Posts by Don

Thanks for the reply.

My first reaction to your post is that whether it's concepts or preconcepts in translation, the word there in 33 is prolepsis, so we're back to the discussion of what the canonic faculty of what prolepsis is.

Quote from Cassius

it is also valid and important to abstract into the single word "pleasure" all possible examples of pleasurable feelings so that we can discuss pleasure conceptually and understand that it is "Pleasure" and not divine will or ideal forms that constitutes the highest good.

See, that's where I'm not understanding where our disagreement lies. I agree that the single word pleasure encompasses all possible pleasurable feelings.

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Right there, as an example, is Epicurus including ataraxia, aponia, joy, and delight under the heading of pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

that it is "Pleasure" ... that constitutes the highest good.

We can capitalize the word to make it appear more "conceptual" but they couldn't do that in the ancient world. It was all capital letters when Epicurus was writing. But he also explicitly says:

U67. I do not think I could conceive of the good (τἀγαθὸν tagathon) without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.

The word there is tagathon "the highest good." Here's including all those physical pleasurable feelings/activities within the definition of the supreme good.

The last point for now from me is that preconceptions (prolepsis) is a distinct leg of the canon apart from the feelings of pleasure and pain. I agree we have to have words to describe the myriad pleasurable and painful feelings, and words have to have a referent in the physical or mental world. For me, when it comes to naming feelings, we feel the feeling then try to name it. That's one reason the are so many shades and intensities of pleasure and pain. Similarly but distinctly, we sense a pattern in the world through the proleptic faculty and call it justice or a cow or a tower.

This is a conversation that would work better as an actual conversation, but I remain engaged in the discussion.

Quote from TauPhi

Canonical pleasure is a feeling but "feeling pleasure" is something completely different and these two are not interchangeable.

I touched on this in my reply to Cassius but I felt a desire to respond directly to your post as well.

I disagree. As I mentioned above, from my reading, the Epicureans were firmly rooted in the physical world. Epicurus hit on using pleasure as a criteria of truth specifically because it was a visceral feeling which does "arise in every animate being."

Diogenes Laertius10.31..34: Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings (pathe) are the standards of truth ... They affirm that there are two states of feeling (pathe), pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined.

Grief, sadness, joy, and all the emotions or feelings fall either under pleasure or pain.

I'm not a huge fan of Brene Brown, but her recent Atlas of the Heart set out to classify our emotions:

https://brenebrown.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Atlas-Resources_02_List-of-Emotions_FeaturedCover.png

In looking over her chart, I think every one of those emotions or experiences can be classified as either pain or pleasure (or painful or pleasurable if you like). That's what Diogenes is referring to when he says of the Epicureans "there are two states of feeling (pathe), pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being."

I'm still not sure desire is a feeling: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hide-a…on-and-a-desire

The subtitle of that article gets at something that's been tickling my brain: "Emotion and desire are intimately related, but which one comes first? " I would substitute "feeling" for "emotion" for out purposes, but it'll do. I also like "some desires are purely physiological or biological, although even these, whether or not they be satisfied, give rise to emotions." (my emphasis added) . I still think we can have feelings about a desire but I don't think that I think that desire itself is a feeling.

In looking at Brene Brown's list, I keep thinking: We can have a desire for longing. We can wish for contentment. We can want to have our grief taken away. We can want ice cream. We can lust for sex. We can't just desire/wish/want/lust. We have to desire desire/wish/want/lust for something. There has to be an object, internal or external, of our desire/wish/aspiration/want. I think this is why I'm reluctant to assign the word "feeling" to desire. Now, we can pile feelings on top of desire if we don't get what we want (or if we do get what we want).

Quote from TauPhi

He knew that when reasoning is involved people are prone to make mistakes in their judgements. Types of desires is a neat tool to increase our chances to reason well and to make choices that minimise pain and maximise pleasure.

I like the way you worded this. I'm not sure how I can fit it into what I wrote above, BUT I wanted to acknowledge that I like the way you worded this AND to say I agree with your idea.

Yep, I think we are going to have to disagree; however, let me try to win you over to the dark side... or at least try to fully explain my position.

Quote from Cassius

I of course agree with your view of please and pain and feelings. I just also believe that the same words can also be used as concepts to denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain), and I think that Epicurus is using it both ways in different contexts as needed.

From my perspective, pleasure (hedone) and pain (various words: lype, algos) refer to the *feelings* we experience. However, I also agree with you that the words "denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain)." As I read the texts, I understand Epicurus et al. to be saying that ALL our feelings - ALL of the ways that we experience what happens to us (the literal meaning of pathe) - fall into either being pleasure or pain. All we feel can be categorized into one or the other those overarching categories. So, I agree that he's "using it both ways in different contexts," but our feeling is the constant referent.

