Posts by Don

Interoception: the hidden sense that shapes wellbeing

There’s growing evidence that signals sent from our internal organs to the brain play a major role in regulating emotions and fending off anxiety and depression

www.theguardian.com

So, this is a "listen to your feelings" concept I can get behind. This is the work of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett too:

'I'm extremely controversial': the psychologist rethinking human emotion

How we interpret our feelings depends on where and how we’re brought up, says professor Lisa Feldman Barrett - and not understanding this is making our lives…

www.theguardian.com

Quote from Cassius

We cross posted -- much of the answer to your question is in the "animality objection" in post 82 above.

Quote from Don

I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.

That would be correct if we considered all pleasure is good" to mean "all pleasure is THE highest good" but it is by no means clear (at least to me) that Epicurus was considering "good" here in that absolute sense, rather than in the relative sense in which there are many goods, some better than others. That's the reason for the SUMMUM in the "summum bonum" I think.

Okay, let me finally return to my "Oh, my"...

Pleasure is "THE highest good" not because it is the "Best Bestest Good Out Of All The Other Goods."

It is "The Good" because it is the good thing to which all other possible candidates for "The Good Thing" leads. It is The Good, the Tagathon, the Goal, the Telos at the End of every action or desire. It is NOT "good" relative to other goods. It is THE GOOD. There are no rivals.

Virtue cannot be The Good because ultimately we act virtuously because it is instrumental to pleasure.

Wisdom cannot be The Good because we act wisely ultimately because it is instrumental to feelings of pleasure.

Philosophy cannot be The Good because we follow a philosophy because it will lead us to pleasure.

EVERYTHING points to pleasure. Pleasure sits at the top of the heap of possible candidates for The Good BECAUSE it is the final destination, The Goal, the Telos, the End. That is why it's the SUMMUM bonum. It is at the summit of goods. All paths up the mountain pass virtue, wisdom, etc., along the way and what sits at the end of the path at the top... why do we do the things we do? ... To achieve pleasure! The SUMMUM denotes the top or the summit. It is literally the highest good. It is the good "at the utmost, at farthest." Every path, followed to its end, leads ultimately to pleasure. Pleasure is literally The End at the end of the path.

This is also an argument against viewing some pleasures being "higher" than others. PLEASURE writ large is the telos, the goal, the end, the highest good. We chase pleasure in all its myriad and varied forms.

Aristotle didn't accept pleasure as The Good because (according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) "pleasure cannot be our ultimate target, because what counts as pleasant must be judged by some standard other than pleasure itself, namely the judgment of the virtuous person." That's circular reasoning it seems to me. Pleasure can't be the ultimate good because there needs to be a standard of pleasure judged by some virtuous person?? That's one reason why Epicurus said Pleasure IS The Standard for our choices. There is no other "authority" - no virtuous person - judging our actions except does this choice lead to pleasure.

Now, this didn't deter Epicurus from saying, "Yes, all pleasure is good, but that pleasure you're thinking about choosing... Experience has shown that leads ultimately to pain, not the most pleasant life. Okaaay, you do the drugs all night, drink til dawn if you choose to. BUT you're going to pay a hefty price tomorrow and even more if you keep it up. But I will not argue that you aren't feeling pleasure in the moment. I'll let the Cyrenaics know you'll be knocking at their door."

Quote from Cassius

Another way of stating the question is that if he had been consistent, as soon as Epicurus formulated his philosophy he should have retired to his cave and lived a subsistence existence totally apart from the crowd. But he did not -- he lived a life of relative material luxury and devoted much of his time to philosophical controversy. Why - one naturally would ask? And I think the answer has to be in part that he valued the pleasures that he chose to pursue more highly - much more highly - than the pleasures he would have achieved had he retired to the cave on bread and water.

I'm not sure what you're getting at here. Epicurus talked the talk and walked the walk. He aimed to live the most pleasant life. Living an ascetic life in a cave open to the elements, alone, away from friends, on the edge of starvation, would not be pleasant. He knew that obviously. He set up shop right outside the walls of the city on the road to the Academy in relative affluence for the day. It has nothing to do with "higher" or "lower" pleasures. The life he led was the most pleasant for him and he chose that.

