remote hypothetical when Epicurus was looking for a philosophy to help people in the here and now. I understand Wilson's rationale for including it in her article and concur with her assertion regarding Epicurus's reaction to it.

Quote from Elayne

I think you are reading far more into PD10 than it says. Epicurus doesn't take it as far as you have. It's not stated as a universal piece of advice.

LOL. Now, that's the same thing I said about your and Cassius 's interpretation. You're going to have to be more specific on what you mean by *my* "reading more into (it)". I think I'm taking the most conservative interpretation possible in light of what's actually written and taking it along with what else Epicurus wrote on this exact topic.

I think that Doctrine is addressing a specific life situation and refuting a specific accusation leveled at the Epicureans, namely that they're nothing but Cyrenaics under a different name.

If by a "universal piece of advice," you mean do I think Epicurus would advise anyone that a pleasurable life could not be lived by living a profligate life, I would agree. That is exactly what he says. Do I think that Epicurus would say that IF that life could dispel the fears and anxieties about the gods, death, etc., that it could be a pleasurable life? Yes. But I believe Epicurus was a realist and dealt with real solutions to real world problems, and as in this life the profligate life will undoubtedly lead to more pain overall than pleasure, he would not recommend it as a series of choice-worthy pleasures.

Okay. That seems like it might be a fruitful approach. Here we go:

Quote from Elayne

PD10 does not say that prudence is more important than pleasure.

Agreed.

Quote from Elayne

It does not say anything that would rule out a bliss pill,...

Agreed. However, I'm not going down the "bliss pill" rabbit hole again. This whole topic is like asking, "Would you have a unicorn for a pet?" but even less defined. At least we "know" what a unicorn "is" basically.

Also, I see Epicurus's philosophy as one of individual responsibility. Each of us is responsible for our own pleasure. We get to make choices. Let me be clear, I'm not placing decision-making above pleasure. It is a means to pleasure. If someone wants to take the pill, take the pill. As I see it defined, it takes away the ability to choose and reject, to chart ones own path. Okay, it's the *final* choice one could take, but the pill/machine is so ill-defined, I'm reluctant to keep flogging a dead unicorn.

In the end, the argument doesn't provide benefits to real people. For PD 10, I'd rather deal in reality and practicalities as Epicurus said philosophy should do.

Quote from Elayne

PD10 does not say anything to rule out the pleasures of the profligates if the painful consequences could be removed, or if they could be combined with the pleasure of information about reality that would remove false fears.

Agreed, but again I don't believe Epicurus is dealing in hypotheticals or counterfactuals here. He has observed that that lifestyle - in reality and in everyday experience - is not conducive to a pleasure-filled life. It does NOT teach how to remove false fears. I agree with your proposal that it doesn't rule it out, but I believe Epicurus is addressing a real person in the real world who asks "Can I have a completely pleasurable life engaging in "the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons"?" To that, I believe he would answer "No."

Quote from Elayne

Don, if you don't take each PD in the context of _all_ the PDs, then you can easily wind up "proof-texting" and drawing conclusions Epicurus did not make.

Point taken, but I don't believe I'm proof-texting in relation to PD 10. I've seen people try to proof-text with excerpts and fragments (e.g., lathe biosas), and I fully agree that's a problem.

When I say that it seems to me that ya'll are making PD 10 do more work than it has to, I'm not saying it should be read in isolation. Each Doctrine is one of 40 bricks in the wall supporting the school (to use an Oinoanda metaphor), so I don't think every brick needs to carry the whole structure. Individual bricks can respond to specific tenets of the philosophy or specific refutations of other schools. Of course, each doctrine is a part of the philosophy and needs to fit in properly. However, from my perspective, there's danger in both the urge to prooftext and to overinterpret.

Ah, DeWitt. I have intentionally not finished re-reading all of Epicurus and His Philosophy. This is exactly what I mean by making each Doctrine do more work than it has to. When you (and DeWitt) say...:

Quote from Cassius

Plato is never mentioned by name in the principle doctrines

...I have to ask, "Then is Plato really there?" Epicurus and his school had plenty of other schools and philosophers to refute, both contemporary and older ones. I'm maintaining that PD 10 is a direct attack/refutation against the Cyrenaics.