Diogenes Laertius: They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined.

I believe Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans were firmly rooted in physical reality. When you say "concepts" I hear "Platonic ideals that exist outside the physical world." And the word that he uses is consistent for pleasure - hedone - although different words for pain are sometimes used to juxtapose against pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

For example i think references to "limit of pleasure" are conceptual. Of course we can prove our concept is accurate by looking to the feelings, and that's why it all makes sense. But the "limit of quantity of pleasure" does not in my mind describe a "particular feeling."

I agree that the "limit of pleasure" doesn't describe a "particular feeling." Instead, it refers to an animate being feeling only pleasurable sensations. Which, as finite, animate, mortal beings we can never achieve. It's a goal to move toward. That's why we choose and reject desires. To move closer to the limit of pleasure even if it is an unattainable goals for us mortal beings. Just because it's unattainable, it still is a worthy goal even if pleasures can be added and subtracted to our experience.

As it says:

Diogenes Laertius: Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible*, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures (hedone).

Eudaimonia falls under pleasure. *"The highest possible" to me reads like "the limit of pleasure." We live as mortal beings and experience pleasure that can be augmented by adding and subtracting pleasures (pleasurable feelings).

Quote from Julia

I think it is interesting there never was a symbol other than the bust, which I'm sure not just anyone could afford to own or put on display.

I don't know if any of the ancient philosophical schools had symbols as we think of them: Stoics, Academics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans, Cyrenaics, and so on and so on. Maybe they had no need. If you wanted to be a student of a school, you knew where to go in your city. I believe all the schools though had statues and busts of their founders in prominent places. Cassius Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't their reference to Epicureans in particular going around with Epicurus face on rings, cups, etc, as if it's an idiosyncrasy of the school?

Quote from Cassius

I am not sure there is much variation in the appearance of pigs(?)

That leaping posture in both of them seems too similar to be coincidence to me, but granted, that's only two data points.

I find the pose of the Boscoreale pig surprisingly similar to the Herculaneum pig.

"The Boscoreale Treasure is a large collection of exquisite silver and gold Roman objects discovered in the ruins of the ancient Villa della Pisanella at Boscoreale, near Pompeii, southern Italy." So, they're both from the same general area and same time but still, I find that similarity fascinating.

Thinking out loud (fully realizing I just said no letters )

Φ or Φ - Greek phi

• = Philosophy
• Two stylized Ps back to back = Pleasure and Pain

Some mashup of Greek H eta hedone "pleasure" and Α alpha algos "pain"?

Pig? Stylized pig? Think Christian fish?

Like I said, just thinking out loud.

Quote from Julia

Symbols like these are adopted and used without asking for universal agreement, let alone permission, and they either make it or they don't. As such, the process is an evolutionary trial & error cycle through the court of public opinion, until something just happens to be found that clicks with enough of a majority to catch on. So the trick, in my opinion, is not to make the entire world agree. It should be enough if we can come to reasonable level of agreement amongst each other, and then just try and see what happens.

Well said, Kalosyni , kudos!

I'm reminded of the Christian fish:

Ichthys - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

which appears to have been used even earlier than the cross, fell out of popular use, then roared back onto the backs of cars in the 1970s.

Quote from Julia

I think the four letters "20er" spelled out are already too much writing to make for a good logo / symbol / …

Agreed. I really like it as a graphic or as say a team logo when we have a softball team. As an overall symbol, agree with you.

Quote from Julia

lunate Epsilon: ϵ (Unicode U+03F5)
Combining Dot Above: ̇ (Unicode U+0307)
Result:ϵ̇

I can't endorse that dotted lunate epsilon. It has the same issue you raised with the symbolized E with the detached top line as to necklace, etc.

Generally, I don't like letters or numbers to be used as symbols. There's too much room for misinterpretion, jokes, etc. I'm not even sure I fully endorse the pig as a symbol. Is Horace the only textual evidence for that? I know the statue is from Herculaneum. That said, I do have a small plastic piglet on my desk at work:

Pig

OINK OINK! Like any pig, our Pig from schleich® FARM WORLD has a great sense of smell thanks to its powerful nose. The pink hoofed animal likes using it to…

us.schleich-s.com

I don't have a firm proposal, but I'm intrigued by the conversation.

Quote from Cassius

the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.

I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.

Quote from Cassius

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

You're on to something, but don't overly rely on that translation to make your point. Here's my translation:

So, the one who exhorts, on the one hand, for the one who is young to live nobly; and, on the other hand, the one who is old to come to an end nobly is a good-hearted simpleton not only because life is to be welcomed** but also because the practice of living well, nobly, and beautifully and the practice of dying well, nobly, and beautifully are the same. But far worse is the one who says, on the one hand, it is well not to be born; or, on the other hand, "failing this, to pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible."

