Posts by Don

Thank you, Martin! What Martin is saying was my impression as well. Epicurus was fully against using logic and rhetoric and argument to obfuscate the truth or to mislead people. People "gifted" with the ability to make fine speeches or craft elaborate but empty arguments can convince unsuspecting or uncritical people of anything.

Quote from camotero

"How do we know something is true? I can feel when something is true". I don't think this is true, but I'm open to be corrected. I'm pretty sure the person who said this didn't mean it and said it rhetorically or lightly as no one objected it. But as I said, I don't think you can feel truth. You may have true feelings. But the truth about something has to be established (and agreed upon to be able to move forward) logically, albeit after the senses gave us content to reason about, and after we've tested out reasoning with those same senses.

Your quote here Mathitis Kipouros reminded of this thread that I had started awhile ago: Facts don't care about your feelings

That footnote 50 after Socrates refers to Cicero's Brutus (85.292):

Quote

"But I made some remarks," said Atticus, "which I had several times a mind to mention; only I was loath to interrupt you. As your discourse, however, seems to be drawing towards an end, I think I may venture to out with them."—"By all means," replied I.—"I readily grant, then," said he, "that there is something very humourous and elegant in that continued Irony, which Socrates employs to so much advantage in the dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines. For when a dispute commences on the nature of wisdom, he professes, with a great deal of humour and ingenuity, to have no pretensions to it himself; while, with a kind of concealed raillery, he ascribes the highest degree of it to those who had the arrogance to lay an open claim to it. Thus, in Plato, he extols Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and several others, to the skies: but represents himself as a mere ignorant. This in him was peculiarly becoming; nor can I agree with Epicurus, who thinks it censurable. But in a professed History, (for such, in fact, is the account you have been giving us of the Roman Orators) I shall leave you to judge, whether an application of the Irony is not equally reprehensible, as it would be in giving a judicial evidence."—"Pray, what are you driving at," said I,— "for I cannot comprehend you."

Here's one section of DeWitt that addresses what I remembered about Socrates and about dialectic. Interestingly, logic doesn't appear in the index to Epicurus and His Philosophy:

Quote

As for the third branch of Platonic studies, dialectic, the evidence for Epicurus' familiarity with it is the express and almost total rejection of it. The grounds of this rejection were both ethical and intellectual. It is on record that he condemned the irony of Socrates.50 It is not difficult to discern the reasons for this. The pretence of ignorance is a form of dishonesty and inconsistent with that absolute frankness (parresia) by which Epicurus set great store, as will be shown under the head of the New Virtues. Yet even assuming that Socrates felt himself to be genuinely ignorant of the nature of piety or justice, he was deliberately concealing his mastery of a devastating skill in debate, which could only result in the humiliation of the hapless interlocutor in the presence of witnesses. This was totally opposed to that disinterested concern (kedemonia) for the good of the instructed which was required of the Epicurean teacher. If Cicero disagreed with Epicurus about the condemnation of irony, this was but natural, because, whether as trial lawyer or political orator, the ability to make his victim writhe under mental punishment was a precious part of his equipment. In the judgment of Epicurus the Second Philippic of Cicero and the speech of Demosthenes On the Crown would have seemed to represent oratory at its ethical worst, whether because of cruelty of intention on the part of the speakers or the love of havoc on the part of the listeners. A second evil of dialectic was the tendency to become eristic and argue for victory instead of truth. This was incompatible with the Epicurean considerateness (epieikeia) for the feelings of others, which fore- shadowed the Golden Rule of Christianity. It was thus no accident that Epicurus, in the manifest division of labor which prevailed in the mature organization of the Garden School, reserved for himself the task of refuting the Megarians,51 with whom eristic was a specialty. Only the head of the school seemed capable of dealing with methods so contrary in spirit to the new philosophy. The intellectual grounds for rejecting dialectic were equally funda- mental. Epicurus denied categorically each of its four assumptions, first, that reason was the criterion, second, that sensations were undependable, third, that phenomena were shifting and deceptive, and fourth, that the only real and eternal existences were the ideas. The reality of the ideas he denied on the ground that nothing exists except atoms and empty space. In place of reason he declared Nature to furnish criteria of truth and he held the Sensations, supplemented by the Feelings and innate notions (Anticipations), to be direct and immediate contacts with external reality, whether physical or social. Thus dialectic became a superfluity. The rejection of Plato's teachings is almost total.

I'm be very curious about that book I ordered. I think it will answer some questions we're posting here. Here is a section of a review specifically on Sedley's chapter:

David Sedley contributes a helpful chapter about “Epicurus on Dialectic,” in which he considers several ways in which Epicurus’ well-known rejection of the dialectical method reflects Epicurus’ own ontological commitments. One particularly noteworthy aspect of Sedley’s chapter is his discussion of the so-called ‘Bat Riddle’ that Glaucon mentions in Book V of the Republic (89-105), in which ‘a man who is not a man shoots and does not shoot a bird that is not a bird,’ etc. Sedley argues that this riddling description of the eunuch (who is both a man and not a man) who shoots (and misses) a bat (which both is and is not a bird, as it is a bird relative to its gift of flight but is not a bird insofar as it is viviparous) captures the Epicurean view that being is in all cases relative and aspectual, and hence not truthfully or meaningfully disclosed through the kind of dialectical investigation at play in, for example, Platonic division.

That sounds like a lot of work.

Wasn't one of Epicurus's big gripes against Socrates that Socrates just ignored the commonly accepted definitions of words or he made up new definitions? To my memory, Epicurus was like "How can you even hold a conversation let alone an investigation of 'truth' with this guy?? He's just a jerk!"