Quote from Cassius

And I would say that what seems like the obvious answer to me is that he chose the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing and controversy as much more pleasant to him than the life of "grazing in the grass."

Epicurus chose "the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing" precisely because he found it pleasurable. He obviously enjoyed teaching, writing diatribes against rival schools, welcoming friends into the Garden. I don't think he weighed living like a cow or a pig AGAINST a life of teaching and writing. He knew what would bring him pleasure and pursued that.

Moooooooo

PS. On second thought...Oink

LOL! Okay, it's my turn to say, "Oh, my! "

Off to work now, but I'll try to post tonight.

Quote from Cassius

The next step though is significantly harder, which is the analysis of "ranking" pleasures

Please don't take this as some kind of ad hominem, because it's not meant that way...

But why?

Why do you want or need to rank pleasures?

I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.

Maybe ranking desires for specific pleasures is possible (Epicurus did do that after a fashion with necessary, natural, etc.), but by definition pleasure is good.

I might even amend my post above to say the pleasure of breathing, eating, are both natural and necessary. The desire to eat shrimp instead of bread is natural but not necessary.

Cassius is right and we need to return to Kalosyni 's original list that started this thread and what is meant when an Epicurean talks about pleasure. Godfrey 's mention of Maslow's hierarchy above reminded me of a post I wrote last year. Here's the applicable excerpt:

Quote

I was listening to a TED Radio Hour today about Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs… and realized it seemed VERY Epicurean: KD 29: Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion). The necessary desires are at the bottom. To not be hungry, etc. The need for security is the social contract Epicurus talks about. Love and friendship is next. It gets a little more fuzzy with self-esteem and self-actualization but I think the similarities remain and are worth exploring!

I wanted to emphasize again - at the risk of derailing the thread immediately - that those categories pertain to desires not pleasure. We *need* air, food, water, shelter. We can gain pleasure from those "necessary needs", but it is a necessary desire to seek air, food, water, shelter. Without wanting, seeking, and procuring adequate air, we die. Without adequate food, we die. Etc.There is an agency to making sure we have those necessary desires filled. Fulfilling those desires also gives us pleasure and removes pain. Think of swimming underwater. We can decide to stay under as long as possible, but at some point we're going to "desire" to breathe. Our heads splash through the surface and we take in a big breath of air. Ahhhhhhh!! Yeah, baby! That's the pleasure. So, my contention is that a desire need not be grand. It need not be capital-D Desire. Just like pleasure doesn't need to be capital-P Pleasure. There are things that we desire because they're necessary for living, and only the living can experience pleasure. Then pleasures can be varied. We can desire different foods, clothing, shelter, etc. A desire for those varieties are "unnecessary" in the sense that any food would do if we were starving, but there's nothing "wrong" or "bad" about deriving pleasure from fulfilling a desire for shrimp rather than bread when it comes to the "necessary" desire for food as long as it's not an undue struggle or painful process of fulfilling that variety.

Again, this was all very stream of consciousness so I'm hoping Kalosyni is at least getting pleasure from reading these digressions.

I'm going to duplicate my post from above on that phrase "most pleasant" so it doesn't get lost. @Nate 's excellent compilation of PD translations might prove helpful in this analysis as well.

Quote from Don

The larger context of that phrase is:

Quote from Epicurus

...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.

So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the most pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:

Quote from Cicero

Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?

Good post, Godfrey . Pulling out a couple more sentences for emphasis from the WP article:

• Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them
• [Desires'] fulfillment is normally experienced as pleasurable in contrast to the negative experience of failing to do so.
• there is significant disagreement about how to define desires (This one made me laugh... Yeah, Wikipedia, no kidding!)
• Pleasure-based theories focus on the tendency of desires to cause pleasure when fulfilled. (This one does seem spot-on to how we're trying to define desires here)

Quote from Godfrey

I wouldn't limit a desire to a mental concept, it could also be a physical or psychological craving.