**οὐ μόνον ὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν,... "not uniquely or only because of the 'welcoming-ness' of living,..." Or maybe better "because life is to be welcomed,..."

ἀσπαστός = welcome (whose arrival is a cause of joy)

Quote from Cassius

whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.

Desire cannot be separable from pain or pleasure because we have feelings about everything that happens to us. While we are alive, we always FEEL pleasure or pain in varying degrees. BUT is it right to say "Desire IS painful?" I'm not so sure...but...hmmm...I'm not sure.

Quote from Godfrey

Is desire really only a function of the mind? Isn't it often physical... maybe even primarily physical? It ultimately has to be as everything is physical, even the mind.

I agree that everything is physical, or material if you will. I'm not sure what you mean by "physical" in this sense. Do you mean you can "feel" desire in the sense that a particular desire "makes your heart ache" or desiring something so hard you become sick to your stomach wanting it?

Quote from Godfrey

not conflate desires with pleasures.

Completely, 100% agree with this!!

Quote from Godfrey

desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.

Quote from Godfrey

So I gather that the pleasure/pain network is separate from wanting (desire), but that they are integrally intertwined. This makes sense in light of our difficulty in determining whether desire is pain. It also reinforces the idea of desires not being the same as pleasure/pain when considered in regard to the categories of desires.

That does seem instructive, and I'd generally agree with your conclusions.

Quote from Joshua

Does the same hold for grief, sorrow, guilt, shame, fear, despair, etc?

Is happiness always pleasureable?

Interesting questions. I would say we feel pain in relation to those emotions, by definition... however, if someone is feeling the - let's say - "pain of fear" in a haunted house ride at an amusement park, are they feeling pain or pleasure? They expect to feel fear and yet they seek it out as a form of pleasure.

I would have to say that "happiness" is always pleasurable, especially if we're going to equate that with "eudaimonia": Reflect on what brings happiness, because if you have that you have everything, but if not you will do everything to attain it. (letter to Menoikeus) (Digression: ( just realized that he's not actually saying "we will do anything to have happiness." He's saying we will do everything to have what brings happiness. Slightly different emphasis.)

My mind goes back and forth, but one question and direction that hit me was...(I'm going to a little stream of consciousness here, so bear with me as I think through this, admittedly a little haphazardly)...

Is All Desire Painful? If one answers it is, doesn't Epicurus call us to avoid pain? I realize that sometimes we choose pain for a greater pleasure. However, if we are going to maintain that something as basic to human nature as "desire" (epithymia) is ALWAYS painful - and we know its painful - isn't that a rationalization that we should limit desires to ONLY those that are natural and necessary? If ALL desires at ALL times are painful, why would we want to engage in activity that is guaranteed to bring us pain? Note, I'm not endorsing this rationalization. But if we maintain that "desire = pain" someone could make this argument.

I know we have to have a feeling about everything in our lives while we're living. We live. We feel. I've done this before to try to get our fixation off of one English word. Here are the 19 headwords for ἐπῐθῡμῐ́ᾱ in Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎:

appetite idem, page 35.
aspiration idem, page 45.
bent idem, page 74.
caprice idem, page 112.
concupiscence idem, page 156.
craving idem, page 182.
desire idem, page 215.
hunger idem, page 410.
inclination idem, page 428.
itch idem, page 461.
longing idem, page 498.
lust idem, page 505.
passion idem, page 597.
predilection idem, page 634.
proneness idem, page 653.
vagary idem, page 942.
want idem, page 961.
whim idem, page 976.
wish idem, page 983.

If we begin to say desire is different from aspiration or wish, I don't know whether we can do that and keep to the spirit of the texts we have. That comb might be too fine. I'm thinking specifically of Epicurus' desire to plan for his community's and his friends' futures in his will. Did that aspiration/wish/desire bring him pleasure or pain? Was it painful to aspire/desire a good future for his friends and school?

Digression...

Note in VS21, Epicurus only talks of necessary, natural, and harmful desires. There's no talk of unnecessary or empty. Only desires which are harmful. Is he lumping "unnecessary" and "empty" together? I don't think so. I think his categorization (with doing absolutely no research into academic papers, etc.! so that caveat) categorization of desires was a work in progress. The slightly different wording in Menoikeus, the Principal Doctrines, the Vatican Sayings, show that he revisited this idea for quite some time and we see that reflected in the various ways of talking about desires.

VS21. Nature must be persuaded (πειστέον), not overpowered (βιαστέον). And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires. (Saint-Andre translation w/slight variation)

VS21. οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τάς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

πειστέον = win oversomeone to an act or course of actione sp. by speech or entreaty, oft. opp. compulsion or deception

NOTE the order in VS21: We are instructed to fulfill the NECESSARY desires and then the NATURAL desires " if they cause no harm" (ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι). That "harm" is used throughout the latter PDs: PD31 (to not harm one another or be harmed), PD32 (With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed... making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.), PD33 (Justice ...is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed), PD35 (an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed ).