I'm definitely NOT saying that Epicurus and his school didn't need to address Plato's philosophy, and I agree with DeWitt *in general* on that point. But, frankly, Dewitt's penchant for finding precursors of Christianity everywhere in Epicurus makes me wary of his finding anti-Platonic elements everywhere, too.

Quote from Cassius

I certainly think that we are together on the practical result of the doctrine.

Well, I'm genuinely glad to hear that. Originally, I wasn't even sure of that!

Quote from Cassius

I think we are just still apart on the type of argument being employed and therefore the implications involved in presenting the position as a system of thought.

My understanding of this differing position is still that you're trying to make this Doctrine do more work than it has to. My position is that there are 40 principal doctrines that all work together to present the full system of the school. I'm also trying to take the most literal approach to each doctrine with the least amount of interpretation. In effect, I'm going to characterize my literal/conservative intent as "Epicurus said what he meant and meant what he said" and leave it at that. I think once one starts to say "what he's actually saying is..." that's "like butter scraped over too much bread."

Quote from Cassius

PD8: " No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures."

and from the letter to Menoeceus:

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided."

LOL! I would cite both those Principal Doctrines to defend my position, too, so we *must* be starting to meet somewhere

I did want to address this part of your post:

Quote from Cassius

If we look at PD10 solely from the "practical" point of view alone, it seems to me that we imply, or at least open up the logical possibility, that pleasure can lose its nature as good in certain contexts -- namely the context in which the cost of such pleasure is large in terms of the pain required in order to achieve it. I would submit that labeling pleasure "good" or "not good" is not at all the same as saying pleasure is to be "chosen" or not chosen," so I am suggesting that Epicurus is telling us to keep these two aspects in mind as distinctly separate.

I don't agree. Looking at it as "practical" provides a concrete example of the philosophy's application to a real-world situation in which people must exercise choices and avoidances as to how to live a pleasurable life. The extravagant pleasures in and of themselves are not "good" or "bad"; they are situationally "choice-worthy" or not. There's no question the "profligate" (I'm really beginning to hate that translation) are experiencing pleasure. Epicurus is not saying some pleasures in and of themselves are good or bad. He explicitly states pleasure is good, The Good. But also explicitly states not all pleasures should be chosen at all times. The import for me of PD 10, PD 8, the Letter, is to reinforce the goal is to lead a pleasurable life. I would cite:

Quote

PD 25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

For me, that dovetails with:

Quote

everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely blessed life.

Epicurus's emphasis, in my opinion, is that the "profligate" experiences pleasure but will not find "the health of the body and the serenity of the soul" nor "a completely blessed life" if they're not also addressing their fear of the gods, of death, of pain. That way of life will not teach you how to rid yourself of those impediments to a completely blessed life filled to its fullness of pleasure.

Here is my initial response to your posts above. Please let me know if I misunderstood or misinterpret anything you wrote :

I think this Doctrine is neither counterfactual nor hypothetical. I think Epicurus is saying exactly what he means to say.

I interpret it to be Epicurus's concrete observation as to the inadequacy of pursuing a life of "sex, drugs, & rock n roll" (to use a shorthand) if one wants to lead a pleasurable life. The "profligate" life provides momentary pleasure but will lead to multiple pains in short order. You are welcome to pursue those pleasures, but Epicurus is not going to encourage or sanction your choice. Not all pleasures should be chosen.

I believe this Doctrine was also a direct counter to any criticism of his school of just being Cyrenaic. He needed to give a firm rebuttal to those who painted the Epicureans with the same brush as the Cyrenaics. It is also my contention that this is the purpose of the Letter to Menoikeus section:

Quote

So when we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean the pleasures of decadent people or the enjoyment of sleep, as is believed by those who are ignorant or who don't understand us or who are ill-disposed to us, but to be free from bodily pain and mental disturbance. For a pleasant life is produced not by drinking and endless parties and enjoying boys and women and consuming fish and other delicacies of an extravagant table, but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul.

