Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

It's interesting to note that in that summary there is no distinction between kinetic and katastematic

True. There's no distinction, but...

Quote from Cicero

undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain

Quote from Cicero

strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness

To my reading, both of those are solid descriptions of ataraxia and aponia, ie, katastematic pleasure. So, katastematic pleasure is mentioned but the distinction itself between katastematic and kinetic was not important enough to mention.

Quote from Cassius

The answer cannot be "no more than causes any pain" because we sometimes do chose pain as Epicurus said, for greater pleasure, and we seek not that which is longest but the most pleasant

Excellent point!

Well, to play devil's advocate, we DO have to limit all desires in some sense. Eating food and drinking water are both natural and necessary but if we overeat or even drink too much water (hyponatremia), it's going to lead to pain.

And yes, I'm using water as an example to be provocative

This got longer as I continued to review this thread. This is enough for now! These are consolidated ancient and modern sources and some notes from my posts within this thread:

Notes:

Idea (revised): Biological homeostasis = aponia (freedom from pain in the body; everything is working as it should.

Pathe "what is done or happens to a person or thing, opposite: πρᾶξις (praxis)" Praxis is the concrete aspect of pragma (genitive: pragmata).

On perceived errors in Wikipedia: We can all be Wikipedia editors and contribute content, External links, and references to all relevant articles. Nothing stopping us but time and inertia (two powerful forces btw)

Critical source: Diogenes Laertius, Book X.136:

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK X, EPICURUS (341-271 B.C.)

Other Ancient Sources, both Epicurean and otherwise:

Fragment 68 (see post #37)

68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it. (Saint-Andre)

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα (katastēma) καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Vatican Saying 11 (see post #47)

Alternative translation of VS11 by me: "For the majority of people, to be at rest is to be bored stiff; but to be active is to be raving like a rabid dog."

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

ἡσυχάζον (hesykhazon) I. to be still, keep quiet, be at res

My take is that this "being at rest, being still, keeping quiet" IS none other than ataraxia/aponia/katastematic pleasure. Most people - not us Epicurueans he's saying - think this is being bored or numb. We recognize its importance.

However, he's also saying Epicureans can enjoy active pleasures without "raving like a rabid dog".

Principal Doctrine 14 (see post #47)

PD14 . “Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)

Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

hesykhias shows up here - just like VS11 - translated as "inner peace". Again, inner peace = aponia/ataraxia = katastematic pleasure

Vatican Saying 33 (see post #37)

VS33 The body cries out (σαρκὸς φωνὴ) to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. (NOTE: I see these three conditions to be defining *aponia* and thus a katastematic pleasure!) Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness (εὐδαιμονίας eudaimonias).

σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἂν <διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.

Diogenes of Oenoanda (see posts #37 & #39)

DCLP/Trismegistos 865216 = LDAB 865216

Wall Inscription site:

The inscripion

Diogenes of Oenoanda A:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.

Let us first discuss states (καταστημάτων katastematon), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Diogenes of Oenoanda B discusses katastema: "Diogenes (of Oenoanda) justifies the Epicurean use of the term 'pleasure' to refer to the experience of the state of tranquillity that constitutes the moral end by stating that such usage is in line with the term's ordinary meaning." Not sure if I agree with all of that, but the "state of tranquility" is aponia/ataraxia/katastematic pleasure.

See this paper

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43909587

Metrodorus, Fragment 5 (see post #40 and #46):

Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte : Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, d. 277 B.C : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

26

archive.org

"Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'"

This, to me, points to the "source" - "the sound state of the flesh" (to sarkos eustathes *katastema*) - being a more confident source of pleasure than "objects" (kinetic pleasure). It does NOT say the source "in ourselves" is "better (more value)" just that we can be more "sure" of its continuance - I would add - because we have control over it.

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Metrodorus's quote is: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. Right there, again, is κίνησιν (kinēsin) and καταστηματικῆς (katastēmatikēs).