Put an interlibrary loan request in today for this book with Sedley's chapter:

Epicurus on Dialectic (Chapter 3) - Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle

Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle - November 2018

www.cambridge.org

Take a look at the definitions. There's some intriguing stuff:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, διαλεκτ-ικός

Greek Word Study Tool

Including a reminder that it's the title of a work by Metrodorus.

Thanks!!

The line in Perseus has:

31] "They reject dialectic as superfluous"

The word is διαλεκτική

Greek Word Study Tool

I need to check the texts but do I remember correctly that Epicurus didn't necessarily write against logic so much as rhetoric?

That 10th book of Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Eminent Philosophers is the core of the core in my opinion. That's where a substantial portion of Epicurus's actual works are widely available! It has Diogenes' bio of Epicurus along with the letters and the Principal Doctrines.

Kalosyni , I wanted to add that, if you haven't run into it yet, I find the Tetrapharmakos (literally, "four ingredient medicine") a good starting place to think about what Epicurus's philosophy entails. Some on this forum may beg to differ, but I find it one of the most condensed, succinct summaries and it has ancient origins (quoted or written by Philodemus himself). Here's a personal translation:

Nothing to fear from gods.

Not to be anxious about death

The Good (pleasure) is easy to find;

And the Terrible (pain) can be endured.

That's the nutshell version in my opinion. Commentary and discussion of each of those lines could fill a book, but that's a starting point. Especially line 3. I believe moments of pleasure are available every day including recollection of past pleasures. Moment by moment, we decide to find pleasure or not. Carpe diem means Pluck the ripe fruit of pleasure that's right in front of you now.

It's more than okay for you to add your thoughts In fact, I think your fresh perspective is quite valuable. Thanks!

Quote from Philia

1) The name "Epicurean" - as it exists to the every day common understanding is: one who is devoted to the enjoyment of fine food and wine. It will be difficult to overcome that definition of "Epicurean".

Oddly enough, the original Epicureans including in the time of Epicurus himself dealt with this exact problem, too. People back then couldn't get over the idea of pleasure as the guide for life and attributed all kinds of fancy food stereotypes and debauchery to the Epicureans. However, just liked the modern Stoics have, I think we can eventually work through the stereotypes associated with the name "Epicurean" and claim it back. The words small e "epicurean" and capital E "Epicurean" can hopefully coexist like stoic and Stoic. That being said, I fully agree with you that it won't be easy.

Quote from Philia

2) The academic interpretation vs. DeWitt interpretation (both of which I have yet to fully grasp) seems to lend itself to endless debate, and is further complicated if you are wanting to use the phrase "Classical Epicureanism".

i think we're all trying to fully grasp it, so you're not alone The point I often come back to is that Epicurus wanted his philosophy to be understandable to everyone: men, women, young, old, etc. That's one reason it spread throughout the ancient world and why the early Christians saw it as such a threat. That's one of the reasons we have those ancient stereotypes and slanders. Personally, I try to return to the fundamentals as contained in the Principal Doctrines and Letters. Your points are well taken!

Quote from Philia

3) "Pleasure is the highest good" - this phrase is ethically incomplete, and it is too vague and open to multiple interpretations.

We're having that exact conversation on what that phrase means on another thread. I would say it's a starting point. Encapsulated in that phrase, for me, is the idea that we should pursue the most pleasurable life and make decisions that point us in that direction. Sometimes we'll undergo pain for future pleasure (ex, the pain of exercise for a healthier life). Also, for me, that phrase means why do we do virtuous actions? They make us feel good (pleasure). Why do we look forward to seeing friends? They bring is pleasure. Pain and pleasure are guides to what to avoid and what to pursue.

Thank you again for your post!! I think you've added valuable food for thought!

Quote from Cassius

"the map isn't the territory itself."

That is an excellent point to remember. Thanks for that!

Quote from Cassius

It's less clear to me where the pleasure /pain fits,

The on/off switch?

Just a reminder to not let our metaphors run away with our philosophy. (I know I'm guilty of this sometimes! Shoehorning a metaphor to fit the philosophy probably does a disservice to both).

It concerns me a little that Dewitt explicitly states "[isonomia] is lacking in extant Epicurean texts," but then goes on to weave this elaborate complex explanation of what Epicurus meant by isonomia, how important it is, etc. If it is "lacking in extant Epicurean texts," where does DeWitt get the justification for all this? How do we know Cicero got it right with his one mention?

Quote from Cicero

Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite.

That's it. That's all I can see in Cicero's text. And Dewitt even takes issue with Cicero's interpretation, but there's so little to go on and the term "is lacking in extant Epicurean texts" I'm thinking it's esoteric enough that, *if* Epicurus found it to be a helpful concept, it wasn't uppermost in his mind.

All I can see is that, basically, it says if something *can* exist in the universe, it probably exists in abundance due to the infinite nature of the universe.

It seems to me Dewitt is off and running on one of his "I have a tiny snippet of information, and I can build and extrapolate on that to infinity and beyond."

I still think Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's work is an interesting possible modern interpretation of the anticipations. I think Godfrey mentioned her in this thread. If suggest taking a look at that discussion elsewhere on the forum.

I like the compass metaphor a lot. I'd be nice to find a "real" quote from someone. Are there any North Star/sailing quotes out there anywhere.

Quote from Cassius

How's that literally and in Roman word order?

"to the senses - these - are known ? Or

"the senses - these [things] - are known?

or "the senses - these [things] - know?

I'm not sure if putat is present indicative or a passive, or whether sentiri is a plural of senses or some kind of participle or dative or other construct. There's no "ad" there for "to the senses" but those Romans seemed to drop things a lot!

sentiri according to the link is a verb, present infinitive passive "to be discerned by one's senses"?

putat is 3rd p singular present indicative active (he/Epicurus) "he believes, considers, regards..."

So ..

"He believes this to be discernible to one's senses..." liked fire being hot.