Posts by Don

FYI: I'm going to start using KD (Key Doctrines) instead of PD (Principal Doctrines) to maintain the same KD initials for English and Greek (Kyriai Doxai). Call me pedantic. I can take it.

KD 34: Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

Saint-Andre translation: Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing.

So, there's really no such thing as an unjust act or injustice itself it seems, just like righteousness doesn't exist in and of itself. Okay, that's at least consistent. Wrong-doing (another translation of ἀδικία) isn't "bad in and of itself" ("οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν").

What I'm reading here is that breaking the law - transgressing that mutual contract - isn't bad in and of itself. It's only bad because of the fear you as the criminal experience from the anxiety that you might get caught.

Frankly, this is where Epicurus begins to lose me. This KD, along with the next one (KD 35) which we'll look at below, clearly seems to say that the only unjust act, according to Epicurus, is one that will make you fear you might get caught breaking a law. What if you have no conscience? What if you don't fear punishment? Granted, punishment was much harsher in ancient Greece and Rome than it is currently in modern culture. Consider the prisons in ancient Rome. They were terrible places! Check out this article from the Center for Hellenic Studies on "Punishment in Ancient Athens". Some punishments listed include "imposed fines, imprisonment, a set time of public humiliation in the stocks, limited loss of political rights, total disfranchisement, exile from the city ..., and death...." It could also include torture and what the article calls "bloodless crucifixion" that sounds horrible and was for citizens. The article goes on to say even convicted murderers were expected to try and break out of prison and go into exile, ridding the polis of their poisonous influence and giving the criminal a new possible life elsewhere. So, even the justice system of Ancient Athens had loopholes! Epicurus's conscience deterrent seems woefully lacking and without real teeth. It *almost* seems - dare I say - idealistic, and expects humans all to be subject to the same fear.

In KD 34, Epicurus does decide to finally use ἀδικία "injustice" ἀ "not" + δικία "just" http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=a)diki/a

This KD is going to be better parsed by bringing along the next one, KD 35. As Cassius has pointed out, there are no numbers in the original manuscripts. This one also stars with another Οὐκ ἔστι "it is not" like 33 and 34:

KD 35: Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι κινοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

Saint-Andre translation: It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

...ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι,...

...contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed,...

(Note our old friend βλάπτειν again!)

Here again, the emphasis is on the uncertainty of escaping detection. Was Epicurus relying on someone's fear of being tortured or of being removed or exiled from the city to maintain security and peace! It appears so. I find that a weak argument on several fronts. It also seems an odd way of defining injustice.

Thoughts?

Quote from JJElbert

To illustrate Don's point, a little thought experiment; how many male names could I produce from the ancient world off the top of my head? Easily a hundred. How many women? Thinking now, I start to struggle after five or six. And how many of those are duly famous in their own right? Sappho...Hypatia...Cleopatra...

And how many names would be actual women and how many would be mythological or legendary?

Okay, moving on to PD 33, it appears pretty straightforward:

33 Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

Saint-Andre translation: 33 Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place. [St-Andre note: The word συνθήκη, translated here as "compact", means essentially the same as the word σύμβολον from Principal Doctrine 31.*]

Here, it's important to note that there's not a word meaning absolute although the intent is the same. Epicurus specifically says:

Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη...

"Righteousness does not exist in and of itself"

δικαιοσύνη is an abstract noun formed from δῐ́καιος (díkaios, “just”) +‎ -σῠ́νη (-súnē, "forms abstract nouns from adjectives or nouns"). So, δικαιοσύνη = righteousness, justice (as an abstract concept); fulfillment of the law. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…try=dikaiosu/nh

Epicurus states unequivocally that there is no such entity as δικαιοσύνη that exists independent of context. There is no Platonic Form of righteousness in the Cosmos.

... but/instead... ἀλλ’...

it is always a compact

...ἀεὶ ... συνθήκη...

...ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ... τόπους ... τις...

agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

to not harm one another or be harmed

(Note our old friend βλάπτειν from the previous PDs)

Some important words:

ἀλλήλων expresses an action done in two directions: of one another, to one another, one another, each other, mutually, reciprocally. So, the compact/agreement has to be reciprocal and mutually agreed upon.

συστροφαῖς is a mass or gathering of people. This is the dative plural form of συστροφή. The -στοφη -strophē is akin to strophe in English as in a poem's twisting lines or the word apostrophe. I imagine a coming together of people, swirling in from disparate locations, to form a bustling community.

ὁπηλίκους refers to the idea of no matter how big or how small. The size of the gathering doesn't matter when it comes to making an agreement. This is potentially important for our discussions.

I'm also putting βλάπτειν back in here http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=bla/ptw and its opposite αδικέω which notably Epicurus chooses NOT to use: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…=captus#lexicon That may also continue to be important as this discussion moves doing.