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato’s "Philebus," [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epicurus, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, III.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

Academic Papers:

Epicurean Happiness: A Pig's Life?

Epicurean Happiness: A Pig's Life?

www.academia.edu

"Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures. A Reappraisal", Elenchos xxxvi (2015) fasc. 2: 271-296.

In this paper I shall offer new definitions for what seem to be the most dominant terms in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures – “kinetic” and “katastematic”. While…

www.academia.edu

"ΤΟ ΚΑΤ’ ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ AND EPICUREAN KATASTEMATIC PLEASURES", ORGANON 48 (2016): 5-19

Abstr act. In this article I wish to emphasize the significance of τὸ κατ&#39; ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν, an expression appearing in our sources on Epicurean ethics which…

www.academia.edu

"Epicurus' Varietas and ἡ κινητικὴ ἡδονή", Mnemosyne 71 (2018) 777-798.

According to Epicurus’ view which locates the summit of pleasure in the absence of all pain, once pain has been removed pleasure cannot be increased, but it…

www.academia.edu

Nice summary, Godfrey . I would agree with all of your points.

And I also agree that getting the distinction between desires and pleasure clear in one's mind is crucial. I particularly like your point about desires being potentially limitless while pleasure/pain each have a natural limit (the elimination of the other feeling: No pain = all pleasure simply because if one is filled **with** pleasure, there's no room for pain. It's the *filling up with pleasure* that's important, not the "removing pain.")

On the desire side, one can continue to lust for power no matter how much power you already have. You can desire more money, no matter how much money you already have. There is no natural limit to those kinds of desires. In one sense, that's why they're empty/void, *nothing* can fill them up!

Cassius asked me:

"what would you say are the implications of your position"

Well, I was going to read all the papers, synthesize all the points, convey my agreements and objections, pull in modern and ancient citations and quotes, and...

But that seemed like way too much work and pain!!

So, what I'll do is try to summarize my thinking into some bullet points and see how far we get.

From what I read in the classical and modern sources:

- The katastematic and kinetic pleasure distinction was not uncommon in ancient philosophical debate.

- Epicurus saw his own approach to this debate as a clear line of contrast between his school and, primarily, the Cyrenaics since both schools were getting painted with the same hedonistic brush.

- - The Cyrenaics posited 2 kinds of feelings (pathē) that a human could have (Pleasure (kinesis), Pain) and a 3rd Neutral "state" (katastema) when experiencing neither pleasure nor pain.

- - - Epicurus rejected this "3rd state". He said the "pathē are two: pleasure and pain." When you're feeling one, you're not feeling the other. This appears to have been revolutionary and controversial at the time, to hear any number of ancient authors tell it.

- - - I see this corroborated especially by X.136 in Diogenes Laertius but other places as well.

- That said, once Epicurus defined "pleasure" as including katastema within the pathos of pleasure, the distinction does not appear to have been a big deal. He was concerned with pleasure. All pleasures.

- - Epicurus, per his quote (and surrounding context of X.136) from On Choices and Avoidances, equates ataraxia and aponia with katastematic pleasures (katastematikai hēdonai).

- - - I also find the "calm sea" metaphor of katastematic pleasure in several sources intriguing since there are numerous references to seas, waters, boats, harbors in Epicurean writings from Epicurus to Lucretius and beyond.

- - In light of the ataraxia & aponia = katastematikai hēdonai definition, anytime ataraxia & aponia (or the associated freedom from pain in body or mind, or calm, etc), we can substitute "katastematic pleasure."

- - - BUT, more importantly, it doesn't matter! It's all pleasure, whether ataraxia & aponia, eating food, seeing pleasing forms, etc. It's all pleasure.

- - - HOWEVER, Epicurus DID seem to place some importance , on that freedom from pain and trouble in both body and mind. BUT not to the exclusion of every other pleasure because he couldn't conceive of "good things"/pleasure without what the Cyrenaics conceived of as kinetic pleasure. As Epicurus writes to Menoikeus: "We do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life."