Trying to wrap my head around your statement here. Are you referring to things like addiction? A "desire" that is more of an involuntary craving? I would categorize addiction or craving as different from a desire. A desire - in my mind - has to be voluntarily brought to mind. You have to have agency to decide to fulfill the desire or not. Yes, I'm picking up on agency from Wikipedia. A craving for an addiction takes the agency out of the picture. But.. hmm.. what about a strong desire to possess something or to be with someone? Still working all this out.

The sense I was trying to get across with the "a desire is a mental concept" is that a desire is something you can think about. In fact, the thought "I want X" (and its many permutations) is itself the desire. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are something that happens to you. You can think about the feelings of pleasure and pain after they occur.. or before they occur if you have a desire for something. Pleasure and pain are, after all, what we attempt to experience or avoid, respectively. But, in the moment, pleasure or pain just happens. You can desire lunch with a friend. You can schedule lunch with a friend. But during the lunch with a friend you experience the feeling of pleasure welling up. You can't think "Now, I will experience pleasure." That's like that beer commercial from a number of years ago where the person says, "Commence relaxation NOW!"

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The commercials ... make fun of a certain Teutonic obsession with control, using various scenarios whose humor would come through whether it was a beer ad or a late-night comedy skit. In one, a blond actor struggles to get comfortable on a couch for a relaxation session. He is wearing a stiff white shirt and tie and is listening to a compact disk titled "Das Kalm." "Commence relaxation now," an offscreen voice commands. It does not work out well. "Germans don't do laid back," the announcer intones in an unmistakable German accent. "They do beer."

(PS... with apologies to Martin btw)

It's that idea of willing something that needs to be allowed to arise naturally that I'm trying to get at. Pleasure and pain can't be willed. They can be nurtured and chosen but you can't say "Commence feeling pleasure NOW!". You can say, "I desire this experience that will result in pleasure."

Quote from Cassius

it is clear too that we also feel pleasure or pain independently of any desire

Absolutely! The literal definition of πάθη pathē is "what is done or what happens to a person." See my #71 above that you reacted to. That's why desires and pleasure (& pain) are two very different things. We can choose our desires. Pleasure and pain will happen to us irregardless of whether we choose one over the other or not. What Epicurus's philosophy does is give us a goal toward which to direct what choices we make about which desires to pursue and which to reject at any given time depending on our context and circumstances.

I would also add we can consciously desire something. We can think about wanting something. We don't get a choice but to experience pain or pleasure when it's happening. We react. If I hit my thumb with a hammer, I feel pain! I don't get to decide if it's painful, it just is.

Now, I can "will" myself to endure the pain... like the experiments that have subjects hold their hand in ice water. Those who swear can more readily withstand the cold longer than those who are not allowed to swear. They are both experiencing pain but one group experiences it as less painful. Same stimulus, different reactions.

Quote from Cassius

I would say that may be too broad. Can't we desire to feel pain in order to experience more pleasure later?

We choose to experience pain for a larger pleasure. We don't desire to experience pain.

Quote from Cassius

On the other hand, while we are feeling pain or pleasure we are feeling it without thinking why - we just feel it.

Right. We feel pleasure and pain resulting from a specific desire being fulfilled.

Quote from Cassius

Is not a desire somehow more "willed" while pleasure and pain are simply reactions?

Desires are conscious thoughts - "longings" - for something.

Pleasure and pain are the feelings we experience which help us choose which desires to fulfill and which to reject.

Quote from Cassius

That gets back to pathe right? A desire is not a pathe is it?

A desire is an επιθυμια epithymia; pain and pleasure are παθη pathe. Yes, two different words. Two different "things."

Quote from Cassius

(1) What is the relationship between desire and pleasure?

We desire to experience pleasure.

We desire to avoid pain.

The larger context of that phrase is:

Quote from Epicurus

...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.

So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:

Quote from Cicero

Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.

See in that first sentence i would say that it is impossible and illogical to evaluate the result without considering each of the factors (duration intensity etc) that we are discussing. The result IS largely those resulting factors, is it not?

I wouldn't say the *result* is the duration/intensity. The result is what happens *after* the desire is filled or experienced; After you've experienced the duration/intensity. The decision of whether or not to fulfill a specific desire is contingent on what happens if it's fulfilled or what happens if it's not, after the experience. How much pleasure ensues from fulfilling this desire balanced against how much pain ensues from fulfilling that desire. I desire/decide to undergo the pain of exercise because the *result* I desire is a healthier life. I sense a lack of exercise is detrimental and I desire to fill that lack. The result I wish to achieve is a healthier life.