Let the games continue...

The more I think about this, the more I wonder if we can include slaves in the ethnos έθνος mentioned in the Principle Doctrine. Slaves, although powerless, are still bound by the laws put in place by the slaveholding state. However, such law is not for the mutual benefit or pleasure of both parties.

Now, I can see the ruling class of such a state using a rationalization that the enslaved need to be "civilized," that they can't take care of themselves "by their nature", etc. which is not based on observation but prejudices.

As such, it seems to me that such a law would have to be unjust. It does not meet the fundamental quality or prolepsis of justice in providing an agreement to neither harm nor be harmed. One party is obviously harming the other. As such, any law sanctioning slavery is unjust whether ancient or modern. Whether or not Philodemus encourages using slaves or treating them kindly.

Now, an enslaved person who rises up against the one who oppresses her is not necessarily engaged in a just act. That's still harming another. However, if it was in self-defense or in direct reaction to being harmed by the unjust law of slavery, maybe it could be determined to be just.

On the other hand, if two parties sign a contract of indentured service and the servant rises up against the other party, that is unjust. In that case, even though one party has more power than the other, each agreed to the contract.

The whole idea of agreements, mutual benefit, security from harm, seems the only way to determine if justice or injustice is present. Maybe in some situations, it simply doesn't exist. For example, there is no justice or injustice if a tiger kills and eats a human. There was never any agreement. If another human kills and eats a human, that is an injustice because there are laws against that. By living in a society with those laws, citizens "agree" to abide by those laws.

I'm still trying to work out the identity of the ethnos who do not have power or who decide to not enter into agreements. This gets much more complex when dealing with humans than the animal scenarios. How and when are agreements made? Is the international community one society under some laws?

Obviously, I'm still thinking out loud. Maybe spend some time in JSTOR or Long & Sedley's Hellenistic Philosophers.

I may pause this one and continue to delve into parsing the remaining PDs.

I finally had the chance to listen to the entire episode. I agree this is an important practical topic. Lucretius's focus on a men's perspective primarily is simply because it was a very patriarchal society. His deciding to talk about women enjoying sex at all is a revolutionary idea for his time.

I also generally agree with Elayne's brief comment near the end on women's status in ancient Roman society. In fact, women were always going to be under the control of a male guardian. Male slaves could at least have the possibility of buying or winning their freedom. The pater familias, the oldest male in the household, literally had life and death control over all the members of the household. The women of ancient Greece had their lives even more circumscribed.

Ancient Greek and Roman women could only exercise any influence solely through the men in their lives. If they could get men to listen to them only by feigning to enjoy sex with them, more power to them. They had to be resourceful.

The hetairai of ancient Greece had it both better and worse than most women. From what I remember reading, they had no recourse if a roaming band of drunken men tried to break into their house to demand sex. There are stories of men trying to burn doors down because they felt entitled even after being turned away for being rude, drunk, and disorderly. I've read the hetairai were often more free and cultured than married women, but at the cost of their security. They were expected to entertain men, engage them in high-level conversation at symposia, and also be available for sex. Some hetairai were long-term companions of particular men (e.g., Pericles and Aspasia)

On a slight tangent: To get a woman's perspective on Ancient Greece in an entertaining and poignant fashion, I highly recommend Natalie Haynes recent novel A Thousand Ships. This is a retelling of the Trojan War from the perspective of all the women and goddesses mentioned in Homer and other sources. Haynes does an amazing job narrating the audiobook, too! It was an eye-opening experience listening to it.

btw... I believe this all hinges on the definition of "injustice" and what it means in an Epicurean context to be "unjust."

Okay, I'm working through whether I concur with all your assertions and citations. Leaning towards some, others... Jury remains out.

Let me propose an alternative history scenario (and I know I'm going against my "no hypotheticals" policy):

• The Confederacy and the United States sign a treaty in the 1860s recognizing the Confederacy as a separate country.
• The institution of slavery continues in the South.
• Does this represent no injustice since enslaved people have no power to enter into a social agreement?
• What would an Epicurean - either northern or southern - have to say about this after the treaty between the two countries was signed?

Let me talk this out:

So, humanists deal in ideals. "The powerful *should* protect the weak." There's no natural source for this. It simply derives from the humanist idealist perspective of the "intrinsic" value of human life. It's an article of faith if you will. Epicurus rejects ideals and absolutes. So...

Question 1: What, if any, intrinsic value does Epicurus place on human life? I'm seeing the answer as "none" with the caveat that he also places great value on the life of the individual since this is the ONLY life you get... And we should strive to make it as pleasurable as possible.

So, maybe the idea that Epicurus doesn't place an absolute value on human life needn't bother me? But...