PS: I would like to go back over this thread and compile all the sources I mentioned previously. Honestly, I forgot some, looking back over this long thread. But that'll come later.

Quote from Kalosyni

, it is important to point out that neutral affect is distinct from other nonvalenced states, such as feeling numb

I think *that's* important, too!

Quote from Cassius

I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly

I think the context is clear. I don't think Diogenes is trying to cherry pick either. Look at the full section where this occurs (I'm using Perseus/Hicks for ease of copying )

Quote

136 He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

*Six* titles are referenced there from *three" Epicurean authors: Epicurus, Diogenes of Tarsus, and Metrodorus. There are two quotes, one from Epicurus, one from Metrodorus. All supporting the same thing. I put much more stock in Diogenes Laertius than I do Cicero. It seems to me DL was trying to get down (mostly) factual or at least anecdotal facts as opposed to Cicero who has a an agenda.

PS. I keep getting frowny faces when I use parentheses. Please don't read more into it anybody. I fixed one in this post already.

Quote from Cassius

I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly

Hmm. If that's the concern, we would arguably have to throw out the majority of fragments and even Cicero since he also didn't necessarily cite context but cherry picked what he wanted.

Quote from Cassius

Please correct me if I am wrong, but in addition to being "rare" this is a statement by Diogenes Laertius

Not from my reading. The original specifically says "And Epicurus in On Choices says as follows..." Then gives the quote.

Quote from Cassius

I see no evidence in the core Epicurean texts that the Epicureans got around to mentioning the word "katastematic" except at best in rare instances.

Sure, rare, but:

Quote

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

Sorry, don't have time to read your full post right now. I will!

But Epicurus literally defined katastematic pleasure as ataraxia (freedom from trouble in the mind) and aponia (freedom of pain in the body).

My contention is that anytime those concepts come up in his and other Epicurean writings, they're talking about katastematic pleasure. They don't use the word because it's not necessary. By definition: freedom from trouble in the mind and freedom of pain in the body = katastematic pleasure.

They don't mention the term every time because it really didn't matter to them. It was a tautology: pleasure = pleasure.

Compare my Arisocles/Eusebius quote in #123 (also available here at the end of chapter 18 for in situ context:

Eusebius of Caesarea: Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospel). Tr. E.H. Gifford (1903) -- Book 14

with Cicero in De Finibus:

Quote

For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself5 — anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations — that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses — this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 17 "I certainly do not," said he; "I maintain that all who are without pain are enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest form of pleasure." "Then you think that a man who, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for p99 another, feels the same pleasure as the thirsty man who drinks it?"

So, they're all feeding off each other, pointing back to earlier sources:

Cicero 106–43 BC

Aristocles of Messene 1st-century CE

Eusebius 260 – 339 CE

To reply to your post, Cassius :

Quote from Cassius

something that people assert to be as important as this - to take the place of pleasure itself in the discussion of Epicurus - very much needs to be sharpened down to a fine point so that it can be placed in proper perspective

Katastematic pleasure isn't taking the place of pleasure per se. They're redefining pleasure in an almost Ciceronian way and substitute their definition for pleasure writ large. Many of the "mainstream" commentators are ONLY focusing on that third state - the calm, the absence - that Epicurus included within his definition of pleasure when he rejected there was a neutral state with no motion of the soul atoms. He said, in strong opposition to the Cyrenaic position (and others), that there is no neutral state. That state - the freedom from pain and trouble in the body and mind - is included in Epicurus's definition of pleasure. There is only pleasure OR pain, full stop. That *feeling* of calm, of the stable well-functioning state of body and mind, IS pleasurable. But Epicurus included ALL pleasures within the definition of Pleasure, whether "kinetic" when the soul-atoms were in motion in the moment, whether one was remembering or anticipating a past or future pleasure, or whether one was experiencing the absence of pain and trouble in body and mind. I'm going to posit (for now) that those last two categories of pleasure fall under "katastematic" pleasure. Furthermore, wherever Epicurus is writing about calm, freedom from pain or trouble in body or mind, remembering or anticipating pleasure, etc. that he's writing about katastematic pleasure whether the word gets used or not. For him, I believe, there was a distinction without a difference. It was all pleasure and so all of it fell under the descriptor of "good." The problems arise with some desires for specific pleasures that led to pain, or pleasures at certain times that were unwise or not prudent. We make better decisions when we're calm and working well in body and mind and that, I think, is why Epicurus laid an importance of emphasis on that aspect, but ALL pleasures were within the realm of consideration in context and choices.