I would also add that, from the letter to Menoikeus, the "unnecessary" desires are encompassed within the natural desires in VS21: "among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural"

Quick thought: desire is not a feeling. Desire is a function of the mind. We can have a feeling about a desire. But desires are cognitive.

Not sure if that helps. Placing here for later.

I love the pig woodcut design as artwork. Epicurus' bust is great as artwork.

But you have to hand it to the major religions for having easy to spot, easy to draw symbols:

☦️☪️☯️☸️🔯🕉️✡️✝️🪯

That's what we're looking for.

Getting people to agree and use it, that's a whole other kettle of fish.

There are things like the leaping piglet silhouette, @Eikadistes ' 20er moon, graphic representations of the Epicurus bust, etc. But for sheer basic graphic symbols, ya gotta hand it to the cross, crescent, Star of David, et al.

This is a good example of nothing ever goes away on the Internet I had completely forgotten about this thread from 4 years ago!

Honestly, I still think the idea has some merit. One issue is that, having the Epicurean community being so fragmented and decentralized, it would be difficult for any one image to catch on and be accepted. I remain skeptical of the ΤΦ mashup used elsewhere. It's an interesting graphic image, but tetrapharmakos is technically one word.

The symbol above? The Epicurean Atom?

And, yes, Cassius remains correct, the widespread symbol in the ancient world that we know of was the image of Epicurus in stone, on cups, on rings, etc.

Quote from Cassius

I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain. When a person is experiencing something painful, there is pain. When there is no painful feeling, there is pleasure. When a person is experiencing a pleasurable feeling, there is pleasure. Saying something like "except pain" paints the wrong picture. It's similar to saying "When I'm dead..." There is NO "I" when death is present. Likewise, there is no "pain" without someone experiencing a painful feeling.

I'd also add that there is no "desire" without someone desiring something.

As to "Is All Desire Painful?"... What happens if we expand it: "Is every desire accompanied by painful feelings?" since as I said, there is no standalone "pain" without a person feeling painful feelings.

If we look at some expanded synonyms or definitions that encompass the connotations of desire (epithymia; verb epithymeo) "set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet, desire" there is definitely a perceived lack of something that someone wants to acquire. However, there is also the idea of aspiring to something, wanting to achieve something. In that case, is it a pleasant feeling to feel you are working toward a positive goal??

I don't know if my ramblings help the discussion, but this is an interesting question. I can see how the split happened in the discussion!

Quote from Rolf

Quote from Don

don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Ah sorry, I meant natural but unnecessary

Sorry as well for my assumption.

That said, Cassius and my comments about the number of categories is always a good topic.

Quote from Cassius

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

If you have Cicero's citation handy, that would be handy.

That's one reason I like natural, necessary, and empty.

Epicurus' categories are not a strict permutation of the words un-natural and un/necessary.

Quote from Cassius

those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

In part (or in full?), empty desires, from my perspective, are those that cannot - by definition - ever be satisfied. I want more money, I want more power, and so on. I'd be curious for others' examples. Power and money have their place. Philodemus talks about "natural wealth." But greed - without limits - can never be satisfied. That's an empty - think bottomless - desire.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Quote from Bryan

I think you want U423, and so for the rest.

Exactly! Thanks, Bryan ! I was switching back and forth between VS and Fragments. (Corrected above now)

Selected Fragments, by Epicurus

This one has the Greek and English side by side.

And

Epicurus: Fragments - translation (3)

423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil; and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily. [note] τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ θρυλῶν.

***

[ U423 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

SIDEBAR: In looking at the Vatican Sayings above, I made the following delightful discovery.

Quote

U471. ...through their greed fall into ever-changing desires. ...καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

The word translated here as "ever-changing" is πολυτρόπους (polytropous).

My delightful discovery part is that πολυτρόπος is the first word used to describe Odysseus in the first line in Homer's Odyssey: ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ "Sing to me, O Muse, of the man of twists and turns,..."

πολυτρόπος has a myriad of interpretations, which is appropriate. It is literally formed of πολυ (poly) "many" + τρόπος (trópos) "a turn, direction, course, way; a way, manner, fashion; of persons, a way of life, habit, custom"

So, in VS471 the πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας " 'polytropic' desires " conveys the meaning of desires that are ever-turning, always changing direction, taking many courses or directions. To me, it conveys a sense of never being satisfied, always changing ones mind as to what they want, and so on.

I can hear the objections like "We shouldn't just be satisfied. What happens to ambition?" and so on. I simply point to VS35. Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.