Question 2: Is Epicurus equating animals with the people who don't have the power to - or who chose not to - enter into social agreements? On one level, that's true. From a naturalist perspective, we're all animals. On the other hand, this idea has been used to rationalize some heinous atrocities throughout history. Does Epicureanism recognize such events as atrocities (e.g., Holocaust, Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambodian Killing Fields, etc etc)? Or, if the people involved had no power, is there any injustice? What is an Epicurean response to these kinds of events - historically and contemporary? If there one kind of response or just individual responses? What is the practical response? What is the philosophical response?

If we're taking a deep dive into the meaning of justice and injustice in Epicurus's Philosophy, I'm going all in. Mostly for myself, but y'all are welcome to ride along. Let's hold our breath!

In trying to get a handle on what the last few Principal Doctrines mean, I'm looking next at 32:

Quote

Saint-Andre translation: With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.

I'm using Saint-Andre's translation because I find it more literal than some of the others. Even so, it's helpful to parse the original text along with it.

Quote

32 Ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

Here we find βλάπτειν and its forms again, so we're dealing with intention it seems. But who are these people (εθνών) referred to as

μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο whose situation is similar to animals? They're not (μη) ἐδύνατο nor (μη) ἐβούλετο...

ἐδύνατο had to do with having power or the ability to do something.

ἐβούλετο had to do with making choices or preferences.

So these people (εθνών ethnōn, related to English ethnography, ethnicity) had no power and no ability to make choices. It sounds like Epicurus is referring to conquered peoples or those unwilling to choose to make agreements (enemies?).

My unease here stems from the fact that he seems to be equating the situation with these peoples with the situation with animals. We can't make agreements with animals, we can't make agreements with these peoples, and so there's no justice nor injustice with relation to them.

Is he saying "don't worry about how you treat animals and people with whom you have no covenant"? There is no justice or injustice in these situations is what he's saying. Is this giving credence to "might makes right"? If so, I have some issues. Isn't part of the humanist - humanist not Epicureanism - philosophy that those weaker or less fortunate should be protected by and from those with more power?

Reactions?

Quote from Cassius

Maybe we need to be very precise as to what it is that justice relates to. For example what does "courage" relate to? Will power? What does "temperance" relate to? Self-control? What does "wisdom" relate to? Practical application of knowledge?

Cicero gives the spectrums as a starting point:

• Wisdom < > Rashness
• Temperance < > License
• Courage < > Cowardice
• Justice < > Unrighteousness

Of course, you know I want to see the original Latin and various translations. For now, I won't digress. It seems to me that these each relate to a different decision-making process, i.e., to which end of the spectrum do we gravitate:

• How do we decide on courses of action?
• How do we decide on which desires to pursue?
• How do we respond to danger?
• How do we treat other people?

Cicero - and possibly Epicurus - seems to imply that a more pleasurable life will be lived by the person who gravitates to the left than to the right.

Quote from Cassius

Perhaps the area of human life that "justice" relates to is simply "our relationship with other people" and the question involved is "does this or that relationship in fact lead to pleasure for each person concerned, or does it lead to pain for one of more of the people concerned?

Is it possible that the question of just or unjust is as simple as that?

I think it is. Look at the experiments with children and monkeys and fairness (i.e., justice). They know when the puppet or they themselves are being cheated. I believe that's the concept of fairness (Lisa Feldman Barrett maybe) or prolepsis (Epicurus) that forms the basis of our idea of justice.

I think it's important to look at PD 31 and the exact words used:

Quote

31: Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit [σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος, lit. "an agreement of interests"], to not harm one another or be harmed.

Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

[St-Andre note to PD 31] The word σύμβολον refers to a covenant, contract, or other mutual agreement, especially (in a legal sense) a treaty between two city-states to safeguard trading between them. The verb βλάπτω means to hurt or damage someone or something, but not in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing (for which the verb ἀδικέω is used)

Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν is a little more complex than "natural justice" would imply. To dikaion (Τὸ ... δίκαιόν) has to do with behaving in an orderly manner, adhering to mutual obligations in contracts, observant of duties to gods and men, etc. The modifying phrase (...τῆς φύσεως ...) tēs physeōs is literally "of nature" or to paraphrase natural, but also the natural form or constitution of something. "The most fundamental form of the mutual obligations of two parties" is a long-winded way of getting at the nuance of the topic of PD 31.

And what is this "natural form"? To not harm or be harmed refers "to not hurt or damage someone or something in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing." Therefore, willful injustice or wrongdoing are not "just" ways of acting. You have to consider intention in deciding if one's actions are just or not.

Injustice ἀδικία rears its head then in PD 34:

Quote

34: Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν...

Injustice (ἀδικία) or "hurting or damaging someone or something in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing" is not purely bad in itself... (but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing. )

So, do we act justly or righteously to simply avoid this disturbance and anxiety? Is Epicurus just saying you will lead a pleasurable life if you act justly because you won't be looking over your shoulder your whole life? I think this is part of it, but there also seems to be a societal component as well. But that can wait until tomorrow!