"He (sc. Aristippus the Younger) clearly defined pleasure as the end, inserting into his doctrine the concept of pleasure related to motion. For he said, there are three conditions (katastasesis) of our temperament: one, in which we are in pain, is like a storm at sea; another, in which we experience pleasure and which can be compared to a gentle wave, for pleasure is a gentle movement, similar to a fair wind; and the third is an intermediate condition, in which we experience neither pain nor pleasure, which is like a calm. He said we have perception of these affections alone (toutôn de kai ephasken tôn pathôn monôn hêmas tên aisthêsin echein). (F5 Chiesara=SSR IV A 173 and B5)."

Source:

Persons, Objects and Knowledge in the Cyrenaics.pdf

The Cyrenaic views on persons, objects and knowledge.

www.academia.edu

Epicurus didn't accept this "third state". He included this "calm" under the category of pleasure. That's the katastematic pleasures.

I realize I need to read more.

Now I'm done for today... Oh, wait, it's already Saturday. I'm done for now then.

By the way, if this line of reasoning is correct, then the categories of katastematic and kinetic pleasures is irrelevant to a "modern" Epicurean because the Ancient Greek categories are built on a concept of the movement (or not) of "atoms" of the "soul/mind/psykhē" and that's *not" how our bodies and minds work.

Don't misunderstand. It could be interesting in an historical sense in understanding the controversies and rivalries between schools. And it appears to have been vitally important to the ancients.

But in applying the classical precepts to modern lives when we understand neurons and dopamine and so on, it's irrelevant. Epicurus would then have taught that ALL pleasure is pleasurable: in the moment, in anticipation, in remembrance. All of it. I do think he taught that freedom from pain and trouble in the body and mind was vitally important, but there's no injunction to ONLY experience that.

Quote from Cassius

I know I seem like Negative Nellie here

"Iron sharpens iron" as the saying goes. Keep the questions coming!

Quote from Cassius

wouldn't the pleasure you get from planning and carrying out some activity in expectation of the reward that the activity will bring be something that has to ring of "action"? I thought that katastematic was supposedly implying "rest" or "static."

I'm coming to the understanding that it isn't necessarily an action like we think of "doing something". Look at that excerpt again,:

Quote from Don

Nor, (the Cyrenaics) say, is pleasure brought about through memory or expectation of goods, as Epicurus held: for the motion of the soul is obliterated by time’ (DL 2.89–90) (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα)

The movement, the action, is the "motion of the soul (ψυχής psykhes)" that happens while one is *experiencing* a pleasure in the moment. It appears the Cyrenaics did not believe that their was any "motion of the soul" during "memory or expectation" of pleasure. The "motion" (κίνημα kinēma; related to kinesis, kinetic) only happened during the pleasure of the moment. Possibly "memory or expectation" was experienced in the "state", the soul/mind was "static." In fact, "the motion of the soul is obliterated by time." The motion of the soul stops - it is "obliterated." Stops= static. It is simply in a state of readiness to move again *with the next pleasure of the moment.* However, Epicurus taught that the pleasure of "memory or expectation" in that state *was* in fact just as much pleasure as that experienced in the moment.

Granted, I need to read more Cyrenaic papers now (I didn't see that coming as necessary!), But the bit I've read from scanning the ones I've found, that's the direction I'm heading.