This again is Epicurus saying exactly what he means to say: "We do NOT mean the pleasures of decadent people (άσωτος)." He uses the same word to refer to those people in both the Letter and PD 10. He clearly says "a pleasant life is produced NOT by [that lifestyle] but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul." In the Letter, "sober reasoning" translates νήφων λογισμὸς "nēphōn logismos" where nēphōn literally means “to be sober; to drink no wine; to be self-controlled.” That he uses drinking to say what does not produce a pleasurable life, then says being sober does produce a pleasurable life seems to link those two opposing clauses together. One negative, one positive.

To address Elayne specifically, I'm not saying Epicurus is advocating a middle path. I don't believe he has any problem with drinking per se (he wrote a book entitled Symposium after all) but just getting drunk and acting there fool, or with sex (he cannot conceive of the good without it), etc. But a life consisting solely of these specific decadent pleasures taken to extremes will not teach one to lead a pleasurable life.

Quote from Cassius

Anyone who looks at PD10 and insists on saying that the profligate man "cannot" be successful, and analyzing it that way, is in my view not accepting this as the hypothetical it seems clearly intended to be.

So then to finally address your quote here, Cassius , I do not accept that this is a hypothetical and don't believe it should be interpreted that way.

Cassius and Elayne , this is all *very* helpful and let's me see ya'll's thought processes. I greatly appreciate your willingness to continue to engage in this conversation. Let me now quote the areas above where we have agreement:

Quote from Cassius

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure as the ultimate good, which means the ultimate good or goal for which we do everything else to achieve, and which is not in terms an intermediate step toward any higher goal. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in if in fact those activities succeed in bringing them pleasure which they feel to outweigh the pain which may be required to achieve that pleasure. This is because any legitimate censure would have to be based on them failing to achieve the ultimate goal of nature, and if they do in fact achieve that goal, there is no natural grounds for censuring them. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured to the extent that they fail to achieve their goal, which in practical human experience is likely to happen if their profligate ways do not banish the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If their profligate ways included a means of resolving these and all other pains and fears, there would be no proper /natural grounds for censuring them because they were in fact successful in achieving a pleasurable life.

Quote from Elayne

he is saying he hasn't observed such a strategy succeeding. That partying doesn't relieve fears of the supernatural-- according to his observations.

Quote from Elayne

embedded in that formula is also the supremacy of pleasure as the goal, and his condemnation of the strategy because it fails at pleasure.

Now, I can address the places where our interpretations diverge with more specificity.

Thanks for posting these. I've really enjoyed your translation work!

My contention has been that anytime we see το αγαθόν / ταγαθον , it can be translated colloquially as "pleasure" ( literally The Good with capitalization rendering its importance in an English way that's not necessarily possible in the original text since a lot of those manuscripts used an uncial script)

Plus I tend to read το κακόν in these contexts as "pain."

Some popular translations seem to obfuscate the importance of pleasure and pain in the philosophy by using "the good" and "the bad/evil."

This came home to me in looking at the Tetrapharmakos with ταγαθον "the good" and το δεινον "the terrible" easily paraphrased as pleasure and pain.

I look forward to more of your work!!

This new thread grew out of the discussion of Catherine Wilson's article in The Statesman. In that thread, several of us posted differing interpretations of PD 10. Cassius suggested (correctly) that here might be a better spot for that discussion to take place to better focus the other thread. Fully agree! Hence, my starting this new thread over here.

Elayne and ya'll: Let me see if I can correctly summarize your interpretation of PD 10:

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured in so far as they aren't experiencing the fullness of pleasure because they still have the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If they would resolve these pains and fears and come to a correct understanding of these, they could engage in any of the activities which bring them pleasure without anxiety. Please correct or add anything I've gotten wrong or missed. I sincerely want to make sure I fully understand where you're coming from.

