Posts by Don

I think I see where you're coming from, but I'm trying to apply PD31 to the scenario:

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31 Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed. [St-Andre note to PD 31: The word σύμβολον refers to a covenant, contract, or other mutual agreement, especially (in a legal sense) a treaty between two city-states to safeguard trading between them. The verb βλάπτω means to hurt or damage someone or something, but not in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing (for which the verb ἀδικέω is used)]

That scenario did not seem to agree with that doctrine. But I'm re-reading your post... Maybe a couple times before replying in-depth. Thanks for engaging in this!!

[ADMIN NOTE: This new thread was started so as to contain the responses to the following post, which is itself a response by Don to a post by Elayne. Please check Elayne's post in the original thread for past context. As per the title I gave the new thread, it would be good to produce some hypothetical examples of "just" and "unjust" so we can begin to see the common themes.]

Quote from Elayne

There are people who take great pleasure in actions which their current majority culture labels repugnant but who cause no actual harm to anyone-- and this is definitely a common human social situation, especially in association with religions, not a rare or hypothetical event. For instance, in some cultures, anything other than heteroromantic love and sex is treated with disgust and in some cases still today with the death penalty. Would you say that a consenting adult same-sex couple in such a culture was not Epicurean to have a relationship even at risk of death? I certainly would not.

Okay, this is helpful for me to flesh out my thinking if y'all will bear with me...

I would say this specific scenario is the exact opposite of what I had in mind when I wrote my post, but that's valuable. I do find the scenario you outline repugnant (i.e., that someone holds those beliefs, to be clear), but I want to try and analyse this from an Epicurean perspective and not my personal preference.

First, I believe your scenario can be analysed to spring from an "empty" opinion or belief on the part of the one feeling "disgust" and, as such, they are not acting morally, justly, or prudently, and so their action can be said to be not choice-worthy.

1. Nature appears to provide abundant examples of same sex activities, so the "disgust" does not arise from nature.

2. If not from nature, it must arise from culture and/or law.

3. As such, is the law/custom just? Does it conform with the basic measure of justice: to neither harm nor be harmed.

4. The same sex couple are harmed explicitly. The empty belief also harms the one holding it by producing unnecessary pain. So, it does not align with the basic measure of acting justly.

5. The belief could also arise from religious (god-given) or cultural indoctrination. We know the gods do not hand down dictates from on-high. If it is cultural indoctrination, Epicurus encouraged us to free ourselves from that.

6. Therefore, I would say the person holding this opinion and getting pleasure from it is not acting justly, wisely, or morally. If they experience momentary pleasure from holding this belief, it is not choice-worthy for the reasons outlined here. The opinion will not lead to a maximally pleasurable life. A person holding that belief cannot consider themselves as following an Epicurean path.

Now, to turn to the couple.

1. The pleasure of the relationship is not an empty opinion. It arises naturally. I see no reason that specific pleasure is not choice-worthy, but...

2. In deciding to continue the relationship, the couple has to weigh multiple options in deciding choices or rejections: Is the pain at the anxiety of getting "caught" more than the pain of being apart from their partner? How long can their relationship be kept secret? Do they have alternatives? Can they migrate somewhere else? In this case, only they can decide if the resulting pleasure is worth the pain. I wouldn't have any issues with saying these two people were following an Epicurean path regardless of their ultimate choice.

Quote from Elayne

It's not a virtue of mine, relative to them, that I avoid doing things they do-- it's only a virtue in regards to my own pleasure. They wouldn't be happier changing to be like me, either, so far as I can tell.

Ah, that's my point. Someone observing your behavior may attribute it to your "virtue." You know that's an erroneous interpretation, but you're not responsible for correcting their mistaken opinion. [Unless you want to engage in some Epicurean evangelism, of course. That's up to you.] You know you're doing it because it brings you pleasure.

Quote from Elayne

I have not changed my position from what I outlined in my article

Thanks for the link. I'll take a look at that.

Quote from Elayne

What I mean by pleasure occurring or not is that it depends on material causes, not on people's opinions about what ought to happen.

Okay, I have no problem with this then. Your previous phrasing read to me like you were advocating some kind of sui generis arising. I interpreted it to mean you were implying something different. As long as we're clear the work needs to be done and choices and rejections need to be made to bring it about, we're in agreement.

