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Whatever Epicurus thought about the theory, he was dealing with the exact same facts and human nature that we are dealing with today, so he would not have had facts which are not available to us to flesh out the theory any more than we can today.
Point taken on human nature, but we do have access to additional facts on the workings of the human body at a much finer level detail (down to the molecular and atomic level) than any ancient person had access to.
P.S. In a way, our minds do pick up intangible images from the air in the sense that, if we're listening or reading, nothing tangible (i.e., too fine to touch) passes from your mind to mine for me to perceive concepts in my mind...
BUT to be clear, I'm not implying our minds are receivers of fine images composed of infinitesimally small atoms directly into our psychē and that's how we envision dragons and relive past events...
ALTHOUGH we do know that electromagnetic waves can have an impact on behavior of applied in specific manners to our heads/brains...
BUT that is NOT what Epicurus had in mind (oops, no pun intended).
I'm going to say up front that, according to modern physics and science, our brains do not receive images/films/eidōlon like a radio receives radio waves.
However...
The fact that we can just sit by ourselves in a room and imagine centaurs, invent new machines, recollect deceased relatives, enjoy past pleasures, and so on, is - colloquially speaking - magical.
Also the fact that you can speak or write to me, and your actions can make images appear in my mind is - colloquially speaking - magical.
So, this wondrous property of the Cosmos required a physical, non-divine, and more importantly a non-teleologic explanation by Epicurus.
There is no way the ancients could have known about neurons or brain anatomy. I don't slight them for that one bit. They had observation and analogy to work with. That's all. They even used to think the seat of the mind was in the area of the heart because that's where you "feel" strong emotion ("My heart ached thinking about it"). From their perspective, that was plausible.
So how could the mind perceive concepts and "visualize" images, even in sleep?? How do we sense physical things? We touch them. Well, how would we see things? Images must be touching our eyes from outside. How does our mind perceive images, even while sleeping? They must be being touched by similar images from outside. Just as the eyes are not flashlights (sorry, anachronism alert) scanning the environment to see, so our minds can't be sending out beams of thought to think. They must be being touched by something from outside them. It must be very fine eidōlon! That's it! Likewise, with this explanation we don't need gods placing concepts in our minds. We receive extremely fine eidōlon from outside.
This seems to address the need for plausible explanations by the Epicureans. Does it explain the phenomenon well enough? Yes. Does it only use atoms and void in its explanation? Yep. Does it align with the precept that the gods don't interfere in the cosmos! Check. Okay, we're good to go.
a good book with a summary of research on the sensation of knowing is Burton's "On Being Certain." There has been more research since then, but it's a good intro to the neurobiology.
Picked up the book at the library today. Thanks for the recommendation!
Epicurus is saying is not the feelings you list but "this is an affirmation that the goal is NOT set by gods or virtue or idealism or rationalism but by Nature herself through the faculty of feeling."
Agreed. I would even be more specific on saying "... through the faculty of feeling pleasure or pain." The Canon itself is not about emotions, the colloquial connotation of "feeling," but the initial reaction of pleasure or pain (attraction or repulsion) - before you have the chance to "think" about something. The names we give to the emotions are built on that foundation of pain or pleasure "at the speed of thought." I'll address this in response to Elayne's post asap.
I still think Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's research has some intriguing applications in this area: e.g., https://michaelrucker.com/thought-leader…emotion-affect/ Elayne may have touched on some of this.
As a philosophy I don't see this as a vacation guide or a cookbook or a relaxation therapy. Instead, it's much more a blueprint for philosophical and moral revolution against the powers of religion and conventional academia.
It has to be both. I agree with your second statement, but I don't think that precludes the first. The "revolution" has to have everyday applications on the beach, in the kitchen, or at the spa (to try and line up your examples 
)
As for your final paragraph, what I mean here refers t...
LOL! 
Well, I'm glad I didn't go off on that tangent I was going to. Turns out I actually agree with your clarification there. Thanks!
the picture involves the bliss pill issues - in the end we are concerned about living happily, not necessarily having the ability to give the most "accurate" recitation of the details.
Your comment here hints at something I've been planning on writing a longer post about so I'll *try* to be brief here.
When we all use catchphrases like "The goal is pleasure" it can easily be misinterpreted that we mean "the goal is to walk around all day with warm, fuzzy feelings" or "the goal is to exist in a blissful haze." That's not the goal of Epicurus's philosophy. At least not the way I understand it. The goal or telos is to live the most pleasurable life. That's not the same as warm fuzzy blissed out feelings every minute of the day. That's why we endure pains for pleasure that will result from those painful choices. That's why we remember past pleasures when things aren't necessarily going well. Using the catchy motto "pleasure is the goal" was used to caricature Epicurus's philosophy in his own lifetime. The idea that "the goal is to walk around all day with warm, fuzzy feelings" approach is Cyrenaic not Epicurean, and Epicurus fought hard against those stereotypes. When we use "pleasure is the goal" it can easily be misinterpreted as well as "Capital-P Pleasure is the goal" like there's some Platonic ideal form of Pleasure that we're aiming for. I wouldn't want people to think that if they're not experiencing Pleasure that they're doing it wrong. This may also be why people redefine pleasure - to try to attain that mistaken Platonic ideal. That's not the Garden path either.