I can't shake the idea that it has to be possible to determine if an action or law is just or not. Why else would Epicurus devote so many of the Principal Doctrines to justice?

I intellectually understand no divine or absolute source for morality, and life is contextual. But Epicurus's prolepsis of justice has to have some practical application.

What is it but to help us choose how to act justly which goes hand in hand with living pleasurably?

Quote from Elayne

Is your new assertion "People who take pleasure in what a just human would find unjust aren't living according to Epicurean principles and so we would have reason to intervene and attempt to get them to change. Just because they are feeling pleasure doesn't make their life choice-worthy. I wrestle with this, but the more I think about it, the more I'm coming to these conclusions."

Have you substituted "just" for "average", and "unjust" for "repugnant"?

There's revision from there, too. It may be tweaking around the corners but I'll submit this:

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PD10A: If the objects which are productive of pleasures to persons engaged in unjust acts really freed them from fears of the mind — the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain — if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, [then] we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.

Sorry. I couldn't resist. But that's my basic argument... "What is just and unjust from an Epicurean perspective, and what is choice-worthy?"

Quote from Elayne

I would also say it's not correct to label someone taking pleasure in _anything_ as not Epicurean.

You're right. Experiencing pleasure or not doesn't make one an Epicurean. Every living thing does that. To be an Epicurean, we need to make decisions based on the Canon, etc.

Quote from Elayne

Btw, it's 100% natural for humans to establish taboos, unjust or not.

In the current discussion, I don't believe homophobia can be termed a taboo although you may be able to define taboo broadly enough to include anything culturally prohibited. But even with that, I would assert it ultimately springs from a religious prejudice even if it eventually becomes "cultural."

Quote from Elayne

I can see it makes you very uncomfortable to confront the lack of definite moral standards apart from individual pleasure. I think that's what makes this discussion relevant to where it started, because that's exactly why people cling to the fixed virtues in Stoicism rather than to pleasure.

Is it that obvious? Frankly, that's one thing that bothers me. Maybe I'm not cut out for Epicureanism after all. Maybe I am a Stoic or a Buddhist after all. This discussion is very interesting from that perspective too in making me confront prejudices and proclivities of my own.

Just thinking, we need to be careful to distinguish among behaviors or laws that are just, that are moral, or that are ethical. The latter two bleed into the area of absolutists. But we *should* be able to decide if an act or law is just or not. We're supposed to have prolepseis of that after all.

Quote from Cassius

It is possible that it would be a good idea to start a new discussion under one of the "justice" subforums.

Good idea. We've gone far astray off the initial topic of this thread.

Quote from Cassius

...There's a pleasure in using one's mind and doing what one can to find out the truth and then apply the lessons learned, and at least from my point of view that pleasure is worth an awful lot.

That entire post is an eloquent statement of your beliefs and obviously heartfelt and sincere. I deeply appreciate your sharing it.

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus might say that "justice" means "an agreement (contract?) that brings pleasure to all parties to the contract." If so, then injustice might refer to "an agreement (contract? social relationship?) that does NOT bring pleasure to all parties in that relationship.

I see where you're going I think.

But if that's the case, then I also think I stand by my initial assertion that the law/custom/contract to execute homosexuals is not just because it certainly doesn't benefit both parties.

In light of there being no absolute justice (or ideal virtue of justice), how do we determine if an act (or law) is just? How do we act justly?

Can you provide a specific scenario that would illustrate someone acting justly? Or the opposite?

That's not a challenge btw 😉 just a clarifying question.

I also would say that the pleasure of the homophobe is no more choice-worthy than the pleasure of the profligate from our old friend PD 10. You may get pleasure from it for awhile, but it's eventually going to bite you... Or has the potential to. In the former case, depending where they go in the world, there is social sanction, political ostracism, becoming a victim of violence if you state your beliefs to the wrong person, etc.

I realize this veers from the justice argument, but I feel it's also a consideration in determining the choice-worthiness of the pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time,

In the modern world, how do we define "place". Are we dealing with only national or smaller places... Or do we consider the international arena to take precedence? Or the human community,? Or something else entirely?

Quote from Cassius

I think this is a very good scenario to illustrate the issue, so I am not sure Don why you see this as "the exact opposite of what you had in mind"(?) Maybe there is something in your comment there, as to why you find the scenario the opposite of what you were thinking, that would help if you explained(?)

Oh, I originally approached the thought experiment as something I (or someone like me) would find repugnant (e.g., killing ones children, torturing people, etc.) that someone else would find laudable. I didn't consider the scenario of somebody being repelled by something I feel positive toward. So I found the turned-tables an interesting but unexpected opportunity to explore this topic.

I hope that helps explain my verbage.