Quote from Elayne

Maximum pleasure is exactly what an ordinary person would say it is-- total filling of one's mind and body with wonderful bliss-- and it occurs when all pain is absent. When one has achieved maximum blissfulness, it's unmistakable. One will not want anything more at that time, as Epicurus noted. Contrary to rumor, regular humans can experience this.

Quote from Elayne

The maximum possible pleasure over a lifetime is realistically not likely going to involve continuous total bliss, because we don't have the power to prevent every pain, including pains that can stand in the path to pleasures--- but we can obtain a lot more ongoing pleasure than most people realize.

Quote from Elayne

We must evaluate all decisions and virtues in light of pleasure as our sole guide and goal. Yes, of course, it's smart to take into account both our past experiences and the experiences of other humans in similar situations. That's basic physics.

Yep, I agree with this statement, too.

So.... Do we disagree somewhere then that I'm missing? Is there anything I've stated that you take issue with? Or that I've implied that you don't agree with? I'm sincere and not being mean, sarcastic, or flippant here. I'm genuinely curious to dig into details.

Quote from Cassius

In other words I don't think any of us have a problem with saying that "in general" we can use the past to point the right direction in the future, but we certainly can't do that all the time, and we have to understand that the universe isn't mechanistic or determined or fated or guided by divinity and so walk and chew gum at the same time.

One of the few things we can use to make choices and rejections in the present is whether we reacted with pleasure or pain to a specific action in a specific situation in the past. Is the current situation similar enough to the past situation to warrant one decision or another? Barring that, have we observed others taking actions that had painful or pleasurable outcomes *from our perspective* in similar circumstances to this? We don't have to accept a mechanistic or divine universe to use observation and perceived causes and effects to make prudent decisions.

Quote from Elayne

I am going to be bold and say that for any specific behavior/virtue you want to name as universally leading to a maximally pleasurable human life, I can name an exception.

Whether you can name an exception to an action in a specific circumstance doesn't really prove anything. Acting justly, prudently, and morally *is* contextual. It may be that the same action in a different situation would not be acting prudently, justly, or morally.

Maybe I should say that in a specific situation, there are actions within that given scenario that would lead to a more pleasurable life for (almost) anyone. The identical action in a different situation may not lead to a more pleasurable life. Therefore, there are no absolute or uniquely virtuous actions; only virtuous actions contextually for a given circumstance.

Quote from Elayne

People resist understanding that nothing defines pleasure other than the direct experience. Maximum pleasure is not modified or limited by definitions or concepts-- it simply occurs or does not.

There's nothing to argue about here in that pleasure or pain *are* direct experience, just like the senses. Pain and pleasure are two non-rational/pre-cognitive guides we use to make choices and rejections.

How do you define what Epicurus meant by the "limit of pleasure" or the "maximum pleasure"? Can you expand on what you mean by it "simply occurs or does not"? And if it "simply occurs or does not" what use is it to make choices or rejections in an effort to bring the maximally pleasurable life about?

Quote from Elayne

When you said honesty wasn't the most important virtue in my hypothetical but protecting the friend was, that is exactly the kind of thing virtue ethicists say-- while failing to acknowledge that the actual deciding factor is pleasure, not protection of another.

Let me rephrase then: The pain I would feel if my friend were harmed is actually the deciding factor.

Quote from Elayne

In PD5, Epicurus does not idealize the words prudently, morally, and justly. He doesn't put forth a concept of prudence that would result in the same action for every human in every situation.

I never said he idealized those "virtues" as capital-V Virtues.

In fact, that's exactly why he did NOT write:

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It is not possible to live a pleasurable life without Wisdom, Morality, and Justice; and it is impossible to live with Wisdom, Morality, and Justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.

as if they were Platonic ideals or absolutes. He used adverbs to clearly show he was not talking about specific actions but rather acting prudently, morally, and justly in any given situation.

Quote from Elayne

No, a descriptor is not the same as a qualifier. A qualifier, as you accurately say, limits or modifies -- and I am doing neither. If my description were a qualifier, it would mean that I am _not_ only doing as I please but am limiting or modifying my scope of action beyond doing as I please. And that's not the case.