I'm also concerned Cassius by your "not necessarily having the ability to give the most "accurate" recitation of the details." This seems to me to open the door to some problems and I'd like to hear or read more about what you actually mean here before I go off on a tangent.
We may be talking past each other again.
Let's get specific: I'm listening to 27:30 -- 30:27 including when Charles says it "feels like evidence" and Elayne says "that feeling of correctness is usually pleasurable". My point was that the Flat-earther's "pleasurable" feeling of "correctness" is probably just as pleasurable for them as yours is for you. People cherry picking facts when they have that "pleasurable" feeling of "correctness" is exactly my concern. That "pleasure" reaction needs to be tethered to corroboration from the senses to be a valid criteria for truth. Which I think you're saying, but of what value - other than its pleasure - is that feeling of "correctness" then?
This knowing sensation is a subjective experience that has been studied. It can be produced directly with brain stimulation, minus any content. The sensation of knowing is neurological but doesn't necessarily correlate with accuracy.
This sounds fascinating. Do you have any citations or names of researchers or studies for us to follow-up on?
I report that for me, the sensation of knowing has a sort of "rightness" that I classify as pleasurable. Similar sensation to a picture being lined up evenly on a wall or the sensation of symmetry in justice. I experience it as satisfying. That doesn't mean I actually am correct.
So, I'm still confused then. If you're just saying you have a "sensation of knowing" that's "pleasurable" and that it doesn't mean what you know is correct, then it's not evidence of anything if someone is trying to change your mind. It's just a pleasurable feeling. It seems to me that holding a warm, fuzzy blanket and feeling pleasure at that while someone explains something would - for purposes of accepting an argument - would be the same.
It's just a known human phenomenon which was relevant to our discussion of how an individual decides what amount of certainty is enough to act on. It's a subjective decision influenced by feelings. There is no way to find a fixed rule. What confidence interval do you want before you are going to try a new drug, for instance?
The key term here is "decide" - that's choice and avoidance - which involves using reason to assess the evidence from your sensory input, initial reaction of pleasure or pain, and mental anticipations. I'm still cautious of phrases like "influenced by feelings." Are you talking emotions? From my perspective, emotions are not what Epicurus talks about. The emotions - fear, anger, sadness, love, contentment - are how we mentally process the reaction of pleasure or pain. Decision making while subjective is a cognitive process.
I'm not sure I'm onboard with the idea of the pleasurable "feeling when you 'know' something" paradigm y'all have been discussing. Are you saying that's a criteria of what's real or true? That seems to be cutting out 2/3 of the Canon. Or are you saying that that pleasurable reaction is just part of confirmation of being true. This all seems to go back to my "facts don't care about feelings" thread.
I may be misunderstanding the episode, so here's my take on what I've heard. Please correct me if I misunderstood.
When a Flat-earther says, "I 'know' the Earth is flat" they no doubt feel pleasure at "knowing" they're "right" because their belief is echoed by their friends, it's "corroborated" by all the "sources" shared within that community, it makes them feel like they're in on a big truth that other people don't realize, etc.
But they're not truly applying observation through the senses, and so are missing that component of the Canon.
So, their feeling of "pleasure at knowing" is not the same as - or of the same use in the Canon - as someone who knows something that actually aligns with reality?
This specific Flat-earther knowledge pleasure may be one that shouldn't be chosen until it is weighed against the sensations. Maybe? The pleasure of "knowing the Earth is flat" can lead to pain if there is derision from outside the group -- although that could also be a pleasure in "knowing" you're in the In group and know the "truth" about the Earth. It could also lead to pain if you finally accept the Earth is not flat and feel you've been duped.
I'm just having a hard time understanding the importance of "that pleasure of knowing" being canonical. Or wasn't it meant to be?
In light of this optative verb in KD 10, I think it's important to contrast this with the If... Then.... statements in KD 7. As a refresher:
Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate. (Emphasis added)
Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.
In KD 7, the are no funky moods/tenses/aspects. The if's are followed by an aorist indicative verb and active indicative, respectively. Straightforward statements of fact. So, the idea that a person could indeed find security in being well esteemed or widely admired is not seen as an impossibility. This dovetails nicely with Cassius 's fervent conviction that Epicureans *could* find security in a public political life. It may be more difficult, and Epicurus seemed to warn people to be careful of entering that arena, but it wasn't out of the question. There was no sense of impossibility or unreality to the idea.
However, I'm contending that that optative verb in KD 10 supports my contention that we can *desire* to not hold the lifestyle of "those who are past any hope of recovery" against them but we really *know* that that's not going to happen. In this life, as reality is lived, the "profligate" lifestyle will NOT alleviate the fears of death, the gods, etc.