Good idea, Cassius . I'm going to move over to the PD10 link to continue that discussion. I really want to understand ya'll's* interpretation of that Doctrine. I'm not saying I agree with it (yet, maybe?), but we may be talking past each other in some ways. I'm going to try and use Daniel Dennett's presentation of Rapoport's Rules. I don't think we're opponents, but I do see us as having different interpretations.

*Note: English really needs an official 2nd person plural pronoun instead of the ambiguity of "you." For now, I'm picking "ya'll"

Quote from Cassius

I suspect Don would say that he agrees with that point, so maybe the issue is more "why do we think there is an issue in how to express this?"

Quick response, short on time right now, but...:

A) Yes, I agree about pleasure.

B) I think y'all are making PD 10 do way more heavy lifting than it has to.

I'll try and add more detail later.

Elayne what I agreed with was your eloquent description of the "things productive of the pleasures of the profligate" being unable to address the anxiety and fear of the gods, death, etc. When Epicurus is saying if those things did teach the limit of desires, we'd have no reason to censure the profligate. The "limit of desires" I take to refer to the desires one choose and those one refects. Not every desire leads to pleasure and so those should be rejected. The word translated as "limit" also can have the connotation of the "perfection" of something. So if those things taught the perfection of desire - how to prudently make choices and rejections - we'd have to need to censure the "lost." The fact that he calls them ἀσώτους along with the commentary on the Menoikeus Letter leads me to believe he's not condoning their choices in any way. I believe he's clearly saying, this isn't the way to choose to live a pleasurable life.

Quote from Elayne

Don you did say PD10 was about taking responsibility though-- but that's only in service of pleasure. So that would not be a reason to turn down a true bliss for you pill in an environment free of threats, if you believed it was as advertised.

Yes. Each of us is responsible for our own pleasure through the choices and avoidances each of us decide to follow.

Quote from Elayne

Don then maybe I misunderstood what you said about "teaching us limits"-- because he didn't use it that way.

PD 10 does explicitly say that "if, further, they [that which is productive of pleasures to profligate persons] taught them to limit their desires [then] we should not have any reason to censure such persons,..."

So, Epicurus is saying the profligate don't learn to limit their desires and so we should have reason to censure them.

It's actually phrased not as an infinitive "to limit" but:

If, furthermore, "that which produces profligate pleasures" taught 'the limit (τὸ πέρας)' of desires/yearnings/lusts' ( τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) etc."

Quote from Elayne

I don't think you understand PD 10. If you take it in context with the entire body of writings, it is very clear Epicurus places nothing above or equal to pleasure. The problem is that the pleasures of the profligates not only produce more pain than pleasure but that they leave anxiety unaddressed, and thus they can't produce complete pleasure. They leave the pain of anxiety. And he is talking about limits not because of the modern concept of "knowing our limits." He is referring to the understanding that once you have removed all pain, you will be full of maximum pleasure, a real and wonderful feeling, and that we are not (as was argued in his time) forced to seek more and more pleasure endlessly, if there is no pain. He is saying complete pleasure can actually happen for humans.

Yes. There's a problem with the pleasures of the profligate, and I think you described that problem well. I'm not seeing where we disagree.

Quote from Cassius

PD10 in my view is as hypothetical or a logical challenge or whatever you would like to call it, set up specifically as an "in your face" statement of the position that the ultimate goal is pleasure, and forcing you to confront what some people are going to think are uncomfortable truths.

I don't see it that way, and I know we had this conversation previously. I don't think Epicurus is dealing in hypotheticals at all in this doctrine. I think he's being very concrete. Especially taking the Letter to Menoikeus along with this, I think he's saying, "Look at those people who stay drunk all night and treat their bodies so badly. Yes, that's pleasure, but they don't consider the consequences of their pleasure. That's not what I'm calling you to do. You can't live a pleasurable life without living nobly, justly, and prudently. The lost are not living nobly, justly, or prudently, and so will find it impossible to live pleasurably."

Oh my! We already have a hypothetical drug and now we're talking about ill-defined gods. Yikes.

My answer is still no. Epicurus wouldn't advocate taking the drug. How would it make me a god? How would my atoms replenish themselves to make me incorruptible?