I still think we're splitting hairs. I'm using modifier, descriptor, and qualifier as synonyms. Maybe that's sloppy, maybe not. You're using each with a specific narrow definition from what I can see. This could spiral down a sophist rabbit hole, so I'm content to abandon this particular thread.

I do want to respond to your other points, but that'll be a bit later.

I'll admit the Stoic mention was a throwaway line. I freely admit I shouldn't have thrown that in there because i don't know enough about the Stoics to say that unequivocally. I'mma gonna take that back. So...

Quote from Cassius

Unless I am shown that i need to revise my understanding of the Stoics or others on this point I think that I'm probably correct,

I'll concede this, but...

Quote from Cassius

and this isn't just a minor point but perhaps why we keep sparring over PD10. Truly I think that Epicurus held that the word virtue and all of its particular instances has NO MEANING unless it actually leads to pleasure, so he basically held the word to be without content except as defined in a particular circumstance,

I don't think PD10 has anything to do with virtue. Let me be clear. The cautions Epicurus lays out in opposition to the profligate life in PD10 has *nothing* to do with whether it's "virtuous" or not. Zero. And there's no question whether the "lost" in PD10 experiences pleasure. They do. The reason that those life choices can be cautioned against is that they do not - from observation over time and multiple instances - do not reliably lead to a lifetime of pleasure. Trying to say that they do or can is living in a utopian hypothetical fantasy world. And Epicurus urged people to live in the real natural material cosmos. You can experience pleasure for a bit if you do this, but that path is not choice-worthy. You have been warned.

The enslavement of other humans was widespread and accepted as "natural" in the ancient (and not so ancient world):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/slavery…sophers_1.shtml

At least Epicurus held out the idea that what was considered "just" in one place and era need not be considered just for all places and all time. Plus Epicurus accepted all people into the Garden when that kind of thing was unheard of: free, enslaved; men, women. That's one of the things that first attracted me to his philosophy.

Quote from Protonus

I assume that the context means "each of us dies without truly living" by postponing joy?

That's probably not a bad way of summarizing. We only have one life and are not both twice. If you don't experience a pleasurable life now, you've missed your opportunity.

Welcome to the discussion, Protonus !

I do believe also that just not many people are aware of Epicureanism as an option.

The Stoic "indifference" and thus dichotomy of control even has antecedents in Epicurus's philosophy. I think it's a Greek thing and not unique to the Stoics.

But I think Epicurus is on sounder footing overall with respect to this and ... Well, everything else, too:

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Letter to Menoikeus (Diogenes Laertius, book X: 127): Remember that what will be is not completely within our control nor completely outside our control, so that we will not completely expect it to happen nor be completely disappointed if it does not happen.

And...

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Vatican Saying 14: We are born only once and cannot be born twice, and must forever live no more. You don't control tomorrow, yet you postpone joy. Life is ruined by putting things off, and each of us dies without truly living. [Emphasis added]

And...

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Vatican Saying 64: The esteem of others is outside our control; we must attend instead to healing ourselves.

Quote from Elayne

It would be weird to remove my awareness of future consequences from actions in the present--

I think it would be weird, too, so I'm curious where you're getting that from what's posted. From my perspective, the "awareness of future consequences" is the heart of any practice of Epicuren philosophy. That's the basis for all choices and rejections: how do actions in the present affect my current and future experience of pleasure.

Quote from Elayne

I disagree strongly about any implied absolute meaning for virtue common to all humans. If Epicurus was saying that, and I don't think he was, he would have been wrong.

So, do you disagree with PD 5 then? Why does Epicurus single out living prudently, morally, and justly if not recognizing them as "virtues" consistent with a pleasurable life across a wide swath of people? These traits lead - by observation - to more pleasurable living. Why wouldn't he endorse them?

Quote from Elayne

There can't biologically be one set of behaviors leading to a pleasurable life for every single human.

That's just not true. There are any number of behaviors that will consistently and verifiably lead to a more pleasurable life for any organism. Nature gives plenty of examples of behaviors that make an organism "fit" that are applicable across populations. Humans are no exception. I'm not saying every human being is going to have every common behavior, but I think you're going overboard to say there aren't *any* common behaviors that would be conducive to a pleasurable life. A pleasurable life is free from anxiety, want, pain, etc. There are common actions to take to achieve that.