Admittedly, this is very stream of consciousness. I reserve the right to revise and extend my remarks.

Quote from Cassius

I agree with this, but probably more is needed to define what desire really is.

The word Epicurus uses when talking about natural, necessary, etc is επιθυμία epithymia:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

I'll admit I have only the barest knowledge of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Using Epicurus's method of using what the generally-accepted definition of a word is, I'd offer that a "desire" is a mental concept sensing a need for some thing one does not currently have or for an experience one is not currently undergoing. One senses a lack or void that one feels needs to be filled. Whether one fills that sensed need is the crux of making choices and rejections.

After having read the above exchange, I don't know whether we're farther along or not. I'm going to summarize my thoughts. Take from this what you will.

Pleasure can be experienced from ... Let's say, drinking wine.

Some people desire the pleasure of drinking wine. This is a natural but unnecessary desire. One could satisfy one's thirst simply by drinking water. Maybe this person wants to vary their pleasure The person who desires the pleasure experienced by drinking wine weighs the pain in procuring the wine (minimal), any resulting pain (enjoy in moderation, minimal pain), commits to not acting foolish (maintain reputation, no pain). The desire to experience the pleasure of intoxicating beverages in this context can be experienced with minimal pain. Go ahead.

Another person who struggles with alcoholism weighs the desire for the pleasure of intoxicating beverages much differently.

The *pleasure* of drinking wine stays the same. Two people drinking wine will expressive pleasure. They may decide to pursue their desires for wine drinking for very different reasons

The desire to experience the pleasure of drinking wine is completely contextual and subjective.

The decision to indulge the desire to experience this specific pleasure is completely personal, subjective, and contextual.

There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

We cannot rank pleasures.

Wait are you disagreeing with Godfrey's point too when he says "of course they're not"?

I definitely rank my pleasures -- steak is much more pleasant than hot dogs.

I would say you rank your desires. A desire for steak is stronger for *you.* That doesn't rank the "pleasure* derived from steak better than that from hot dogs.

Quote from Cassius

but if we extended the point that pleasures cannot be compared or ranked in any way at all, that would be the reduction to the absurd, so in my mind that proves that this cannot have been Epicurus' meaning.

Oh, I don't agree with that at all. We cannot rank pleasures. We CAN rank desires for pleasures in context of their place and time. I think this is exactly what Epicurus meant.

Quote from Cassius

My initial reaction to splitting the discussion of desires and their results is to be wary of that, because just like virtue, what does it gain anything to talk about desires apart from the results of pursuing those desires? In the end there is nothing given by nature for the decision of what to choose and to avoid other than pleasure and pain. A science of desires separated from their consequences, would be no more helpful or useful than a science of virtue, apart from the results of pursuing those virtues.

I think we're talking about the exact opposite of this. There should be no talk of desires without talk of their results for the individual. That's what distinguishes them from talk of pleasures. Is my desire to pursue the pleasure of intoxicating beverages prudent? Depends. If I have no commitments later and don't "act the fool" to preserve my reputation, that desire could be pursued.

I think talk of a "science of desires" is a slippery slope again possibly devolves into adding up Utilitarian dolors and hedons. Epicurus endorsed simply pointing to the pursuit of pleasure of children and animals as proof of pleasure's being the good to which all other instrumental goods points. Why do we practice wisdom? Because it brings us pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

we still have to deal with the question: "Are all pleasures the same in all respects so that we should consider the choice of any pleasure to be equivalent to the choice of any other?"

I don't think all pleasures are identical. They are varied. And choices are definitely not equivalent. It's all about the consequences stemming from the desires for different pleasures. And desires for the same pleasure at different times. One time it may be prudent. Another time, not.

One thing that just struck me is:

We choose which *desires* to choose and reject not pleasures.

Desires are necessary, natural, etc.; Pleasures are NOT categorized. By definition, all pleasures are "good." It is the results of desires for specific pleasures that feed into whether one chooses to fulfill a desire or not.