That's a quick reply. More later.

(1) She's saying Epicurus would say "Don't take the pill."

(2a) Short answer: No.

(2b) Longer answer: The drug's effects, once taken, would serve as a barrier between me and the cosmos and I would no longer be able to prudently make decisions about how to achieve my own pleasure. Prudence is instrumental in achieving the goal of feeling pleasure. Prudence and wisdom don't sit above pleasure. Some might say, "but you've achieved pleasure with the pill." I've achieved pleasure but it's someone else's definition of pleasure. The creator of the drug has decided for me the hormone levels (dopamine, oxytocin, serotonin) that will produce "my" pleasure. I have a similar reason for not wanting to upload my mind into a computer to live forever. Who owns the hardware? What parameters have they programmed into it? Same way with this hypothetical pill (that I'm defining here as producing hormone levels determined by someone else's chemistry). The pill is someone else's hardware. The only way in this universe to achieve pleasure is to make choices and rejections based on one's own senses, one's own reactions of pleasure and pain, and whatever the prolepses are.

My take is that this is the crux of Wilson's argument expressed in the least number of words for her article.

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Most would rather experience hardships, ups and downs, and the pains of off-and-on deprivation that keep our appetites sharp.

The Epicurean can agree entirely. A bliss drug would not be a source of real pleasure because it would wipe out experience. Blissed out, we would not be encountering the world as it is, but a distorted world in which the causes of physical and psychological pleasure as well as pain were obscured.

To bring this back to Wilson, she's not saying experiencing hardship and pain are somehow superior to pleasure. She's saying without encountering the real world, we have no way to make choices of how to achieve pleasure. We don't *want* or desire to experience hardship or pain, but we recognize that the world is full of both. Having the *choice* of either experiencing the world *as it is* and making *my* choices and avoidances based on the input of *my* senses etc. or being "blissed out" on someone else's definition of an abstract ideal "pleasure" for me, I'd choose the " hardships, ups and downs, and the pains of off-and-on deprivation." It's not a Stoic glorification of enduring pain. It's a proclamation of the fact that I have one life to live; it should be lived pleasurably; and the only path I have is for me to make my choices and aim at that goal - directing myself as best I can using the Canonic faculties I've been given by natural evolution.

Quote from Cassius

As to the bliss pill, I also see Elayne's point that the general principle that she's laying out is very wide from the mark. She's choosing to emphasize that the problem would be that "the causes of pain and pleasure would be obscured." Well, why is that a problem? If the bliss pill works, who cares WHY it works -- that's principle doctrine 10 in spades. The clear implication of this phrasing is that it is the KNOWLEDGE of the causes that is of concern to Wilson.

I don't want to go down the "bliss pill" rabbit hole again, but, in principle, I agree with Wilson about this. I continue to assert that PD 10 is about personal responsibility and it's specifically saying the "pleasures of the profligate" are not recommended, and that the most important word in that Doctrine is *if*. If they do these things, then we have no complaints... But those pleasures *don't* provide freedom from fear or teach us limits, etc. That's the point. Plus it has to be taken in context with the Letter to Menoikeus which appears to me to be commentary on PD 10:

Quote

10If the things that produced the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

In the Letter to Menoikos: So when we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean the pleasures of decadent people or the enjoyment of sleep, as is believed by those who are ignorant or who don't understand us or who are ill-disposed to us, but to be free from bodily pain and mental disturbance. For a pleasant life is produced not by drinking and endless parties and enjoying boys and women and consuming fish and other delicacies of an extravagant table, but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul.

If we're on the bliss pill or on the experience machine or constantly intoxicated or eating lotuses, we can't use "sober reasoning" or "search out the cause of everything we accept our reject." Taking the bliss pill could be a personal choice, but I think it would fall under the unrecommended pleasures of the profligate (literally, the lost) and I don't believe Epicurus would endorse that. Pleasure is pleasure, but not every pleasure should be chosen.

I realize I may be a minority opinion, but this is one I haven't been convinced to change yet.