Quote from Elayne

And even for a single human, it's not wise to make any fixed virtue that could override pleasure-- there can be extenuating circumstances, such as the classic murderer asking for your friend's whereabouts. So no virtue like honesty is fixed. Everything is relative to pleasure.

I don't have any argument with this. I'm not advocating overriding pleasure by virtue. Virtue is *always* in service to pleasure. There isn't any absolute virtue that's followed 100% of the time. Virtuous activity and the degree to which it's carried out is always relative to the situation and context. Stoics would say that. Epicureans would say that. In any case, honesty isn't the appropriate virtue here in your scenario anyway. You're throwing up a red herring. Here the virtuous act is protecting your friend. Anyone who says that being 100% truthful at all times is living in a utopian fantasy.

Quote from Elayne

For most of us, natural empathy provides the pro-social pleasure motive. For some, fear of consequences provides the reason to abstain from harming others, which Epicurus mentioned multiple times. However, it is easy to observe that some high functioning low empathy humans have enough financial resources to protect themselves from at least some degree of asocial if not downright anti-social living. And _if_ they have pleasurable lives that way, free from both anxiety and painful punishment, only they can give testimony. It's definitely risky to live outside the typical human virtue preferences, but it can be done. Those are the folks I try to avoid strenuously!

I understand your saying "only they can give testimony," but people can convince themselves - or try to convince others - of most anything. I would find it difficult to accept the idea that a misanthropic, antisocial person feels pleasure at their lives. That's a lot of psychological pain to work through. But it's also not my place to worry about them unless I have to interact with them... Which, as you say, it is best to simply avoid them per Epicurus's advice.

Quote from Cassius

If in fact, per PD10, he achieves pleasure, then in fact there is nothing to criticize.

I knew PD10 was going to come up. I know we've tangled on this before, and while I accept your premise you present here, I reject that that is what Epicurus was saying. He did not observe that the person described in PD10 *would* realistically "achieve" nor *could* expect to achieve pleasure. I believe Epicurus was saying exactly what he meant here (after looking at the verb forms used) and in the Menoikeus Letter. I'm going to be obstinate on this point. To use an Epicurean pun: I'm pig-headed in this.

Quote from Cassius

If applied as written, this gives an automatic veto power over your conduct to the unqualified "outside observer" and that would be deferring to an outside force that has no more natural or idealist authority than anything Plato or Moses came up with.

I should be more clear. I'm not implying veto power to anyone. What I'm saying is that if the Epicurean acts virtuously from a desire for their own pleasure, the outside observer sees this and assumes (incorrectly!) that the Epicurean is acting virtuously for virtue's sake. The 3rd party assumes a particular motivation for the virtuous behavior they observe. That motivation, however, is not the Epicurean's motivation. The outward appearance may be similar to the Stoic's or Peripatetic's, but the actions spring from a completely different set of motivations.

And the Epicurean need not dissuade the 3rd party from their assumptions. That's the 3rd party's problem.

Quote from Cassius

In other words, I think the key is that you do not give unqualified "Others" veto power over the goals you choose for your life.

Oh, yeah. I knew 39 was all queued up. And I agree with this, as what I stated above may imply.

Overall, I don't have much to quibble with in your response unless I'm missing something... Other than our divergent interpretations of PD10.

I suspected my post would elicit some discussion. This is good! I don't have time this morning to respond to everything, but wanted to comment specifically to Elayne 's comment:

Quote from Elayne

Don that's not a qualifier-- it's just a description of what I like to do, not a restraint separate from my pleasure.

I think we're splitting hairs. Merriam-Webster's definition of qualifier is:

a word (such as an adjective) or word group that limits or modifies the meaning of another word (such as a noun) or word group

That's what your phrase is doing.

I do exactly plan on doing as I please.

What do you do?

That which involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others.

I don't have any problem with that sentiment. In fact it's laudable, not that you should care what I think. But it definitely qualifies/describes what you please to do. You can't say "no qualifiers" and then add a statement defining what you please to do means to you.