ΜΕΜΨΑΙΜΕΘΑ “(then we would not) blame” μέμφομαι–μέμφεσθαι: hold (acc.) against (dat.); here, “we would (not) have held (ὅ τι) against (αὐτοῖς).”
I just came across a helpful fact:
μεμψαιμεθα is in the first person middle plural optative. The optative mood "expresses something that would happen in a hypothetical situation in the future." It is conditional: If (εἰ) X were the case, then we would not blame (μεμψαιμεθα). The Ingenious Language, a recent book by Andrea Marcolongo on Ancient Greek, has one chapter dedicated almost exclusively to the optative mood and its shades of meaning. My understanding (and I'm still processing it and rereading) is that the optative is used in many cases to express desire, usually desire that cannot be fulfilled: "I wish for this but know it is not going to happen." It is a mood reflecting the unreality of a situation.
These are the kinds of fine detail that consistently keep pulling me back into deeper study of the ancient Greek texts! I barely have my toes wet in the sand and SO want to go scuba diving!!
(Full disclosure: I've found Wiktionary (especially the smart phone app) to be a wonderful tool in parsing some of the Greek syntax. The app along with a Greek keyboard has been indispensable. I just (1) didn't want to give the impression I had more knowledge then I do, and (2) provide tips to anyone else who wants to dig into the texts. Sapere aude )
(Seneca’s Letters – Book II – Letter LXXXV)
Epicurus also decides that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for the happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy.
It's not a matter of balance. "Virtues" are instrumental.
Fragment 70. Beauty and virtue and such are worthy of honor, if they bring joy; but if not then bid them farewell!
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive…ppiness/617847/
I have found that most of the serious approaches to happiness can be mapped onto two ancient traditions, promoted by the Greek philosophers Epicurus and Epictetus. In a nutshell, they focus on enjoyment and virtue, respectively.
etc...
TOYC ΑCΩΤΟΥC “profligates” οἱ ἄσωτοι–τῶν ἀσώτων: libertines, spendthrifts; a lost case; from ἄσωτος–ἀσώτη–ἄσωτον: having no hope of safety, in desperate case, abandoned, past any hope of recovery. ἄσωτος
I think that source definition is so important in this. When "profligate" is being used in translation, it sounds like a moral or ethical chastisement only. And that may be part of it BUT saying these decisions to live that lifestyle put them as "having no hope of safety, in desperate case, abandoned, past any hope of recovery" puts a more "these are obviously negative choices to make" spin on it.
Curious to see what anyone's take is on this TED-Ed video on Nozick's "experience machine" and the (professed) short-comings of hedonism.
At the risk of wading in late to this discussion, I just would like to offer the following reminder. And I apologize if this had already been covered. I admit I haven't closely read all 60+ posts.
As a start, arguing over Epicurus's saying "nothing comes from nothing" is specious. Epicurus never said, "Nothing comes from nothing." That's what English translators have made him say. As I've mentioned ad nauseum, Epicurus didn't speak English or Latin.
His Letter to Herodotus states:
πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.
"First,... nothing comes into being from that which doesn't exist."
To me, this is broad enough to cover everything y'all have been discussing on that point. He doesn't say "Nothing comes from nothing" although one can paraphrase it that way in English. However, that's not literally what it says. He says "οὐδὲν - no-thing" comes from "that which is not existing (τοῦ μὴ ("not") ὄντος (ontos 'being, existing'))." (Note: ὄντος is related to English ontology, ontological.) Atoms, energy, fields, space-time all *exist.* When one throws in "ex nihilo", Epicurus didn't say that either. That's an interpretation, a translation. There has to be something for something else to come into being from it. Dawkins even emphasizes this about new species in that video. You need a starter for new species. Things come from other existing things. Period.
It might be good to go back to each of those twelve statements to see what Epicurus actually said before planting a flag on either side of any debate.
Plus, taking Epicurus in context is important. What was he arguing against? What is the *import* of his statements (i.e., no supernatural realm)? Was he closer to our understanding than his peers? Was he "on the right track"? etc.
Plus plus, I don't think that list exists as a list anywhere but in DeWitt. Does it? Diogenes Laertius mentioned Epicurus's "Twelve Rudiments" but that work is lost. I don't think we know for certain what twelve points were in that work. Please correct me if I missed something from another source!! My understanding is that the Herodotus letter is as close as we get, and DeWitt's Twelve don't seem to match up neatly one-to-one in order with that letter. I've tried.
I think you're going to have to look at Dewitt and see what he's referring to with "first principles". Does me mean like "axioms"? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom
Okay, more it would be interesting if we could find a comparison between dianoia and logismos.
As a start, here's dianoia from LSJ:
Agreed.
I see him against the enculturation or education of the assembly-line variety that obscures one's ability to learn from nature and observation. But I may be fantasizing.