FYI, here's another paper:

Plutarch's Adversus Colotem and the Cyrenaics: 1120C-1121E

Plutarch's Adversus Colotem and the Cyrenaics: 1120C-1121E

www.academia.edu

There are a number on Academia by Sedley, Warren, and others.

And I'm deliberately staying away from Cicero until I can get some more sources, hopefully actual texts being quoted by other authors and not paraphrased into characters in Cicero's work.

Fascinating stuff!

Just with that tantalizing bit, it would seem to me to look like the kinetic pleasures were pleasures experienced in the moment. Katastematic pleasures, which the Cyrenaics didn't recognize as pleasures, are the ones that are "brought about through memory or expectation of goods."

I think this is important: (emphasis added)

‘Nor, (the Cyrenaics) say, is pleasure brought about through memory or expectation of goods, as Epicurus held: for the motion of the soul is obliterated by time’ (DL 2.89–90) (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα). I take this to mean that although you can, implicitly, derive mental pleasure now from a bodily pleasure you are likewise enjoying now, the mental enjoyment is eliminated when you are temporally separated from the bodily pleasure, whether it lies in the past or the future.7

Epicurean versus Cyrenaic happiness

Epicurean versus Cyrenaic happiness

www.academia.edu

[89] ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ᾽ Ἐπικούρῳ, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή: οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερα, μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις. δύνασθαι δέ φασι καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν τινας μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι κατὰ διαστροφήν: οὐ πάσας μέντοι τὰς ψυχικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ἐπὶ σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀλγηδόσι γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψιλῇ τῇ τῆς πατρίδος εὐημερίᾳ ὥσπερ τῇ ἰδίᾳ χαρὰν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι: ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. 27 [90] ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. λέγουσι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ὅρασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι ἡδονάς. τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς. μέσας τε καταστάσεις ὠνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν. πολὺ μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χείρους τὰς σωματικάς. ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ πονεῖν, οἰκειότερον δὲ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ὑπελάμβανον. ὅθεν καὶ πλείονα οἰκονομίαν περὶ θάτερον ἐποιοῦντο. διὸ καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αἱρετῆς οὔσης τῆς ἡδονῆς τὰ ποιητικὰ ἐνίων ἡδονῶν ὀχληρὰ

πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦσθαι: ὡς δυσκολώτατον αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἀθροισμὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιούντων.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Β, Κεφ. η᾽. ΑΡΙΣΤΙΠΠΟΣ

At some point, I'd like to consolidate my thinking on this topic with relevant citations to the source material. I think it would also be fruitful to really understand what the Cyrenaics thought as Epicurus drew a definite contrast between them and the Garden.

To expand on Metrodorus and VS45, here are other uses of πραγμάτων (pragmatōn) that are in line with those and pertinent to my thinking:

PD21

Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one's entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle. (Saint-Andre)

Saint-Andre note on the text: The word ἀγών, translated here as "struggle", originally referred to the contests pursued by athletes at public festivals such as the Olympic games; Epicurus is not necessarily counselling against personal discipline (such as that involved in learning true philosophy), but against the trials and dangers of action in the public arena.

My note on the text: The use of πραγμάτων (pragmatōn) here is perfectly in line with the idea of "external circumstances or things." Plus the pain referred to in the first part ἀλγοῦν from ἄλγος can refer to both pain of the body or of the mind, which to me aligns with aponia and ataraxia, respectively.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἄλγος

PD38 also uses pragmatōn twice:

When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.

ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια ὅτε σενέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, ὕστερον δʼ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.

Not quite as directly relevant but still nominally applying to circumstances and actions.

Once again, here's the LSJ entry for πράγμα (pragma) (pragmatōn is simply the plural genitive of pragma, ie, "of pragmas")

Greek Word Study Tool

PS: I don't pass up an opportunity to recommend @Nate 's compilation of the Principal Doctrines. Always instructive to see alternative translations along with the original Greek.