PS: I should add that I realize that your qualifier/modifier is contextual. If someone is harming someone you care about (or you're being harmed yourself), you would have no qualms about NOT concerning yourself with the pleasure of the other, the attacker in this case. Nor would I.

It sounds to me like Elayne is embodying KD5:

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KD5: It is not possible to live a pleasurable life without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.

Virtues like empathy, compassion, altruism are not ends unto themselves but are traits that can spring from our desire for -- and can lead to -- our personal experience of pleasure. We don't practice virtues (however that's defined) because it's the "right" thing to do; we practice virtues because it leads to a pleasurable life.

As I understand Elayne 's post (please correct me if I'm misinterpreting):

Quote from Elayne

Well... I do exactly plan on doing as I please, with no qualifiers! It's just that what I please involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others, not that I'm trying to avoid causing trouble or disrupting my schedule for reasons unrelated to pleasure.

It actually seems you are in fact adding qualifiers right away:

I do exactly plan on doing as I please which involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others.

Which seems to uphold the tenets of KD5. Elayne is not going to purposefully cause pain to others because she takes pleasure in the pleasure of others.

Likewise, if we value our own pleasure, the most intelligent choice is to be kind to others since that engenders goodwill, creates bonds of friendship and love (among colleagues, partners, family members, etc.), and so increases the likelihood that our personal pleasure is more secure. This use of intelligent choice seems to me to be acting virtuously. Elayne even says:

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[Person B] should want me to be selfish for their own sake!

This seems to be similar to what the psychologists, Buddhists, et al. call "selfish altruism" or "intelligent selfishness":

• https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/m…lating-kindness
• https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/in-con…shness-altruism
• https://www.skepticspath.org/blog/how-to-be…ish-dalai-lama/

Which leads me to ask: What if someone does what the average person would call selfish "morally reprehensible" actions but derives personal pleasure from them?

I'll fully agree that Epicurus's philosophy does not endorse Platonic ideals. There is no "ideal" form of beauty, chairs, Truth, etc. The philosophy clearly states that there is no absolute god-given moral authority, it's based on societal agreements and "don't harm; don't be harmed." Plus he wrote "all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good [good, blessing, benefit, useful to us], not all pleasure is choiceworthy."

He doesn't say it's right, morally or ethically good, just basically that all pleasure is "positive" but just because it's positive doesn't make it choice-worthy. And pain is not always to be fled from. In fact, the pleasure "choice" and pain "shunned" use the same roots that Epicurus consistently uses where "choice" and "avoidances" show up in translations.

Epicurus clearly tried to break sharply away from "virtue for virtue's sake." Virtue, he taught, was instrumental to pleasure and thus to leading a pleasurable life. So, it seems to me that Epicureans are still going to act virtuously to the outside observer. The inner motivation is going to be far different than the Stoic or Aristotelian, but the visible form/action is going to be similar.

I get the impression from time to time that some people want to say there's no absolute moral authority to define morality in Epicurean philosophy, so anything goes as long as the person is experiencing Pleasure in the moment.

I don't accept this. A pleasurable life is the goal. Epicurus says that's only possible if you act virtuously; and vice versa: if you act virtuously, you'll have a better chance of living pleasurably.

People who take pleasure in what the average human would find morally or ethically repugnant aren't living according to Epicurean principles and so we would have reason to intervene and attempt to get them to change. Just because they are feeling pleasure doesn't make their life choice-worthy. I wrestle with this, but the more I think about it, the more I'm coming to these conclusions.

I like this better than the Tetrapharmakos "symbol" I've seen online that mashes the tau Τ and phi Φ of that word.

Quote from JJElbert

Wait a minute...🤔

From Don –ἀοχλησία is "freedom from disturbance"...

And ἐκκλησία is "a political or religious assembly"....

Do I detect a pun here? 🙃

LOL. Well, if there wasn't one, there is one now! Well played!!

I thought I'd add a link to my section on the characteristics of the sage, specifically about sexual desire:

https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…l-relationships

The section of the podcast talking about not succumbing to lust brought my translation to mind.

Just needed to say, Joshua , I always enjoy reading your insightful comments. Thanks!!